Justice v. Mission Hosp., Inc.

Justice v. Mission Hosp., Inc., 2019 NCBC 21.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
COUNTY OF BUNCOMBE 18 CVS 1755

RANDY JUSTICE, Individually and on
behalf of all persons similarly situated;
CATHY JUSTICE, Individually and on
behalf of all persons similarly situated;
and CATHY JUSTICE, Guardian ad
Litem for the minor child JULYETTE
WILKERSON,

Plaintiffs,
ORDER & OPINION ON
v. MOTIONS TO DISMISS

MISSION HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a
“MISSION HOSPITALS” or “MISSION
HOSPITAL”; NATIONAL GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY; and
REVCLAIMS, LLC,

Defendants.

1. THIS MATTER is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss for Failure to

State a Claim by each Defendant and a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction made by Defendant National General Insurance Company.

(together, the “Motions”). The Court, having considered the Motions, the briefs in

support of and in opposition to the Motions, and the arguments of counsel,

concludes that the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

should be DENIED, the Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim should be

GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint should be DISMISSED.
Long, Parker, Warren, Anderson, Payne & McClellan P.A., by Robert B.
Long, Jr. and Steve R. Warren for Plaintiffs.

Jones Walker LLP, by Joseph L. Adams for Defendant RevClaims, LLC.

Roberts & Stevens P.A., by Phillip T. Jackson and Eric P. Edgerton for
Defendant Mission Hospital, Inc.

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson P.A., by Robert W. Fuller and Mark A.
Hiller for Defendant Mission Hospital, Inc.

Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick LLP, by Christian H. Staples, J. Bennett
Crites, III, and Laura Johnson Evans for Defendant RevClaims, LLC.

Young Moore & Henderson P.A., by Glenn C. Raynor for Defendant
National General Insurance Company.

Gale, Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2. Plaintiffs initiated this action on April 20, 2018, asserting claims of breach

of contract, interference with contractual relations, and unfair or deceptive trade

practices (“UDTP”). (Compl., ECF No. 3.) Plaintiffs subsequently amended their

complaint on May 30, 2018, to add a claim for conversion. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–47,

ECF No. 16.) Plaintiffs seek to represent a purported class of similarly situation

persons. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48–57.)

3. On July 2, 2018, defendant Mission Hospital, Inc. (“Mission”) filed a motion

to dismiss under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 21.) On July 13, 2018,

defendant RevClaims, LLC (“RevClaims”) likewise moved to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6). (ECF No. 27.) On August 8, 2018, defendant National General Insurance

Company (“National General”) moved to dismiss, first under N.C. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) (“Rule 12(b)(1)”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs

having no “injury in fact” and second under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim. (ECF No. 32.)

4. The motions have been fully briefed and argued, and they are now ripe for

resolution.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5. The Court does not make findings of fact but accepts the well-pled

allegations of the Complaint as true.

6. Plaintiffs’ various claims arise from their treatment at Mission following an

automobile accident, in conjunction with which Plaintiffs or someone on their

behalf executed forms which, in part, include the assignment of certain insurance

benefits. The various claims arise from and depend upon the success of Plaintiffs’

contention that the assignment did not reach the medical payments coverage

provided by Plaintiffs’ automobile policy. (“MedPay”).

A. The Accident and Hospital Visit

7. The three Plaintiffs are family members Randy and Cathy Justice and the

infant Julyette Wilkerson who reside together in Buncombe County. (Am. Compl.

¶ 1.) Cathy Justice is Wilkerson’s great aunt and legal guardian. (Am. Compl.

¶ 7.) Plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident on January 4, 2017, (Am.

Compl. ¶ 7), and were brought to Mission’s Emergency Room that same evening,

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 22, & 25.)
8. Mission is a North Carolina corporation operating a hospital in Asheville,

North Carolina. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) National General is a Missouri corporation

domiciled in Jefferson City, Missouri. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) RevClaims is a foreign

corporation handling third party billing for Mission; its domicile is not established

by the record. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4.)

9. Upon Plaintiffs’ arrival, Mission requested that a “Consent to

Treatment/Financial Agreement” form be executed for each Plaintiff. (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 10, 23, & 25.) Because Randy Justice was unable to execute the form, Mission

recorded verbal consent in place of his signature, with a hospital employee as a

witness. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Cathy Justice signed her own form and one on behalf

of Julyette Wilkerson as legal guardian. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22 & 25.) Plaintiffs do

not challenge that the forms were signed; rather, they challenge their application

and meaning.

10. Each consent form is identical and contains a clause labeled as

“Assignment of Insurance Benefits” which states:

I assign all liability and health insurance benefits for these services to the
provider(s) and direct all insurance entities to furnish all information
regarding my benefits, status of claim, reasons for non-payment, and other
information deemed necessary for the collection of debt. I agree that I may be
responsible for all charges incurred. (“Assignment of Benefits”) (Am. Compl.
at Ex. B, Randy Justice Consent to Treatment/Financial Agreement Form
(emphasis added).)

11. Randy and Cathy Justice maintained an automobile insurance policy

with National General that provided first-party medical payments coverage up to

$1,000 per person and $1,000 per accident. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.)
12. Mission prepared a registration form which included “Primary,”

“Secondary,” and “Tertiary” insurance information for each Plaintiff. (Am. Compl.

¶ 8 and Am. Compl. at Ex. A & E, Registration Forms.) For Randy Justice, the

primary insurance is listed as “Liability Pending,” the secondary as “Humana

ChoicePro Medicare,” and the tertiary as “Medicare MCA.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) For

Cathy Justice, the form reflects “Liability Pending” as the primary insurer, with

no secondary and tertiary coverage indicated. (Am. Compl. at Ex. E, Cathy Justice

Registration Form.) The record does not include a registration form for the minor

Julyetta Wilkerson.

13. RevClaims conducts collection activities for Mission, and as an agent for

Mission filed three notices with National General indicating that each of the three

Plaintiffs “has a claim with your company and [RevClaims is] seeking recovery in

connection with personal injuries.” (Am. Compl. at Exs. C, G, J, RevClaims

Submissions.) The notice continues, “[p]ursuant to N.C.G.S § 44-49, et seq.,

RevClaims, LLC hereby gives notice of a lien…against any sums recovered as

damages for personal injuries, whether in litigation or otherwise.” (“RevClaims

Submissions”) (Am. Compl. at Exs. C, G, J, RevClaims Submissions.) A copy of

the Financial Responsibility Form was included in each submission to National

General by RevClaims. (Consent to Treatment/Financial Agreement Forms.)1

1 The Court understands that a statutory lien would be limited to third-party insurance
rather than first-party coverages. However, Mission’s right to MedPay payments is based on
the contractual Assignment of Benefits rather than a statutory lien.
14. Within two weeks, National General remitted three checks for $1,000,

representing the limits of the MedPay coverage under its policy. (Am. Compl.,

¶¶ 21, 24, & 26.) Plaintiffs contend that National General did so without first

contacting them and that they learned of the payments when later seeking

payment from National General themselves. (Am. Compl. ¶28.)

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims

15. Plaintiffs bring separate distinct claims against the Defendants, each

based on the central contention that Plaintiffs had not assigned their claims to

MedPay coverage to Mission. In their briefs, Plaintiffs admit that each of their

claims fails if their Assignment of Benefits included their to payment under the

MedPay provisions of the applicable insurance policies, but argue that each of

their claims must avoid dismissal if either the scope of the Assignment of Benefits

is ambiguous or if, as a matter of clear contract construction, the Assignment of

Benefits does not extend to payments pursuant to Plaintiffs’ MedPay coverage.

(See Pls.’s Resp. Br. Opp’n Mission Hospital, Inc. and RevClaims Mots. Dismiss

3–4, ECF No. 36 “Pls.’s Resp. Mi. Hosp. and RevClaims”.)

16. The Court details each of the separate claims below.

1. Claims Against Mission

17. Plaintiffs assert interference with contractual relations, conversion, and

UDTP claims against Mission. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35, 40, & 46.)

18. The UDTP claim is grounded on the contention that Mission has a

practice of having patients sign financial consent forms which are then presented
to insurance companies to collect monies to which Mission has no legitimate claim.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 35.) The claim rests on the assertion that MedPay coverage is not

a “liability or health insurance” benefit within the meaning of the Assignment of

Benefits.

19. Anticipating a defense based on the learned profession exception to their

UDTP claim, Plaintiffs allege that Mission’s billing practices are not related to

providing medical care but to “the entrepreneurial aspects of operating the

hospital for its own interests, as opposed to the interests of their patients and

other health care providers.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 35.)

20. Based on their position that the MedPay coverage falls outside the

Assignment of Benefits clause, Plaintiffs contend that Mission intentionally

induced National General to breach its contractual obligations to pay MedPay

benefits directly to Plaintiffs, (Am. Compl. ¶ 42), and then converted the MedPay

payments, (Am. Compl. ¶ 46.)

2. Claims Against RevClaims

21. Plaintiffs’ claims against RevClaims essentially repeat claims against

Mission based on RevClaims having acted as Mission’s agent. (Am. Compl. ¶ 35.)

22. Plaintiffs do not allege a separate basis for RevClaims’ liability if

Mission is not found liable as its principal.
3. Claims Against National General

23. Plaintiffs claim National General breached its contract with Plaintiffs

by making MedPay payments to Mission in response to RevClaims’ collection

efforts. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34–38.)

24. In addition to their assertion that the Assignment of Benefits did not

extend to MedPay coverage, Plaintiffs further contend that any assignment was

prohibited by the provision of the National General policy which provides that

“[y]our rights and duties under this policy may not be assigned without our written

consent.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 30 (emphasis added).)

25. Plaintiffs claim that National General’s breach of contract was

accompanied by the aggravating circumstances of National General’s (1) failure

to contact the Plaintiffs before paying the benefit and (2) failing to properly

investigate Mission’s authority to submit a claim, thereby constituting both a

UDTP and an illegal claims practice. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

26. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted only where “the face of the

complaint discloses some insurmountable bar to recovery.” Anderson v. Seascape

at Holden Plantation, LLC, 241 N.C. App. 191, 200, 773 S.E.2d 78, 85

(2015)(quoting Meadows v. Iredell County, 187 N.C. App. 785, 787, 653 S.E.2d 925,

927 (2007)). The Court treats the allegations as true to determine if they are a

sufficient basis for liability under some legal theory. See Silver v. Halifax County

Board of Comm'rs, 805 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017). “The complaint must
be construed liberally, and the court should not dismiss the complaint unless it

appears that the plaintiffs could not prove any set of facts in support of their claim

which would entitle [plaintiff] to relief.” Lynn v. Overlook Dev., 328 N.C. 689,

692, 403 S.E.2d 469, 471 (1991). However, a claim is properly dismissed pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) either (1) when the pleadings on their face reveal no law supports

the claim, (2) when the complaint reveals the absence of a fact sufficient to make

a good claim, or (3) when some fact in the complaint necessarily defeats plaintiff’s

claim. See Johnson v. Bollinger, 86 N.C. App. 1, 4, 356 S.E.2d 378, 380 (1987).

27. Similar to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, when considering a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion based solely on the pleadings, the Court views the allegations of the

complaint as true and reads them in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. See Mangum v. Raleigh Board of Adjustment, 362 N.C. 640, 644, 669 S.E.2d

279, 283 (2008). The courts are intended to be open to those who suffer harm and

so as a general rule those who can demonstrate an injury have standing. Id. at

642, 669 S.E.2d at 281. “It is not necessary that a party demonstrate that injury

has already occurred, but a showing of immediate or threatened injury will suffice

for the purposes of standing.” Id. at 642–43, 669 S.E.2d at 282.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Assert a Claim Against National General

28. To satisfy the standing requirement, “a plaintiff must show: (1) injury

in fact, or injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2)

causation between the challenged action of the defendant and the injury; and (3)
the likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” See Lee

Ray Bergman Real Estate Rentals v. N.C. Fair Housing Center, 153 N.C. App. 176,

179, 568 S.E.2d 883, 886 (2002).

29. National General contends that Plaintiffs have shown no injury in fact

because Plaintiffs do not contest that they are liable to Mission for hospital

services they received. Thus, since the MedPay payments National General made

to Mission reduced Plaintiffs’ total debt to Mission, “[t]here is therefore no net

economic benefit to an insured,” and it makes no difference if the monies are paid

directly to the Plaintiffs or indirectly on their behalf. (Br. Supp. NGI Mot. Dismiss

5–6, ECF No. 32.)

30. Plaintiffs contend that, even if they may be ultimately liable to Mission,

they, not National General, had the right to determine when and how payment

would be made to Mission, and that National General has no right to make that

determination.

31. Plaintiffs claim a contractual right as to how they will utilize the

benefits of their first-party coverage. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claim

might support an injury-in-fact adequate to construe standing if the right to the

MedPay coverage had not been assigned. See Pierson v. Buyher, 330 N.C. 182,

186, 409 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1991)(“[i]t is sufficient if nominal damages are

recoverable for the breach or for the wrong, and it is unimportant that the actual

or substantial damage is not discovered or does not occur until later.”); see also

Hamm v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 2010 NCBC LEXIS 17, at *11 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2010)(“[a] breach of contract, even if negligible, constitutes

injury.”).

32. However, the Court need not consider such possibility further because,

as described below, the Court concludes, as a matter of law and based solely on

Plaintiffs’ complaint, that any right to MedPay coverage had been assigned to

Mission.

33. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged an injury-

in-fact adequate to support the Court’s consideration of the merits of their claims

so that National General’s Rule 12(b)(1) Motion should be denied. The Court

therefore proceeds with its consideration of Plaintiffs’ claims on their merits.

B. Plaintiffs’ Own Pleadings Demonstrate That Benefits Under Their
MedPay Coverage Was Assigned to Mission

34. Plaintiffs’ briefs in opposition to the motions posit that there are three

potential outcomes in interpreting the relevant contracts, with Plaintiffs’ claims

surviving dismissal only under two of the three outcomes. (See Pls.’s Resp. Mi.

Hosp. and RevClaims at 3–4.) That is, if the Assignment of Benefits clearly

assigns benefits under the MedPay coverage, Plaintiffs’ claims fail. (See Pls.’s

Resp. Mi. Hosp. and RevClaims at 3–4.) However, if the scope of the assignment

is ambiguous or the assignment clearly does not assign those benefits, then

Plaintiffs’ claims against each Defendant proceeds. (See Pls.’s Resp. Mi. Hosp.

and RevClaims at 3–4.) Plaintiffs’ three potential outcomes depend upon the

construction of the term “liability or health insurance” as used in the Assignment

of Benefits. (See Pls.’s Resp. Mi. Hosp. and RevClaims at 3–4.)
35. After a full consideration, the Court concludes that the Assignment of

Benefits unambiguously assigns payments under Plaintiffs’ MedPay coverage to

Mission, and accordingly Plaintiffs’ claims fail based on Plaintiffs’ own allegations.

36. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. See Morell v.

Hardin Creek, Inc., 821 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2018). Where language is unambiguous,

it is the job of the courts to give it effect. See Runyon v. Paley, 331 N.C. 293, 305,

416 S.E.2d 177, 186 (1992). An ambiguity “exists in a contract when either the

meaning of words or the effect of provisions is uncertain or capable of several

reasonable interpretations.” Register v. White, 358 N.C. 691, 695, 599 S.E.2d

549, 553 (2004).

37. Benefits under Plaintiffs’ MedPay coverage were assigned if those

benefits were either a “liability insurance” or a “health insurance” benefit.

Plaintiffs contend that the effect of the language is unambiguous. Defendants

contend the effect is clear and in their favor.

38. Defendant Mission argues that the Court can rest its finding of an

assignment on either of two pathways: first that the MedPay benefits were

“liability insurance” because the coverage was provided by an automobile

insurance policy, or second, because the MedPay coverage was “health insurance.”

(See Br. Supp. Mi. Hosp. Mot. Dismiss 7–8, ECF No. 22.) Mission prefers its first

position. (See Br. Supp. Mi. Hosp. Mot. Dismiss at 8.) The Court does not accept

Mission’s first basis, as there is some potential ambiguity whether the term

“liability insurance” should be read to be limited to third-party coverage and first-
party MedPay coverage does not become “liability insurance” just because the

coverage is part of an automobile liability insurance policy.

39. Plaintiffs argue that their assignment of “liability insurance” must be

limited to those coverages which are mandatory for a statutory minimum limits

policy as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.

v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 439, 238 S.E.2d 597, 603 (1977)(“The mandatory

coverage required by the Financial Responsibility Act….does not require the

insurer to extend medical payment coverage beyond the terms of the policy to one

who receives liability coverage solely by virtue of the Act.”). MedPay coverage is

not mandatory. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(g).

40. While MedPay coverage is not statutorily mandated, it does not follow

that optional coverage contained within an automobile liability policy cannot be

“liability insurance.” Plaintiffs’ construction would, for example, require the

Court to conclude that third-party liability coverage or uninsured motorist

coverage at limits beyond the minimum statutory prescribed limits cannot be

considered “liability insurance.” That construction fails the test of common sense.

41. But rejecting Plaintiffs’ primary argument as to whether MedPay is

“liability insurance” also does not mandate that the Court agree with Mission’s

contention that MedPay is included with the Assignment of Benefits simply

because it is provided by an automobile liability policy. MedPay coverage is first-

party coverage where one seeks to provide coverage for injury irrespective of fault

and liability. MedPay coverage may be contained in an automobile liability policy,
but payments pursuant to the coverage do not depend upon any finding of liability.

The Court concludes that it is ambiguous whether there the term “liability

insurance” as it is used in the Assignment of Benefits includes MedPay coverage.

The Court need not resolve that ambiguity, because it concludes that MedPay

coverage is clearly and unambiguously “health insurance” within the scope of the

Assignment of Benefits.

42. Plaintiffs seek to limit the term “health insurance” as used in the

Assignment of Benefits section to the definition of the term “health benefit plan”

in various North Carolina statutes. The two terms, however, do not equate. The

Court again concludes that Plaintiffs present a statutory argument that goes too

far.

43. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-3-2252 provides:

As used in this section:…(2) “Health benefit plan” means an accident and
health insurance policy or certificate; a nonprofit hospital or medical service
corporation contract; a health maintenance organization subscriber contract; a
plan provided by a multiple employer welfare arrangement; or a plan provided
by another benefit arrangement, to the extent permitted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, or by any waiver of or
other exception to that act provided under federal law or regulation. “Health
benefit plan” does not mean any plan implemented or administered by the
North Carolina or United States Department of Health and Human Services,
or any successor agency, or its representatives. “Health benefit plan” also does
not mean any of the following kinds of insurance:…(g) Medical payments under
motor vehicle or homeowners’ insurance policies.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-3-225.
(emphasis added)

2 Plaintiffs incorrectly cite to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-3-25(2), but it is clear that they rely on
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-3-225.
44. This or a substantially similar definition is used throughout the

insurance statutes. E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 58-3-167; 58-50-61; 58-3-169; and 58-

3-174.

45. By its express terms, the statute excludes MedPay coverage from the

definition of a health benefit plan. Plaintiffs jump to the conclusion that MedPay

coverage cannot be considered “health insurance.” But the statute clearly

acknowledges that there are other forms of health insurance, such as Medicaid,

Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program administered by the

North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, that are excluded

from the definition of “health benefit plan.” Payments under such plans are

recognized by North Carolina courts as “health insurance benefits.” See, e.g., Lake

v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Emps., 234 N.C. App. 368, 369, 760

S.E.2d 268, 270 (2014) (Plaintiffs “…were eligible upon retirement to receive these

health insurance benefits from the State Health Plan…” referring to N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 58-3-167).

46. The Court concludes that the relevant statutes and decisions make it

clear that the terms “health benefit plan” and “health insurance benefits” are not

synonymous, and the Court further concludes that the language of the Assignment

of Benefits clause clearly assigns MedPay coverage as “health insurance” within

the scope of the Assignment of Benefits at issue.

47. It follows that all claims in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint must be

dismissed, unless somehow the assignment was invalid.
C. The Anti-Assignment Provision of the National General Policy Did Not
Preclude Plaintiffs’ Assignment to Mission

48. The Court now considers Plaintiffs’ argument that National General’s

policy language precludes Plaintiffs from assigning their interest.

49. To this Court’s knowledge, no North Carolina court has yet been

required to address the assignment issue in the context of MedPay coverage. The

general rule is that provisions “prohibiting assignment are for the benefit of the

insurer, only the insurer may complain that the assignment is in violation of the

prohibitory clause, and if the insurer refuses to do so, the insured cannot attack

his or her own assignment on these grounds.” Couch on Insurance §35:5 (3d. ed.

2009). Moreover, “[t]he great majority of courts adhere to the rule that general

stipulations in policies prohibiting assignments of the policy, except with the

consent of the insurer, apply only to assignments before loss, and do not prevent

an assignment after loss…” this is because “[t]he purpose of a no assignment

clause is to protect the insurer from increased liability, and after events giving

rise to the insurer’s liability have occurred, the insurer’s risk cannot be

increased…” Couch, supra, at § 35:8.

50. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs were free to assign the benefits

payable under their MedPay coverage to Mission.

D. The Court Need Not Address Plaintiffs’ Additional Claims in Light of
the Valid Assignment of MedPay Benefits to Mission

51. Plaintiffs present other claims that depend on a finding that Plaintiffs

did not assign their MedPay benefits to Mission. Those claims must be dismissed
because they depend upon a finding in Plaintiffs’ favor that the Court concludes

is precluded by the unambiguous terms of the Assignment of Benefits. And

because Plaintiffs’ primary UDTP claim fails, the Court likewise need not consider

whether Mission would be entitled to a defense under the learned profession

exception to N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-1.1 or whether a single payment by National

General constitutes an unfair claim practice under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15.

V. CONCLUSION

52. For the foregoing reasons:

a. National General’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction is DENIED;

b. Defendants’ various Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim are

GRANTED;

c. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and.

d. Each Party shall bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of March, 2019.

/s/ James L. Gale
James L. Gale
Senior Business Court Judge