Myhra v. Myhra

D ebra K aye M yhra , appellee , v .
phillip J eroMe M yhra , appellant .
756 N.W.2d 528
Filed August 19, 2008. 	No. A-06-1403.
1. Divorce: Appeal and Error. In actions for dissolution of marriage, an appellate
court reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether there has been
an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge,
within the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects to act or refrains
from acting, and the selected option results in a decision which is untenable and
unfairly deprives a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters submitted
for disposition through a judicial system.
3. Divorce: Child Custody: Child Support: Property Division: Alimony: Attorney
Fees: Appeal and Error. The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to the
trial court’s determinations regarding custody, child support, division of property,
alimony, and attorney fees.
4. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The reopening of a case to receive additional
evidence is a matter within the discretion of the district court and will not be dis-
turbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.
5. ____: ____: ____. In an appeal of an equitable action, an appellate court tries
factual questions de novo on the record, provided that where credible evidence
is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers and may
give weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and
accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
6. Pretrial Procedure. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.
7. ____. A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he or she
obtains information upon the basis of which he or she knows that the response
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a
failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment.
8. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Among factors traditionally considered in
determining whether to allow a party to reopen a case to introduce additional
evidence are (1) the reason for the failure to introduce the evidence, i.e., counsel’s
inadvertence, a party’s calculated risk or tactic, or the court’s mistake; (2) the
admissibility and materiality of the new evidence to the proponent’s case; (3) the
diligence exercised by the requesting party in producing the evidence before his
or her case closed; (4) the time or stage of the proceedings at which the motion is
made; and (5) whether the new evidence would unfairly surprise or unfairly preju-
dice the opponent.
9. Trial: Testimony. Admission of testimony that is beyond the scope of the permis-
sion granted to adduce additional testimony is discretionary.
10. Property Division: Valuation: Time: Appeal and Error. There is no “hard and
fast” rule concerning valuation dates so long as the selected date bears a rational
relationship to the property to be divided, and the selected date is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.
920 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

11. Property Division. Although the division of property is not subject to a precise
mathematical formula, the general rule is to award a spouse one-third to one-half
of the marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined
by the facts of each case.
12. Evidence: Words and Phrases. evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, or the evi-
dence tends to establish a fact from which the existence or nonexistence of a fact
in issue can be directly inferred.
13. Judges. The partiality of a judge is established when a reasonable person would
have to conclude that a judge was partial to one party to the action.
14. Divorce: Property Division: Alimony. In dividing property and considering ali-
mony upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider four factors: (1) the
circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of the marriage, (3) the history of
contributions to the marriage, and (4) the ability of the supported party to engage
in gainful employment without interfering with the interests of any minor children
in the custody of each party.
15. Alimony: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an alimony award, an appellate court
does not determine whether it would have awarded the same amount of alimony
as did the trial court, but whether the trial court’s award is untenable such as to
deprive a party of a substantial right or just result.
16. Alimony. In determining whether alimony should be awarded, in what amount, and
over what period of time, the ultimate criterion is one of reasonableness.
17. ____. The purpose of alimony is to provide for the continued maintenance or sup-
port of one party by the other when the relative economic circumstances make it
appropriate. Alimony should not be used to equalize the incomes of the parties or
to punish one of the parties.
18. ____. Disparity in income or potential income may partially justify an award
of alimony.
19. Appeal and Error. To be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must
be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party assert-
ing the error.
20. Equity: Fraud. Under the doctrine of unclean hands, a person who comes into
a court of equity to obtain relief cannot do so if he or she has acted inequitably,
unfairly, or dishonestly as to the controversy in issue.
21. Property Division: Interest. A district court can exercise its discretion and award
interest on deferred installments payable as part of a marital property distribution.
22. Property Division: Interest: Time. When exercising its discretionary power, one
factor the district court should consider when determining whether a property
settlement payable in installments should draw interest from the date of judgment
is the burden on the payor-spouse.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J aMes t.
G leason, Judge. Affirmed.
larry r. Demerath, of Demerath law offices, for appellant.
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	921
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920

edith T. 	Peebles 	and Anthony W. 	liakos, 	of 	brodkey,
Cuddigan, Peebles & belmont, l.l.P., for appellee.
inboDy, Chief Judge, and sievers and C arlson, Judges.
sievers, Judge.
Debra kaye Myhra filed for dissolution of her marriage in
the district court for Douglas County. before trial, her husband,
Phillip Jerome Myhra, learned that his employer could merge with
another company, which would entitle him to a multimillion-
dollar bonus. Phillip did not disclose this information to Debra,
despite her interrogatory asking him whether he had any inter-
est in any expectations or awards. After Debra rested her case
but before a decree had been issued, Debra made a motion to
the court to withdraw her rest to introduce evidence about the
merger and the bonus. The court sustained her motion, and she
introduced evidence regarding Phillip’s bonus. The trial court
found that the merger bonus was marital property and awarded
Debra a portion thereof. Phillip now appeals.
FACTUAl AND ProCeDUrAl bACkGroUND
Debra and Phillip were married on september 9, 1978. They
have three children, born April 17, 1987, April 4, 1990, and
July 19, 1995. since mid-December 1999, Phillip has worked as
the executive vice president for UICI, a health insurance com-
pany. In 2002, Phillip earned $499,723. In 2003, Phillip earned
$644,546. In 2004, Phillip earned $855,153. In 2005, Phillip
earned $814,060. Debra works as a medical technologist and
earns approximately $25 per hour working part time, but she has
earned as much as $60,000 per year when working full time.
Debra filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the dis-
trict court for Douglas County on August 6, 2004. on october
6, 2004, Debra submitted interrogatories to Phillip, including the
following interrogatory: “Do you own or have a direct or indi-
rect interest in any other property or thing of value whatsoever,
including but not limited to royalties, copyright, trademarks,
expectations or awards?” During the pendency of the action,
Phillip never disclosed that UICI was contemplating a merger
with an investment group and that such a merger would entitle
Phillip to a multimillion-dollar bonus.
922 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs

In the summer of 2005, Phillip was aware that UICI could
potentially merge with the investment group. on september 15,
2005, UICI entered into a merger agreement with the investment
group. As part of this merger agreement, UICI adopted a bonus
plan in which Phillip became entitled to a merger bonus, assum-
ing the merger was completed and he was still employed upon
the date the merger was completed. The amount of his bonus
would be based upon the price of UICI stock on the date the
merger was completed.
on october 20, 2005, a trial on Debra’s petition for dissolu-
tion was held in the district court for Douglas County. At the
time of the trial, the merger agreement was available to the
public because it was filed with the securities and exchange
Commission on september 15, 2005, and such filing revealed
that a pool of $20 million would be available to pay bonuses to
four UICI executives, one of whom was Phillip, upon comple-
tion of the merger.
Debra rested her case on october 20, 2005, but on December
15, she made a motion to the district court to withdraw her rest
so that she could introduce evidence regarding the merger and
merger bonus. The district court found that Phillip had failed to
supplement his answers to interrogatories and that Phillip had
concealed information regarding the merger and merger bonus
from Debra and the court. It therefore allowed Debra to reopen
her case.
on July 25, 2006, further trial proceedings were held, and
Debra introduced evidence that on April 5, 2006, the merger
between UICI had been completed, that Phillip’s interest in
the merger bonus had vested, and that the gross amount of the
merger bonus was $3,378,160, 60 percent of which had been
distributed to Phillip on the day the merger closed and 40 per-
cent of which was to be distributed to him within 180 days of
the merger. evidence was also introduced that Phillip had cashed
out certain UICI stock options for $1,909,500 and sold certain
UICI stock for $60,700, and that he had received a gross bonus
in 2006 of $398,937 for work performed in 2005 (the 2005
bonus). Phillip attempted to introduce the testimony of Dennis
hein, a certified public accountant. hein would have testified
that Phillip’s merger bonus would not have been considered an
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	923
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920

asset under generally accepted accounting principles until the
date that it vested on April 5, 2006, when the merger was com-
pleted. Debra made a motion in limine asking the district court
to exclude the testimony of hein, and the district court sustained
the motion.
In the district court’s decree of dissolution of marriage, it
found that all of the parties’ property was marital property,
including the merger bonus and the 2005 bonus; that the assets
for which evidence was adduced at the october 20, 2005, trial
would be valued based on that date; and that assets for which
evidence was introduced at the July 25, 2006, trial would be
valued based on that date. The district court awarded Phillip
$7,796,574 of marital property. It awarded Debra a $2 million
judgment to be paid within 3 years of the decree, plus interest
at 7.014 percent; $485,964 worth of marital assets; $3,000 per
month in alimony until she reached age 65; and $25,000 in attor-
ney fees. Phillip timely appealed.
AssIGNMeNTs oF error
Phillip assigns the following errors to the district court: (1)
allowing Debra to withdraw her rest, (2) allowing Debra to intro-
duce evidence beyond the scope of her motion to withdraw her
rest, (3) determining that the merger bonus and 2005 bonus were
marital property, (4) using incorrect dates to value the parties’
marital estate, (5) sustaining Debra’s motion in limine regarding
the testimony of hein, (6) acting with passion and prejudice, (7)
awarding unreasonable alimony, (8) finding Phillip in contempt
for certain sales of stock made by him, (9) failing to find Debra
had unclean hands, and (10) failing to clarify the interest on
the judgment.
sTANDArD oF reVIeW
Dissolution of Marriage, Division of
Marital Property, and Alimony.
[1,2] In actions for dissolution of marriage, an appellate court
reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether
there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Tyma
v. Tyma, 263 Neb. 873, 644 N.W.2d 139 (2002). A judicial
abuse of discretion exists when a judge, within the effective
limits of authorized judicial power, elects to act or refrains from
924 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs

acting, and the selected option results in a decision which is
untenable and unfairly deprives a litigant of a substantial right
or a just result in matters submitted for disposition through a
judicial system. Bauerle v. Bauerle, 263 Neb. 881, 644 N.W.2d
128 (2002).
[3] The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to the
trial court’s determinations regarding custody, child support,
division of property, alimony, and attorney fees. Millatmal v.
Millatmal, 272 Neb. 452, 723 N.W.2d 79 (2006).
Reopening Case and Withdrawing Rest.
[4] The reopening of a case to receive additional evidence
is a matter within the discretion of the district court and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion. Jessen v. DeFord, 3 Neb. App. 940, 536 N.W.2d
68 (1995).
Unclean Hands.
[5] In an appeal of an equitable action, an appellate court tries
factual questions de novo on the record, provided that where
credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the
appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the
trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one
version of the facts rather than another. Burk v. Demaray, 264
Neb. 257, 646 N.W.2d 635 (2002).
ANAlysIs
Whether Debra Should Have Been Allowed
to Withdraw Her Rest.
[6] It is clear that the primary reason Debra was allowed
to withdraw her rest was because the district court found that
Phillip had knowingly concealed information about the merger
bonus from her and from the court. Debra had asked Phillip via
interrogatory whether he had any interest in any expectations or
awards. Despite this question, Phillip never disclosed, prior to
the 2005 trial, to Debra that he could receive the merger bonus
or the conditions upon which receiving such hinged. The terms
of the merger were such that the bonus provided for therein
was clearly an expectation. An expectation is a “basis on which
something is expected to happen; esp., the prospect of receiving
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	925
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920

wealth, honors, or the like.” black’s law Dictionary 598 (7th
ed. 1999). Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action. Neb. Ct. r. Disc. § 6-326(b)(1). Clearly,
Debra was entitled to discovery regarding Phillip’s possible
merger bonus.
[7] Under § 6-326(e), a party has a duty to supplement
answers to interrogatories as follows:
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior
response if he or she obtains information upon the basis of
which . . . (b) he or she knows that the response though
correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances
are such that a failure to amend the response is in sub-
stance a knowing concealment.
based on these rules, Phillip had a duty to disclose the
potential of the merger bonus. It was not Debra’s duty to inde-
pendently determine that Phillip could receive a merger bonus,
for example, by scouring seC filings, because she had already
queried him via an interrogatory (unobjected to, we note) that
was broad enough to include the expectation of the merger
bonus. even if he did not know of the potential merger bonus
until september 15, 2005, that would have been still more than
a month before the october 20 trial. And when he learned of
the $20 million bonus pool in which he could share, his prior
responses to interrogatories were no longer true, he should
have supplemented his answers, and his failure to amend his
responses was a knowing concealment. on this basis, the trial
was reopened and Debra was allowed to introduce evidence on
the merger bonus and related facts, and we agree with the dis-
trict court’s view of the discovery issue. Phillip argues that the
case should not have been reopened.
[8] Among factors traditionally considered in determining
whether to allow a party to reopen a case to introduce addi-
tional evidence are (1) the reason for the failure to introduce
the evidence, i.e., counsel’s inadvertence, a party’s calculated
risk or tactic, or the court’s mistake; (2) the admissibility and
materiality of the new evidence to the proponent’s case; (3) the
diligence exercised by the requesting party in producing the evi-
dence before his or her case closed; (4) the time or stage of the
926 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs

proceedings at which the motion is made; and (5) whether the
new evidence would unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the
opponent. Jessen v. DeFord, 3 Neb. App. 940, 536 N.W.2d 68
(1995) (citing 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 382 (1991)).
Phillip essentially argues that Debra should have intro-
duced evidence of the merger bonus during the 2005 portion
of the trial. he claims she was not diligent in her efforts
to introduce evidence of the merger bonus, waited too long to
introduce such evidence, and had no justification for failing
to introduce such evidence. however, all of these arguments are
completely refuted by the fact that Phillip concealed informa-
tion from Debra regarding the merger bonus, even though he
had such information no less than 30 days before the trial and
admits he was aware of the potential of the merger in the sum-
mer of 2005. In an affidavit, Phillip claims Debra had actual
and constructive notice of the merger because of the seC filing,
as well as alleged conversation with Debra’s lawyer at a break
during the trial in which he allegedly told the lawyer that there
was going to be a merger.
There are several reasons why this argument is unavailing.
First, Philip is essentially arguing that “Debra should have dis-
covered, by searching seC filings, that she could not trust his
interrogatory answers,” although they were given under oath.
obviously, to embrace this notion would be to emasculate the
core notions of full and honest disclosure and discovery upon
which our civil judicial system depends. second, the affidavit
does not claim Debra, via the conversation between Phillip
and Debra’s lawyer, had actual or constructive knowledge of
the merger bonus. Phillip had been specifically asked whether
he had any interest in any “expectations or awards,” and at no
point was Phillip relieved of his duty to supplement his answers
to interrogatories and provide Debra information regarding the
merger bonus. It was his failure to do so which prevented Debra
from introducing evidence regarding the merger bonus in the
2005 portion of the trial.
Phillip also claims that the evidence Debra introduced in the
2006 portion of the trial was inadmissible and immaterial and
that he was prejudiced by its admission. however, the claim
is really an argument that the merger bonus was not marital
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	927
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920

property, and we address that question below. Its relevancy
is obvious.
[9] Phillip also asserts that the district court erred in allowing
Debra to introduce evidence beyond the scope of her motion to
withdraw her rest. but, admission of testimony that is beyond
the scope of the permission granted to adduce additional tes-
timony is discretionary. see Lewelling v. McElroy, 148 Neb.
309, 27 N.W.2d 268 (1947). The additional evidence Debra was
allowed to introduce, such as information regarding Phillip’s
stock and stock options and his 2005 bonus, was closely related
to the scope of her motion to withdraw her rest. Prior to the
merger, Phillip held stock and stock options in UICI, and as a
result of the merger, Phillip was required to sell these options.
And Phillip’s 2005 bonus was based on the same year, 2005,
during which UICI entered into the merger agreement. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in receiving such
evidence, because it was related to the merger and the bonus
flowing therefrom.
The district court allowed Debra to withdraw her rest so that
she could introduce evidence regarding the merger bonus, evi-
dence which Phillip had wrongfully and knowingly concealed
from her. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sus-
taining Debra’s motion to withdraw her rest.
Whether District Court Abused Its Discretion
by Determining That Merger Bonus and
2005 Bonus Were Marital Property.
The district court chose July 25, 2006, as the valuation date for
the merger bonus and the 2005 bonus. The district court selected
this valuation date for these assets because it was on that date
that evidence was introduced regarding them. Phillip argues that
the district court abused its discretion in using this valuation
date because it is not rationally related to the bonuses and the
bonuses did not arise from the joint efforts of the parties.
[10] There is no “hard and fast” rule concerning valuation
dates so long as the selected date bears a rational relationship to
the property to be divided, and the selected date is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. see Walker v. Walker, 9 Neb. App. 694,
618 N.W.2d 465 (2000).
928 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs

We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in
selecting July 25, 2006, as the valuation date for the merger
bonus. Phillip’s claim that the merger bonus is not the product
of the parties’ joint efforts is not supported by the nature of
the bonus. The bonus was contingent on Phillip’s continued
employment until the completion of the merger and also on the
UICI stock price. It does not appear that the merger bonus is
based only on some discrete time period of Phillip’s employ-
ment such that these efforts can be distinguished from the
parties’ joint efforts made during the marriage. see Davidson
v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998) (to extent
husband’s unvested employee stock options and stock reten-
tion shares were accumulated and acquired during marriage,
they were accumulated and acquired through joint efforts of
parties). rather, the merger bonus appears to be based on
Phillip’s cumulative efforts as an executive vice president with
UICI from mid-December 1999 until the date the merger was
completed. Phillip was not required to continue his employ-
ment with UICI or the subsequent entity formed by the merger
beyond the date when the merger bonus vested in order to
receive the merger bonus. From this fact, it is a reasonable
inference that the merger bonus was a reward for Phillip’s past
efforts, rather than future services. This can also be seen in the
fact that the merger bonus was indexed to UICI’s stock price
at the time of the merger. Phillip’s contribution to UICI’s stock
price was obviously a key component of his career with UICI,
as well as a form of compensation in the sense that the higher
the stock price, the more valuable the options. Phillip’s efforts
as a high ranking executive throughout his employment with
UICI from mid-December 1999 until the merger bonus vested
on April 4, 2006, obviously contributed to the UICI stock price.
because the merger bonus was based on Phillip’s efforts for
many years during which he was married to Debra, we cannot
say the district court abused its discretion in picking a valuation
date for the merger bonus of July 25, 2006, and finding that the
merger bonus was marital property.
[11] Phillip also argues that there is no rational relation-
ship between the valuation date of July 25, 2006, and the 2005
bonus. It does appear that that the 2005 bonus, which was based
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	929
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920

on Phillip’s efforts in 2005, is not so much a product of the
parties’ joint efforts, particularly considering that Debra filed
for divorce in 2004. however, we note that even if we were to
consider the 2005 bonus as Phillip’s nonmarital property, we
nevertheless would not reduce the district court’s allocation of
roughly one-third of the marital estate to Debra, because such
is on the low end of the accepted range. because this was a
long-term marriage to which Debra contributed in a substan-
tial way, her portion of the marital estate could have been
closer to one-half. The district court’s judgment of $2 million,
in combination with the $485,964 worth of assets Debra was
awarded, is approximately one-third of the net marital estate
of $8,334,731.87—even if we were to remove the 2005 bonus
from the marital estate, we would not reduce her allocation of
the marital estate. We recognize these figures do not account for
taxes Phillip has paid or will pay on certain assets, but the evi-
dence on tax consequences is limited to Phillip’s testimony that
he was in the “35% bracket.” That information is insufficient for
us to make any findings about the tax consequences of the bonus
or the stock options. but even if we used a hypothetical rate of
35 percent of the bonus and stock options, Debra’s share of the
net marital estate would still be within the one-third to one-half
rule parameter for property division in a dissolution. Although
the division of property is not subject to a precise mathematical
formula, the general rule is to award a spouse one-third to one-
half of the marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reason-
ableness as determined by the facts of each case. Gress v. Gress,
271 Neb. 122, 710 N.W.2d 318 (2006). here, the district court’s
award to Debra, while in line with the one-third to one-half rule,
was on the low end of that permissible range. Therefore, even
if we were to agree with Phillip that the 2005 bonus was non-
marital property, we would not reduce Debra’s award, given her
substantial contributions to the parties’ marriage over the course
of nearly 30 years.
We affirm the district court’s valuation date with regard to the
merger bonus, and to the extent we agree with Phillip’s argu-
ment that the 2005 bonus should have been considered his non-
marital property, we nevertheless would not and do not disturb
Debra’s award.
930 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs

Whether District Court Erred in Sustaining Debra’s
Motion in Limine Regarding Testimony of Hein.
Phillip attempted to introduce the testimony of hein, a certi-
fied public accountant, who would have testified that for the
purposes of generally accepted accounting practices, the merger
bonus was not an asset until April 6, 2006, when the merger
was completed. on Debra’s motion in limine, the district court
excluded the testimony of hein. Phillip argues that this testi-
mony should not have been excluded and that he was prejudiced
by its exclusion.
[12] evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence, or the evidence tends to establish
a fact from which the existence or nonexistence of a fact in
issue can be directly inferred. see Neb. rev. stat. § 27-401
(reissue 1995).
Under that definition of relevancy, the testimony of hein
may have been of some marginal relevancy, but was certainly
not determinative as to whether the merger bonus was marital
property, and should have been considered by the trial judge
“for what it was worth.” That said, the determination of what
is marital property is fundamentally guided by Nebraska case
law—not accounting principles. because of our de novo stan-
dard of review, we consider hein’s testimony via the offer of
proof. After considering such, we conclude that the trial court
did not err in concluding that the merger bonus was marital
property, irrespective of an accountant’s opinion to the contrary.
Therefore, while hein’s testimony should have been received,
there is no prejudice to Phillip from its exclusion.
Whether District Court Acted With Passion and Prejudice.
Phillip claims that the district court’s findings that all assets
and debts of the parties were marital was motivated by passion
or prejudice. however, there is simply no proof that the district
court’s determinations were the consequence of anything other
than appropriate legal determinations.
[13] The partiality of a judge is established when a reasonable
person would have to conclude that a judge was partial to one
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	931
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920

party to the action. see, Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 242
Neb. 347, 495 N.W.2d 36 (1993); State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733,
579 N.W.2d 503 (1998). other than not liking the trial judge’s
rulings, Phillip points to nothing in the record which would sat-
isfy this standard.
here, the district court’s determination that all assets and
debts were marital was based on the evidence and established
precedent. obviously, Phillip’s primary concern is the merger
bonus and the reopening of the record. We have previously
explained our strong agreement with the court’s view of the
discovery issue that readily justified the reopening of the
record. We have explained above why the merger bonus is
marital property, and there is no proof that anything other than
appropriate legal determinations caused the district court to find
the same.
Whether District Court Abused Its Discretion
in Its Award of Alimony.
[14-16] Phillip claims the district court awarded unreason-
able alimony. In dividing property and considering alimony
upon a dissolution of marriage, a court should consider four
factors: (1) the circumstances of the parties, (2) the duration of
the marriage, (3) the history of contributions to the marriage,
and (4) the ability of the supported party to engage in gainful
employment without interfering with the interests of any minor
children in the custody of each party. Schaefer v. Schaefer, 263
Neb. 785, 642 N.W.2d 792 (2002). In reviewing an alimony
award, an appellate court does not determine whether it would
have awarded the same amount of alimony as did the trial
court, but whether the trial court’s award is untenable such as
to deprive a party of a substantial right or just result. Bowers
v. Lens, 264 Neb. 465, 648 N.W.2d 294 (2002). In determining
whether alimony should be awarded, in what amount, and over
what period of time, the ultimate criterion is one of reasonable-
ness. Id.
[17,18] The purpose of alimony is to provide for the contin-
ued maintenance or support of one party by the other when the
relative economic circumstances make it appropriate. Alimony
should not be used to equalize the incomes of the parties or to
932 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs

punish one of the parties. Kalkowski v. Kalkowski, 258 Neb.
1035, 607 N.W.2d 517 (2000). however, disparity in income
or potential income may partially justify an award of alimony.
Bauerle v. Bauerle, 263 Neb. 881, 644 N.W.2d 128 (2002).
here, the parties were married for nearly 30 years and each
party made substantial contributions to the marriage. The dis-
trict court awarded Debra $3,000 per month until she reaches
the age of 65 years, dies, or remarries, whichever occurs first.
There is great disparity between the parties’ incomes. Debra has
never earned more than $60,000 in a year and currently earns
$25 per hour for part-time work while being primarily respon-
sible for the raising of the parties’ three children. Phillip earned
more than $800,000 per year in 2004 and 2005. Thus, alimony
of $36,000 per year for a maximum of approximately 10 years
seems rather insignificant and completely appropriate in the
factual setting of this case. Clearly, Phillip will have no problem
paying Debra $3,000 per month, and the district court’s award
of alimony to Debra was reasonable and was not an abuse of
its discretion.
Whether District Court Erred in Finding Phillip in Contempt
for Certain Sales of Stock Made by Him.
[19] Although Phillip assigns error to the district court’s
finding him in contempt for certain sales of stock, he does not
specifically argue this point, and therefore we will not address it.
To be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be
both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of
the party asserting the error. In re Estate of Matteson, 267 Neb.
497, 675 N.W.2d 366 (2004).
Whether District Court Erred in Failing to Find
That Debra Had Unclean Hands.
[20] Phillip claims that Debra had unclean hands and should
therefore have been denied the opportunity to withdraw her rest
and receive attorney fees. Under the doctrine of unclean hands,
a person who comes into a court of equity to obtain relief cannot
do so if he or she has acted inequitably, unfairly, or dishonestly
as to the controversy in issue. Manker v. Manker, 263 Neb. 944,
644 N.W.2d 522 (2002).
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	933
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920

Phillip’s brief implies that Debra’s claim to have been unaware
of his merger bonus prior to her motion to withdraw her rest is
dishonest, but there is simply no evidence of this. The fact that,
in a conversation between Phillip’s and Debra’s lawyers during
trial, the pendency of the merger was mentioned does not equate
to the knowledge that Debra or her counsel was aware Phillip
was in line to receive a multimillion-dollar bonus—remembering
that such topic was covered by the unanswered interrogatory we
have previously discussed in considerable detail. Phillip also
claims that Debra “falsely alleged that she was unable to procure
the deposition testimony of . . . hein” and thus blocked hein’s
testimony. but the record shows that hein stated to Debra’s
counsel less than 2 weeks before trial that he did not have suf-
ficient information from Phillip to answer Debra’s questions.
Therefore, Debra’s counsel did not falsely state that she was
unable to obtain hein’s testimony. The district court did not err
in not finding that Debra had unclean hands.
Whether District Court Erred in Failing
to Clarify Interest on Judgment.
Phillip claims that the decree of dissolution was unclear as
to whether interest should accrue on the deferred judgment
from the date of the decree, and Phillip claims that interest
should not accrue on the $2 million judgment from the date of
the decree.
[21,22] A district court can exercise its discretion and award
interest on deferred installments payable as part of a mari-
tal property distribution. see Seemann v. Seemann, 225 Neb.
116, 402 N.W.2d 883 (1987). When exercising its discretionary
power, one factor the district court should consider when deter-
mining whether a property settlement payable in installments
should draw interest from the date of judgment is the burden
on the payor-spouse. see Nickel v. Nickel, 201 Neb. 267, 267
N.W.2d 190 (1978).
Despite Phillip’s claim that the decree was vague on the issue
of interest, the district court, in fact, clearly ordered that interest
accrue on the deferred award from the date of the decree, but
that he could pay the judgment early. Given that Phillip quite
obviously has the resources to pay the judgment immediately
934 	16 NebrAskA APPellATe rePorTs

and thereby avoid interest, there simply is no reason that he
should not pay interest on it if he chooses to defer payment.
Payment of interest in these circumstances is not an unreason-
able burden for him.
CoNClUsIoN
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the dis-
trict court in all respects.
affirMeD.
MyhrA v. MyhrA 	935
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 920