Ferer v. Aaron Ferer & Sons Co.

in that regard should be upheld in the absence of an abuse of
that discretion, something that the majority has not suggested in
its analysis.
Section 42-364.15 required the district court to enter such
orders as were necessary to enforce the rights of the parents.
The court did this, and this court has found the court’s orders to
be appropriate. Section 42-364.15 grants the district court dis-
cretion to use contempt powers to enforce its orders. The court
declined to exercise this discretionary power, finding that both
parties were at fault, and this court has found that the court did
not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in so finding. Section
42-365.15 also grants the district court discretion to require a
bond to secure compliance with its orders. The court declined
to exercise this discretionary power, and without a finding that
the court abused its discretion in some fashion, this court should
affirm that decision as well. Inasmuch as the majority has found
no abuse of discretion—and no clear error or other error appear-
ing on the record—and has provided no rationale to support
imposing a bond in a case where both parties were at fault and
evidence was presented to support the district court’s holdings,
I cannot join in the majority’s imposition of a bond where the
district court declined to impose one. I would affirm the district
court’s order in its entirety.
AAron M. F erer , AppellAnt And cross -Appellee , v . AAron
F erer & sons co ., A nebrAskA corporAtion , et Al .,
Appellees And cross -AppellAnts .
755 N.W.2d 415
Filed July 29, 2008. 	No. A-07-773.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. It is the duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
2. ____: ____. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction unless the appellant has
satisfied the requirements for appellate jurisdiction.
3. Judgments: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(2)
(Cum. Supp. 2006) permits a notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to
operate as a notice of appeal from the final judgment only when a lower court
announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the
entry of judgment.
866 	16 NebRASkA AppellATe RepoRTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:17 AM CST

4. Judgments: Final Orders. The content of a document, rather than the intention of
the judge or any interpretation of a party, dictates whether the document constitutes
the final determination of the rights of the parties.
5. Judgments. In interpreting a document, neither what the parties thought the
judge meant nor what the judge thought he or she meant is of any relevance;
what a document means as a matter of law is determined from the four corners of
the document.
6. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When an appellate court is without jurisdiction
to act, the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: peter c.
bAtAillon, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
David A. Domina and Nicole A. parks, of Domina law
Group, p.C., l.l.o., for appellant.
Steven e. Achelpohl for appellee Aaron Ferer & Sons Co.
Michael A. Nelsen, of Hillman, Forman, Nelsen, Childers
& McCormack, for appellees Matthew D. Ferer and Whitney
H. Ferer.
Michael F. kinney and Daniel J. epstein, of Cassem, Tierney,
Adams, Gotch & Douglas, for appellees erickson & Sederstrom,
p.C., and Charles V. Sederstrom, Jr.
inbody, Chief Judge, and sievers and cArlson, Judges.
cArlson, Judge.
INTRoDUCTIoN
pursuant to this court’s authority under Neb. Ct. R. App. p.
§ 2-111(b)(1), this case was ordered submitted without oral
argument. Aaron M. Ferer (Ferer) appeals from an order of the
district court for Douglas County finding that the statute of limi-
tations bars his claims and dismissing his causes of action. For
the reasons set forth below, we determine that we lack jurisdic-
tion over Ferer’s action because he did not file a timely notice of
appeal, and therefore, we dismiss his causes of action.
bACkGRoUND
In Ferer’s first amended complaint, filed June 11, 2004,
the following defendants were named: Aaron Ferer & Sons
Co.; erickson & Sederstrom, p.C.; Charles V. Sederstrom, Jr.;
FeReR v. AARoN FeReR & SoNS Co. 	867
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 866

Matthew D. Ferer, personally and as the parent and natural
guardian of emma Ferer; Whitney H. Ferer, personally and
as the parent and natural guardian of Nicholas R. Ferer and
Hannah C. Ferer; and Allyson l. Ferer, personally and as the
parent and natural guardian of Claire A. Dubin and Samuel
l. Dubin. Ferer’s complaint arises out of his late father’s gift
of company stock to two of Ferer’s brothers, Whitney and
Matthew, and includes causes of action for declaratory judg-
ment, constructive fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful
registration, and unjust enrichment.
on october 3, 2006, the trial court granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment which had been filed by Aaron Ferer & Sons
Co., Whitney, and Matthew, stating that the statute of limitations
barred Ferer’s claims against these parties. The court dismissed
Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., Whitney, and Matthew from the law-
suit, but did not state whether Matthew and Whitney were being
dismissed only in their individual capacities or also in their
capacities as parents of their children.
In an order filed on october 30, 2006, the trial court granted
a summary judgment motion filed by Sederstrom and erickson
& Sederstrom. The court noted that Ferer’s claims against these
parties were also barred by the statute of limitations and dis-
missed these two additional parties from the lawsuit.
on June 28, 2007, the trial court dismissed the action as to
Allyson, but only in her capacity as parent and guardian of
Claire and Samuel. Ferer appealed to this court on July 13.
In an order to show cause dated August 29, 2007, we noted
that Ferer’s action was dismissed as to all the parties, except
that it appeared that the action remained pending as to Matthew
and Whitney in their representative capacities and as to Allyson
in her individual capacity. We also stated that if Ferer’s action
had not been fully dismissed as to all parties, the order was
not final and appealable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315
(Cum. Supp. 2006). Therefore, we issued the order, “[p]laintiff
appellant [Ferer] is directed to show that all parties have been
‘fully dismissed’ within 15 days of the date of this order; and
failing same, this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to [Neb. Ct.
R. of prac.] 7A(2) [(rev. 2001)]” (now codified as Neb. Ct. R.
App. p. § 2-107(A)(2)).
868 	16 NebRASkA AppellATe RepoRTS

In an order filed September 18, 2007, the trial court noted,
“The prior orders of this Court were intended to have dismissed
all Defendants in their individual and representative capacities.
As such, all Defendants are so dismissed as set forth in this
Court’s prior orders.” Ferer did not file a new notice of appeal
subsequently to this order.
ASSIGNMeNTS oF eRRoR
on appeal, Ferer argues that the trial court erred in finding
that the statute of limitations bars his lawsuit and in granting the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissing his
lawsuit against them.
ANAlYSIS
[1,2] It is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether
it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. See Goodman v. City
of Omaha, 274 Neb. 539, 742 N.W.2d 26 (2007). An appellate
court acquires no jurisdiction unless the appellant has satisfied
the requirements for appellate jurisdiction. Id.
In the defendants’ cross-appeal, they argue that we lack
jurisdiction over this appeal since not all of the parties were dis-
missed in each of their capacities at the time Ferer filed his first
appeal and because after the trial court dismissed all of the par-
ties on September 18, 2007, Ferer failed to file a new notice of
appeal. Ferer cites Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2006)
in support of his position that his July 13 appeal was timely
because it relates forward. Section 25-1912(2) states:
A notice of appeal or docket fee filed or deposited after
the announcement of a decision or final order but before
the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order shall be
treated as filed or deposited after the entry of the judgment,
decree, or final order and on the date of entry.
Therefore, the plain language of § 25-1912(2) provides for
the relation forward of a notice of appeal or docket fee only
when filed or deposited “after the announcement of a decision
or final order,” but before “entry of the judgment” pursuant to
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301 (Cum. Supp. 2006). J & H Swine v.
Hartington Concrete, 12 Neb. App. 885, 687 N.W.2d 9 (2004).
Accord In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Woltemath,
FeReR v. AARoN FeReR & SoNS Co. 	869
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 866

268 Neb. 33, 680 N.W.2d 142 (2004). Section 25-1912(2) was
not intended to validate anticipatory notices of appeal filed prior
to the announcement of a final judgment. In re Guardianship &
Conservatorship of Woltemath, supra; J & H Swine, supra.
[3] In In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Woltemath,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that § 25-1912(2) permits a
notice of appeal from a nonfinal decision to operate as a notice
of appeal from the final judgment only when a lower court
announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately
followed by the entry of judgment. In the instant case, we
conclude that the trial court’s July 13, 2007, dismissal, from
which Ferer appealed, did not announce a “judgment, decree,
or final order” within the meaning of § 25-1912(2) because
it did not dispose of all of the claims against all of the par-
ties in each of their capacities. Therefore, Ferer’s notice of
appeal was filed prematurely and cannot relate forward pursuant
to § 25-1912(2).
Ferer also argues that his appeal was timely because the trial
court, in its September 18, 2007, order, stated that its prior
orders were “intended to have dismissed all Defendants in their
individual and representative capacities.” We note though that
what the trial court intended is not something we can consider.
Rather, we are restricted to looking within the four corners of
the trial court’s previous orders to determine whether all of the
defendants were dismissed in their individual and representa-
tive capacities.
[4,5] The content of a document, rather than the intention
of the judge or any interpretation of a party, dictates whether
the document constitutes “‘the final determination of the rights
of the parties.’” Peterson v. Peterson, 14 Neb. App. 778, 785,
714 N.W.2d 793, 799 (2006), disapproved on other grounds,
Wagner v. Wagner, 275 Neb. 693, 749 N.W.2d 137 (2008). See
§ 25-1301(1). In Neujahr v. Neujahr, 223 Neb. 722, 393 N.W.2d
47 (1986), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that in interpret-
ing a decree of dissolution, neither what the parties thought the
judge meant nor what the judge thought he or she meant was of
any relevance and that what a document means as a matter of
law is determined from the four corners of the document.
870 	16 NebRASkA AppellATe RepoRTS

In the instant case, our review of the record shows that the
trial court dismissed Allyson only in her representative capac-
ity, not her individual capacity, and that although the trial
court dismissed Matthew and Whitney, it is unclear whether
the trial court dismissed Matthew and Whitney only in their
individual capacities or also in their capacities as parents of
their children.
[6] Therefore, because the orders from which Ferer appealed
did not dismiss all of the parties in each of their capacities,
the trial court’s orders were not final and appealable until the
trial court dismissed each party in all capacities on September
18, 2007. Ferer failed to appeal from the September 18 order.
Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over his appeal and must dismiss
it. See In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Woltemath,
268 Neb. 33, 680 N.W.2d 142 (2004) (when appellate court is
without jurisdiction to act, appeal must be dismissed). To avoid
this result, we suggest that trial judges include, at the end of
any entry intended to be a final order, a phrase to the effect that
“any request for relief by any party not specifically granted by
this order is denied.”
CoNClUSIoN
After reviewing the record, we conclude that we lack jurisdic-
tion over Ferer’s appeal because he did not file a timely appeal,
and therefore, we dismiss his appeal.
A ppeAl disMissed .
stAte oF nebrAskA, Appellee , v .
J oseph connor , AppellAnt .
754 N.W.2d 774
Filed July 29, 2008. 	No. A-07-1230.
1. Criminal Law: Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a crimi-
nal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on
the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Such matters are for the finder
of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the
properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is
sufficient to support the conviction.
STATe v. CoNNoR 	871
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 871