Erickson v. U-Haul Internat.

to rule that § 84-712.05(5) allowed the City to withhold
the records from disclosure. Further, because an exemption
applied, the requesting parties did not substantially prevail and
the court erred in awarding attorney fees under § 84-712.07.
We therefore affirm in part, and in part reverse and remand
the cause with directions for the district court to enter an order
consistent with this opinion.
A ffirmed in pArt, And in pArt reversed
And remAnded with directions.
shAri erickson And G eorGe erickson, AppellAnts , v.
U-hAUl internAtionAl , doinG bUsiness As U-hAUl
compAny, A corporAte defendAnt, And U-hAUl
center of n.w. omAhA, Appellees.
767 N.W.2d 765
Filed July 2, 2009. 	No. S-08-759.
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and admis-
sible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an
appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the judgment was granted, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences deducible from the evidence.
3. Jurisdiction: States. When there are no factual disputes regarding state contacts,
conflict-of-law issues present questions of law.
4. Statutes: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a statute is a ques-
tion of law. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court has an obliga-
tion to resolve the questions independently of the conclusion reached by the
trial court.
5. Rules of Evidence: Appeal and Error. When the Nebraska Evidence Rules
commit the evidentiary question at issue to the discretion of the trial court, an
appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
6. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s determination of the rele-
vancy and admissibility of evidence must be upheld in the absence of abuse
of discretion.
7. Jurisdiction: States. In answering any choice-of-law question, the court first
asks whether there is any real conflict between the laws of the states.
8. ____: ____. In conflict-of-law analysis, an actual conflict exists when a legal
issue is resolved differently under the law of two states.
18 	278 NEbRASkA REpoRTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:49 AM CST

9. Jurisdiction: States: Torts. In conflict-of-law analysis, the “most significant
relationship” test is used to determine the applicable law for specific tort
claim issues.
10. Jurisdiction: States. In choice-of-law analysis, the law of the site of the injury
is usually applied to determine liability, except where another state has a more
significant relationship on a particular issue.
11. Damages: Marriage: Words and Phrases. Damages for loss of consortium
represent compensation for a spouse who has been deprived of rights to which
he or she is entitled because of the marriage relationship, namely, the other
spouse’s affection, companionship, and assistance and particularly his or her
conjugal society.
12. Claims: Marriage. Although loss of consortium is a personal legal claim which
is separate and distinct from those claims belonging to the injured spouse, a loss
of consortium claim derives from the harm suffered by the injured spouse.
13. ____: ____. In a loss of consortium claim, the rights of recovery by the uninjured
spouse are based upon the injured spouse’s right to recover for direct injuries.
Not only must there be an injury to the injured spouse, but also there must be a
compensable injury, that is, an injury for which the defendant is liable.
14. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Relevant evidence is that which has any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: pAtriciA
A. lAmberty, Judge. Affirmed.
p. Shawn McCann, of Sodoro, Daly & Sodoro, p.C., for
appellants.
Ronald F. krause, of Cassem, Tierney, Adams, Gotch &
Douglas, and k. Lee Marshall and Stephen G. Strauss, of
bryan Cave, L.L.p., for appellees.
heAvicAn, 	c.J., 	wriGht, 	connolly, 	G errArd, 	stephAn,
mccormAck, and miller-lermAn, JJ.
G errArd, J.
This is the second time this case has come before us.1
It remains a case about a moving day accident. Dale and
Judith Carstens were moving from Walnut, Iowa, to Herman,
Nebraska, and had enlisted the help of their daughter, Shari
Erickson. To facilitate the move, Judith rented a U-Haul truck.
1 See Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 274 Neb. 236, 738 N.W.2d 453 (2007).
ERICkSoN v. U-HAUL INTERNAT. 	19
Cite as 278 Neb. 18

While operating the truck, Dale accidentally pinned Shari’s
foot between the truck’s ramp and a concrete step. As a result
of the accident, Shari and her husband, George Erickson, sued
U-Haul International, Inc.; U-Haul Center of N.W. omaha
(U-Haul Center); and Dale. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the
plaintiffs’ statutory liability claims and directed a verdict
against George’s loss of consortium claim. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendants on the plaintiffs’ remaining
negligence claims.
The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the court should not have
entered judgment on their statutory liability and loss of con-
sortium claims and that the court erred in excluding certain
photographic evidence at trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Shari’s mother, Judith, rented the truck from U-Haul Center,
a Nebraska corporation, to move from Iowa to Nebraska. The
truck, known as a 17-foot easy-loading mover, was titled in the
name of “U Haul Co.” Shari, a resident of Nebraska, agreed
to help her parents move. While operating the truck in Iowa,
Shari’s father, Dale, attempted to back it up to a porch, but
the loading ramp was a few inches short of the top step. Shari
held the ramp up while Dale attempted to reverse the truck a
few more inches. When the truck was engaged, however, it
first jumped forward, throwing Shari off balance, and as Dale
backed up the truck, it pinned Shari’s foot between the con-
crete step and the truck’s ramp. As a result of the injury, Shari
had reconstructive surgery on her foot and was hospitalized for
approximately 3 weeks.
Shari and George sued U-Haul International, U-Haul Center,
and Dale for negligence. Dale has since died, and his estate is
no longer a party. The Ericksons also brought claims against
U-Haul International for vicarious liability and statutory neg-
ligence pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,239 (Reissue
2008) or, in the alternative, Iowa Code Ann. § 321.493 (West
Cum. Supp. 2008). The district court had previously entered
summary judgment in favor of U-Haul International and
U-Haul Center, based, respectively, on a lack of tort duty and
insufficient minimum contacts with the State of Nebraska. on
20 	278 NEbRASkA REpoRTS

appeal, we reversed both findings and remanded the cause
for trial.2
before trial, U-Haul International filed a motion for par-
tial summary judgment as to the statutory negligence cause
of action. After a hearing, the district court granted U-Haul
International’s motion for partial summary judgment, conclud-
ing that U-Haul International was not statutorily negligent
because it was not the owner of the truck. The district court did
not resolve the issue of whether Nebraska or Iowa law applied,
but determined that Erickson could not prevail under the rele-
vant statutes of either state.
A jury trial was held to determine the negligence claims
against U-Haul International and U-Haul Center. Judith testi-
fied that she did not see any legible warning decals on the truck
instructing that the ramp should not be extended while the
truck was in motion. The Ericksons also introduced a number
of exhibits, including exhibits 30 and 31, which were photo-
graphs of a standard U-Haul truck bumper displaying a warn-
ing decal. The general manager of the U-Haul Center identified
exhibit 30 as “the warning decal above the ramp” and exhibit
31 as a “little bit sharper view of Exhibit No. 30.” He testified
that both exhibits were photographs of a U-Haul truck, but not
the truck in question. Instead, the truck pictured in exhibits 30
and 31 was a different truck, with a different ramp, than the
truck which was involved in the accident.
U-Haul objected to the exhibits on foundation and rele-
vance grounds. In response, the Ericksons’ counsel argued that
although the exhibits were “not probative of at the time of the
accident how the particular truck was,” the exhibits were “pro-
bative of the fact that U-Haul has ramps with defective stickers
on them and labels that haven’t been replaced.” but the district
court sustained the foundation and relevance objections.
The district court received into evidence, however, a color
copy of the U-Haul ramp warning decal depicted in exhibits 30
and 31. The warning sticker below the latch to the truck’s rear
door states, “DANGER Do NoT extend or hold ramp while
vehicle is in motion. Failure to follow this warning could result
2 See id.
ERICkSoN v. U-HAUL INTERNAT. 	21
Cite as 278 Neb. 18

in serious or fatal injury.” (Emphasis in original.) The district
court also received into evidence copies of photographs of the
actual truck, including photographs of the truck’s bumper with
a warning decal affixed.
U-Haul Center’s shop manager testified that the truck, at
all times and including the day of the accident, had an empty
vehicle weight of 8,140 pounds. In addition, the assistant cor-
porate secretary of U-Haul International testified that with each
rental of a truck, such as the truck here, an insurance policy is
included, providing coverage for at least the minimum financial
limits for the state where the vehicle is rented.
George did not attend trial and did not testify regarding any
alleged loss of consortium. Shari, however, testified that the
accident affected her intimacy and relationship with George.
She testified that since the accident, her husband “probably has
to do more chores” and he “takes it personally” if they sleep
in separate bedrooms. At the close of the Ericksons’ evidence,
the district court sustained U-Haul International’s motion for a
directed verdict on the loss of consortium claim.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of U-Haul International
and U-Haul Center, upon which the court entered judgment.
The Ericksons appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS oF ERRoR
The Ericksons assign, restated and renumbered, that the dis-
trict court erred in (1) granting U-Haul International’s motion
for partial summary judgment dismissing the statutory liabil-
ity claim against U-Haul International; (2) dismissing, on a
directed verdict, George’s loss of consortium claim; and (3)
excluding photographic evidence of the warning label affixed
to a U-Haul loading ramp.
STANDARD oF REVIEW
[1,2] Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and
admissible evidence offered at the hearing show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate
inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 In
3 Thone v. Regional West Med. Ctr., 275 Neb. 238, 745 N.W.2d 898 (2008).
22 	278 NEbRASkA REpoRTS

reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom
the judgment was granted, giving that party the benefit of all
reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.4
[3,4] When there are no factual disputes regarding state
contacts, conflict-of-law issues present questions of law.5 The
meaning of a statute is also a question of law.6 When reviewing
questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to resolve
the questions independently of the conclusion reached by the
trial court.7
[5,6] When the Nebraska Evidence Rules commit the evi-
dentiary question at issue to the discretion of the trial court,
an appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence for
an abuse of discretion.8 A trial court’s determination of the
relevancy and admissibility of evidence must be upheld in the
absence of abuse of discretion.9
ANALYSIS
stAtUtory liAbility
In their first assignment of error, the Ericksons contend that
the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment
on their statutory liability claims. The Ericksons argue that
pursuant to Nebraska’s § 25-21,239, U-Haul International, as
owner of the truck, is jointly and severally liable for damages
to the Ericksons. Alternatively, the Ericksons argue, U-Haul
International is vicariously liable for Dale’s negligence pursu-
ant to Iowa’s § 321.493. The district court found that U-Haul
4 Amanda C. v. Case, 275 Neb. 757, 749 N.W.2d 429 (2008).
5 Johnson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 Neb. 731, 696 N.W.2d
431 (2005).
6 Ahmann v. Correctional Ctr. Lincoln, 276 Neb. 590, 755 N.W.2d 608
(2008).
7 Steffen v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 276 Neb. 378, 754 N.W.2d 730
(2008).
8 Japp v. Papio-Missouri River NRD, 273 Neb. 779, 733 N.W.2d 551
(2007).
9 See Sturzenegger v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, 276 Neb. 327, 754
N.W.2d 406 (2008).
ERICkSoN v. U-HAUL INTERNAT. 	23
Cite as 278 Neb. 18

International was not the owner of the truck and, therefore,
was not statutorily negligent under either the Nebraska or
Iowa statute.
[7,8] before addressing U-Haul International’s potential
statutory liability, we should first determine which state’s law
governs: Nebraska or Iowa. In answering any choice-of-law
question, the court first asks whether there is any real con-
flict between the laws of the states.10 An actual conflict exists
when a legal issue is resolved differently under the law of two
states.11 Nebraska’s § 25-21,239 imposes statutory liability on
owners of trucks in certain situations for damages caused by
operation of the truck. Section 25-21,239 states:
The owner of any truck . . . leased for a period of less
than thirty days or leased for any period of time and used
for commercial purposes, shall be jointly and severally
liable with the lessee and the operator thereof for any
injury to or the death of any person or persons, or damage
to or the destruction of any property resulting from the
operation thereof in this state . . . .
Iowa’s § 321.493 also imposes statutory liability upon
the owner of a leased vehicle in certain situations. Section
321.493 provides:
1. a. Subject to paragraph “b”, in all cases where dam-
age is done by any motor vehicle by reason of negligence
of the driver, and driven with the consent of the owner,
the owner of the motor vehicle shall be liable for such
damage. For purposes of this subsection, “owner” means
the person to whom the certificate of title for the vehicle
has been issued or assigned . . . .
b. The owner of a vehicle with a gross vehicle weight
rating of seven thousand five hundred pounds or more
who rents the vehicle for less than a year under an agree-
ment which requires an insurance policy covering at least
the minimum levels of financial responsibility prescribed
by law, shall not be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle
for the purpose of determining financial responsibility for
10 Yoder v. Cotton, 276 Neb. 954, 758 N.W.2d 630 (2008).
11 Heinze v. Heinze, 274 Neb. 595, 742 N.W.2d 465 (2007).
24 	278 NEbRASkA REpoRTS

the operation of the vehicle or for the acts of the operator
in connection with the vehicle’s operation.
After reviewing the Nebraska and Iowa statutes, we con-
clude that an actual conflict exists. Although both Nebraska
statute § 25-21,239 and Iowa statute § 321.493 impose statu-
tory liability upon the owner of a leased vehicle for the neg-
ligent operation of the vehicle, liability is resolved differently
under each law. Specifically, Iowa’s § 321.493(1)(b) provides
that the owner of a vehicle shall not be statutorily liable for
the acts of one who rents the vehicle for a short term, when
the vehicle has a gross weight rating of 7,500 pounds or more.
Another notable difference between the two statutes is that
the Nebraska statute, unlike the Iowa statute, provides that the
owner of the truck shall be jointly and severally liable for dam-
ages resulting from the operation of the truck only within the
State of Nebraska.
[9] Given that the potential statutory liability of U-Haul
International would be resolved differently under the two stat-
utes, we carry out a choice-of-law analysis. In choice-of-law
determinations, we often seek guidance from the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.12 Under the Restatement, the
“most significant relationship” test is used to determine the
applicable law for specific tort claim issues.13 Section 145(2)
of the Restatement provides the contacts that a court should
consider when determining which state has the most significant
relationship to the parties and the occurrence under general
conflict-of-law principles. The contacts under § 145(2) are:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred,
(c) the domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incor-
poration and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.14
12 See Harper v. Silva, 224 Neb. 645, 399 N.W.2d 826 (1987).
13 See, Heinze, supra note 11; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§§ 145 and 174 (1971).
14 Restatement, supra note 13, § 145(2) at 414.
ERICkSoN v. U-HAUL INTERNAT. 	25
Cite as 278 Neb. 18

[10] Under the Restatement, the law of the site of the injury
is usually applied to determine liability, except where another
state has a more significant relationship on a particular issue.15
The Restatement notes that in certain circumstances, vicari-
ous liability “may also be imposed by application of the local
law of some state other than that of conduct and injury.”16
In particular, vicarious liability may be imposed under the
local law of the state where the relationship between the
one sought to be held liable and the tort-feasor is centered.17
Application of the local law of that state to impose vicarious
liability is particularly likely if that state has some relation-
ship to the injured plaintiff.18 In our case, as in illustration 6 of
§ 174 of the Restatement, Judith rented the truck in Nebraska
from the U-Haul Center, a Nebraska corporation. Judith and
Dale then drove to Iowa where they met Shari, a resident of
Nebraska. While in Iowa, Dale accidentally caused injury to
Shari. Although the injury occurred in Iowa, the facts that the
Ericksons were residents of Nebraska and that the U-Haul
rental agreement was signed in Nebraska provide this state
with a significantly greater relationship to the parties. Thus,
we conclude that Nebraska law governs the determination of
liability in the present case.
The Ericksons contend that the district court erred in grant-
ing partial summary judgment because U-Haul International,
as the owner of the truck, was liable. The Ericksons argue
that the certificate of title, which shows the owner of the
truck as “U Haul Co.,” creates an issue of fact as to whether
U-Haul International was the owner of the truck. Whether
U-Haul International was the owner of the truck, however,
is irrelevant.
Under § 25-21,239, U-Haul International is not liable,
because § 25-21,239 only creates liability for injuries or dam-
age “resulting from the operation thereof in this state.” It is
15 Heinze, supra note 11.
16 Restatement, supra note 13, § 174 comment c. at 520.
17 Id.
18 Id.
26 	278 NEbRASkA REpoRTS

undisputed that Shari’s injury occurred while Dale operated the
truck in Iowa. Shari’s injury did not result from the operation
of the truck within Nebraska, and therefore, § 25-21,239 does
not apply.
We 	further 	note 	that 	even 	though 	Nebraska 	law 	is
clearly applicable here, under these circumstances, U-Haul
International would not be liable under Iowa law either. based
on § 321.493, an owner of a vehicle is not statutorily liable
for the acts of one who rents the vehicle for less than 1 year,
when the vehicle has a “gross vehicle weight rating of seven
thousand five hundred pounds or more.” Therefore, even if the
Iowa statute applied and U-Haul International was the owner
of the truck, it would not be statutorily liable under § 321.493,
because the truck weighed more than 7,500 pounds and it was
rented for less than a year under an agreement which required
an insurance policy covering the minimum level of finan-
cial responsibility.
Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Ericksons, we conclude that regardless of the ownership of
the truck, U-Haul International is not statutorily liable under
Nebraska’s § 25-21,239. Accordingly, we conclude, albeit for
different reasons, that the district court did not err in granting
partial summary judgment to U-Haul International.
loss of consortiUm clAim
[11-13] In their second assignment of error, the Ericksons
argue that the district court erred when it dismissed, on a
directed verdict, George’s loss of consortium claim. Damages
for loss of consortium represent compensation for a spouse
who has been deprived of rights to which he or she is entitled
because of the marriage relationship, namely, the other spouse’s
affection, companionship, and assistance and particularly his or
her conjugal society.19 Although loss of consortium is a per-
sonal legal claim which is separate and distinct from those
claims belonging to the injured spouse,20 a loss of consortium
19 Simms v. Vicorp Restaurants, 272 Neb. 744, 725 N.W.2d 406 (2006).
20 See id.
ERICkSoN v. U-HAUL INTERNAT. 	27
Cite as 278 Neb. 18

claim derives from the harm suffered by the injured spouse.21
The rights of recovery by the uninjured spouse are based upon
the injured spouse’s right to recover for direct injuries.22 Not
only must there be an injury to the injured spouse, but also
there must be a compensable injury, that is, an injury for which
the defendant is liable.23
In this case, George’s recovery for a loss of consortium
claim is dependent upon the success of Shari’s underlying tort
claim. because George’s right to recover for loss of consortium
is derivative of his wife’s claim, and she did not recover, he
likewise cannot recover.
exhibits 30 And 31
In the final assignment of error, the Ericksons contend that
the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded exhibits
30 and 31, photographs of a U-Haul truck ramp with an illeg-
ible warning decal on it. The district court excluded them
as irrelevant.
[14] Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.24
Relevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.25 Here, the issue before the district
court was whether U-Haul International breached a duty of
care to Shari by leasing a truck with inadequate warnings or
failing to provide instructions regarding the use and operation
of the loading ramp. Exhibits 30 and 31 depict the condition
of a warning decal on a truck not involved in the accident
and are not of consequence to the legal determination in this
case. Such evidence is not probative as to whether U-Haul
International breached a duty of care to Shari. Moreover, the
district court received into evidence a color copy of the U-Haul
ramp warning decal depicted in exhibits 30 and 31 and copies
21 See Johnston v. State, 219 Neb. 457, 364 N.W.2d 1 (1985).
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 2008).
25 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 2008).
28 	278 NEbRASkA REpoRTS

of photographs of the actual truck, including photographs of
the truck’s bumper with a warning decal affixed. There was no
abuse of discretion by the district court in excluding exhibits
30 and 31 at trial.
CoNCLUSIoN
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court in all respects.
A ffirmed.
AHMANN v. NEbRASkA DEpT. oF CoRR. SERVS. 	29
Cite as 278 Neb. 29
John A hmAnn And nebrAskA A ssociAtion of pUblic
employees Afscme locAl 61, Appellees , v.
nebrAskA depArtment of correctionAl
services And the stAte of
nebrAskA, AppellAnts.
767 N.W.2d 104
Filed July 2, 2009. 	No. S-08-888.
1. Administrative Law: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A judgment or final order
rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative
procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for
errors appearing on the record.
2. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing an order of a district court under the
Administrative procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is
whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence,
and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
3. Judgments: Evidence: Words and Phrases: Appeal and Error. An appellate
court will not substitute its factual findings for those of the district court where
competent evidence supports those findings. Competent evidence means evidence
that tends to establish the fact in issue.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Whether a decision conforms to law is by defi-
nition a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court reaches a
conclusion independent of that reached by the lower court.
5. Administrative Law: Courts: Appeal and Error. In a district court’s de novo
review of the decision of an administrative agency, the level of discipline imposed
by the agency is subject to the district court’s power to affirm, reverse, or modify
the decision of the agency or to remand the case for further proceedings. The
district court is not required to give any deference to the findings of the agency
hearing officer or the department director.
6. Termination of Employment: Words and Phrases. “Just cause” for dismissal is
that which a reasonable employer, acting in good faith, would regard as good and