In re: R.T.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-1030
Filed 21 October 2026
Orange County, No. 23JA000083-670
IN THE MATTER OF R.T.
Appeal by Respondent-Mother from order entered 11 July 2025 by Judge
Samantha Cabe in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2
June 2026.
Robinson & Lawing, LLP, by Christopher M. Watford, for Appellant-
Respondent-Mother.
Stephenson & Fleming, LLP, by Deana K. Fleming, for Petitioner-Appellee
Orange County Department of Social Services.
Administrative Office of the Courts, by Brittany T. McKinney, for Appellee-
Guardian ad Litem.
CARPENTER, Judge.
Respondent-Mother appeals the trial court’s 11 July 2025 order (the “Order”)
terminating her parental rights to her minor child, Raven.1 On appeal, Respondent-
Mother filed a petition for writ of certiorari (“PWC”) and argues that the trial court
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the minor child in accordance with N.C. R. App. P.
42(b) (2025).

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erred by: (1) failing to appoint her a Rule 17 Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”); and (2)
determining that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights based on neglect,
willful failure to make reasonable progress, and dependency. After careful review,
we dismiss Respondent-Mother’s appeal.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
Raven was born to Respondent-Mother in June 2023. In October 2023, law
enforcement responded to a call that Respondent-Mother was disheveled, walking in
traffic holding Raven, and asking strangers to take Raven. Respondent-Mother
refused to leave the roadway, requiring the officers to form a protective circle around
her and Raven. Respondent-Mother left the scene and went home. After receiving
the report, the Orange County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) immediately
dispatched a social worker to Respondent-Mother’s home. Respondent-Mother
presented as paranoid and refused the social worker’s entry, requiring the social
worker to call a mobile crisis unit to assist.
Once inside the home, the social worker observed cluttered and filthy areas.
The social worker also observed Respondent-Mother holding the face of her other
child, Chris,2 and “squeezing it.” Chris was visibly scared of Respondent-Mother and
cried throughout the visit. Respondent-Mother spoke to Chris as if he was a man and
accused him of cheating on her. Because Respondent-Mother was aggressive and
2 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the minor child in accordance with N.C. R. App. P.
42(b).

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appeared to be exhibiting paranoia and delusions, police had her involuntarily
committed at a local hospital. DSS placed Raven and Chris in the care of Respondent-
Mother’s friend. The friend informed DSS that she could only be a temporary
placement.
DSS had an extensive history with Respondent-Mother as a child and, more
recently, as a parent. In April 2023, DSS investigated allegations that Respondent-
Mother neglected Chris. DSS referred Respondent-Mother to mental health services
for schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder.
On 18 October 2023, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging Raven and Chris
were neglected and dependent because they were exposed to a substantial risk of
injury and Respondent-Mother was unable to provide proper care, supervision, or
protection. The same day, DSS obtained nonsecure custody, temporarily placing both
juveniles with Respondent-Mother’s friend.
On 7 December 2023, the trial court held the initial adjudication and
disposition hearing. At the prehearing conference, DSS moved for the trial court to
appoint Respondent-Mother a Rule 17 GAL. The trial court examined Respondent-
Mother and declined to appoint a Rule 17 GAL, determining that Respondent-Mother
was competent, able to comprehend the nature of the proceedings and their
connection to her actions, and able to properly assist her attorney.
Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated Raven and Chris as neglected and
dependent, maintaining custody with DSS. The trial court ordered Respondent-

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Mother to complete a parental competency evaluation and follow all
recommendations. The trial court also ordered Respondent-Mother to engage in
parenting education.
In December 2023 and February 2024, Respondent-Mother was again
involuntarily committed. Meanwhile, Respondent-Mother threatened the friend who
was caring for the juveniles. Concerned for her safety, the friend informed DSS that
she was no longer willing to serve as a temporary placement. Because DSS could not
find suitable placements for Raven or Chris, DSS placed them together in a licensed
foster home in January 2024. During this time, DSS began to consider Chris’s
biological father as his placement provider. DSS could not determine Raven’s
biological father.
The trial court conducted permanency planning hearings in June and July
2024. In its order entered 30 July 2024, the trial court found that although
Respondent-Mother attended visitations with a parenting aide, her interactions with
Raven and Chris during visits were inappropriate. The trial court also incorporated
the psychologist’s findings from Respondent-Mother’s parental capacity evaluation
and determined that Respondent-Mother was not consistently engaging in mental
health treatment or medication management. Further, Respondent-Mother’s
schizoaffective disorder diagnosis, non-compliance with treatment, and inappropriate
behaviors indicated a lack of ability to provide parenting in an emotionally or
physically safe manner.

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The trial court also found that Respondent-Mother did not acknowledge the
danger her mental health issues could cause. The psychologist recommended, and
the trial court ordered, that Respondent-Mother demonstrate stability through
medication compliance, treatment compliance, stable housing, and no additional
involuntary commitments. The trial court also ordered Respondent-Mother to
address her parenting deficits with the parenting aide, enroll in mental health
treatment at a specific mental health clinic, and comply with provider
recommendations. On 7 August 2024, DSS placed Chris in the care of his biological
father.3
The trial court held another permanency planning hearing for Raven in
November 2024. In its order, the trial court found that Respondent-Mother’s progress
was inadequate because she had not yet initiated therapy at the mental health clinic
and was inconsistent with her mental health treatment. The trial court also found
that Respondent-Mother was not receptive to the parenting aide’s feedback.
Additionally, although Respondent-Mother offered kinship relatives for potential
placement, the trial court found none were appropriate. The trial court ordered
Respondent-Mother to demonstrate parenting knowledge learned through her service
providers, follow the psychologist’s recommendations in the capacity evaluation, and
3 Because Chris was placed in the care of his father, he is not a party to this appeal.

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work exclusively with the determined mental health clinic for psychiatric services.
Later that month, Respondent-Mother was again involuntarily committed.
On 25 February 2025, DSS filed a petition to terminate Respondent-Mother’s
parental rights of Raven, alleging neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress,
and dependency. The trial court held termination hearings on 1 May 2025 and 15
May 2025. The psychologist who conducted Respondent-Mother’s parental capacity
evaluation testified that Respondent-Mother was “manic and unable to focus,” read
at a second-grade level, and consequently, had difficulty understanding and
managing her mental-health conditions. The psychologist further testified that
Respondent-Mother lacked the capacity to protect Raven from future harm because
she denied needing treatment, failed to appreciate the risk her mental-health
conditions posed to Raven, and experienced rapidly escalating symptoms during
periods of crisis.
The DSS social worker testified that Respondent-Mother’s communications
were erratic and difficult to follow. At times, Respondent-Mother accused the social
worker of plotting against her, threatened legal action in response to routine
communications about visitation, and demanded that the social worker cease
contacting her—followed by a barrage of emails or text messages in rapid succession
that were “confusing” and unrelated to the matter being discussed.

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Respondent-Mother testified that she had maintained a stable residence for a
year and worked two full-time jobs. She denied being diagnosed with schizophrenia,
instead contending that she had anger issues.
Regarding Raven’s placement, the social worker testified that Respondent-
Mother provided the names of “several people,” but none were appropriate
placements for Raven. Raven’s maternal grandmother was not approved due to her
criminal history and prior child protective service reports. Raven’s maternal great-
aunt had an overnight visit with Raven, but Raven returned with missing patches of
hair, a different demeanor, and was sleepless and inconsolable. DSS attempted to
engage the maternal great-aunt in training, but she moved out of the county without
notice. DSS also considered and rejected Raven’s maternal great-grandmother as a
placement because she lived in a one-room senior living facility and was “the only
occupant allowed in the room by the facility.” Respondent-Mother confirmed that the
maternal great-grandmother “stays at an elderly home.”
On 11 July 2025, the trial court entered the Order, terminating Respondent-
Mother’s parental rights on grounds of neglect, willful failure to make reasonable
progress, and dependency. The trial court found that Respondent-Mother’s
unresolved mental-health needs created an injurious environment and exposed
Raven to a risk of physical, mental, and emotional harm. It further found that
Respondent-Mother was: unable to incorporate feedback from the parenting aide;
failed to provide proper care and supervision during supervised visits; did not

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consistently engage with a mental-health provider or follow through with
recommended services; denied her schizophrenia diagnosis and need for medication;
remained at a high risk of another psychotic episode because she did not acknowledge
her mental-health needs; had not demonstrated stability through medication
compliance or an absence of involuntary commitments; and could not identify an
appropriate placement for Raven. On 12 August 2025, Respondent-Mother filed an
untimely notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
Respondent-Mother filed a PWC because she filed her notice of appeal one day
late due, in part, to a technological issue with Odyssey. She contends that
extraordinary circumstances exist because the technological issue was outside of her
control. She argues that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her
parental rights without first appointing her a Rule 17 GAL. She also argues that the
trial court erred in terminating her parental rights based on neglect, willful failure
to make reasonable progress, and dependency.
“Notice of appeal . . . shall be given in writing . . . within 30 days after entry
and service of the [termination] order.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(b) (2025). Failure
to give timely notice of appeal “is jurisdictional, and an untimely attempt to appeal
must be dismissed.” In re J.C.B., 233 N.C. App. 641, 645, 757 S.E.2d 487, 490 (2014)
(citing In re I.T.P-L., 194 N.C. App. 453, 459, 670 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2008)); see also In
re H.R.P., 297 N.C. App. 339, 343, 910 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2024) (“Failure to comply with

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the requirements of Rule 3.1(b) is, therefore, a jurisdictional defect requiring
dismissal.”).
This Court may consider the matter, however, by issuing a writ of certiorari.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2025); see also In re S.D.H., 296 N.C. App. 392, 397,
908 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2024) (granting the respondent-father’s PWC following his Rule
3.1 violation). A writ of certiorari is a “prerogative writ” that we may issue to “aid
our jurisdiction.” See In re S.D.H., 296 N.C. App. at 397, 908 S.E.2d at 874 (citing
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c)(2023)).
Because issuing a writ of certiorari is an extraordinary measure, a petitioner
must first satisfy a two-part test. Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs, 384 N.C. 569,
570, 887 S.E.2d 848, 849 (2023). The appellant must show (1) either “merit or that
error was probably committed below,” and (2) that “extraordinary circumstances”
justify appellate review. Id. at 572–73, 887 S.E.2d at 851. “There is no fixed list of
‘extraordinary circumstances’ that warrant certiorari review, but this factor
generally requires a showing of substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial
resources, or wide-reaching issues of justice.” State v. Martinez, 390 N.C. ___, ___,
933 S.E.2d 759, ___ (2026). “We require extraordinary circumstances because a writ
of certiorari ‘is not intended as a substitute for a notice of appeal.’ ” Id. at ___, 933
S.E.2d at ___ (quoting Cryan, 384 N.C. at 573, 887 S.E.2d at 851).
At the outset, we agree that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting
review of the merits of Respondent-Mother’s issues on appeal. See Cryan, 384 N.C.

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at 572–73, 887 S.E.2d at 851. Indeed, Respondent-Mother would be substantially
harmed if we dismiss her appeal because of a technological issue outside of her
control. See Martinez, 390 N.C. at ___, 933 S.E.2d at ___. We now turn to whether
Respondent-Mother can demonstrate error or merit of her issues on appeal. See
Cryan, 384 N.C. at 572, 887 S.E.2d at 851.
A. Rule 17 GAL
Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to appoint her a Rule 17 GAL. Specifically, she contends that her schizophrenia and
low intellectual functioning prevented her from successfully interacting with and
complying with DSS. We disagree.
“[T]rial court decisions concerning both the appointment of a [GAL] and the
extent to which an inquiry concerning a parent’s competence should be conducted are
reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C.
101, 107, 772 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2015) (citing In re M.H.B., 192 N.C. App. 258, 261, 664
S.E.2d 583, 585 (2008)). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is
‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’ ” In re M.H.B., 192 N.C. App. at 261, 664 S.E.2d
at 585 (citing White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985)).
“On motion of any party or on the court’s own motion, the court may appoint a
[GAL] for a parent who is incompetent in accordance with [Rule 17].” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1101.1(c) (2025); see also id. § 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(2) (2025) (requiring an
incompetent defendant to defend through a general or testamentary guardian or a

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GAL and permitting the court, upon motion, to appoint a GAL when no known
guardian exists). An adult is not incompetent or lacking capacity if she “is able to
sufficiently (i) manage . . . her affairs and (ii) communicate important decisions
concerning . . . her person, family, and property.” Id. § 35A-1101(7) (2025).
In determining whether to appoint a Rule 17 GAL, the trial court may consider
mental-health diagnoses as well as the litigant’s courtroom behavior, ability to
communicate lucidly, apparent “understanding of the situation” in which the litigant
is involved, capacity to assist counsel or “address other important issues,” and
“numerous other factors.” In re J.A.J., 381 N.C. 761, 768, 874 S.E.2d 563, 569 (2022)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
A trial court is not required to “inquire into the necessity for the appointment
of [a Rule 17 GAL] solely because the parent has diagnosable mental health
problems.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 110, 772 S.E.2d at 457. Indeed, “an individual
can simultaneously be found incompetent under Chapter 35A yet not require a [Rule
17 GAL].” In re Q.B., 375 N.C. 826, 837, 850 S.E.2d 898, 905 (2020). “Similarly, the
trial court [is] not required to inquire into the appropriateness of the appointment of
a [Rule 17 GAL] simply because [DSS seeks] to have respondent’s parental
rights . . . terminated for mental health-related grounds and requested the trial court
to conduct a competency inquiry.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 110, 772 S.E.2d at 457.
Further, “an allegation that parental rights are subject to termination based upon
incapability stemming, directly or indirectly, from a parent’s diagnosable mental

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health conditions does not automatically necessitate the appointment of a [Rule 17
GAL].” Id. at 110–11, 772 S.E.2d at 458.
Here, the trial court made a reasoned decision when declining to appoint
Respondent-Mother a Rule 17 GAL. See In re M.H.B., 192 N.C. App. at 261, 664
S.E.2d at 585. The record demonstrates that the trial court considered Respondent-
Mother’s mental-health diagnoses, courtroom behavior, ability to communicate
lucidly, understanding of the situation in which she was involved, and ability to assist
her counsel. See In re J.A.J., 381 N.C. at 768, 874 S.E.2d at 569. Specifically, the
trial court found that “[w]hile Respondent-Mother may have a mental health
diagnosis and borderline IQ, she has the capability of decisions and advocating for
herself.” See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) (Unchallenged
findings “are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.”).
Indeed, Respondent-Mother was present and actively participated in the juvenile
proceedings, which included testifying at the termination hearing. See In re J.A.J.,
381 N.C. at 768, 874 S.E.2d at 569. Throughout the termination hearing, the trial
court observed her demeanor, responses, interactions, and ability to answer
questions. See id. at 768, 874 S.E.2d at 569.
Moreover, the trial court had previously conducted an inquiry into Respondent-
Mother’s competence at the initial adjudication and disposition hearing and deemed
her competent. Thus, based on the facts and circumstances known to the trial court
at the time, the trial court’s decision not to appoint a Rule 17 GAL was neither

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arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason. See In re M.H.B., 192 N.C. App. at
261, 664 S.E.2d at 585. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See
In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 110–12, 772 S.E.2d at 457–58.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
Respondent-Mother next argues that the trial court erred in determining that
grounds existed to terminate her parental rights based on neglect, willful failure to
make reasonable progress, and dependency. We disagree.
Termination of parental rights proceedings consist of adjudication and
disposition. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1109, 1110 (2025). During adjudication, “the
petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence the
existence of at least one ground for termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the
General Statutes.”4 In re J.M.J.-J., 374 N.C. 553, 555, 843 S.E.2d 94, 98 (2020)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). “[A]n adjudication of any single
ground . . . will suffice to support a termination order.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815,
845 S.E.2d 66, 71 (2020) (citation omitted).
We review the trial court’s adjudication to determine “whether the findings
support the conclusion of law.” In re D.D.M., 380 N.C. 716, 720, 869 S.E.2d 693, 696
(2022) (citation omitted). “[F]indings of fact that are supported by clear, cogent, and
4 We note that, in October 2025, the standard of proof for termination actions was amended to “clear
and convincing evidence,” but the Order was entered before the effective date of the amendment. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(b).

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convincing evidence are deemed conclusive even when some evidence supports
contrary findings.” Id. at 720, 869 S.E.2d at 696 (citation omitted). “The trial court’s
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id. at 720, 869 S.E.2d at 696. Under a de
novo review, this Court “considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the [trial court].” In re K.S., 380 N.C. 60, 64, 868 S.E.2d 1, 4
(2022).
A trial court may terminate parental rights pursuant to dependency if:
petitioners can prove by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that “the parent is incapable of providing for the
proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the
juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of
[section] 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability
that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable
future.”
In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99, 105–06, 852 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2020) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(6) (2019)). “In order for dependency to provide a basis for terminating
parental rights, the petitioners must also prove that ‘the parent lacks an appropriate
alternative child care arrangement.’ ” Id. at 106, 852 S.E.2d at 6–7 (quoting N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6)).
Here, the trial court did not err in adjudicating the existence of the dependency
ground. The trial court found that Respondent-Mother was unable to provide proper
care and supervision and that she did not identify an appropriate caretaker.
Respondent-Mother concedes that she was incapable of providing proper care and
supervision but argues that Raven’s maternal great-grandmother was a suitable

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placement. The trial court properly found to the contrary. See In re D.D.M., 380 N.C.
at 720, 869 S.E.2d at 696. The social worker and Respondent-Mother testified that
Raven’s maternal great-grandmother lived in a nursing home. A nursing home is not
an appropriate setting to provide the care and supervision required by a young child.
Accordingly, Respondent-Mother lacked an appropriate alternative childcare
arrangement. See In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. at 106, 852 S.E.2d at 6.
Respondent-Mother was unable to provide proper care and supervision of
Raven, and the trial court properly found that maternal great-grandmother was not
a suitable placement. Thus, clear, cogent, and convincing evidence establishes that
grounds existed to terminate Respondent-Mother’s parental rights based on
dependency. See id. at 105–06, 852 S.E.2d at 6. Because one ground is sufficient to
terminate parental rights, we need not address Respondent-Mother’s remaining
arguments. See In re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815, 845 S.E.2d at 71. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err.
Respondent-Mother has not demonstrated error or merit as to either issue on
appeal and, therefore, has not satisfied Cryan’s two-part test. See Cryan, 384 N.C. at
570–73, 887 S.E.2d at 849–51.
III. Conclusion
In sum, Respondent-Mother has not shown error or merit as to her issues on
appeal. Because she has not demonstrated error or merit, we decline to issue writ of
certiorari and dismiss her appeal.

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DISMISSED.
Judges GRIFFIN and STADING concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).