In re Interest of C.H.

by an enjoined party if the injunction was granted in error.
Reasonable attorney fees incurred in dissolving the bond may
also be recovered.12
We note that the Aupperles exhausted their statutory reme
dies by moving for an increase in the bond. Section 25 1073
allows a restrained party to move the court for additional secu
rity, “and if it appears that the surety in the undertaking has
removed from the state or is insufficient,” the court can either
vacate the injunction or order an increase in the bond. In this
case, the Aupperles requested an increase in the amount of the
bond, and it was denied.13 We find that equity, as well as our
statutory language and policies, requires a party requesting an
injunction to pay for any damages caused by the injunction, as
well as reasonable attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
[5] Pursuant to §§ 25 1067 and 25 1079, if an injunction
is wrongfully granted, the party requesting the injunction is
required to pay all damages and reasonable attorney fees to the
enjoined party and is not limited to the amount of the bond. We
reverse the decision of the district court and remand the cause
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR
fuRtheR pRoceedings.
12 Williams v. Hallgren, 149 Neb. 621, 31 N.W.2d 737 (1948).
13 See, e.g., Tracy, supra note 2.
in Re inteRest of c.h., a child undeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of nebRaska , appellee , v. c.h., appellant.
763 N.W.2d 708
Filed April 10, 2009. 	No. S 08 261.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases
de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile
court’s findings.
2. Motions to Suppress: Miranda Rights: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a
motion to suppress statements to determine whether an individual was “in
IN Re INteReSt OF C.h. 	565
Cite as 277 Neb. 565
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:52 AM CST

custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.
ed. 2d 694 (1966), findings of fact as to the circumstances surrounding the inter
rogation are reviewed for clear error, and the determination whether a reasonable
person would have felt that he or she was or was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave is reviewed de novo.
3. Miranda Rights: Words and Phrases. An individual is in custody during an
interrogation if there is a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associ
ated with a formal arrest.
4. Miranda Rights. there are two inquiries relevant to determining the degree of
restraint on freedom of movement: (1) an assessment of the circumstances sur
rounding the interrogation and (2) whether a reasonable person would have felt
that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
5. Juvenile Courts: Miranda Rights. In situations where authorities initiate con
tact with a juvenile, an advisement to the juvenile that he has the option to stay
and answer questions or terminate the interview is crucial to the determination of
whether a statement by the juvenile was voluntary.
6. Evidence: New Trial: Appeal and Error. When considering the sufficiency of
the evidence in determining whether to remand for a new trial or to dismiss, an
appellate court must consider all the evidence presented by the State and admitted
by the trial court irrespective of the correctness of that admission.
Appeal from the County Court for Madison County: Ross a.
stoffeR, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Matthew 	A. 	headley, 	Deputy 	Madison 	County 	Public
Defender, and Melissa A. Wentling for appellant.
Gail 	Collins, 	Deputy 	Madison 	County 	Attorney, 	for
appellee.
WRight, 	connolly, 	stephan, 	mccoRmack , 	and 	milleR-
leRman, JJ.
WRight , J.
NAtURe OF CASe
C.h., a minor, appeals his adjudication in the separate juve
nile court of Madison County. the court found C.h. to be a
juvenile within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43 247(1) and
(2) (Cum. Supp. 2006) based on evidence that C.h. sexually
assaulted his 5 year old half sister. Because the court should
have suppressed C.h.’s confession, we reverse the adjudication
and remand the cause for a new adjudication hearing.
566 	277 NeBRASkA RePORtS

SCOPe OF ReVIeW
[1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the
record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juve
nile court’s findings. In re Interest of Dustin S., 276 Neb. 635,
756 N.W.2d 277 (2008).
[2] In reviewing a motion to suppress statements to deter
mine whether an individual was “in custody” for purposes of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. ed. 2d
694 (1966), findings of fact as to the circumstances surround
ing the interrogation are reviewed for clear error, and the deter
mination whether a reasonable person would have felt that he
or she was or was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave is reviewed de novo. State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668,
668 N.W.2d 448 (2003).
FACtS
C.h. was 14 years old in October 2007. At that time, he
lived with his father, stepmother, and three half siblings. he
shared a bedroom with his two half brothers and half sister,
ages 8, 4, and 5, respectively. C.h. had his own bed, his half
brothers shared the top bunk of a bunk bed, and his half sister,
the victim, slept in the bottom bunk.
During the night of October 15, 2007, C.h.’s father heard the
girl whimpering in the children’s bedroom. When he entered
the room, he saw C.h. leaning over her while she slept. C.h.
told his father that C.h. thought she had wet the bed. two days
later, on October 17, the girl told their father that C.h. had put
tape over her mouth the night before and that her “potty hurt.”
In response to this statement, the father called the principal
at the high school where C.h. was a student and the Madison
County Sheriff’s Department.
Investigator Richard Drummond with the Madison County
Sheriff’s Department received the father’s call about the alle
gations. Drummond arranged for the child advocacy center
at a hospital in Norfolk, Nebraska, to interview the girl. he
also asked traci Fox, a protection and safety worker with
the Department of health and human Services, to assist with
the investigation.
IN Re INteReSt OF C.h. 	567
Cite as 277 Neb. 565

At the child advocacy center, forensic investigator kelli
Lowe interviewed the girl. the statement given indicated that
C.h. put blue tape on her mouth, that he put his hand in her
genitalia, that she told C.h. not to do that, and that she did not
like it. She also told Lowe that C.h. touched her vagina with
his penis.
Lowe showed the girl drawings of a little girl without her
clothes on and a little boy without his clothes on and asked her
to identify body parts. the girl identified the genitalia of the
girl in the picture and the genitalia of the boy in the picture.
After the interview, a physician’s assistant employed by the
hospital physically examined the girl. At the beginning of the
examination, the girl indicated to the physician’s assistant that
C.h. had touched her in the vaginal area and the anal area with
his finger and that he tried to place his penis inside her. During
the examination, the girl described other incidents of sexual
assault by C.h.
Following the interview and examination, Drummond and
Fox went to the school C.h. attended and met with the prin
cipal. Drummond spoke to the father about interviewing C.h.,
and the father did not object to the interview. C.h.’s father and
stepmother also expressed that they were not willing to allow
C.h. to return to their home following the interview. Before
meeting with C.h., Drummond determined that he would detain
C.h. and take him to the juvenile detention center in Madison,
Nebraska, at the conclusion of the interview.
At the school, the principal brought C.h. to a confer
ence room in the principal’s office area. Drummond and Fox
entered the room after C.h. the room was a large, well lit
room with tables set up in a U shape and chairs around the
outside of the tables. there was one window to the outside,
and the door to the room was on the wall opposite the window.
C.h. sat in a chair against the wall near the door between the
ends of the U shaped tables. Drummond sat on one side of the
“U,” and Fox sat on the other. Drummond was dressed in plain
clothes and sat 4 to 5 feet from C.h. the door to the room
was unlocked.
Drummond introduced himself and Fox and told C.h. that
he was with the Madison County Sheriff’s Department. he
568 	277 NeBRASkA RePORtS

told C.h. they were going to ask him some questions. the
entire interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. the first
10 to 15 minutes consisted of discussing C.h.’s background
and family information. Drummond did not tell C.h. that he
was free to leave at any time during the interview or that he
could terminate the interrogation, nor did he advise C.h. of his
Miranda rights.
Drummond conducted the interview in a conversational
question and answer format, and C.h. answered the questions.
Drummond stated that C.h. did not appear tired or under the
influence of any medication. he appeared to understand what
was going on and did not appear to have any mental problems,
to be developmentally delayed, or to have any physical prob
lems indicating discomfort or duress.
After gathering background information, Drummond asked
questions about the sexual allegations. Drummond described
the conversation as follows:
I told [C.h.] that his sister . . . had spoken to her dad
that morning and said that . . . there had been some inap
propriate sexual contact and that [she] had gone to the
hospital where we had been most of the morning and up
until the time that we came and talked to him. that [she]
had been interviewed and also had been — and checked
physically. And he at that point he began to show some
emotion, started . . . weeping a little bit, asked if [she]
was okay. then I asked him if . . . he had had inappropri
ate contact with her.
C.h. admitted to sexual contact with the girl. C.h. told
Drummond the sexual encounters happened quite often.
At the conclusion of the interview, Drummond informed
C.h. that he was going to be detained and taken to the juvenile
detention center. Drummond transported C.h. to the juvenile
detention center in his unmarked police vehicle. C.h. was not
restrained and rode in the front passenger seat. Fox rode in the
back seat behind C.h.
After C.h. was removed from the family home, his step
mother found blue tape under C.h.’s bed. While C.h.’s father
and stepmother were transporting him to an appointment in
October 2007, he told them that he “‘was guilty.’” When his
IN Re INteReSt OF C.h. 	569
Cite as 277 Neb. 565

father asked him if what he told Drummond was true, C.h.
started crying and said he was sorry.
On November 13, 2007, C.h. filed a motion to suppress the
statements he made to Drummond and Fox. On December 4,
the juvenile court held a hearing on the motion. On January 7,
2008, the court overruled C.h.’s motion to suppress.
A trial was held on February 19, 2008, and the parties
stipulated to the facts of the case, except that C.h. objected
to consideration of his statements to Drummond and Fox. the
juvenile court found that C.h. had committed acts which would
constitute the felony offense of sexual assault in the first degree
and that C.h. had committed acts which would constitute the
misdemeanor offense of sexual assault in the third degree.
the court adjudged C.h. to be a juvenile within § 43 247(1)
and (2) and committed him to the temporary custody of the
Department of health and human Services, Office of Juvenile
Services (OJS), for an evaluation. On March 11, C.h. filed an
appeal of his adjudication. On April 7, the court placed C.h.
in the temporary legal custody of OJS and in the physical cus
tody of a sex offender treatment group home in South Sioux
City, Nebraska.
ASSIGNMeNtS OF eRROR
C.h. assigns, restated, that the juvenile court erred in (1)
overruling his motion to suppress; (2) finding that the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that C.h. committed acts
which would constitute a felony and a misdemeanor, causing
him to be a juvenile within the meaning of § 43 247(1) and (2);
and (3) placing C.h. at a juvenile detention center during the
pendency of the case.
ANALYSIS
motion to suppRess
C.h. first alleges that the juvenile court erred when it denied
his motion to suppress statements he made to Drummond, a
law enforcement officer, during the interview at his school. he
argues that the court should have suppressed his statements
on the grounds that he made the statements during a custodial
570 	277 NeBRASkA RePORtS

interrogation and had not been advised of his Miranda rights,
thereby violating his Fifth Amendment rights.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. ed. 2d 694 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
authorities must employ procedural safeguards during a cus
todial interrogation to protect a suspect’s privilege against
self incrimination. Specifically, authorities must advise an indi
vidual in custody that he has the right to remain silent and the
right to an attorney. however, this requirement applies only
“‘where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom
as to render him [or her] “in custody.”’” In re Interest of Tyler
F., 276 Neb. 527, 532, 755 N.W.2d 360, 366 (2008) (quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. ed. 2d
714 (1977)). When a suspect is not in custody, authorities are
not required to advise the suspect of his or her rights and may
use the statements at trial.
the term “interrogation” encompasses express questioning
as well as words or actions by police officers, other than those
routine to arrest and custody, that the officers should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. See State v. Rodriguez, 272 Neb. 930, 726 N.W.2d
157 (2007). In this case, Drummond’s interview of C.h. at
the school was clearly an interrogation, and it is undisputed
that Drummond did not advise C.h. of his Miranda rights.
therefore, the issue presented is whether C.h. was in custody
during the interrogation. If C.h. was in custody, the juvenile
court erred in failing to suppress the statements he made
to Drummond.
[3,4] An individual is in custody during an interrogation if
there is a “‘“restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.’” Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. ed. 2d 383 (1995). Accord
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L.
ed. 2d 938 (2004). there are two inquiries relevant to deter
mining the degree of restraint on freedom of movement: (1) an
assessment of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
and (2) whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
IN Re INteReSt OF C.h. 	571
Cite as 277 Neb. 565

Id. See, also, State v. Rogers, ante p. 37, 760 N.W.2d 35 (2009);
State v. McKinney, 273 Neb. 346, 730 N.W.2d 74 (2007); State
v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003).
In State v. Rogers, supra, we described many circumstances
that the court may assess in determining whether an individual
is “in custody.” We described eight circumstances that are con
sidered to be most relevant to the custody inquiry. We also cited
State v. Mata, supra, in which we found helpful the assessment
of six common indicia outlined by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the eighth Circuit in U.S. v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496 (8th Cir.
2002). those factors are:
“(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of
questioning 	that 	the 	questioning 	was 	voluntary, 	that
the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to
[leave], or that the suspect was not considered under
arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained
freedom of movement during questioning; (3) whether the
suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily
acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions; (4)
whether strong[ ]arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were
employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere
of the questioning was police dominated; or, (6), whether
the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of
the questioning.”
Id. at 500. See, also, In re Interest of Tyler F., supra; State v.
McKinney, supra; State v. Mata, supra. the first three factors
are mitigating factors. the presence of these circumstances
indicates a suspect was not in custody. the second three factors
are aggravating factors, the existence of which make it more
likely a suspect was in custody. We recently applied these fac
tors in a juvenile custody inquiry in In re Interest of Tyler F.,
276 Neb. 527, 755 N.W.2d 360 (2008).
In In re Interest of Tyler F., a 14 year old juvenile was
adjudicated in juvenile court on allegations of criminal imper
sonation and disturbing the peace. the charges stemmed from
allegations that tyler F. accessed the Internet and posed as a
female acquaintance. he posted a classified advertisement on
a Web site, stating that the female was looking to have sexual
relations with men. Several men used the contact information
572 	277 NeBRASkA RePORtS

provided in the advertisement to call the female or show up at
her home. the police ultimately identified tyler as a suspect
and interviewed him at his high school about the Internet post.
During the interrogation, tyler admitted that he had posted
the classified advertisement. At trial, he sought to suppress
the statements he made to officers, because he was not given
Miranda warnings before the interrogation. the juvenile court
denied the motion.
On appeal, we analyzed the mitigating and aggravating fac
tors set forth in U.S. v. Axsom, supra, to determine whether
tyler was in custody. the interviewing officers informed tyler
that he was not under arrest. he had unrestrained freedom of
movement during the interrogation. he was not handcuffed or
physically restrained, and officers did not physically block or
prevent his movement. It was less clear whether he “initiated
contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official
requests to respond to questions.” In re Interest of Tyler F., 276
Neb. at 535, 755 N.W.2d at 368. Although tyler did not initi
ate the interview and was escorted to the interview by school
security guards, this did not automatically indicate that his
responses were not voluntary. In fact, tyler agreed to talk to
the officers after they informed him that he was free to leave.
therefore, all mitigating circumstances indicated that tyler
was not in custody.
Consideration of the aggravating factors also indicated that
tyler was not in custody. Regarding the first aggravating factor,
we noted that the officers did not use any strong arm tactics or
deceptive stratagems. they were dressed in plain clothes and
did not have firearms drawn. the officers were straightforward
with the evidence, and tyler confessed when the officers
informed him they had traced the Internet post to his family
computer. tyler was not placed under arrest at the termination
of questioning. Following his confession, tyler was permitted
to return to class.
the evidence supported all three mitigating factors and did
not support two of the three aggravating factors. We declined
to definitively resolve the question of whether the interrogation
atmosphere was police dominated. Weighing the factors, we
concluded that the juvenile was not in custody and that use of
IN Re INteReSt OF C.h. 	573
Cite as 277 Neb. 565

his statements did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. In re
Interest of Tyler F., 276 Neb. 527, 755 N.W.2d 360 (2008). We
reached the same conclusion in State v. McKinney, 273 Neb.
346, 730 N.W.2d 74 (2007), and State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668,
668 N.W.2d 448 (2003).
In the case at bar, the factors indicate that C.h. was in cus
tody. Although C.h. had unrestrained freedom of movement
during the questioning, Drummond did not advise C.h. that he
was not under arrest, that he was free to leave, or that he did
not have to talk to Drummond and Fox or answer any ques
tions. Based on our analysis in In re Interest of Tyler F. and
because C.h. was not told that he was free to leave and did
not have to answer questions, we conclude that C.h. did not
voluntarily acquiesce to questioning by law enforcement or
social services.
[5] As in In re Interest of Tyler F., C.h. was escorted to the
principal’s office for the interview, and there is no evidence
that he resisted talking to Drummond. however, unlike the
juvenile in In re Interest of Tyler F., C.h. did not confess with
the assurance and knowledge that he was free to terminate the
interview and leave. In situations where authorities initiate
contact with a juvenile, an advisement to the juvenile that he
has the option to stay and answer questions or terminate the
interview is crucial to the determination of whether a statement
by the juvenile was voluntary. See In re Interest of Tyler F.,
supra. Because C.h. was not advised that he was free to leave,
we conclude that his statements were not voluntary.
We also find that the third aggravating circumstance was
present. Following the interrogation, Drummond placed C.h.
in custody and transported him to the juvenile detention cen
ter. even before the interrogation, Drummond had made the
determination to place C.h. in custody regardless of whether
he confessed.
Assessing the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,
we conclude that three factors indicate C.h. was in custody.
C.h. was not advised that he was free to leave, his state
ments to Drummond were not made voluntarily, and he was
placed in custody at the conclusion of the interrogation. A law
enforcement officer’s preinterview decision to take a suspect
574 	277 NeBRASkA RePORtS

into custody at the conclusion of questioning is not necessar
ily fatal to the custody analysis, but the decision to place C.h.
in custody following the interrogation prevented Drummond
from being able to honestly tell C.h. that he was free to leave.
Without this advisement, C.h. did not have the information
necessary to make an informed decision as to whether to talk
to law enforcement and social services.
C.h. was a 14 year old high school freshman summoned
to the principal’s office and questioned by an officer from the
sheriff’s department regarding serious allegations of sexual
assault. he was not told that he was free to leave, and we con
clude that someone in C.h.’s position would not believe he was
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. C.h. was “in
custody” for purposes of Miranda protections. Since he was
not advised of his Miranda rights, the juvenile court erred in
failing to suppress his confession.
sufficiency of evidence
[6] When considering the sufficiency of the evidence in
determining whether to remand for a new trial or to dismiss,
an appellate court must consider all the evidence presented by
the State and admitted by the trial court irrespective of the cor
rectness of that admission. State v. Delgado, 269 Neb. 141, 690
N.W.2d 787 (2005); State v. Rathjen, 266 Neb. 62, 662 N.W.2d
591 (2003). In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the
State and admitted by the juvenile court established beyond a
reasonable doubt that C.h. committed acts which would consti
tute a misdemeanor and a felony, causing him to be a juvenile
within § 43 247(1) and (2). Specifically, the evidence shows
that C.h. committed acts which would constitute third degree
sexual assault, a misdemeanor, and first degree sexual assault,
a felony.
third degree sexual assault occurs when a person sub
jects another person to sexual contact without the consent
of the victim or when the person knew or should have
known that the victim was physically or mentally incapable
of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her con
duct. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28 320 (Reissue 2008). Pursuant to
§ 28 320, a sexual assault is third degree sexual assault and
IN Re INteReSt OF C.h. 	575
Cite as 277 Neb. 565

is a Class I misdemeanor if the actor does not cause serious
personal injury to the victim.
First degree sexual assault occurs when a person subjects
another person to sexual penetration without the consent of the
victim or when the person knew or should have known that
the victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting
or appraising the nature of his or her conduct. Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28 319 (Reissue 2008). Pursuant to § 28 319, first degree
sexual assault is a Class II felony.
Considering all of the evidence regardless of whether it was
properly admitted, there was sufficient evidence for the juve
nile court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that C.h. com
mitted these acts and was a juvenile within § 43 247(1) and
(2). Because the confession should have been suppressed and
was a significant part of the evidence upon which the court
relied, we cannot say that admission of the confession was
harmless. We therefore reverse the adjudication and remand
the cause for a new adjudication hearing in which the confes
sion is excluded.
detention duRing pendency of case
C.h.’s final assignment of error, that the juvenile court
abused its discretion by placing him at the juvenile detention
center during the pendency of the case, is moot. C.h. was
placed at the juvenile detention center on October 17, 2007,
following his interview with Drummond. he remained at the
center until the court placed C.h. in the temporary custody of
OJS on April 7, 2008, for placement in a sex offender treatment
group home. It was determined that this placement would be in
C.h.’s best interests. C.h. is no longer at the juvenile detention
center; therefore, we do not need to further address this issue.
See In re Interest of Corey P. et al., 269 Neb. 925, 697 N.W.2d
647 (2005).
Because we reverse the adjudication and remand the cause,
we note that detention pending adjudication is permitted by
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43 254 (Reissue 2008). Section 43 254 states
that “pending the adjudication of any case, if it appears that the
need for placement or further detention exists, the juvenile may
576 	277 NeBRASkA RePORtS

be . . . (2) kept in some suitable place provided by the city or
county authorities.”
CONCLUSION
the juvenile court erred in denying C.h.’s motion to sup
press his confession. Because the confession was erroneously
considered by the court, we reverse the court’s adjudication
that C.h. was a juvenile within § 43 247(1) and (2) and we
remand the cause for a new adjudication hearing.
R eveRsed and Remanded With diRections.
geRRaRd, J., participating on briefs.
heavican, C.J., not participating.
IN Re INteReSt OF O.S. 	577
Cite as 277 Neb. 577
in Re inteRest of o.s., alleged to be
a dangeRous sex offendeR.
o.s., appellant, v. mental health boaRd of the
fouRth Judicial distRict, appellee .
763 N.W.2d 723
Filed April 10, 2009. 	No. S 08 405.
1. Mental Health: Appeal and Error. the district court reviews the determination
of a mental health board de novo on the record.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a district court’s judgment, an
appellate court will affirm the judgment unless it finds, as a matter of law, that
clear and convincing evidence does not support the judgment.
3. Convicted Sex Offender: Due Process: Proof. Although the Sex Offender
Commitment Act does not statutorily require a showing of a recent act of vio
lence, it satisfies due process by requiring the State to prove that a substantial
likelihood exists that an individual will engage in dangerous behavior unless
restraints are applied.
4. Convicted Sex Offender: Proof. to prove that an individual is a dangerous sex
offender under the Sex Offender Commitment Act, the State must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the individual is likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence and that the individual is substantially unable to control his crimi
nal behavior.
5. Convicted Sex Offender: Mental Health: Evidence. Civil commitments under
the Sex Offender Commitment Act and the Nebraska Mental health Commitment
Act require that the mentally ill person be dangerous and that absent confinement,
the person is likely to engage in particular acts which will result in substantial
harm to himself or others.