John Knoblach v. Stacylee A. Morris — 2017 ME 116

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2017 ME 116
Docket: 	And-16-387
Submitted
On Briefs: May 25, 2017
Decided: 	June 8, 2017
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
JOHN KNOBLACH
v.
STACYLEE A. MORRIS
PER CURIAM
[¶1] 	John Knoblach appeals from a judgment of the District Court
(Lewiston, Oram, J.) finding him in contempt for failing to pay spousal support
to Stacylee A. Morris as required by the parties’ divorce decree, and imposing
a period of incarceration unless he paid the arrearage within a specified time;
and from the court’s subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration or
for relief from judgment. 	See M.R. Civ. P. 59(e), 60(b). 	Knoblach argues that
the court erred by holding the contempt hearing one day too soon based on
the 	amount 	of 	notice 	he 	was 	entitled 	to 	receive 	pursuant 	to 	M.R.
Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(C), which states that a contempt subpoena must be served on
the alleged contemnor “no less than 10 days prior to the hearing unless a
shorter time is ordered by the court.” 	See also M.R. Civ. P. 6(a) (stating that if

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the last day of a prescribed time period falls on a Sunday, “the period runs
until the end of the next day”). We affirm.
[¶2] 	Even if the court erred by holding the hearing within the notice
period, Knoblach has not demonstrated that the contempt order should be
vacated. As shown by the court’s authority to order notice of fewer than ten
days in contempt proceedings, see M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(C), that temporal
framework is not jurisdictional. Further, after Knoblach was served with the
contempt subpoena informing him of the date of the hearing, he did not move
to continue the hearing either in his answer to the contempt motion or at the
hearing itself.1 Rather, the record demonstrates that at the contempt hearing,
Knoblach presented evidence and argued his position, and that in its judgment
the court considered and ultimately rejected Knoblach’s contention on its
merits.
[¶3] 	Additionally, Knoblach has argued in his post-judgment motion
and his brief on appeal only that his attorney was unavailable during the week
before the hearing. 	He has not described any additional evidence that he
would 	have 	presented 	or 	how 	he 	otherwise 	would 	have 	proceeded
1 	In his answer to the motion, Knoblach stated only that if the court found the answer
“lack[ing],” or if the court determined that he did “not provide enough evidence or records” at the
hearing, he then would ask the court “to delay” the hearing—something he did not do.

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differently—either with or without the assistance of an attorney—if he had
had one additional day to prepare. 	See Hopkins v. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
2002 ME 129, ¶ 13, 802 A.2d 999 (holding that a party raising a due process
challenge based on defective notice must show how he or she was prejudiced
by the error); cf. Daud v. Abdullahi, 2015 ME 48, ¶ 6, 115 A.3d 77 (concluding
that a defendant’s failure to retain an attorney when he had sufficient time to
do so was “not a substantial reason that would compel the court to grant a
continuance”).
[¶4] 	Therefore, contrary to Knoblach’s argument, the court did not err
or abuse its discretion by proceeding with the hearing without objection on
the scheduled date, or by denying Knoblach’s motion to reconsider or for
relief from judgment. 	See In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 14, 55 A.3d 463 (“When
due process is implicated, we review . . . procedural rulings to determine
whether the process struck a balance between competing concerns that was
fundamentally fair.” (quotation marks omitted)).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.

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Allan E. Lobozzo, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant John Knoblach
Martin J. Ridge, Esq., Beagle Steeves & Ridge, LLC, Portland, for appellee
Stacylee A. Morris
Lewiston District Court docket number FM-2012-208
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY