Upchurch v. Sapp

Upchurch v. Sapp, 2020 NCBC 71.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
ALAMANCE COUNTY 20 CVS 778

JAMES B. UPCHURCH, JR.,

Plaintiff, Counterclaim
Defendant, and Third-Party
Defendant,
ORDER AND OPINION ON
v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
CORBIN SAPP; LUANN MANER;
BRETT DEVRIES; ARTHUR a/k/a
“DUKE” THOMAS; MICHAEL
GLICK; and KELLY GLICK,

Defendants and Counterclaim
Plaintiffs,

and

WTG BURLINGTON, INC.,

Third-Party Plaintiff.

1. James B. Upchurch, Jr. is a shareholder of WTG Burlington, Inc. He was

also its sole director and officer until his fellow shareholders recently removed him.

Describing his removal as a coup, Upchurch has sued the other shareholders. They

in turn have moved to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina

Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 8.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

the motion.

Edmisten & Webb Law, by William Woodward Webb, for Plaintiff James
B. Upchurch, Jr.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Eric M.
David and Katarina K. Wong, for Defendants Corbin Sapp, Luann
Maner, Brett Devries, Arthur “Duke” Thomas, Michael Glick, and Kelly
Glick.
Oertel, Koonts & Oertel, PLLC, by Franklin Paul Koonts and Geoffrey K.
Oertel, for Third-Party Plaintiff WTG Burlington, Inc.

Conrad, Judge.

I.
BACKGROUND

2. Formed in 2015, WTG Burlington is a small business that operates a

restaurant named Wings to Go. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 19, ECF No. 3.) The company has

six shareholders: Upchurch, Brett Devries, Michael Glick, Luann Maner, Corbin

Sapp, and Arthur Thomas. (See Compl. ¶ 4.) Upchurch holds the largest interest at

around forty percent and, until January 2020, served as WTG Burlington’s general

manager and its only director and officer. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4.)

3. Shortly after forming WTG Burlington, the shareholders executed a

Stockholders’ Agreement to govern share transfers and related issues. (See Compl.

¶ 3; Compl. Ex. A [“Stockholders’ Agrmt.”].) Of note here, Upchurch obtained an

option to buy shares held by Sapp, Thomas, Glick, and Maner (abbreviated as the

STGM Shareholders in the agreement):

As and when the STGM Loans shall have been paid and satisfied in full,
Upchurch shall have the option, but not the obligation, at any time
following the date of such payment . . . to purchase any part or all of the
STGM Shares by giving a written notice . . . to the STGM Shareholders
of the exercise of the option and the extent thereof.

(Stockholders’ Agrmt. § 7A; see also Stockholders’ Agrmt. § 2(n).) The STGM Loans

are loans totaling over $300,000 made by these four individuals. (Stockholders’

Agrmt. § 2(l).)

4. This case arises from events beginning in late 2019, when Devries allegedly

“engineered” a “coup” to oust Upchurch. (Compl. ¶ 7.) The coup began with the
removal of Upchurch as general manager for alleged misconduct and the retention of

one of Devries’s business partners to replace him. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11.) Then

Devries and the other shareholders began holding meetings without notice to

Upchurch. (See Compl. ¶ 8.) Around the same time, Devries and Sapp claimed to be

officers and filed official documents with the Secretary of State on WTG Burlington’s

behalf. (See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10.) The coup culminated in the election of new officers

and directors—and, thus, the removal of Upchurch from his positions—at a properly

noticed shareholder meeting in January 2020. (See Compl. ¶ 10.) At some point

during these events, WTG Burlington stopped paying some of its debts, resulting in

damage to Upchurch as guarantor. (See Compl. ¶ 12.)

5. Upchurch remains the largest shareholder of WTG Burlington. He alleges

that he is “ready, willing and able” to exercise his option to buy the shares of Sapp

and Maner, which would give him a majority interest. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Sapp and

Maner have refused. According to Upchurch, Sapp and Maner “have rejected such

acquisition in the absence of Plaintiff satisfying other terms and conditions not in”

the Stockholders’ Agreement. (Compl. ¶ 14.)

6. Upchurch filed this suit against all five of his fellow shareholders and Glick’s

wife (“Defendants”). He claims that Sapp and Maner have breached the Stockholders’

Agreement. In addition, he claims that all Defendants have committed unfair or

deceptive trade practices under N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1 and breached fiduciary duties owed

to WTG Burlington and to Upchurch. Defendants have responded with
counterclaims, and WTG Burlington has intervened to assert its own claims against

Upchurch.

7. Defendants have also moved to dismiss each of Upchurch’s claims. After full

briefing, the Court held a hearing on October 5, 2020. The motion is ripe for

resolution.

II.
ANALYSIS

8. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of the

complaint.” Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 604, 517 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1999) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). The motion should be granted only when “(1) the

complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the

complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or

(3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim.”

Corwin v. Brit. Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 615, 821 S.E.2d 729, 736–37 (2018)

(citation and quotation marks omitted). In deciding the motion, the Court must treat

the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and view the facts and

permissible inferences “in the light most favorable to” the nonmoving party. Sykes v.

Health Network Sols., Inc., 372 N.C. 326, 332, 828 S.E.2d 467, 471 (2019) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). The Court also may consider documents “attached to

and incorporated within [the] complaint.” Weaver v. St. Joseph of the Pines, Inc., 187

N.C. App. 198, 204, 652 S.E.2d 701, 707 (2007).
A. Breach of Contract

9. Upchurch claims that he has an option to buy the shares held by Sapp and

Maner and that they breached the Stockholders’ Agreement by refusing to sell. Sapp

and Maner argue that the option isn’t ripe. The Stockholders’ Agreement, they

contend, requires Upchurch to repay over $300,000 in loans before exercising his

option, yet he has not pleaded that he did so. (See Br. in Supp. 4–5, ECF No. 9.)

10. To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege that a valid

contract exists and was breached. See Poor v. Hill, 138 N.C. App. 19, 26, 530 S.E.2d

838, 843 (2000). If the contract “contains some condition precedent to defendant’s

liability,” the plaintiff must also allege that the condition has been met. Beachboard

v. S. Ry. Co., 16 N.C. App. 671, 681, 193 S.E.2d 577, 584 (1972) (citation omitted); see

also N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(c). “A condition precedent is a fact or event that must exist or

occur before there is a right to immediate performance, before there is a breach of

contract duty.” Mosely v. WAM, Inc., 167 N.C. App. 594, 600, 606 S.E.2d 140, 144

(2004) (citation omitted).

11. Section 7A of the Stockholders’ Agreement states that Upchurch “shall have

the option” to buy the shares of Sapp and Maner “[a]s and when the STGM Loans

shall have been paid and satisfied in full” and “following the date” of repayment.

(Stockholders’ Agrmt. § 7A.) Plainly, the loan repayment is a condition precedent

that must occur before Upchurch’s option ripens. See Craftique, Inc. v. Stevens & Co.,

321 N.C. 564, 567, 364 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1988) (“The use of language such as ‘when,’

‘after,’ and ‘as soon as’ clearly indicates that a promise will not be performed except
upon the happening of a stated event, i.e., a condition precedent.”). But the complaint

does not allege, even generally, that this condition has been met. (See Compl. ¶¶ 13,

14, 16.) At most, the complaint alleges that Upchurch is “ready, willing and able” to

buy the shares. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16.)

12. Upchurch doesn’t deny any of this. Rather, he argues that Sapp and Maner

have tried to impose even more conditions on the option right, beyond those stated in

section 7A. (See Opp’n 2–3, ECF No. 18.) Even if that is true, it does not set aside

Upchurch’s obligation to allege satisfaction of the condition precedent that actually

appears in section 7A. He has not done so and, as a result, has not stated a claim for

breach of the Stockholders’ Agreement.

13. The Court grants the motion to dismiss the claim for breach of contract.

B. Section 75-1.1

14. Upchurch asserts a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices against all

Defendants. Seeking to dismiss the claim, Defendants contend that section 75-1.1

does not apply to shareholder disputes of the sort alleged in the complaint. (See Br.

in Supp. 5–8.)

15. The General Assembly has declared that “unfair or deceptive acts or

practices in or affecting commerce” are “unlawful.” N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a). “As

construed by our Supreme Court, this language is broad enough ‘to regulate a

business’s regular interactions with other market participants’ but not so broad as to

capture conduct ‘solely related to the internal operations’ of a business.” Brewster v.

Powell Bail Bonding, Inc., 2018 NCBC LEXIS 76, at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 26,
2018) (quoting White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 51–52, 691 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2010)).

Thus, “any unfair or deceptive conduct contained solely within a single business is

not covered by” section 75-1.1. White, 364 N.C. at 53, 691 S.E.2d at 680.

16. All the alleged wrongdoing here was internal to WTG Burlington. Liberally

construed, the complaint alleges that one or more Defendants held shareholder

meetings without proper notice, removed Upchurch as general manager without

cause, appointed a new general manager affiliated with Devries, acted as officers

without authority, and failed to pay the company’s debts. (See Compl. ¶ 19.) These

are internal disputes about management and corporate governance “having nothing

to do with the type of unfair market conduct section 75-1.1 was designed to address.”

Brewster, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 76, at *16–17 (collecting cases); see also Morgan v.

Turn-Pro Maint. Servs., LLC, 2020 NCBC LEXIS 5, at *33 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 15,

2020) (dismissing claim relating to “purely internal dispute” about authority to act

on company’s behalf); Comput. Design & Integration, LLC v. Brown, 2018 NCBC

LEXIS 216, at *82–83 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2018) (dismissing claim based on “acts

related to one member’s buyout of another member’s interest in an LLC”); Kane v.

Moore, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 184, at *13–15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2018) (dismissing

claim involving diversion of corporate opportunities to “third-party businesses”

controlled by LLC member); LLG-NRMH, LLC v. N. Riverfront Marina & Hotel,

LLLP, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 105, at *10–11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (dismissing

claim based in part on dispute between LLC members about “alleged interference

with restaurant management”).
17. Upchurch points to the fact that his replacement as general manager came

from outside the company. (See Opp’n 5.) Even so, a dispute about the hiring of a

general manager is an internal dispute about company management. The tangential

involvement of outsiders “does not change the fundamental character of the dispute.”

JS Real Est. Invs. LLC v. Gee Real Est., LLC, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 104, at *21 (N.C.

Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2017); see also Kane, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 184, at *13–15;

LLG-NRMH, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 105, at *11–13; Potts v. KEL, LLC, 2018 NCBC

LEXIS 24, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2018).

18. At bottom, this is a dispute among shareholders. The alleged wrongdoing

concerns the internal operations of a single market participant, is not in or affecting

commerce, and therefore does not support a claim under section 75-1.1. The Court

grants the motion to dismiss the claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices.

C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

19. Upchurch also asserts his claim for breach of fiduciary duty against all

Defendants. This claim is alleged in highly general terms. (See Compl. ¶ 22.)

Although the complaint doesn’t clearly say so, Upchurch has clarified his intent to

assert the claim directly, not derivatively on behalf of WTG Burlington. (See Opp’n

7.) As elucidated in his brief, Upchurch’s theory is that Defendants are majority or

controlling shareholders and, in that capacity, breached fiduciary duties owed to

minority shareholders (meaning Upchurch). (See Opp’n 10–12.) Defendants move to

dismiss the claim on several grounds, including that the complaint fails to allege facts

to support the existence of a fiduciary relationship. (See Br. in Supp. 13–15.)
20. “As a general rule, shareholders do not owe a fiduciary duty to each other or

to the corporation.” Freese v. Smith, 110 N.C. App. 28, 37, 428 S.E.2d 841, 847 (1993).

Majority shareholders, however, have a duty to protect the interests of the minority.

See Gaines v. Long Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 344, 67 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1951).

21. Here, no single Defendant is a majority shareholder. Upchurch argues that

Defendants, as a group, should be treated as majority shareholders because their

aggregate interest is nearly sixty percent. (See Opp’n 10.) In support, he cites Loy v.

Lorm Corp., 52 N.C. App. 428, 278 S.E.2d 897 (1981). There, the Court of Appeals

allowed a minority shareholder to pursue relief against three fellow shareholders who

together held a majority interest, served as corporate “directors and officers,” were

“firmly in control” of the corporation, and had common interests stemming from their

related, jointly owned business. Id. at 431, 278 S.E.2d at 900. But the defendants in

that case conceded that they were collectively majority shareholders, so the Court of

Appeals did not address the circumstances in which a group of minority shareholders

effectively becomes a controlling majority. See id. at 432, 278 S.E.2d at 901.

22. In any event, the allegations in the complaint bear no resemblance to Loy.

Upchurch claims, for example, that he was the sole director and officer during the

relevant period. (See Compl. ¶ 3.) Although Upchurch’s brief argues that Defendants

“acted in concert,” (Opp’n 10), his complaint says nothing of the sort. There are no

allegations that Defendants acted in concert, had a common plan, or even held

common interests. At most, the complaint pins the supposed coup on Devries and

alleges that the others “ratif[ied]” his actions. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Indeed, the complaint
does not identify any actions taken by Maner, Thomas, or the Glicks, apart from

shareholder votes. These allegations, taken as true, do not show that Defendants

formed a majority bloc from their minority interests. See United Leasing Corp. v.

Guthrie, 192 N.C. App. 623, 634, 666 S.E.2d 504, 511 (2008) (holding that complaint

did not adequately allege that defendant “acted in concert with others” to convert

property); cf. Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 39, at *19–21

(N.C. Super. Ct. June 19, 2019) (noting “the obvious difference between backing a

majority coalition and exercising majority control as of right” when assessing whether

LLC members owed fiduciary duties to each other).

23. As an alternative, Upchurch argues that Defendants, individually, are

controlling minority shareholders. (See Opp’n 10–12.) “[O]ur Supreme Court has not

decided whether a minority shareholder exercising actual control over a corporation

owes a duty to other shareholders.” Panzino v. 5Church, Inc., 2020 NCBC LEXIS 17,

at *12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2020) (citing Corwin, 371 N.C. at 616, 821 S.E.2d at

737). Regardless, Upchurch has not alleged that any individual Defendant exercised

actual control over WTG Burlington. As noted, Upchurch alleges that he was the sole

director and officer. (See Compl. ¶ 3.)*

24. In short, Upchurch has not adequately alleged the existence of a fiduciary

relationship, which is an essential element of the claim. See Dalton v. Camp, 353

* Upchurch relies heavily on Brewster, which denied a motion to dismiss a claim for breach

of fiduciary duty against minority shareholders. The reasoning in Brewster offers no support
for Upchurch. There, the Court followed an appellate decision that was later reversed by the
Supreme Court in Corwin. See Brewster, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 76, at *10. In addition, the
complaint in Brewster alleged that the minority shareholders acted in concert and exercised
control over the corporation—allegations that are absent here.
N.C. 647, 651, 548 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2001); Bennett v. Bennett, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 19,

at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2019). The Court therefore grants the motion to

dismiss his claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

III.
CONCLUSION

25. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. In its discretion, the

Court dismisses the claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty without

prejudice. The section 75-1.1 claim is dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED, this the 8th day of October, 2020.

/s/ Adam M. Conrad
Adam M. Conrad
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases