Metropolitan Comm. College Area v. City of Omaha

But, assuming without deciding that a juvenile adjudicated
in a delinquency hearing is entitled to notice that the court
could terminate parental rights, such termination was not a
possibility when Spencer entered his plea. The court placed
Spencer in the custody and care of OJS, an office charged
with providing delinquent juveniles treatment in a manner
consistent with public safety.10 OJS did not have the author-
ity to terminate Spencer’s mother’s parental rights.11 To ter-
minate parental rights, the State would first have to file a
new petition under § 43-247(3) or Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-291
(Reissue 2008). Either proceeding would be a separate case
and not part of the delinquency proceedings. Thus, although
§ 43-1312(3) lists as an option the termination of parental
rights, that was not a possibility in the State’s delinquency
case against Spencer.
Because termination of parental rights was not a possibil-
ity in Spencer’s delinquency proceedings, we conclude that he
received adequate notification of all possible consequences of
his no contest plea.
A ffirmed.
10 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-402 (Reissue 2008).
11 See, generally, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-401 to 43-423 (Reissue 2008).
The meTropoliTAn C ommuniTy C ollege A reA, A poliTiCAl
subdivision of The sTATe of nebrAskA And body
CorporATe And poliTiC, AppellAnT, v.
C iTy of omAhA eT Al ., Appellees.
765 N.W.2d 440
Filed May 15, 2009. 	No. S-08-813.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which
an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
2. ____: ____. Absent anything to the contrary, an appellate court will give statutory
language its plain and ordinary meaning.
3. Statutes. It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute
that is not warranted by the legislative language.
782 	277 NEBRASkA REpORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:52 AM CST

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: peTer
C. bATAillon, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Robert T. Cannella and Gerald L. Friedrichsen, of Fitzgerald,
Schorr, Barmettler & Brennan, p.C., L.L.O., and James R.
Thibodeau for appellant.
paul D. kratz, Omaha City Attorney, and Bernard J. in den
Bosch for appellees.
heAviCAn, C.J., WrighT, C onnolly, gerrArd, mCC ormACk ,
and miller-lermAn, JJ.
heAviCAn, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
The Metropolitan Community College Area (Metro) filed an
action requesting that the City of Omaha (City) be permanently
enjoined from condemning land owned by Metro. The district
court denied Metro’s request. Metro appeals.
FACTUAL BACkGROUND
The facts of this case are largely stipulated. The City sought
to condemn a portion of Metro’s Elkhorn Valley campus.
Metro’s campus is within the city limits of the City and is
located on the northeast corner of the intersection of U.S.
Highway 6, also known as West Dodge Road, and Nebraska
Highway 31, also known as 204th Street. There is just one
entrance/exit to Metro’s campus, which is located off of 204th
Street. Metro’s entrance/exit drive, while not a city street, is
lined up across 204th Street with Cumberland Drive, which is
a city street.
The City sought to widen and improve Metro’s entrance/exit
and also to connect a new street, 203d Street, from Veterans
Drive north of campus, generally southward to the entrance/
exit drive leading into Metro’s campus. After acquisition of the
property, what is currently the roadway leading into Metro’s
campus would become a city street and would be maintained
by the City.
Because Metro was not responsive to the City’s offer to
purchase this property, the City filed a “petition to Condemn
METROpOLITAN COMM. COLLEGE AREA v. CITy OF OMAHA 	783
Cite as 277 Neb. 782

property” in Douglas County Court on March 14, 2008. On
April 11, Metro filed an action seeking to enjoin the City from
condemning the property. The parties agreed to the entry of a
temporary injunction so that a trial on the permanent injunction
could proceed more expeditiously.
Following a trial regarding the issuance of a permanent
injunction, the district court dismissed Metro’s request. The
court reasoned that the land in question was currently being
used as a street, and that such was not a specific public use.
The court continued: “The result of this condemnation is that it
will still be used as a street, except that it will be more capable
of handling more traffic and provide more access to adjacent
areas.” Metro appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Metro assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district
court erred in concluding that the City had the authority to
condemn Metro’s property.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an
appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.1
ANALySIS
The City’s general power of eminent domain is set forth
in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-366 (Reissue 2007), which provides
in part:
The city may purchase or acquire by the exercise of
the power of eminent domain private property or public
property which is not at the time devoted to a specific
public use, for the following purposes and uses: (1) For
streets, alleys, avenues, parks, recreational areas, park-
ways, playgrounds, boulevards, sewers, public squares,
market places, and for other needed public uses or pur-
poses authorized by this act, and for adding to, enlarging,
widening, or extending any of the foregoing; and (2) for
constructing or enlarging waterworks, gas plants, or other
1 Loves v. World Ins. Co., 276 Neb. 936, 758 N.W.2d 640 (2008).
784 	277 NEBRASkA REpORTS

municipal utility purposes or enterprises authorized by
this act.
(Emphasis supplied.)
[2,3] The parties are in agreement that the property in ques-
tion is public property. Thus, the sole issue presented by this
appeal is the interpretation of the phrase “devoted to a spe-
cific public use” and whether Metro’s use of the property in
question qualifies as such. Absent anything to the contrary,
an appellate court will give statutory language its plain and
ordinary meaning.2 And it is not within the province of a court
to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the
legislative language.3
Metro contends that as the sole means of ingress and egress
into its campus, its entrance/exit drive is devoted to a spe-
cific public use. The City, meanwhile, suggests that the land
in question is not devoted to a specific public use, because
Metro’s mission is to provide educational services. The City
argues that Metro’s entrance/exit is not sufficiently related to
that mission. The City also argues that because its use would
not impair or destroy Metro’s use of the drive and, in fact, the
City would improve the drive, the City should be permitted to
acquire the land by eminent domain.
We agree with Metro that its entrance/exit is devoted to a
specific public purpose. Without such an entrance, it would not
be possible for Metro to effectively administer its mission of
providing educational services. This is particularly true where
the drive in question is the sole means of ingress and egress
into campus. We reject the City’s suggestion that because
the entrance/exit drive is not directly related to the providing
of educational services, it fails to qualify as a “specific pub-
lic use.”
We also reject the City’s contention that the exercise of emi-
nent domain in this case is permissible because the City would
“improve” the drive, and because the drive would continue to
2 Koch v. Cedar Cty. Freeholder Bd., 276 Neb. 1009, 759 N.W.2d 464
(2009).
3 Steffen v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 276 Neb. 378, 754 N.W.2d 730
(2008).
METROpOLITAN COMM. COLLEGE AREA v. CITy OF OMAHA 	785
Cite as 277 Neb. 782

be used as an entrance/exit to Metro’s campus, Metro’s use
would not be impaired or destroyed. The City cites authority
for this proposition,4 and indeed the exception suggested by the
City appears to be the rule in many jurisdictions.5
However, this court is concerned only with the language of
§ 14-366, a statute which appears to be relatively unique. The
language of that statute provides that the City may “acquire by
the exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . public prop-
erty which is not at the time devoted to a specific public use.”
This statute makes no allowance for eminent domain if the tak-
ing would not impair or destroy the existing use. Instead, the
statute very clearly provides the City the authority to take pub-
lic property only if that property is not “devoted to a specific
public use.” We decline to read into the statute the exception
suggested by the City.
We conclude the district court erred in dismissing Metro’s
request for a permanent injunction. We therefore reverse the
district court’s decision and remand this cause with instructions
to enter an injunction restraining the City from proceeding with
its planned condemnation of a portion of Metro’s entrance/
exit drive.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is reversed, and the cause
is remanded to the district court with instructions.
reversed And remAnded.
sTephAn, J., not participating.
4 See State ex rel. Md. Heights, Etc. v. Campbell, 736 S.W.2d 383 (Mo.
1987).
5 See 1A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 2.17 (3d ed.
2007).
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