Yant v. City of Grand Island

reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause
for a new trial.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR a new tRial .
H eavican, C.J., not participating.
yant v. City of grand island 	935
Cite as 279 neb. 935
RogeR Yant et al ., appellants , v. tHe citY
of gRand island et al ., appellees.
784 n.W.2d 101
filed May 28, 2010. 	no. s-09-664.
1. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Whether a statute is constitu-
tional is a question of law; accordingly, the nebraska supreme Court is obligated
to reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the court below.
2. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Presumptions. a statute is presumed to be consti-
tutional, and all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality.
3. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Proof. the burden of establishing the unconstitu-
tionality of a statute is on the one attacking its validity.
4. ____: ____: ____. the unconstitutionality of a statute must be clearly established
before it will be declared void.
5. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Special Legislation. the focus of the prohibi-
tion against special legislation is the prevention of legislation which arbitrarily
benefits or grants special favors to a specific class. a legislative act constitutes
special legislation if (1) it creates an arbitrary and unreasonable method of clas-
sification or (2) it creates a permanently closed class.
6. ____: ____: ____. the prohibition against special legislation forbids the
legislature from selecting a class from a large number of persons standing in the
same relation to the privileges.
7. Constitutional Law: Special Legislation: Public Policy. to be valid, a legis-
lative classification must be based upon some reason of public policy, some
substantial difference of situation or circumstances, that would naturally sug-
gest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to objects to
be classified.
8. Special Legislation. the legislature has the power to enact special legislation
where the subject or matters sought to be remedied could not be properly reme-
died by a general law and where the legislature has a reasonable basis for the
enactment of the special law.
9. Constitutional Law: Special Legislation. Unless specifically prohibited by neb.
Const. art. iii, § 18, the legislature is not prohibited from passing local or spe-
cial laws.
10. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Public Purpose. incidental benefits do not render
a statute unconstitutional when enacted for a public purpose.
11. Constitutional Law: Statutes. a grant of administrative authority is not neces-
sarily an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:48 AM CST

12. Constitutional Law: Legislature. Where the legislature has provided reason-
able limitations and standards for carrying out the delegated duties, there is no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. those reasonable limitations
and standards may not rest on indefinite, obscure, or vague generalities, however,
or upon extrinsic evidence not readily available.
13. Administrative Law: Legislature: Statutes. it is a well-established principle
that the legislature may delegate to an administrative agency the power to make
rules and regulations to implement the policy of a statute.
14. Legislature. delegation of legislative power is most commonly indicated where
the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where regulation requires a
course of continuous decision.
15. Constitutional Law: Public Purpose. the nebraska Constitution does not
prohibit the state from doing business or contracting with private institutions in
fulfilling a governmental duty and furthering a public purpose.
appeal from the district Court for lancaster County: JoHn
a. colboRn, Judge. affirmed.
raymond 	E. 	Walden, 	of 	Walden 	law 	office, 	James
Beckmann, of Beckmann law offices, and Kenneth C. Winston
for appellants.
Jon Bruning, attorney general, dale a. Comer, and Charles
E. lowe for appellees department of administrative services
and state treasurer.
John C. Wiltse and Joel d. Pedersen for appellee Board of
regents.
dale M. shotkoski, grand island City attorney, for appellee
City of grand island.
Jack Zitterkopf, Chief deputy Hall County attorney, for
appellees Hall County treasurer and Hall County Board of
supervisors.
gail s. Perry, of Baylor, Evnen, Curtiss, grimit & Witt,
l.l.P., for appellee nebraska state fair Board.
Michael l. Johnson, of leininger, smith, Johnson, Baack,
Placzek 	& 	allen, 	for 	appellees 	Hall 	County 	livestock
improvement 	association 	and 	Hall 	County 	agricultural
society, inc.
936 	279 nEBrasKa rEPorts

H eavican, c.J., wRigHt, connollY, geRRaRd, mccoRmack,
and milleR-leRman, JJ., and inbodY, Chief Judge.
H eavican, C.J.
i. introdUCtion
roger yant, Brian Von seggern, and Jerry Christensen (col-
lectively appellants) appeal the decision of the lancaster County
district Court denying their request for a declaratory judgment
declaring 2008 neb. laws, l.B. 1116 (lB 1116), unconstitu-
tional. appellants claim that lB 1116, which provided for the
relocation of the nebraska state fair from lincoln, nebraska,
to fonner Park in grand island, nebraska, is special legisla-
tion, and hence unconstitutional and void. We affirm the deci-
sion of the district court.
ii. faCts
the facts of this case are not in dispute. according to the
record, the location of the state fair has been set by statute
since 1901. Prior to the passage of lB 1116, neb. rev. stat.
§ 2-101(3) (reissue 2007) provided in part:
the state fair shall be held at or near the city of lincoln,
in lancaster County, under the direction and supervision
of the nebraska state fair Board, upon the site and tract
of land selected and now owned by the state for that pur-
pose and known as the nebraska state fairgrounds.
at its annual meeting in 2003, the state fair Board admitted
publicly that the state fair and its campus were “in a dire short
term and long term financial crisis.”
in 2004, the nebraska legislature requested that an investi-
gation be conducted into new models for the state fair. among
the alternatives suggested and considered were to not have a
state fair, to relocate the state fair to another site in lincoln
or lancaster County, or to relocate the state fair to another
location in the state. another study was conducted in 2007,
and on december 14, the legislature held a public hearing on
the report generated by the study. lB 1116 was introduced on
January 23, 2008, and was then referred to the legislature’s
agriculture Committee for a public hearing.
yant v. City of grand island 	937
Cite as 279 neb. 935

the agriculture Committee held a public hearing on lB 1116
on february 26, 2008, giving various parties an opportunity to
present arguments for and against relocating the state fair. and
over the course of several days, the floor debate on lB 1116
allowed various members of the legislature to present argu-
ments both for and against relocating the state fair.
lB 1116 was passed and is now codified at § 2-101 (supp.
2009). section 2-101(4)(a) states:
it is the intent of the legislature that no later than 2010
the nebraska state fair be permanently located within the
city of grand island upon the site and tract of land owned
by the Hall County livestock improvement association
and known as fonner Park . . . .
subsection (b) provides:
the 	nebraska 	state 	fair 	Board, 	the 	department 	of
administrative services, and the Board of regents of
the University of nebraska shall cooperate with each
other and with other appropriate entities to provide for
and carry out the plan to relocate the nebraska state fair
and transfer the nebraska state fairgrounds in lancaster
County to the Board of regents . . . .
While grand island, Hall County, and the Hall County livestock
improvement association (HClia) were tasked with preparing
fonner Park to host the state fair, the University of nebraska
was designated to take over the fairgrounds in lancaster County
for an “innovation Campus.”1 thus, the effect of lB 1116 was
threefold: the legislation operated to relocate the state fair
from lincoln to grand island, it required certain entities asso-
ciated with the state fair to cooperate in relocating the fair,
and it transferred the fairgrounds in lancaster County to the
University of nebraska.
in 2008, appellants filed suit in lancaster County district
Court asking the district court to issue a declaratory judgment
finding that lB 1116 was unconstitutional and void in its
entirety. the district court dismissed appellants’ action, finding
that the statute was constitutional. this appeal followed.
1 see neb. rev. stat. § 2-113 (supp. 2009).
938 	279 nEBrasKa rEPorts

iii. assignMEnts of Error
appellants assign that the district court erred in finding that
(1) lB 1116 did not constitute special legislation in violation of
neb. Const. art. iii, § 18, and (2) lB 1116 did not improperly
delegate legislative powers to private corporations. appellants
also claim that lB 1116 is unconstitutional in its entirety and
that the unconstitutional portions cannot be struck.
iV. standard of rEViEW
[1-3] Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of
law; accordingly, the nebraska supreme Court is obligated to
reach a conclusion independent of the decision reached by the
court below.2 a statute is presumed to be constitutional, and all
reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of its constitutionality.3
the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute
is on the one attacking its validity.4
[4] the unconstitutionality of a statute must be clearly estab-
lished before it will be declared void.5
V. analysis
appellants argue that lB 1116 is unconstitutional for two
reasons: first, because it violates the prohibition on special legis-
lation found in article iii, § 18, of the nebraska Constitution,
and second, because there is an unconstitutional delegation of
authority to HClia and the state fair Board. We affirm the
decision of the district court.
1. lb 1116 is not UnconstitUtional
special legislation
We first note that the burden of proving a statute is unconsti-
tutional is on the party attacking the validity of a statute,6 and
2 Pavers, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 276 neb. 559, 755 n.W.2d 400 (2008).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 see State ex rel. Stenberg v. Omaha Expo. & Racing, 263 neb. 991, 644
n.W.2d 563 (2002).
6 Pavers, supra note 2.
yant v. City of grand island 	939
Cite as 279 neb. 935

unconstitutionality must be clearly established before a statute
will be declared void.7
neb. Const. art. iii, § 18, provides:
the legislature shall not pass local or special laws in
any of the following cases . . . .
. . . .
granting to any corporation, association, or individual
any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise
whatever . . . . in all other cases where a general law can
be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
[5] in support of their argument, appellants cite Hug v. City
of Omaha.8 in that case, we stated:
the focus of the prohibition against special legislation
is the prevention of legislation which arbitrarily benefits
or grants “special favors” to a specific class. a legislative
act constitutes special legislation if (1) it creates an arbi-
trary and unreasonable method of classification or (2) it
creates a permanently closed class.9
appellants 	argue 	that 	lB 	1116 	both 	operates 	upon 	or
affects a closed class and creates arbitrary and unreasonable
classifications.
(a) Closed Class
[6,7] the prohibition against special legislation forbids the
legislature from selecting a class “from a large number of
persons standing in the same relation to the privileges.”10 to be
valid, a legislative classification “‘“must be based upon some
reason of public policy, some substantial difference of situation
or circumstances, that would naturally suggest the justice or
expediency of diverse legislation with respect to objects to be
classified. . . .”’. . .”11 We find that lB 1116 does not violate
the closed class prohibition of article iii, § 18, because the
7 State ex rel. Stenberg, supra note 5.
8 Hug v. City of Omaha, 275 neb. 820, 749 n.W.2d 884 (2008).
9 Id. at 826, 749 n.W.2d at 890.
10 Id.
11 Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys., 265 neb. 918, 938, 663
n.W.2d 43, 65 (2003).
940 	279 nEBrasKa rEPorts

legislature had a reasonable basis for enacting a special law in
furtherance of a legitimate public policy.
(i) Legislative Classification
[8,9] appellants argue that lB 1116 benefits a select few by
creating closed classes represented by the city of grand island
and the HClia. We have previously held that the legislature
has the power to enact special legislation where “‘the subject or
matters sought to be remedied could not be properly remedied
by a general law, and where the [l]egislature has a reasonable
basis for the enactment of the special law.’”12 in fact, unless
specifically prohibited by article iii, § 18, the legislature is not
prohibited from passing local or special laws.13
in State, ex rel. Spillman, v. Wallace,14 we upheld a law that
discriminated between counties that had made efforts to eradi-
cate tuberculosis in cattle and those that had not. We stated that
although a general law could have been passed that applied
to all counties, to do so would have been to lose the benefits
accrued by the efforts of certain counties.15 Because the matter
was one of promoting a reasonable public policy and because
special laws pertaining to the regulation of cattle were not spe-
cifically prohibited by article iii, § 18, the law was found to be
constitutional special legislation.
in the case before us, we likewise note that none of the 21
prohibitions on special legislation may be fairly read to apply
to designating a site for the state fair or permanently relocat-
ing it. although appellants suggest that lB 1116 should have
“set criteria for the state fair Board or for some state agency
to apply in taking and reviewing proposals from any communi-
ties interested in hosting the fair,”16 we stated in Wallace that
“‘[i]t is for the [l]egislature to determine whether the purpose
12 State, ex rel. Spillman, v. Wallace, 117 neb. 588, 594, 221 n.W. 712, 714
(1928).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Brief for appellants at 17.
yant v. City of grand island 	941
Cite as 279 neb. 935

for which it legislated could be properly accomplished by a
general law. . . .’”17
as appellees noted, the state fair is not the only facility,
program, or activity for which a permanent location has been
selected by statute. in order to allocate limited resources, the
legislature has also specified the location of prisons,18 nebraska
veterans’ homes,19 and state colleges.20 the legislature also
has determined official locations, including setting the city of
lincoln as the permanent seat of state government,21 and desig-
nating the state Capitol and grounds as permanent fixtures in
lincoln.22 in this same vein, selecting a permanent location for
the state fair is also a reasonable allocation of resources.
(ii) Special Privileges and Public Purpose
appellants further argue that lB 1116 violates article iii,
§ 18, because it gives “specific and exclusive grants of fran-
chise, property, and privileges to specific groups.”23 in support
of their argument that lB 1116 constitutes unconstitutional
grants of franchise, property, and privileges, appellants cite to
Haman v. Marsh.24
in Haman, the statute in question would have paid $33.8 mil-
lion of state tax money to depositors who had suffered losses
due to the failure of industrial loan and investment compa-
nies in nebraska. When it was passed, the statute limited the
defined class of recipients to three such companies. We found
that the legislation was passed with the sole benefit of those
three recipients in mind.25 the benefit granted in Haman was
the intended purpose of the statute, whereas the purpose of
17 Wallace, supra note 12, 117 neb. at 595, 221 n.W. at 714.
18 neb. rev. stat. §§ 72-703 (reissue 2009) and 83-954 (reissue 2008).
19 neb. rev. stat. § 80-315 (reissue 2008).
20 neb. rev. stat. § 85-301 (reissue 2008).
21 neb. rev. stat. § 72-701 (reissue 2009).
22 neb. rev. stat. § 72-723 (reissue 2009).
23 Brief for appellants at 9.
24 Haman v. Marsh, 237 neb. 699, 467 n.W.2d 836 (1991).
25 Id.
942 	279 nEBrasKa rEPorts

lB 1116 is to designate a permanent location for the state
fair. Unlike the situation in Haman, the state fair is something
of interest to the entire state and is intended to benefit all
nebraskans. indeed, appellants do not dispute this.
[10] We have upheld expenditures for state fairs and other
expositions as expenditures for a public purpose.26 We have
also previously held that incidental benefits do not render a
statute unconstitutional when enacted for a public purpose.27
and, while proximity to the state fair may benefit local busi-
nesses, those benefits are incidental to the public purpose
behind lB 1116.
Hence, we find that appellants have neither overcome the
presumption of constitutionality nor met their burden of show-
ing that lB 1116 is an unconstitutional grant of special privi-
leges or benefits.
(b) Unreasonable and arbitrary Classification
appellants also contend that the legislature’s decision to
locate the state fair at fonner Park in grand island was
unreasonable and arbitrary. appellants primarily rely on Cox
v. State,28 in which this court struck down a law that gave a
tort victim a remedy against the state for injury to the victim
that occurred on a state highway. Essentially, the statute in
question in Cox waived sovereign immunity and the statute
of limitations for one particular person. the court stated that
such a law would require those similarly situated to peti-
tion the legislature to make exceptions for each in turn.29
appellants contend that the same is true in this case and that
the legislature granted special favors to the state fair Board,
the HClia, and the University of nebraska when it relocated
the state fair to fonner Park.
first, we note that Cox involved the grant of a civil remedy
to one person out of a class of many, for no reason other than
26 State v. Cornell, 53 neb. 556, 74 n.W. 59 (1898).
27 see State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, 204 neb.
445, 283 n.W.2d 12 (1979).
28 Cox v. State, 134 neb. 751, 279 n.W. 482 (1938).
29 Id.
yant v. City of grand island 	943
Cite as 279 neb. 935

“the peculiar facts and circumstances of the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff.”30 in contrast, this case involves selecting a
new permanent site for the state fair, which necessarily requires
selecting one location. as we noted above, the legislature may
pass a specific law where a general law cannot be made appli-
cable and where it has a reasonable basis to do so.
appellants argue that “nothing in [lB 1116] describes any
means for choosing a new fair site. the legislature simply
put a finger on the map and said this will be the place.”31 the
record indicates that quite the opposite is true, however. the
state fair Board first recognized in 2003 that the state fair and
its campus were in short- and long-term financial crises that
would require action. over the next 3 years, the legislature
authorized two studies to be conducted to find alternatives for
the state fair, and public hearings were held on the findings.
after lB 1116 was proposed, hearings and floor debates were
held, giving interested parties opportunities to provide input on
the potential location of the state fair. nothing in the record
indicates that the legislature’s decision to relocate the state
fair, or its choice of location, was arbitrary or capricious.
We therefore find appellants’ first assignment of error to be
without merit because they have not met their burden of show-
ing that lB 1116 is unconstitutional special legislation.
2. lb 1116 not UnconstitUtional delegation
of legislative poweRs
appellants next argue that lB 1116 is unconstitutional
because it delegates to private corporations the authority to
spend tax revenues. lB 1116, § 6, now codified at § 2-113,
provides:
(3) the University of nebraska and the city of grand
island shall provide certification to the department of
administrative services on october 1, 2008, february 1,
2009, and July 1, 2009, of all funds provided to carry out
subsection (4) of section 2-101. all amounts as certified
in subdivisions (2)(a) and (c) of this section shall be held
30 Id. at 758, 279 n.W. at 487.
31 Brief for appellants at 19.
944 	279 nEBrasKa rEPorts

and expended as determined by agreement between the
[HClia] and the nebraska state fair Board.
appellants argue that only the legislature has the power to
expend state funds and that granting authority to the HClia
to spend state funds was an unconstitutional delegation of that
power. We note that in connection with appellants’ special
legislation assignment, appellants argued that the legislature
exercised too much authority in moving the fair, but here, they
argue that it delegated too much authority. appellants’ argu-
ment is inconsistent, and we find that the legislature acted
within the scope of its power to delegate.
[11,12] a grant of administrative authority is not neces-
sarily an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.32
“[W]here the legislature has provided reasonable limitations
and standards for carrying out the delegated duties, there is no
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.”33 those
reasonable limitations and standards may not rest on indefinite,
obscure, or vague generalities, however, or upon extrinsic evi-
dence not readily available.34
the statutes in question do delegate spending authority, but
only for specific purposes. Under lB 1116, § 1, now codified
at § 2-101(4)(a), the funds expended were to “provide for and
carry out any plan of improvements to [fonner Park],” and the
funds were to come from “the nebraska state fair Board, the
[HClia], and other appropriate entities.” lB 1116, § 6, now
codified at § 2-113, quoted above, states that the University
of nebraska and the city of grand island were to provide
certification of all funds used to carry out the move and
improvements. according to § 2-113(2)(a) and (c), the funds
were to be provided by or on behalf of the University of
nebraska and the city of grand island. Under § 2-113(4)(b),
the state fair Board is to be responsible for any remaining
costs associated with site improvements involved in relocat-
ing the fair.
32 see Blackledge v. Richards, 194 neb. 188, 231 n.W.2d 319 (1975).
33 Ponderosa Ridge LLC v. Banner County, 250 neb. 944, 951, 554 n.W.2d
151, 157 (1996).
34 see id.
yant v. City of grand island 	945
Cite as 279 neb. 935

[13,14] it is a well-established principle that the legislature
may delegate to an administrative agency the power to make
rules and regulations to implement the policy of a statute.35
and in particular, we have said that delegation of legislative
power is most commonly indicated where the relations to be
regulated are highly technical or where regulation requires a
course of continuous decision.36 in this case, the legislature set
the location of the state fair, then delegated authority to prepare
fonner Park to the entities best suited to make those decisions.
the statutes clearly require that all funds be spent to prepare
fonner Park and to make it suitable to house the state fair. it is
not the role of the judiciary to interfere with the proper delega-
tion by the legislature to the state fair Board in a situation
such as this. We find there was no unconstitutional delegation
on the part of the legislature.
[15] appellants further contend that lB 1116 is unconsti-
tutional because the expenditure of funds was delegated to
HClia, a “private association.”37 However, “[t]he nebraska
Constitution does not prohibit the state from doing business
or contracting with private institutions in fulfilling a govern-
mental duty and furthering a public purpose.”38 Because, as
discussed above, the state fair is considered a public purpose,
the legislature is not prohibited from delegating certain duties
in connection with such public purpose.
appellants’ second assignment of error is also without merit,
because they have not met their burden to show that lB 1116
was an unconstitutional delegation of authority.
3. R emaining assignment of eRRoR
appellants’ final assignment of error is that lB 1116 is
unconstitutional in its entirety and that the unconstitutional por-
tions cannot be struck. Because we find no merit to appellants’
35 Scofield v. State, 276 neb. 215, 753 n.W.2d 345 (2008).
36 Id.
37 Brief for appellants at 22.
38 Myers v. Nebraska Invest. Council, 272 neb. 669, 690, 724 n.W.2d 776,
797 (2006). see, also, Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, supra note 27.
946 	279 nEBrasKa rEPorts

argument that lB 1116 is unconstitutional, we need not reach
this assignment of error.
Vi. ConClUsion
appellants have not met their burden of showing that
lB 1116 is unconstitutional. We therefore affirm the decision
of the district court.
affiRmed.
stepHan, J., not participating.
yant v. City of grand island 	947
Cite as 279 neb. 935