Lucas v. Hopper

Lucas v. Hopper, 2026 NCBC 39.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 24CVS000502-780

ANDREW LUCAS, SHANNON
LUCAS, and SDB PARTNERS OF
EDEN, LLC,

Plaintiffs,
AMENDED SECOND ORDER AND
v. OPINION ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
HAROLD HOPPER, LINDA
HOPPER, TYLER HOPPER, and LH JUDGMENT
SERVICE, INC.,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Motion,” ECF No. 67) with regard to Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust

enrichment. The Court, having considered the Motion, the parties’ briefs and exhibits

submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, the arguments of counsel,

the applicable law, and all other appropriate matters of record, CONCLUDES that

the Motion as to the unjust enrichment claim should be GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

Fitzgerald Hanna & Sullivan, PLLC, by Andrew Fitzgerald, Stuart
Punger, Jr., and Douglas W. Hanna, for Plaintiffs Andrew Lucas,
Shannon Lucas, and SDB Partners of Eden, LLC.

Carruthers & Roth, P.A., by Rachel S. Decker and Kevin A. Rust, for
Defendants Harold Hopper, Linda Hopper, Tyler Hopper, and LH
Service, Inc.

Davis, Judge.
INTRODUCTION

1. On 14 January 2026, the Court issued an Order and Opinion (“14 January

Opinion”) granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to nine of the ten

claims asserted by Plaintiffs in this action. Lucas v. Hopper, 2026 NCBC LEXIS 4

(N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2026). With regard to the remaining claim for unjust

enrichment, the Court determined that Plaintiffs had raised a triable issue on that

claim but deferred ruling so that the parties could submit supplemental briefs on the

issue of who the proper parties would be as to that claim. Having received the parties’

supplemental briefs, the Court now revisits this issue.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2. “The Court does not make findings of fact on motions for summary

judgment; rather, the Court summarizes material facts it considers to be

uncontested.” McGuire v. Lord Corp., 2021 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *1–2 (N.C. Super. Ct.

Jan. 19, 2021) (cleaned up).

3. The Court sets forth herein only those portions of the factual background of

this case relevant to its determination of the Motion with regard to the unjust

enrichment claim. A more detailed recitation of the factual and procedural

background of this matter can be found in the 14 January Opinion.

4. Plaintiff Andrew Lucas (“Andrew”) started working for the MillerCoors

company at a facility located in Eden, North Carolina (the “Eden Facility”) in or

around 2008 as a plant environmental engineer. (Dep. of Andrew Lucas [“A. Lucas

Dep.”] 11:20–12:3, ECF No. 78.2.)
5. LH Service, Inc. (“LH Service”) is a North Carolina corporation that was

incorporated in 2006. (Dep. of Linda Hopper [“L. Hopper Dep.”] 9:21–10:7, ECF No.

43.3.) LH Service has been solely owned by Defendant Linda Hopper (“Linda”) since

its inception. (L. Hopper Dep. 9:18–20.)

6. In or around 2016, Defendant Harold Hopper (“Harold”), who is Linda’s

husband, began serving as LH Service’s manager. (30(b)(6) Dep. of LH Service, Inc.

[“LH Service Dep.”] 8:19–9:11, ECF No. 78.3.) In 2022, his son, Defendant Tyler

Hopper (“Tyler”), began taking over this role. (LH Service Dep. 9:8–11.)

7. Harold had been performing maintenance and facilities work for

MillerCoors for twenty-five years, and LH Service began providing maintenance

services for MillerCoors at the Eden Facility around 2014. (Dep. of Harold Hopper

[“H. Hopper Dep.”] 29:21–24, 31:12–21, ECF No. 43.2.)

8. Around August 2016, MillerCoors announced the closure of its Eden

Facility. (Dep. of Michael J. Lozano [“Lozano Dep.”] 9:3–12, ECF No. 78.1.) Andrew

was approached about working on some environmental projects during the closure,

and Andrew, in turn, approached Harold about working together on these projects for

MillerCoors. (Aff. of Andrew Lucas [“Lucas Aff.”] ¶ 7, ECF No. 77; Lozano Dep. 62:7–

11; H. Hopper Dep. 46:12–24.)

9. Between 2016 and 2023, Andrew worked on a number of projects at the

Eden Facility. (Lucas Aff. ¶¶ 21–22.) These projects took place pursuant to a

facilities maintenance contract that LH Service had entered into with MillerCoors

prior to the Eden Facility’s closure. (H. Hopper Dep. 29:21–30:4.) Harold described
this contract as a “legacy” contract that was acquired by each of the subsequent

owners of the Eden Facility between 2016 and 2023. (H. Hopper Dep. 28:14–21.) In

addition, one or more of the projects arose as a result of work orders or subcontracts

issued to LH Service by general contractors at the Eden Facility. (LH Service Dep.

11:19–22.)

10. It was agreed that in exchange for his work on these projects Andrew would

be paid a portion of the profits received by LH Service under the contract at issue.

(H. Hopper Dep. 74:13–22, 103:22–104:6; A. Lucas Dep. 30:3–8, 161:17–162:6.)

11. At Harold’s suggestion, Andrew and his wife, Plaintiff Shannon Lucas

(“Shannon”), formed a company called SDB Partners of Eden, LLC (“SDB”) that

would receive LH Service’s payments for Andrew’s work on these projects. SDB

would then disburse those sums to Andrew. (Dep. of Thomas Mabe [“Mabe Dep.”]

26:14–17, ECF No. 78.4; A. Lucas Dep. 31:1–6.)

12. Conceptually, all of the projects that form the basis for the present lawsuit

proceeded in the same fashion. As noted above, each of the projects existed as a result

of a contract that LH Service had either with the then-owner of the Eden Facility or

with a general contractor working for the owner. The work on the project would then

be performed by Harold and Andrew (with assistance, as necessary, from workers

either employed by LH Service or hired by LH Service as independent contractors).

Following the project’s completion, payment for all work on the project would be

received by LH Service. LH Service would then pay SDB a portion of the profits

earmarked for Andrew, and SDB would, in turn, distribute those profits to Andrew.
13. Beginning in or around 2021 (and continuing through the end of the parties’

business relationship), LH Service began maintaining a reserve of cash for expense

payments, resulting in a slowing of profits disbursements. (Lucas Aff. ¶¶ 99–100.)

Harold began paying SDB advance profit payments until he and Andrew could “settle

up” on final profit splits. (H. Hopper Dep. 318:12–25; Lucas Aff. ¶¶ 101, 115.)

14. In early October 2023, Andrew and Harold met to discuss financial issues.

During this meeting, Harold admitted that he owed Andrew money and said he was

planning to “settle up” once there were sufficient funds to do so. (H. Hopper Dep.

337:20–338:3.) At this meeting, Harold agreed to make the rest of the payments he

owed Andrew by the end of 2023. (Lucas Aff. ¶ 130.)

15. On 18 October 2023, Harold convened a meeting with Andrew during which

he informed Andrew that he was terminating his business relationship with Andrew.

He then directed Andrew to call the attorney representing the Hoppers to work out

an agreement. (H. Hopper Dep. 347:25–348:12; Dep. of Tyler Hopper [“T. Hopper

Dep.”] 86:13–25, ECF No. 78.9; Lucas Aff. ¶ 132.)

16. Thereafter, Andrew was stripped of his access to Quickbooks and his LH

Service email account. (T. Hopper Dep. 88:2–11; Lucas Aff. ¶ 137.) The next day,

Andrew and Shannon jointly sent an email to Harold and Linda seeking an

opportunity to discuss the status of their business relationship and requesting that

they “honor our original partnership agreement[.]” (Exhibit 67, ECF No. 77.67.)

Harold and Linda did not respond to the email. (Lucas Aff. ¶ 136.)
17. Nine days later, Harold had a meeting with Rose Satterfield, his

accountant, during which he told her that he still owed Andrew money. (H. Hopper

Dep. 353:5–25.) However, no further payments have been made to Andrew.

18. This lawsuit was initiated on 15 March 2024 in Rockingham County

Superior Court by Andrew, Shannon, and SDB as Plaintiffs against Harold, Linda,

Tyler, and LH Service as Defendants. The Complaint contained claims against all

Defendants for (1) declaratory judgment; (2) breach of partnership agreement; (3)

breach of fiduciary duty; (4) constructive fraud; (5) conversion; (6) dissolution,

accounting and appointment of a receiver; (7) breach of joint venture agreement; (8)

breach of fiduciary duty involving the joint venture; (9) fraud; and (10) unjust

enrichment. (See Compl. ¶¶ 140–262, ECF No. 3.)

19. This case was designated as a complex business case and assigned to the

Honorable Julianna Theall Earp on 18 March 2024. (ECF Nos. 1–2.) The case was

reassigned to the undersigned on 4 June 2025. (ECF No. 90.)

20. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 3 March 2025

seeking summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims. (ECF No. 67.)

21. A hearing on the Motion was held on 5 August 2025 at which all parties

were represented by counsel. (ECF No. 92.)

22. In its 14 January Opinion, the Court granted summary judgment in favor

of Defendants on the first nine claims asserted by Plaintiffs and on Defendants’

counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Lucas, 2026 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *30, 34.

However, after explaining that a triable issue of fact existed with regard to Plaintiffs’
unjust enrichment claim, the Court deferred ruling on that portion of the Motion

pending further briefing by the parties on who the appropriate parties would be for

such a claim. Id. at *38.

23. The Court subsequently received supplemental briefing from the parties on

this issue. (ECF Nos. 99–102.)

24. Therefore, the final remaining issue with regard to Defendants’ Motion is

now ripe for disposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

25. It is well established that “[s]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Morrell v. Hardin Creek, Inc.,

371 N.C. 672, 680 (2018) (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[A] genuine issue is one

which can be maintained by substantial evidence.” Kessing v. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 278

N.C. 523, 534 (1971). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and means more than a

scintilla or a permissible inference.” Daughtridge v. Tanager Land, LLC, 373 N.C.

182, 187 (2019) (citation and internal quotes omitted).

26. On a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence must be considered ‘in

a light most favorable to the non-moving party.’ ” McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C.

280, 286 (2006) (quoting Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470 (2004)).

“[T]he party moving for summary judgment ultimately has the burden of establishing
the lack of any triable issue of fact.” Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313

N.C. 488, 491 (1985).

27. The party moving for summary judgment may satisfy its burden by proving

that “an essential element of the opposing party’s claim does not exist, cannot be

proven at trial, or would be barred by an affirmative defense, . . . or by showing

through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an

essential element of [the] claim[.]” Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83 (2000) (citations

omitted). “If the moving party satisfies its burden of proof, then the burden shifts to

the non-moving party to ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.’ ” Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369–70 (1982) (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P.

56(e)) (emphasis omitted). If the nonmoving party does not satisfy its burden, then

“summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against [the nonmovant].”

United Cmty. Bank (Ga.) v. Wolfe, 369 N.C. 555, 558 (2017) (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P.

56(e)).

ANALYSIS

28. In its 14 January Opinion, the Court stated the following regarding

Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim:

. . . ‘In North Carolina, to recover on a claim of unjust enrichment,
Plaintiff must prove: (1) that it conferred a benefit on another party; (2)
that the other party consciously accepted the benefit; and (3) that the
benefit was not conferred gratuitously or by an interference in the
affairs of the other party.’ Islet Scis., Inc. v. Brighthaven Ventures, LLC,
2017 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2017) (citing Se.
Shelter Corp. v. BTU, Inc., 154 N.C. App. 321, 330 (2002)). ‘The general
rule of unjust enrichment is that where services are rendered and
expenditures made by one party to or for the benefit of another, without
an express contract to pay, the law will imply a promise to pay a fair
compensation therefor.’ Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. State Highway
Comm’n, 268 N.C. 92, 95–96 (1966). However, ‘[i]f there is a contract
between the parties[,] the contract governs the claim and the law will
not imply a contract.’ Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570 (1988).”
Higgins v. Synergy Coverage Sols., LLC, 2020 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *23
(N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2020).

...

Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence in the
present case shows that (1) Andrew worked on a number of projects
between 2016 and 2023 for LH Service in which he was paid a portion
of the profits; (2) although at times he received the sums he requested
for his work on a particular project, beginning in or around 2021 he did
not receive all of the amounts he was owed; (3) Harold assured Andrew
that they would “settle up” at a later date; (4) during a meeting with
[Andrew] in October 2023, Harold confirmed his intentions to “settle up”
with Andrew by the end of 2023; and (5) Andrew has never received any
money from Defendants since those representations were made.

Moreover, Harold admitted in his deposition that he still owes money to
Andrew. (H. Hopper Dep. 353:5–9.)

...

Although the Court therefore concludes that the unjust enrichment
claim raises a triable issue, it is presently unclear who the parties to
such a claim should be. Although the Complaint purports to assert this
claim on behalf of all named Plaintiffs (Andrew, Shannon, and SDB) and
against all named Defendants (Harold, Linda, Tyler, and LH Service),
neither side has briefed the issue of which of these individuals/entities
should be parties to the unjust enrichment claim based on the evidence
in the record.

Lucas, 2026 NCBC LEXIS 4, at *34–38.

I. Proper Plaintiff

29. Plaintiffs contend that Andrew is the proper plaintiff for the unjust

enrichment claim because he was the one who actually performed the services on the

projects at issue. Conversely, Defendants argue that SDB is the only appropriate
plaintiff because Andrew’s portions of the profits for these projects were paid to SDB

(rather than directly to Andrew).

30. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. An unjust enrichment claim requires a

showing that the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant. See Booe, 322 N.C.

at 570 (“In order to establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must have

conferred a benefit on the other party.”). Here, Andrew was the only party performing

services for the benefit of Defendants.

31. SDB was merely a pass-through entity used to collect and distribute

Andrew’s profits to him for those services. (Mabe Dep. 26:14–17; A. Lucas Dep. 31:

1–6.) SDB never actually performed any services for Defendants or otherwise

conferred any benefit on them. See, e.g., Charles Schwab & Co. v. Marilley, 2026

NCBC LEXIS 15, at *41 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2026) (finding that defendant was

not the proper party to bring an unjust enrichment counterclaim as defendant did not

confer a benefit on plaintiff); Patriot Performance Materials, Inc. v. Powell, 2013

NCBC LEXIS 9, at *4–5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2013) (“Powell alleges that

Henderson wrongly used corporate funds to confer benefits upon Clancy. . . . Thus, it

was the corporation, not Powell individually, who conferred a benefit, if any, upon

Clancy and it is the corporation that would be the proper party to bring such an

action.”).

32. Accordingly, Andrew is the only proper plaintiff for the unjust enrichment

claim.
II. Proper Defendant

33. The parties are also not in agreement as to who the appropriate defendant

is to the unjust enrichment claim.

34. Defendants contend that the only proper defendant is LH Service because

it was the party who actually contracted with the owners (or general contractors) of

the Eden Facility for the projects on which Andrew worked.

35. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the proper defendants to this claim are not

only LH Service but also Linda and Harold. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that

Linda (as the sole owner of LH Service) agreed to pay Andrew for work performed at

the Eden Facility on behalf of LH Service and that all profits received were ultimately

distributed to her. Plaintiffs further argue that Harold received an indirect benefit

from Andrew’s services through his filing of joint tax returns with Linda.

36. The Court concludes that LH Service is the only proper defendant on the

unjust enrichment claim. All of the work that Andrew performed took place in

furtherance of contracts that LH Service had with either the Eden Facility owners or

its general contractors. (H. Hopper Dep. 28:14–21; LH Service Dep. 11:19–22.) As a

result, any benefit provided by Andrew was conferred upon LH Service itself. In

addition, LH Service is the only defendant who directly received payments from the

Eden Facility owners or general contractors for the work done on the projects. (A.

Lucas Dep. 106:11–14; LH Service Dep. 34:1–3.)

37. Therefore, the proper defendant to Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is

LH Service.
CERTIFICATION

38. On 14 January 2026, the Court filed its Order and Opinion on Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,

and Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Andrew Lucas (the “14 January

Opinion,” ECF No. 98), which dismissed all partnership and joint venture claims

against Defendants, concluded that the unjust enrichment claim raised a triable issue

of fact, and deferred ruling on the proper parties to Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment

claim. See Lucas v. Hopper, 2026 NCBC LEXIS 4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2026).

39. On 27 February 2026, the Court filed its Second Order and Opinion on

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the “27 February Opinion,” ECF No.

103), which (for the same reasons set forth above), dismissed the unjust enrichment

claim against Defendants Linda Hopper, Harold Hopper, and Tyler Hopper and

concluded that the only claim left for trial was the unjust enrichment claim brought

by Andrew Lucas against LH Service, Inc. See Lucas v. Hopper, 2026 NCBC LEXIS

50 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2026). At the time the 27 February Opinion was filed,

the Court did not certify its ruling dismissing Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim

against Defendants Linda Hopper, Harold Hopper, and Tyler Hopper as a final

judgment under Rule 54(b).

40. On 13 March 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Orders

Entered at ECF No. 98 and ECF No. 103, (ECF No. 108), which the Court

subsequently denied. (ECF No. 114.)
41. On 16 March 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment

under Rule 54(b) as to One or More but Fewer Than All of the Claims (the “Motion

for Final Judgment,” ECF No. 110), seeking the Court’s certification for immediate

appeal of the 27 February Opinion as a final judgment and the entry of a stay as to

any remaining proceedings before the Court while such an appeal is pending.

Plaintiffs contend that proceeding to trial on the unjust enrichment claim “would be

a waste of judicial resources” and “poses a risk of inconsistent verdicts.” (Mem. Supp.

Pls.’ Mot. Entry Final J. Under Rule 54(b) 3, ECF No. 111.) Defendants do not oppose

Plaintiffs’ request for certification, provided the Court issues a stay of the trial of the

remaining unjust enrichment claim during the pendency of the appeal. (Defs.’

Statement Regarding Pls.’ Mot. Certify Immediate Appeal, ECF No. 112.)

42. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion under BCR 7.4, elects to enter

this Order and Opinion without a hearing.

43. Where, as here, a court order does not “dispose of the entirety of the case,”

the order is interlocutory and not usually subject to immediate appeal. See, e.g.,

Chidnese v. Chidnese, 210 N.C. App. 299, 302–03 (2011); N.C. R. Civ. P. 54. An

interlocutory order may be immediately appealable, however, if the trial court

certifies the order as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). See Doe v. City of Charlotte,

273 N.C. App. 10, 19–20 (2020).

44. Rule 54(b) states in relevant part:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may enter a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only if there is
no just reason for delay and it is so determined in the judgment. Such
judgment shall then be subject to review by appeal or as otherwise
provided by these rules or other statutes.

N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

45. Rule 54(b) further provides that “any order or other form of decision is

subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims

and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Id. Rule 54(b) thus permits a trial

court to certify an interlocutory order as a final judgment subject to immediate appeal

by amending the court’s previous order when the trial court concludes that there is

no just reason to delay the appeal of the court’s rulings. See Doe, 273 N.C. App. at 20

(noting that to permit an immediate appeal, “the trial court simply could amend the

initial order by entering a new order with the same substantive language as the

initial order but with the additional Rule 54(b) certification language added” (cleaned

up)).

46. Our appellate courts have affirmed a trial court’s finding of no just reason

for delay of an appeal in various fact-specific circumstances, including where “the

claims that were dismissed and those that remain are factually and legally

intertwined and pertain to essentially the same conduct such that proceeding to trial

could produce verdicts inconsistent with verdicts which may later result from trial of

one or more of the claims which were dismissed.” Kinesis Adver., Inc. v. Hill, 187

N.C. App. 1, 8 (2007) (cleaned up).

47. No just reason for delay has also been found where immediate appeal would

“promote judicial economy” when numerous claims are involved. See Richardson v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 182 N.C. App. 531, 538 (2007). Certification is left to the discretion

of the trial court and the court’s decision is given “great deference.” See, e.g., Hoke

Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 198 N.C. App. 274, 277 (2009) (“We generally accord great

deference to a trial court’s certification that there is no just reason to delay the

appeal.”); see generally G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure, Ch. 54, § 54-

3.

48. After considering the Motion for Final Judgment, the related briefs, the

record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that it should amend

the 27 February Opinion to include a certification of its dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim

for unjust enrichment against Defendants Linda Hopper, Harold Hopper, and Tyler

Hopper as a final judgment subject to immediate appellate review.

49. The remaining unjust enrichment claim against LH Service, Inc. and the

dismissed claims are legally intertwined and arise from the same facts and

circumstances surrounding the parties’ working relationship at the Eden Facility.

See Kinesis Adver., Inc., 187 N.C. App. at 9 (finding the claims were “factually and

legally intertwined” where they were based on the same alleged conduct). In

particular, Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment was pled in the alternative to the

partnership and joint venture claims and stems from a series of projects that the

parties worked on at the Eden Facility. Thus, proceeding to trial on Andrew Lucas’s

remaining unjust enrichment claim against LH Service, Inc. before resolution of an

appeal of (1) the dismissal of the partnership claims and joint venture claims, and (2)

the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim against Defendants Linda Hopper,
Harold Hopper, and Tyler Hopper, would potentially result in two trials involving

identical facts, albeit on different legal theories, with the risk of different juries

reaching inconsistent verdicts on the same disputed facts.

50. As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have a substantial right to have

these same disputed facts determined by the same jury and that, as a result, there is

no just reason to delay an appeal of the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim

against Defendants Linda Hopper, Harold Hopper, and Tyler Hopper. See, e.g.,

Shearon Farms Townhome Owners Ass’n II v. Shearon Farms Dev., LLC, 272 N.C.

App. 643, 647 (2020) (“[W]hen the same fact is determinative of the same issue in

multiple claims, there is a substantial right to have those factual issues determined

by the same jury to avoid the risk that two juries decide that fact differently, leading

to two judgments from the same initial lawsuit with incompatible outcomes.”). Based

on the above, the Court further concludes that it would be inefficient and potentially

wasteful for the parties and the Court to proceed to trial at this time on Andrew

Lucas’s remaining unjust enrichment claim against LH Service, Inc. prior to the

resolution of an appeal of (1) the dismissal of the partnership claims and joint venture

claims, and (2) the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim against Defendants

Linda Hopper, Harold Hopper, and Tyler Hopper.

51. For each of these reasons, the Court therefore concludes that there is no

just reason to delay an appeal of the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment

claim against Defendants Linda Hopper, Harold Hopper, and Tyler Hopper and that
the Court should therefore certify its ruling dismissing those claims herein as a final

judgment as to those matters under Rule 54(b).

CONCLUSION

THEREFORE, with regard to the unjust enrichment claim, IT IS ORDERED

as follows:

1. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Defendant LH Service, Inc. on the

unjust enrichment claim.

2. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of all remaining Defendants on

the unjust enrichment claim.

3. Any claims for unjust enrichment asserted by Plaintiffs Shannon Lucas and

SDB Partners of Eden, LLC are DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. The only claim remaining for trial is the unjust enrichment claim by

Plaintiff Andrew Lucas against Defendant LH Service, Inc.

5. For the reasons set forth above, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion,

hereby CERTIFIES its rulings herein granting Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment with respect to Defendants Linda Hopper, Harold

Hopper, and Tyler Hopper on Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim as a final

judgment as to those matters under Rule 54(b).

SO ORDERED, this the 23rd day of April, 2026.

/s/ Mark A. Davis
Mark A. Davis
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases