Accelerando, Inc. v. Relentless Sols., Inc.

Accelerando, Inc. v. Relentless Sols., Inc., 2025 NCBC 28.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
GUILFORD COUNTY 24CV028428-400

ACCELERANDO, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.
ORDER AND OPINION ON MOTION
RELENTLESS SOLUTIONS, INC. TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT
and ROBERT YODER,

Defendants.

1. THIS MATTER is before the Court on the 5 March 2025 filing by

Defendant Relentless Solutions, Inc. (Relentless) of the Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint (the Motion). (ECF No. 16 [Mot.].) Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North

Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rule(s)), Relentless seeks dismissal of all

claims alleged against it by Plaintiff Accelerando, Inc. (Plaintiff). (Mot. 1.)

2. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES

in part the Motion.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P. by Jennifer K.
Van Zant and Amanda S. Hawkins, for Plaintiff Accelerando, Inc.

Fitzgerald Hanna & Sullivan, PLLC by Andrew L. Fitzgerald, for
Defendant Relentless Solutions, Inc.

Robinson, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

3. This action arises out of Plaintiff’s contention that its competitor,

Relentless, has misappropriated trade secrets taken by Plaintiff’s former

employees—including Defendant Robert Yoder (Yoder)—who left to work for
Relentless. Plaintiff alleges that, in using Plaintiff’s confidential or trade secret

information, Relentless has breached its contract with Plaintiff and wrongfully

interfered with Plaintiff’s service contracts with its customers by inducing them to

terminate the service contracts to work with Relentless instead.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4. The Court does not make findings of fact when ruling on a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and only recites those factual allegations relevant and

necessary to the Court’s determination of the Motion.

A. The Parties

5. Plaintiff is a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business

in Guilford County, North Carolina. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 14 [Am. Compl.].)

6. Relentless is a Florida corporation with its principal office in North Miami,

Florida. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.)

7. Yoder is a resident of Forsyth County, North Carolina. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.)

B. Plaintiff’s Business and Relationship with Relentless

8. Plaintiff, with the authorization of NCR Corporation (NCR), “provides

software and services to businesses that license NCR Counterpoint[,]” a point-of-sale

software product and intellectual property owned by NCR. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–11.)

“The products and services [Plaintiff] provides are highly specialized, and are

targeted to clients who use NCR Counterpoint.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 12.)

9. Approximately thirty companies worldwide, including Plaintiff and

Relentless, have been authorized by NCR “to sell products and provide service to
customers using NCR Counterpoint within certain geographic regions.” (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 10–11.) Relentless is also authorized to provide NCR Counterpoint

products and services. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)

10. On 24 August 2017, Plaintiff and Relentless entered into the Ecommerce 4

Counterpoint Reseller Agreement (the E4CP Agreement), which remains in effect.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 18.)

11. Pursuant to the E4CP Agreement, Plaintiff authorized Relentless “to resell

certain products that [Plaintiff] creates for use with NCR’s Counterpoint” (the E4CP

Products). (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.)

12. As a condition of receiving a license to resell the E4CP Products, the E4CP

Agreement includes a confidentiality provision whereby Relentless “agreed that it

would not use in competition [Plaintiff’s] confidential business information, including

[Plaintiff’s] price lists, data, marketing materials, and business plans.” (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 20–21.) This provision expressly excludes “information that is publicly

known or otherwise available through lawful means, or information that Relentless

independently developed.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.)

C. Yoder’s Employment with Plaintiff

13. Yoder began working for Plaintiff around 15 November 2009. (Am.

Compl. ¶ 15.) At the time of his resignation, Yoder was Plaintiff’s Vice President of

Platform Services, through which he had access to Plaintiff’s confidential information

and clients. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.)
14. In November 2009, Yoder executed a Subcontractor Non-Compete

Agreement (the Non-Compete Agreement). (Am. Compl. ¶ 38; see Am. Compl. Ex. A.,

ECF No. 14.1 [Non-Compete Agt.].)

15. The Non-Compete Agreement includes the following covenant against

competition:

A. During the period of Subcontractor’s contractual relationship with
the Company and for a period of twenty-four (24) months after the
termination of agreement . . . Subcontractor shall not directly or
indirectly, either for Subcontractor’s own account or as a partner,
shareholder (other than shares regularly traded in a recognized
market), officer, subcontractor, agent or otherwise, provide services or
other to any of the Company’s customers, clients or accounts that might
be considered competitive in nature. By way of example, and not as a
limitation, the foregoing shall preclude Subcontractor from soliciting
business or sales from, or attempting to convert to other sellers or
providers of the same or similar products or services as provided by the
Company, any customer, client, or account of the Company.

(Non-Compete Agt. at 1.)

16. The Non-Compete Agreement also includes the following confidentiality

provision:

C. During the period of the Subcontractor’s contractual relationship
with the Company, and thereafter for seven (7) years, Subcontractor
shall not disclose to anyone any Confidential Information. For the
purposes of this Agreement, “Confidential Information” shall include
any of the Company’s confidential, proprietary or trade secret
information that is disclosed to Subcontractor or Subcontractor
otherwise learns in the course of employment such as, but not limited
to, business plans, customer lists, financial statements, software
diagrams, flow charts and product plans.

(Non-Compete Agt. at 2.) The confidentiality provision expressly excludes

information that “(i) is or becomes publicly available through no act of Subcontractor,
(ii) is rightfully received by Subcontractor from a third party without restrictions[,]

or (iii) is independently developed by Subcontractor.” (Non-Compete Agt. at 2.)

D. Yoder Resigns from Employment with Plaintiff and Begins Work
for Relentless

17. Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that Yoder met with

Relentless at its headquarters in Florida in December 2021 and that, shortly

thereafter, Yoder accepted a position with Relentless. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41–42.)

18. On or about 14 March 2022, Yoder informed Plaintiff that he was resigning.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 43.)

19. At some point after resigning from his employment with Plaintiff, Yoder

began working for Relentless as a Solutions Architect L3. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.)

20. Plaintiff alleges that its President, Craig Castor, asked Yoder when he

resigned whether he was leaving to work for Relentless and that Yoder “lied and said

he was not.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 43.)

21. The same day that he resigned, Yoder forwarded certain information

regarding Plaintiff’s then-customer Frham to his personal email address, including

“an internal Accelerando service ticket, which included Frham’s customer contact

information.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 45.) Yoder “also forwarded to his personal email

customer contact information for then-Accelerando customer Girl Scouts Carolinas

Peaks to Piedmont.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff alleges that the customer

information taken by Yoder is confidential. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 45.)
22. Plaintiff further alleges, upon information and belief, that Yoder “also stole

additional confidential and trade secret information” from Plaintiff and that he took

this information to use for Relentless’ benefit. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47–48.)

E. Other Employees Depart Plaintiff and Join Relentless

1. Scott Muller

23. Scott Muller (Muller) began working for Plaintiff in 2005 as an account

manager and later became a vice president of the company. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.)

24. Muller resigned his employment with Plaintiff in 2012 “after an argument

with [Plaintiff’s] President over his authority and compensation.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.)

Plaintiff alleges that, before leaving, Muller threatened that “he would steal

[Plaintiff’s] customers if he left.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.)

25. Upon leaving his employment with Plaintiff, Muller “began working for one

of [Plaintiff’s] clients” and, shortly thereafter, Muller, “through his employer, fired

[Plaintiff].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.)

26. In or around June 2021, Muller was hired as Vice President of Business

Development at Relentless. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges, upon information

and belief, that approximately three months later, in or around September 2021,

Muller became Relentless’ Chief Operations Officer. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.)

2. Dana Dollaeye

27. In or around September 2021, Dana Dollaeye (Dollaeye) was hired as the

Vice President of Client Delivery Service of Relentless. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.)
28. Dollaeye was previously employed by Plaintiff, where she worked “in a

nearly identical role, as [Plaintiff’s] Vice President of Client Delivery Service and an

officer of [Plaintiff].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) Dollaeye resigned from her employment

with Plaintiff on 14 September 2021. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.)

29. In her role as Plaintiff’s Vice President of Client Delivery Service, Dollaeye

“had access to [Plaintiff’s] confidential information, and was in charge of managing

[Plaintiff’s] client service protocols. Nearly all of [Plaintiff’s] employees reported

directly to her, including [Plaintiff’s] Knowledge Services Professionals, service

managers, and subcontractors.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) Dollaeye, in this role, “also had

access to all information regarding rates of pay, benefit classes, and history of

compensation for every employee.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.)

30. After tendering notice, but prior to leaving employment with Plaintiff,

Dollaeye emailed to her personal email certain information which Plaintiff alleges

constitutes its confidential and trade secret information. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff

specifically alleges that Dollaeye emailed herself a host of sensitive documents

including internal best practices and policies, work templates, job descriptions, and

other internal documents (collectively, the Customer Service Protocols). (See Am.

Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges it has “developed and honed” these materials over the

course of more than two decades. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)

31. Only service management employees of Plaintiff have access to the

Customer Service Protocols, and the materials are password protected and are not

shared outside the company. (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.)
32. Plaintiff further alleges, upon information and belief, that Dollaeye

“forwarded and stole additional trade secret materials” from Plaintiff and that she

took this information to use for Relentless’ benefit. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34–35.)

F. Plaintiff’s Customers Leave to Work with Relentless

33. Plaintiff alleges that the following customers have left Plaintiff to work

with Relentless: (1) Girl Scouts Carolinas Peaks to Piedmont (Girl Scouts), (2) Frham,

(3) Shore Décor, and (4) So-Mo Agri Supply. (Am. Compl. ¶ 54.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

34. On 23 December 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action upon the filing of the

Verified Complaint. (ECF No. 3.)

35. On 21 February 2025, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint as a matter of

right. (ECF No. 14.)

36. On 5 March 2025, Relentless filed the Motion. After full briefing, the Court

held a hearing on the Motion on 6 June 2025 (the Hearing), where all parties were

represented by counsel. (See ECF No. 30.)

37. The Motion is ripe for resolution.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

38. In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court

reviews the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v. Medflow, Inc., 370 N.C. 1, 5 (2017). The Court’s

inquiry is “whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint . . . are

sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal
theory[.]” Harris v. NCNB Nat’l Bank, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670 (1987). The Court

accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the relevant pleadings as true. See

Krawiec v. Manly, 370 N.C. 602, 606 (2018). The Court is therefore not required “to

accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,

or unreasonable inferences.” Good Hope Hosp., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health and Hum.

Servs., 174 N.C. App. 266, 274 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

39. Furthermore, the Court “can reject allegations that are contradicted by the

documents attached, specifically referred to, or incorporated by reference in the

complaint.” Moch v. A.M. Pappas & Assocs., LLC, 251 N.C. App. 198, 206 (2016)

(citation omitted). The Court may consider these attached or incorporated documents

without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment.

Id. (citation and quotations omitted).

40. Our Supreme Court has observed that “[i]t is well-established that

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when ‘(1) the complaint on its face

reveals that no law supports the plaintiff’s claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals

the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses

some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff’s claim.’ ” Corwin v. British Am.

Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 615 (2018) (citations omitted). This standard of review

for Rule 12(b)(6) motions is the standard our Supreme Court “routinely uses . . . in

assessing the sufficiency of complaints in the context of complex commercial

litigation.” Id. at 615 n.7 (citations omitted).
V. ANALYSIS

41. Relentless moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against Relentless,

which include: (1) misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of N.C.G.S. § 66-152,

et seq. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55–66), (Count One); (2) breach of contract related to the E4CP

Agreement (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75–81), (Count Three); (3) wrongful interference with

contract (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 82–88), (Count Four); (4) unfair and deceptive trade

practices pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1, et seq. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 89–96), (Count Five);

(5) unjust enrichment (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97–101), (Count Six); and (6) permanent

injunction (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 102–05), (Count Seven)1. The Court will address each

claim in turn.2

1 The request for permanent injunction, which makes up the seventh claim for relief, was

misnamed as a claim for unjust enrichment in the Amended Complaint.

2 As an initial matter, Relentless contends in its reply brief that Plaintiff has abandoned its

claims for unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, and tortious interference
by making no argument regarding those claims in its brief in opposition to the Motion. (See
Reply Br. Supp. Mot. 5, ECF No. 24 [Reply].)

Although the Court notes that Plaintiff’s brief in opposition appears to focus solely on the
misappropriation of trade secrets claim, the Court also notes that Relentless’ brief in support
of the Motion largely discusses Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for misappropriation of trade
secrets and appears to otherwise generally argue that the remaining claims also fail because
“[e]very one of Plaintiff’s claims against Relentless hinges on a basic premise that Relentless
misappropriated trade secrets or confidential information.” (See Br. Supp. Mot. 3–4, ECF
No. 17 [Br. Supp.].)

Despite the fact that the parties’ briefs loosely address these other claims, the Court does not
consider those claims abandoned and will still address whether they have been sufficiently
pled by Plaintiff in the Amended Complaint.
A. Count One: Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

42. Plaintiff alleges that “Relentless, through Mr. Muller, Ms. Dollaeye, and

Mr. Yoder, has misappropriated [Plaintiff’s] trade secrets by using them against

[Plaintiff] to solicit [Plaintiff’s] customers.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49, 56, 60.)

43. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that “[b]ecause Relentless knew from the

Confidential Customer Service Protocols how [Plaintiff] handled customer service

issues, it knew how to undercut [Plaintiff] to its customers.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 51.) By

way of example, Plaintiff alleges that “Relentless was able to point to specific ‘flaws’

in [Plaintiff’s] handling of customer service issues as a way to encourage customers

to leave [Plaintiff], or to compare its own services to [Plaintiff’s].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 51.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that based on its misuse of Plaintiff’s trade secrets,

Relentless successfully encouraged four specific customers—Girl Scouts, Frham,

Shore Décor, and So-Mo Agri Supply—to leave Plaintiff and work with Relentless

instead. (Am. Compl. ¶ 54.)

44. The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act defines a trade secret as

business or technical information, including but not limited to a formula,
pattern, program, device, compilation of information, method,
technique, or process that:

a. Derives independent actual or potential commercial value
from not being generally known or readily ascertainable through
independent development or reverse engineering by persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

b. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
N.C.G.S. § 66-152(3). “To plead misappropriation of trade secrets, a plaintiff must

identify a trade secret with sufficient particularity so as to enable a defendant to

delineate that which he is accused of misappropriating and a court to determine

whether misappropriation has or is threatened to occur.” Krawiec, 370 N.C. at 609

(citation omitted).

45. Misappropriation is defined as the “acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade

secret of another without express or implied authority or consent, unless such trade

secret was arrived at by independent development, reverse engineering, or was

obtained from another person with a right to disclose the trade secret.”

N.C.G.S. § 66-152(1). The allegations of a complaint must identify with specificity

“the acts by which the alleged misappropriations were accomplished.” Washburn v.

Yadkin Valley Bank & Tr. Co., 190 N.C. App. 315, 327 (2008).

46. The crux of Relentless’ argument is that the Amended Complaint does not

include sufficient facts or evidence showing that Relentless has possessed and used

the alleged trade secret information. (See Br. Supp. 3–5, 7–8.) Further, Relentless

argues that the allegations in the Amended Complaint regarding misappropriation

of trade secrets amount to an inevitable disclosure doctrine argument, a doctrine

which has not been adopted by North Carolina courts. (See Br. Supp. 4–5, 10.)

47. Plaintiff contends it has sufficiently alleged misappropriation of trade

secrets against Relentless based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint that

(1) Yoder and Dollaeye each left their employment with Plaintiff and later began

working for Relentless; (2) Yoder and Dollaeye each forwarded themselves Plaintiff’s
alleged confidential or trade secret information after giving notice but prior to leaving

employment with Plaintiff; (3) Relentless used the information taken by Yoder and

Dollaeye to undermine relationships with Plaintiff’s customers so that they would

leave to work with Relentless; and (4) four of Plaintiff’s customers did, in fact, leave

to work with Relentless, including two customers whose information Yoder forwarded

to himself prior to leaving employment with Plaintiff. (See Memo. Opp’n Def.’s

Mot. 6–7, 10–11, ECF No. 21 [Memo. Opp.].)

48. The Court determines that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are

minimally sufficient at this stage to state a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets

against Relentless based on Relentless’ alleged misappropriation of the Customer

Service Protocols taken by Dollaeye.

49. However, to the extent Count One is also based on Relentless’ use of trade

secrets allegedly taken by Yoder or Muller, the Court determines the allegations in

the Amended Complaint insufficient to state a claim for misappropriation of trade

secrets as (i) with respect to Yoder, Plaintiff only alleges that Yoder took confidential

customer information, which Plaintiff concedes does not constitute trade secrets, and

otherwise has generally alleged upon information and belief that Yoder stole

unspecified trade secret information from Plaintiff; and (ii) with respect to Muller,

the Amended Complaint contains no allegations that trade secrets were taken by

Muller and subsequently used by Relentless.

50. Further, the Court rejects Relentless’ argument that these allegations

warrant invoking the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Plaintiff has not simply alleged
that, because former employees of Plaintiff who had access to trade secret information

left to work for a competitor, such information will inevitably be disclosed. Rather,

Plaintiff has specifically alleged that Relentless accessed the alleged trade secret

information taken by Dollaeye, used it to identify flaws in Plaintiff’s services and

encourage customers to leave Plaintiff to work with Relentless, and, as a result, four

customers left to work with Relentless. These are allegations of actual, as opposed to

inevitable, disclosure and use.

51. Therefore, the Court DENIES in part the Motion as to Count One to the

extent it is based on Relentless’ alleged misappropriation of the Customer Service

Protocols taken by Dollaeye. Except as herein denied, the Motion is GRANTED in

part as to Count One to the extent it is based on unidentified trade secrets allegedly

taken by Yoder or Muller.

B. Count Three: Breach of E4CP Agreement

52. Plaintiff alleges that Relentless has breached paragraph C of the E4CP

Agreement by using Plaintiff’s confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information

to compete with Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶ 79.)

53. Relentless appears to argue that this breach of contract claim fails because

the Amended Complaint does not include allegations “explaining the link of how or

why there is a belief that Relentless misused confidential information obtained

during the E4CP [Agreement].” (Br. Supp. 3.)

54. To properly plead a breach of contract claim, the claimant must allege

“(1) [the] existence of a valid contract and (2) [a] breach of the terms of that contract.”
Poor v. Hill, 138 N.C. App. 19, 26 (2000) (citing Jackson v. Cal. Hardwood Co.,

120 N.C. App. 870, 871 (1995)). Where each of these elements are alleged, “it is error

to dismiss a breach of contract claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Woolard v. Davenport,

166 N.C. App. 129, 134 (2004). “[S]tating a claim for breach of contract is a relatively

low bar.” Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 39, at *11 (N.C.

Super. Ct. June 19, 2019).

55. Upon review of the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Court

determines that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts that state a claim for breach of

contract. Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that the E4CP Agreement is a valid,

enforceable agreement between Plaintiff and Relentless, (Am. Compl. ¶ 76), and that

Relentless breached that agreement by using confidential, trade secret, and

proprietary information to compete with Accelerando to solicit Plaintiff’s customers

to work with Relentless, (see Am. Compl. ¶ 79).

56. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to Count Three for breach of

the E4CP Agreement.

C. Count Four: Wrongful Interference with Contract

57. Plaintiff brings Count Four for wrongful interference with contract against

Relentless, alleging that (1) valid contracts existed between Plaintiff and the

following customers for the provision of Counterpoint-related services: Girl Scouts,

Frham, Shore Décor, and So-Mo Agri Supply; (2) Relentless knew that Plaintiff had

contracts with these customers; (3) Relentless used Plaintiff’s confidential and trade

secret information in violation of the E4CP Agreement to intentionally induce these
customers to terminate their contracts with Plaintiff; and (4) Relentless had no legal

justification for interfering with Plaintiff’s customers through the misuse of Plaintiff’s

confidential and trade secret information, which Relentless was contractually bound

to protect. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83–85, 87.)

58. To state a claim for tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must

allege the following: (1) a valid contract exists between the plaintiff and a third

person; (2) the defendant knows of the contract between plaintiff and the third party;

(3) the defendant intentionally induces the third person not to perform the contract;

(4) the defendant in doing so acts without justification; and (5) the interference

results in actual damage to the plaintiff. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall,

322 N.C. 643, 661 (1988) (citing Childress v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 674 (1954)). “The

pleading standards for a tortious interference with contract claim are strict.”

Urquhart v. Trenkelbach, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 12, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2017);

see also Wells Fargo Ins. Servs. USA v. Link, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 42, at *47 (N.C.

Super. Ct. May 8, 2018); Kerry Bodenhamer Farms, LLC v. Nature’s Pearl Corp.,

2017 NCBC LEXIS 27, at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2017).

59. Relentless argues that the claim for tortious interference should fail

because it “hinges on the fact that Relentless allegedly used ‘[Plaintiff’s] confidential

and trade secrets information’ to win customers in the competitive NCR

marketplace[,]” and Relentless believes misappropriation has not been sufficiently

pled. (Br. Supp. 3–4.) Relentless also states that it “should be obvious that clients in

a competitive environment will change providers.” (Br. Supp. 9.)
60. While the Court recognizes that there is a “general principle that

interference may be justified when the plaintiff and defendant are competitors[,]”

competition in business only constitutes justifiable interference so long as it is carried

on in furtherance of one’s own interests and by means that are lawful.” Peoples Sec.

Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C. 216, 221–22 (1988) (emphasis added). Thus, to the

extent Relentless contends this claim fails because Plaintiff and Relentless are

competitors, that argument does not pass muster, as Plaintiff has alleged Relentless,

through unlawful means, has intentionally induced Plaintiff’s customers to terminate

their service agreements.

61. Upon review of the Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that the

allegations are sufficient at this stage to state a claim for tortious interference with

the service contracts between Plaintiff and Girl Scouts, Frham, Shore Décor, and

So-Mo Agri Supply.

62. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to Count Four for tortious

interference with contract.

D. Count Five: Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices

63. Plaintiff alleges that the conduct of Relentless complained of in the

Amended Complaint “is oppressive and substantially injurious to customers and,

therefore, unfair under N.C.[G.S.] § 75-1.1.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 90.) Additionally,

Plaintiff contends that Relentless’ violation of the North Carolina Trade Secrets

Protection Act and wrongful interference constitute unfair methods of competition

and unfair or deceptive trade practices. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91–92.)
64. “To prevail on a claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices a plaintiff

must show (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, or an unfair method of

competition, (2) in or affecting commerce, (3) which proximately caused actual injury

to the plaintiff or to his business.” Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Pollard, 101 N.C.

App. 450, 460–61 (1991) (citing Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539 (1981)).

65. Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes (UDTPA) provides, in

pertinent part, that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”

N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(a). Further, the UDTPA defines “commerce” to include “all business

activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered

by a member of a learned profession.” N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b).

66. “North Carolina courts have previously concluded that when the UDTP[A]

claim rests solely upon other claims . . . which the court determines should be

dismissed, the UDTP[A] claim must fail as well.” Chara, LLC v. Sequoia Servs., LLC,

2020 NCBC LEXIS 52, at *19 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2020).

67. Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient

to state claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and tortious interference with

contract, the allegations are likewise sufficient to state a UDTPA claim as to that

same conduct.

68. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion as to Count Five for violation of

the UDTPA.
E. Count Six: Unjust Enrichment

69. Plaintiff brings Count Six for unjust enrichment against Relentless,

alleging Relentless “received the benefit of [Plaintiff’s] trade secrets and confidential

information” by using the alleged trade secrets and confidential information to solicit

Plaintiff’s customers when it was not entitled to do so. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98–100.)

70. “In North Carolina, to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment, Plaintiff

must prove: (1) that it conferred a benefit on another party; (2) that the other party

consciously accepted the benefit; and (3) that the benefit was not conferred

gratuitously or by an interference in the affairs of the other party.” Cnty. of Wake

PDF Elec. & Supply Co., LLC v. Jacobsen, 2020 NCBC LEXIS 103, at *29 (citing

Southeastern Shelter Corp. v. BTU, Inc., 154 N.C. App. 321, 330 (2002)). The benefit

must be measurable. Krawiec, 370 N.C. at 615.

71. “A claim for unjust enrichment ‘is neither in tort nor contract but is

described as a claim in quasi contract or a contract implied in law.’ ” Jacobsen,

2020 NCBC LEXIS 103, at *28 (quoting Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570 (1988)).

“ ‘The general rule of unjust enrichment is that where services are rendered and

expenditures made by one party to or for the benefit of another, without an express

contract to pay, the law will imply a promise to pay a fair compensation therefor.’ ”

Krawiec, 370 N.C. at 615 (quoting Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. State Highway Comm’n,

268 N.C. 92, 95–96 (1966) (citation omitted)).

72. The basis for Plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment is that Relentless

obtained a benefit through its alleged misappropriation and improper use of
Plaintiff’s trade secrets and confidential information. As a result, the Court

determines that any benefit Relentless obtained through improper use of the alleged

trade secrets and confidential information was taken by Relentless as opposed to

being voluntarily conferred upon Relentless by Plaintiff. See KNC Techs., LLC v.

Tutton, 2019 NCBC LEXIS 72, at *37 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2019) (dismissing unjust

enrichment claim where the plaintiff only alleged the defendants took some benefit

for themselves for which plaintiff believed it should be awarded damages); Am.

Cirs., Inc. v. Bayatronics, LLC, 2023 NCBC LEXIS 165, at **39–40 (N.C. Super. Ct.

Dec. 8, 2023) (holding the alleged wrongful taking and dissemination of information

in violation of a confidentiality agreement did not support a claim for unjust

enrichment because no benefit had been conferred); A Distrib. Co. v. Mood Prod.

Grp. LLC, 2024 NCBC LEXIS 130, at **25–26 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2024)

(dismissing unjust enrichment claim where the defendant was alleged to have taken

a benefit for itself through the fraudulent use of the plaintiff’s certificates).

73. As such, Plaintiff has not stated a proper claim for unjust enrichment.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion as to Count Six, and Count Six for unjust

enrichment is dismissed with prejudice.

F. Count Seven: Permanent Injunction

74. Plaintiff asks the Court to enforce the E4CP Agreement by entering a

permanent injunction forbidding Relentless from using Plaintiff’s confidential or

trade secret information or providing the same “to anyone other than [Plaintiff], and

to return without retaining copies of [Plaintiff’s] trade secret and confidential and
proprietary information, and all other of [Plaintiff’s] property, documents, data, and

files.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 103.)

75. Injunctive relief “is an ancillary remedy, not an independent cause of

action.” Revelle v. Chamblee, 168 N.C. App. 227, 230 (2005) (citation omitted). It is

well-settled that “injunctive relief is not a standalone claim[.]” Window World of St.

Louis, Inc. v. Window World of Bloomington, Inc., 2021 NCBC LEXIS 88, at *15 (N.C.

Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2021).

76. Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion as to Count Seven, and

Count Seven for permanent injunctive relief is dismissed without prejudice to

Plaintiff’s ability to seek this remedy at a later time if warranted by the relevant facts

and law.

VI. CONCLUSION

77. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES

in part the Motion as follows:

a. The Court GRANTS the Motion in part as to Count One, to the

extent it is related to any unidentified trade secrets allegedly taken by

Yoder or Muller and used by Relentless, and that claim is DISMISSED

without prejudice to that limited extent;

b. The Court GRANTS the Motion as to Count Six for unjust

enrichment, and that claim is DISMISSED with prejudice;

c. The Court GRANTS the Motion as to Count Seven for permanent

injunction, and that claim is DISMISSED without prejudice; and
d. Except as herein granted, the Motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this the 19th day of June, 2025.

/s/ Michael L. Robinson
Michael L. Robinson
Chief Business Court Judge