Vitaform, Inc. v. Aeroflow, Inc.

Vitaform, Inc. v. Aeroflow, Inc., 2021 NCBC 79.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
BUNCOMBE COUNTY 19 CVS 3707

VITAFORM, INC. d/b/a BODY
AFTER BABY,

Plaintiff,
ORDER AND OPINION ON
v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS
AEROFLOW, INC. and MOTIF
MEDICAL, LLC,

Defendants.

1. THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendants Aeroflow, Inc.

(“Aeroflow”) and Motif Medical, LLC’s (“Motif Medical”; together “Defendants”)

Motion for Sanctions (the “Motion”), (ECF No. 103), in the above-captioned case.

2. After considering the Motion, the parties’ materials offered in support of and

in opposition to the Motion, and other relevant matters of record, the Court hereby

GRANTS the Motion in part, DENIES the Motion in part, ENTERS the following

FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and ORDERS relief as set

forth below.

Smith DeVoss, PLLC, by Jeffrey J. Smith and John R. DeVoss, and
Wimer & Snider, P.C., by Jake A. Snider, for Plaintiff Vitaform, Inc.
(d/b/a Body After Baby).

Ward and Smith, P.A., by Joseph A. Schouten, Haley R. Wells, and
Jordan M. Spanner, for Defendants Aeroflow, Inc. and Motif Medical,
LLC.

Bledsoe, Chief Judge.
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Procedural Background

3. On 10 September 2021, Defendants submitted a Business Court Rule

(“BCR”) 10.9 dispute summary concerning Plaintiff Vitaform, Inc. (d/b/a Body After

Baby)’s (“Plaintiff”) disclosure of experts on 6 September 2021 (the “BCR 10.9

Dispute”). After receiving Plaintiff’s response, the Court convened a video conference

to consider the BCR 10.9 Dispute on 22 September 2021 (the “Conference”). All

parties were represented by counsel at the Conference.

4. After the Conference, on 23 September 2021, the Court entered its Order on

Defendants’ 10 September 2021 BCR 10.9 Dispute Summary and Scheduling Order

(the “September 23 Order”). 1 (Order on Defs.’ 10 Sept. 2021 BCR 10.9 Dispute Summ.

and Scheduling Order [hereinafter “Sept. 23 Order”], ECF No. 97.) In the September

23 Order, the Court concluded that Plaintiff “fail[ed] to timely comply with its

disclosure and exchange obligations for expert testimony under the [Case

Management Order (“CMO”), (Case Management Order, ECF No. 64),] and the

[North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure].” (Sept. 23 Order ¶ 8.) Although the Court

denied Defendants’ request to “exclude testimony from Plaintiff’s three identified

experts or any other expert testimony sought to be introduced by Plaintiff at trial as

a sanction for Plaintiff’s [misconduct],” (Sept. 23 Order ¶ 8), the Court did afford

1 The Court incorporates herein by reference the findings and conclusions set forth in the

September 23 Order.
Defendants relief. Specifically, the Court exercised its discretion to “extend the

expert discovery period and dispositive motion deadline to alleviate any prejudice

Defendants might otherwise suffer” and “to permit but not require Defendants to file

a motion for sanctions to seek their attorneys’ fees and costs incurred solely due to

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with its disclosure and exchange obligations under the

CMO and the [North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure].” (Sept. 23 Order ¶ 8.) The

September 23 Order provided that Plaintiff would be “afforded a full opportunity to

reply” should Defendants seek sanctions. (Sept. 23 Order ¶ 8.)

5. Defendants filed the current Motion with supporting materials on 11 October

2021, seeking an award of their attorneys’ fees and costs under N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b) for

Plaintiff’s discovery misconduct. In support of the Motion, Defendants tendered

numerous exhibits as well as an affidavit of Defendants’ lead counsel, Joseph A.

Schouten, (Defs.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Sanctions Ex. K [hereinafter “Schouten Aff.”],

ECF No. 104.11). At the Court’s request, (see Interim Order on Defs.’ Mot. Sanctions,

ECF No. 107), Defendants provided an additional affidavit from Defendants’ counsel

including clarifying information on 23 November 2021, (see ECF No. 110).2

6. Defendants support their request with billing records documenting all tasks

and time worked for which Defendants seek attorneys’ fees (the “Billing Statements”).

(Schouten Aff. Ex. 4; Schouten Aff. Ex. 5.) The Billing Statements comprise two

invoices, one for Aeroflow and one for Motif Medical. Each Billing Statement contains

the date of the hours billed, the attorney or paralegal who conducted the respective

2
The Court refers to the initial version of Joseph A. Schouten’s affidavit filed on 11 October
2021 and located at ECF No. 104.11 for purposes of this Order.
task, a brief description of the task, the hours spent on the task, the rate charged for

the task, and the total amount charged. (Schouten Aff. Ex. 4; Schouten Aff. Ex. 5.)

The two Billing Statements reflect identical time entries and charges to each

Defendant. (See Schouten Aff. Ex. 5.) In total, Defendants seek $23,982.00 in

attorneys’ fees for an asserted 75 hours of work performed by Defendants’ counsel

and paralegal in connection with the BCR 10.9 Dispute and this Motion. (Defs.’ Mem. L.

Supp. Mot. Sanctions 5 [hereinafter Defs.’ Br.], ECF No. 104; see Schouten Aff. Ex. 4;

Schouten Aff. Ex. 5.)

7. Plaintiff filed its response on 1 November 2021. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. To Defs.’ Mot.

Sanctions [hereinafter Pl.’s Resp.], ECF No. 105.) Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff’s

violation of the Court’s CMO “was not willful and was based upon a misunderstanding of

the [CMO] that was reasonable and made in good faith in light of all the circumstances.”

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants have “suffered absolutely no material prejudice” from

Plaintiff’s violation and moreover that Defendants’ fee request is “grossly excessive based

on the sheer number of attorney hours billed.” (Pl.’s Resp. 3.)

8. The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for determination. The Court

concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, that a hearing would not assist the Court

in ruling on the Motion and thus decides this matter without a hearing. See BCR 7.4

(“The Court may rule on a motion without a hearing.”).
II.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legal Standard

9. Trial courts retain the inherent authority “to do all things that are

reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State

Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 129 (1987). To that end, it is “within the inherent power of the

trial court to order [a party] to pay [the opposing party’s] reasonable costs including

attorney’s fees for failure to comply with a court order.” Daniels v. Montgomery Mut.

Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 674 (1987); see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S.

Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (recognizing that the trial court’s “authority includes the ability

to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process[,]”

including “an assessment of attorney’s fees” (cleaned up)); Out of the Box Developers,

LLC v. LogicBit Corp., 2014 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *9–10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 20, 2014)

(“[The trial court’s] inherent authority includes the power to sanction parties for

failure to comply with court orders.” (cleaned up)); see also Cloer v. Smith, 132 N.C.

App. 569, 573 (1999) (“The trial court also retains inherent authority to impose

sanctions for discovery abuses beyond those enumerated in [N.C. R. Civ. P.] 37.”).

10. Separate and apart from a trial court’s inherent authority to impose

monetary sanctions, N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) authorizes an award of reasonable

expenses, in addition to other possible sanctions, when “a party or an officer, director,

or managing agent of a party” fails to obey a court order regarding discovery. See

N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). In such circumstances, “the court shall require the party
failing to obey the order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,

caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially

justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. As this

Court has previously recognized, when a party has failed to obey a discovery order,

“an award of reasonable costs is mandatory unless the failure is substantially

justified or an award would be unjust due to other circumstances.” Red Valve, Inc. v.

Titan Valve, Inc., 2019 NCBC LEXIS 57, at *75 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019), aff’d

per curiam, 376 N.C. 798 (2021) (emphasis omitted).

11. Generally, an award of attorneys’ fees requires “that the trial court enter

findings of fact as to the time and labor expended, skill required, customary fee for

like work, and experience or ability of the attorney based on competent evidence.”

Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 146 N.C. App. 658, 672 (2001). When attorneys’

fees are awarded as a sanction, there must be “findings to explain . . . how the court

arrived at” the awarded amount. Dunn v. Canoy, 180 N.C. App. 30, 50 (2006).

12. The Court’s award of expenses, including attorneys’ fees, must be

reasonable. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2); Daniels, 320 N.C. at 674. An award of

monetary sanctions should be limited to those fees and expenses incurred as a result

of the sanctioned party’s improper conduct. See, e.g., N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)

(providing that the court “shall require the party failing to obey the [discovery] order

to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure[.]”);

Daniels, 320 N.C. at 674–75 (concluding that the trial court had the “inherent power

to tax [the] plaintiff with the reasonable costs, including attorney’s fees incurred by
[the] defendant” at a trial in which “plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with the court’s

order prohibiting the introduction of [certain] evidence”).

13. The amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded is left to the trial court’s

discretion and “will not be disturbed without a showing of manifest abuse of [that]

discretion.” Bryson v. Cort, 193 N.C. App. 532, 540 (2008). A trial court will only be

held to have abused its discretion “where the court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported

by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned

decision.” E. Brooks Wilkins Family Med., P.A. v. WakeMed, 244 N.C. App. 567, 578

(2016) (quoting Couch, 146 N.C. App. at 667–68).

B. Plaintiff’s Conduct

14. Plaintiff contends that its acknowledged violation of the CMO was

substantially justified and that an award of expenses against it would be unjust in

these circumstances. Plaintiff asserts that, although the parties reflected their

agreement to exchange expert reports in their Case Management Report (“CMR”),

(Case Management Report 1, 3, ECF No. 62), Plaintiff did not remember that

agreement in August and early September 2021 as the CMO’s deadline for expert

disclosures approached. Plaintiff then argues that because the CMO did not state

that the parties had agreed to exchange reports—only that “[i]f the parties elect to

exchange expert reports,” they must do so on or before the date of expert disclosure—

Plaintiff was substantially justified in believing that it had no obligation to provide

expert reports under the CMO when it reviewed the CMO as the disclosure deadline

loomed. (Pl.’s Resp. 4–6.) The Court disagrees.
15. First, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff’s construction of the

CMO fails and that Plaintiff violated the CMO. (Sept. 23 Order ¶ 6.) Indeed, the

CMR expressly states that the parties agreed that “initial experts and response

experts shall submit a written report to go along with their resumes and all materials

they relied on that were not previously produced in discovery,” (Case Management

Report 3), and the CMO indicates that “[i]f the parties elect to exchange expert

reports”—which they agreed to do in the CMR—those expert reports would be

provided in accordance with the requirements of the CMO, (Case Management Order

5). Plaintiff’s strained interpretation does not permit it to avoid the obligations

attendant to the agreement it admittedly made, whether forgotten or not, and in no

way substantially justifies its failure to provide expert reports or full and complete

expert disclosures as required under the CMO.

16. This conclusion is further supported by Plaintiff’s acknowledgement of its

agreement to exchange expert reports and full and complete expert disclosures in the

weeks and months leading up to the CMO’s 6 September 2021 expert disclosure

deadline. First, in March 2021, Plaintiff acknowledged in its interrogatory responses

that it would comply with the CMO and stated further that “[a]ppropriate expert

reports, upon agreement, or answers to this interrogatory, containing the foundation

and substance of the facts and opinions of the experts will be delivered at the time of

the designation.” (Defs.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Sanctions Ex. A ¶ 3, ECF No. 104.1.)

Then, on 30 July 2021, mere weeks before the expert disclosure deadline, Plaintiff’s

counsel indicated in negotiations over a N.C. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition that
Plaintiff’s “expert witness might need some of the information from this [N.C. R. Civ.

P.] 30(b)(6) to deliver a fully-informed opinion,” (Defs.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Sanctions

Ex. B, ECF No. 104.2 (emphasis added)).

17. Despite these acknowledgements, however, Plaintiff disingenuously argues

that it was unaware of its agreement to provide expert reports until after it submitted

expert disclosures on 6 September 2021. (Pl.’s Resp. 5.) But even then, those

purported disclosures did not include the substance of the experts’ opinions, the

experts’ qualifications, or the facts, data, and materials on which the experts relied

to form their undisclosed opinions—all basic requirements under the CMO and N.C.

R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), not to mention information Plaintiff promised in its interrogatory

responses. And even if the Court could credit Plaintiff’s contention that it did not

recall its agreement to exchange expert reports, Plaintiff’s failure to give even a

cursory review to the CMR containing that agreement when confronted with the

CMO’s language requiring certain action “[i]f the parties elect to exchange expert

reports,” (Case Management Order 5 (emphasis added)), hardly justifies Plaintiff’s

conduct.

18. In short, Plaintiff’s effort to rationalize its disregard of its discovery

obligations is unpersuasive. Plaintiff not only failed to comply with the CMO’s

requirement to provide expert reports by the expert disclosure deadline, but the

disclosures Plaintiff did provide were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s expert disclosure

obligations under the CMO, N.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), and Plaintiff’s representations

in its interrogatory responses. Thus, the Court concludes, in the exercise of its
discretion, that Plaintiff has not shown that its failure to comply with the CMO was

substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

Accordingly, the Court further concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, that

sanctions in the form of an award of attorneys’ fees under N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b) and

the Court’s inherent authority are appropriate in the circumstances here.

19. The Court now turns to an examination of Defendants’ request for

$23,982.00 in attorneys’ fees.

C. Reasonableness of Rates

20. The Court first analyzes the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by

Defendants’ counsel.

21. The reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in this State “is governed by the factors

found in Rule 1.5 of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the North Carolina

State Bar.” Ehrenhaus v. Baker, 216 N.C. App. 59, 96 (2011). “The factors to be

considered in determining whether a fee is clearly excessive” under Rule 1.5(a) of the

Revised Rules of Professional Conduct include:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a).

22. Defendants’ counsel charged at the following hourly rates for the fees it

seeks in the Motion: (i) $400 for Joseph A. Schouten, a partner with approximately

seventeen years’ experience; (ii) $350 for Haley Roper Wells, a partner with

approximately thirteen years’ experience; (iii) $235 for Jordan Spanner, an associate

with approximately three years’ experience; and (iv) $185 for Elizabeth A. Stallings,

a paralegal with over twenty years’ experience. (Schouten Aff. ¶¶ 2, 6, 8–9, 11;

Schouten Aff. Ex. 3.)

23. Plaintiff does not object to the hourly rates Defendants’ attorneys have

charged. Based on Defendants’ counsel’s affidavit, the previous holdings of this

Court, and the Court’s knowledge of the hourly rates of local attorneys providing

similar services in this locality, the Court concludes that Defendants’ attorneys’ rates

are reasonable, clearly not excessive, and within those “customarily charged in [this]

locality for similar legal services.” N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a)(3); see Insight

Health Corp. v. Marquis Diagnostic Imaging of N.C., LLC, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 69,

*21–23 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 6, 2018) (holding hourly rates charged in Buncombe

County of $230 to $405 for attorneys and $150 to $250 for paralegals and support

staff to be reasonable); see also, e.g., Simpson v. Simpson, 209 N.C. App. 320, 328

(2011) (recognizing that, in awarding attorneys’ fees, a trial court may “take judicial
notice of the customary hourly rates of local attorneys performing the same services

and having the same experience.”). 3

D. Time and Labor Expended by Defendants’ Counsel

24. The Court next evaluates the time and labor expended by Defendants’

counsel. See N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a)(1). Plaintiff argues that much of the

time identified for payment on the Billing Statements should be adjusted because the

billing entries reflect an excessive amount of time spent on the BCR 10.9 Dispute and

the Motion.

25. Defendants seek to recover $23,982.00 in attorneys’ fees arising from 75

hours of attorney and paralegal time spent between 7 September and 8 October 2021

in connection with the BCR 10.9 Dispute and the Motion. (Defs.’ Br. 5; see Schouten

Aff. Ex. 4; Schouten Aff. Ex. 5.) Defendants’ counsel avers that he and his colleagues

incurred 42.2 hours of this time, totaling $14,885.00, between September 7 and

September 22 for work performed in connection with the BCR 10.9 Dispute as follows:

3 Defendants’ requested hourly rates here are also within the range of those this Court has

found reasonable for complex business litigation in North Carolina. See, e.g., W&W Partners,
Inc. v. Ferrell Land Co., 2020 NCBC LEXIS 35, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2020) (finding
attorney hourly rate of $526.50 reasonable); Red Valve, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *19–20,
32–36 (finding attorney hourly rates between $250 and $450 reasonable); Bradshaw v.
Maiden, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 98, at *12–13 (N.C. Super. Sept. 20, 2018) (finding attorney
hourly rate of $450 reasonable); Insight Health Corp. v. Marquis Diagnostic Imaging of N.C.,
LLC, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 69, at *21 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 6, 2018) (finding attorney hourly
rates of $375 to $405 reasonable); In re Newbridge Bancorp S’holder Litig., 2016 NCBC
LEXIS 91, at *46–47 (N.C Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2016) (concluding that “a typical and customary
[attorney] hourly rate charged in North Carolina for complex commercial litigation . . . ranges
from $250 to $475”); In re Pike Corp. S’holder Litig., 2015 NCBC LEXIS 95, at *22–23 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2015) (finding attorney hourly rates of up to $550 to be within but at the
higher end of, reasonable rates for complex business litigation in North Carolina). The Court
also takes judicial notice that attorney and paralegal billing rates in North Carolina have
increased since many of these decisions were rendered.
(i) Schouten 23.8 hours ($9,520.00); (ii) Wells 9.4 hours ($3,290.00); (iii) Spanner 8.2

hours ($1,927.00); and (iv) Stallings .8 hours ($148.00). (See Schouten Aff. Ex. 4;

Schouten Aff. Ex. 5.) Defendants’ counsel further avers that he and his colleagues

incurred 28.4 hours, totaling $7,764.00, between September 23 and October 8 for

work performed in connection with the Motion as follows: (i) Schouten 3.4 hours

($1,360.00); (ii) Wells 4.6 hours ($1,610.00); and Spanner 20.4 hours ($4,794.00). (See

Schouten Aff. Ex. 4; Schouten Aff. Ex. 5.) Defendants’ counsel also seek 4.4 hours

that Ms. Wells (2.6 hours) and Ms. Spanner (1.8 hours) incurred on 22 September

2021, which the Court treats separately below.

26. The Court has carefully reviewed Defendants’ Billing Statements, and

contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, that most

of the time Defendants’ attorneys and paralegal spent in connection with the BCR

10.9 Dispute and this Motion was reasonable under the circumstances and should be

awarded.

27. The Court, however, in the exercise of its discretion, declines to award the

following requested fees because the time incurred does not relate to the BCR 10.9

Dispute or the Motion but instead appears to relate to the litigation more broadly:

a. Ms. Wells’ time entries on September 22 for 2.6 hours ($910.00) for

“Formulation of strategy; client conference re discovery matters;

consideration of needed discovery”;

b. Ms. Spanner’s time entries on September 22 for 1.8 hours ($423.00) for

“Continued preparation and development of strategy re Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; analysis of issues re existence

of a trade secret, misappropriation of trade secret, and unjust

enrichment.”

28. The Court also elects, in the exercise of its discretion, to adjust the following

time entries because the Court concludes that the time incurred was excessive for the

tasks performed:

a. Mr. Schouten’s time entries between September 13 and September 21

totaling 12.8 hours for tasks performed after the BCR 10.9 Dispute was

sent through the day before the Conference shall be reduced to 9 hours

(thereby reducing Defendants’ requested fees for this work by $1,520.00);

b. Ms. Spanner’s time entries from September 23 to October 8 totaling 20.4

hours for tasks performed in connection with the Motion shall be reduced

to 14 hours (thereby reducing Defendants’ requested fees for this work by

$1,504.00).

29. Except as provided above, the Court concludes, in the exercise of its

discretion, that no other adjustments to Defendants’ requested attorneys’ fees are

necessary or appropriate and that the fees sought for these tasks are reasonable and

should be awarded.

30. The Court thus finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that Defendants

should be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees for 60.4 hours of attorney and paralegal

time spent in connection with the BCR 10.9 Dispute and the Motion in the total
amount of $19,625.00 as follows: Schouten 23.4 hours ($9,360.00); Wells 14 hours

($4,900.00); Spanner 22.2 hours ($5,217.00); Stallings .8 hours ($148.00).

E. Remaining N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5 Factors

31. The Court finds that the remaining factors set forth in Rule 1.5(a) of the

Revised Rules of Professional Conduct merit the award of attorneys’ fees ordered

herein.

32. As to that portion of N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a)’s first factor

considering “the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly,” the Court finds that the work

required in connection with the BCR 10.9 Dispute and the Motion was challenging

and required a high degree of skill, experience, and specialized knowledge.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the attorneys’ fees awarded hereunder.

33. Considering N.C. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a)’s seventh factor—“the

experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the

services”—the Court finds that Defendants’ attorneys have significant experience in

complex business litigation matters and have shown great ability in investigating the

circumstances of the BCR 10.9 Dispute and the Motion. The Court concludes that

this factor also weighs in favor of the Court’s award of attorneys’ fees in this case.

34. Finally, the Court has considered the remaining factors of N.C. Rev. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.5(a)—to the extent they can be applied to an award of attorneys’ fees in

the context of sanctions—and finds that the attorneys’ fees awarded herein are

reasonable in light of these factors as well.
III.

CONCLUSION

35. WHEREFORE, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, hereby

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions as more

particularly set forth above and ORDERS Plaintiff to pay Defendants’ reasonable

attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $19,625.00 within thirty (30) days of the entry

of this Order.

SO ORDERED, this the 15th day of December, 2021.

/s/ Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Chief Business Court Judge