State v. Halverstadt

We conclude that there is no evidence in this record upon
which the jury could have concluded that Smith committed
sudden quarrel manslaughter instead of second degree mur-
der. We therefore conclude that the improper jury instruction
did not prejudice Smith or affect his substantial rights, and
does not require the reversal of his second degree murder
conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
A ffirmed.
Wright, J., not participating in the decision.
StAte of NebrASkA, Appellee , v.
richArd A. hAlverStAdt, AppellANt.
809 N.W.2d 480
Filed November 18, 2011. 	No. S-11-145.
1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law on
which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
2. ____: ____. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. An
appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statu-
tory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County, Jodi
NelSoN, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court for
Lancaster County, JeAN A. lovell, Judge. Judgment of District
Court affirmed in part and in part reversed, and cause remanded
with directions.
Jeffry D. Patterson, of Bartle & Geier Law Firm, for
appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein for
appellee.
heAvicAN, 	c.J., 	coNNolly, 	StephAN, 	mccormAck , 	and
miller-lermAN, JJ.
736 	282 NeBrASKA rePOrtS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:44 AM CST

StephAN, J.
richard A. Halverstadt was convicted of violating Neb. rev.
Stat. §§ 60-6,294 and 60-6,300 (reissue 2010) after being
cited for hauling an overweight load on a Nebraska roadway.
He appeals, contending the statutes do not apply to his actions,
because he possessed a special permit. We affirm his convic-
tions for violating § 60-6,294, but reverse his conviction for
violating § 60-6,300.
I. FACtS
On May 14, 2010, Nebraska State Patrol trooper John Lewis
stopped a vehicle carrying an oversized load. Halverstadt, the
driver of the vehicle, gave Lewis three special permits related
to the oversized load: one issued by the city of Lincoln, one
issued by Lancaster County, and one issued by the State of
Nebraska. Because Halverstadt was on a county road at the
time Lewis stopped him, Lewis was concerned only with the
county permit.
After viewing the permit, Lewis weighed Halverstadt’s load
with portable scales. Lewis determined that the weight on the
triple axles was 51,300 pounds, which exceeded the 50,100
pounds authorized by Halverstadt’s county permit and the
42,500 pounds authorized by state statute.1 He determined
that the weight on the quad axles was 72,200 pounds, which
exceeded the 64,000 pounds authorized by the county permit
and the 51,500 pounds authorized by state statute.2 Lewis also
determined that the gross weight of Halverstadt’s vehicle was
136,500 pounds, which exceeded the 126,000 pounds autho-
rized by the county permit and the 95,000 pounds authorized
by state statute.3 Lewis wrote “revoked” on the county permit
and cited Halverstadt for two violations of § 60-6,294 based on
the axle weight excesses. He also cited Halverstadt for violat-
ing § 60-6,300 based on the excess gross weight. Halverstadt
was convicted in county court of the statutory violations and
1 See § 60-6,294.
2 Id.
3 See § 60-6,300.
StAte v. HALverStADt 	737
Cite as 282 Neb. 736

fined $500 and $1,550 for the axle violations and $1,050 for
the gross weight violation.
Halverstadt appealed to the district court, which affirmed his
convictions. He then filed this timely appeal.
II. ASSIGNMeNtS OF errOr
Halverstadt assigns, restated, that the district court erred in
(1) concluding the county permit was retroactively revoked
when his violation consisted solely of exceeding the weight
limitations specified by the county permit, (2) convicting him
under an inapplicable statute and imposing a fine contrary to
law, and (3) concluding he violated § 60-6,300 when he was
operating with three valid special permits issued pursuant to
Neb. rev. Stat. § 60-6,298 (Cum. Supp. 2008) and was not the
owner of the vehicle.
III. StANDArD OF revIeW
[1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law on which
an appellate court has an obligation to reach an indepen-
dent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the
court below.4
Iv. ANALYSIS
It is undisputed that Halverstadt’s load exceeded both the
weight limits of his special county permit and the statutory
weight limits on two axles and in gross weight. the issue is
whether he was cited under the correct statute and, if so, what
the penalty for his violations should be.
1. A xle Weight violAtioNS
Section 60-6,294 limits how much weight a vehicle can carry
per axle on Nebraska roadways. Generally, no axle can carry a
load in excess of 20,000 pounds.5 Groups of two or more con-
secutive axles also have weight restrictions based on the dis-
tance in feet between the axles, and these restrictions are set out
in a statutory chart.6 “every vehicle” traveling on a Nebraska
4 State v. Huff, ante p. 78, 802 N.W.2d 77 (2011).
5 § 60-6,294(2).
6 § 60-6,294(3).
738 	282 NeBrASKA rePOrtS

roadway must comply with these weight restrictions.7 the
only statutory exceptions are for agricultural floater-spreader
implements, disabled vehicles, vehicles moving buildings, self-
propelled mobile equipment, and emergency vehicles.8 “the
limitations imposed by [§ 60-6,294 are] supplemental to all
other provisions imposing limitations upon the size and weight
of vehicles.”9
the penalties for “operating any motor vehicle . . . when the
weight of the vehicle and load is in violation of the provisions
of section 60-6,294” are set forth in Neb. rev. Stat. § 60-6,296
(reissue 2010). the penalties are always fines, and they are
assessed based on the percentage of weight that is over the
statutory maximum identified in § 60-6,294.10 the penalties do
not apply in limited situations, including when the cargo can be
shifted to meet the statutory weight limits, certain haulings of
livestock or grain, and the hauling of refuse.11
the Department of roads, the State Patrol, and “local
authorities” may issue special permits allowing operators over
“highways under their jurisdiction” to carry loads exceeding the
statutory maximum weight restrictions.12 each permit issued by
such authority must “state the maximum weight permissible on
a single axle or combination of axles and the total gross weight
allowed.”13 the issuing authority may also “limit the number
of days during which the permit is valid,” limit the number of
trips the permit holder may make, or establish seasonal or time
limitations within which the permit is valid.14
7 § 60-6,294(1).
8 See 	§ 	60-6,294(1) 	and 	(10). 	See, 	also, 	Neb. 	rev. 	Stat.
§§ 60-6,288(2)(i), 60-6,294.01, 60-6,297, and 60-6,299 (reissue 2010)
and § 60-6,298(1)(a)(v).
9 § 60-6,294(1).
10 § 60-6,296.
11 See Neb. rev. Stat. § 60-6,301 (reissue 2010).
12 § 60-6,298.
13 § 60-6,298(4).
14 § 60-6,298(3).
StAte v. HALverStADt 	739
Cite as 282 Neb. 736

In this case, Halverstadt obtained a special permit from the
county. Section 60-6,298(4) provides in part:
No person shall violate any of the terms or conditions of
[a] special permit. In case of any violation, the permit
shall be deemed automatically revoked and the penalty of
the original limitations shall be applied unless:
(a) the violation consists solely of exceeding the size
or weight specified by the permit, in which case only the
penalty of the original size or weight limitation exceeded
shall be applied; or
(b) the total gross load is within the maximum autho-
rized by the permit, no axle is more than ten percent in
excess of the maximum load for such axle or group of
axles authorized by the permit, and such load can be
shifted to meet the weight limitations of wheel and axle
loads authorized by such permit. Such shift may be made
without penalty if it is made at the state or commercial
scale designated in the permit. the vehicle may travel
from its point of origin to such designated scale without
penalty, and a scale ticket from such scale, showing the
vehicle to be properly loaded and within the gross and
axle weights authorized by the permit, shall be reasonable
evidence of compliance with the terms of the permit.
(a) Special Permit Was Improperly revoked
the district court conceded that § 60-6,298(4)(a) provides
that revoking a special permit is not proper if the “violation
consists solely of exceeding the size or weight specified by
the permit” and stated that Halverstadt’s axle violations were
“technically” related only to weight. But it reasoned that when
read in context, § 60-6,298(4)(a) refers only to a situation
where a vehicle exceeds the maximum gross weight specified
by the permit, but at the same time does not exceed any of
the maximum axle weights. It concluded this had to be true,
even though § 60-6,298(4)(a) does not refer to gross weight,
because § 60-6,298(4)(b) applied when a vehicle was within
the maximum gross weight but had axles that exceeded the
maximum by no more than 10 percent. It reasoned that if
§ 60-6,298(4)(a) applied to axle weight in addition to gross
weight, then § 60-6,298(4)(b) would be meaningless.
740 	282 NeBrASKA rePOrtS

[2] We disagree with the district court’s interpretation.
Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary mean-
ing. An appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascer-
tain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct,
and unambiguous.15 reading “gross” into § 60-6,298(4)(a) is
improper and is not required for § 60-6,298(4)(a) and (b) to
make sense. the plain and direct language of § 60-6,298(4)
sets out three possible penalties for a violation of a special
permit. Section 60-6,298(4) provides the general rule that
any violation of the special permit results in both revocation
of the permit and the “penalty of the original limitations.”
Section 60-6,298(4)(a) is one exception to the general rule of
§ 60-6,298(4), and provides that if the only violation is exceed-
ing the size or weight specified by the permit, then revocation
of the permit is not a penalty and “only the penalty of the
original size or weight limitation exceeded” is applied. Section
60-6,298(4)(b) is a further exception to the general rule of
§ 60-6,298(4), and if all the conditions of that subsection are
met, no penalty is imposed for the permit violations.
So construed, it is clear that the statute makes sense without
imposing the term “gross” into the specific statutory language
of § 60-6,298(4)(a). the phrase “exceeding the size or weight
specified by the permit” used in § 60-6,298(4)(a) clearly refers
to either exceeding axle weights or exceeding gross weights. In
fact, the Legislature used the term “gross” in § 60-6,298(4)(b),
indicating that it was aware of the difference between the terms
“weight” and “gross” weight and their use in the statutory
scheme at issue.
We conclude that under the circumstances of this case,
§ 60-6,298(4)(a) applies to Halverstadt. Consequently, his spe-
cial permit was improperly revoked, and only the “penalty of
the original size or weight limitation exceeded” applies to his
axle weight violations of the special permit.
15 In re Ervin W. Blauhorn Revocable Trust, 275 Neb. 256, 746 N.W.2d
136 (2008); Zach v. Nebraska State Patrol, 273 Neb. 1, 727 N.W.2d 206
(2007).
StAte v. HALverStADt 	741
Cite as 282 Neb. 736

(b) “Original Limitations” Means
Statutory Limitations
the district court, based in part on its erroneous interpre-
tation of § 60-6,298(4)(a) and (b), assumed without specific
analysis that the phrase “penalty of the original limitations”
used in § 60-6,298(4) meant the original statutory weight limi-
tations imposed by § 60-6,294. Presumably, it did so based on
the language in § 60-6,298(4) providing that if the violation
falls within that section, the special permit is revoked. And if
the permit is revoked, it is not illogical to conclude that the
term “original” in § 60-6,298(4) means the original statutory
weight limitations of § 60-6,294.
But both § 60-6,298(4) and (4)(a) use the term “original”
when referring to the size and weight limitations. And because
a violation falling under § 60-6,298(4) results in a revocation of
the special permit, but one falling under § 60-6,298(4)(a) does
not, it cannot be, as implied by the district court, that “original”
in § 60-6,298(4) means the statutory weight limitations simply
because under that section the permit is revoked. Instead, for
the statute to be internally consistent, the term “original” in
§ 60-6,298(4) must mean the same thing as the term “original”
in § 60-6,298(4)(a).
the question, then, is whether “original” in both subsections
refers to the statutory weight restrictions or whether it refers to
the weight restrictions of the special permit. We conclude that
§ 60-6,298(4) can reasonably be interpreted either way and is
therefore ambiguous. In such a situation, a court may examine
the pertinent legislative history of the act in question to ascer-
tain the intent of the Legislature.16
Originally, the Nebraska statutes regulating the width and
weight of loads on Nebraska roadways contained no autho-
rization for the issuance of special permits.17 But a statutory
amendment was adopted in 1957 that authorized state and
local authorities to issue special permits.18 the amendment
16 State v. Lebeau, 280 Neb. 238, 784 N.W.2d 921 (2010).
17 See, generally, 1933 Neb. Laws, ch. 105, § 4, p. 426.
18 1957 Neb. Laws, ch. 156, § 4, p. 565.
742 	282 NeBrASKA rePOrtS

provided that no hauler could violate any term or condition
of a special permit so issued and that “in case of any viola-
tion the permit shall be deemed automatically revoked and
the penalty of the original limitations shall be applied.”19 this
identical language is currently codified at § 60-6,298(4). the
1957 amendment did not define “original limitations,” and the
legislative history on the bill is silent as to how this phrase was
to be interpreted.
In 1963, the special permit statute was amended to allow
haulers to avoid penalties altogether in certain situations where
the load had shifted during travel but could be reconfigured
to comply with the restrictions of the special permit.20 the
language adopted in 1963 is identical to the language that
is now codified at § 60-6,298(4)(b). the introducer’s state-
ment of purpose for the bill that resulted in this amendment
explained that as the special permit statute existed prior to the
amendment,
[c]ontractors and contract haulers who move heavy
equipment do so under special permits issued by the
Department of roads. these permits set axle weights,
gross weights, height restrictions and width restrictions.
they are subject to revocation if any of their terms are
violated, and a hauler whose permit has been invalidated
is penalized according to the statutory weight limits,
rather than the weights allowable by the permits.21
In 1965, the Legislature further amended the special permit
statutes to add language identical to that which is now codified
at § 60-6,298(4)(a).22 According to the chairperson of the pub-
lic works committee, the amendment was necessary because
[u]nder the present law, a person desiring to haul a load
exceeding certain widths and weights must get a special
permit from the state to haul such loads. Present statutes
provide that if the hauler violates either the weigt [sic]
19 Id. at 566.
20 1963 Neb. Laws, ch. 226, § 1, pp. 709-10.
21 Introducer’s Statement of Purpose, L.B. 542, Committee on Public Works,
73d Leg. 1 (Apr. 3, 1963) (emphasis supplied).
22 1965 Neb. Laws, ch. 214, § 1, p. 628.
StAte v. HALverStADt 	743
Cite as 282 Neb. 736

or width granted by the permit, the permit is cancelled
and he is fined in an amount just as though he had never
received a permit.23
During floor debate on the 1965 amendment, it was explained
that without the amendment, if a hauler had a special permit
authorizing transport of a load that was both overweight and
overwidth and exceeded one of the authorizations, he lost the
privileges of the special permit for both, and was penalized
under the statutory limitations for both, even though he vio-
lated only one.24 the floor debate explained that the purpose
of the amendment was to ensure the hauler was penalized only
for the provision of the special permit that was violated.25 the
debate was clear, however, that the penalty to be imposed was
based on the statutory restrictions, not the restrictions of the
special permit.26
Based on this legislative history, it is clear that the Legislature
intended to base the penalties for violating a special permit on
the statutory weight restrictions, not those of the special per-
mit. We therefore conclude that the term “original” limitations
as used in both § 60-6,298(4) and (4)(a) means the original
statutory restrictions of § 60-6,294.
Because Halverstadt’s violation of his special permit con-
sisted solely of exceeding the weight specified by the permit,
his conduct fell within § 60-6,298(4)(a) and his permit was not
revoked. He was, however, subject to the “penalty of the origi-
nal size or weight limitation” he exceeded.27 Because “original
size or weight limitation” refers to the statutory limitations
of § 60-6,294, Halverstadt was properly cited and convicted
under that statute. We therefore affirm the convictions under
§ 60-6,294 for the axle weight violations.
23 Committee Statement, L.B. 648, 75th Leg. (Apr. 29, 1965) (emphasis
supplied).
24 Floor Debate, L.B. 648, Committee on Public Works, 75th Leg. (Apr. 14,
1965).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 § 60-6,298(4)(a).
744 	282 NeBrASKA rePOrtS

2. groSS Weight violAtioN
Halverstadt was also convicted of violating § 60-6,300,
which provides:
It shall be unlawful to operate upon the public high-
ways of this state any truck, truck-tractor, or trailer that
weighs in excess of the gross weight for which the regis-
tration fee on such vehicle has been paid plus one thou-
sand pounds, but this section shall not apply to any truck,
truck-tractor, or trailer being operated under a special
permit issued pursuant to section 60-6,298.
Any owner of such a vehicle who permits operation of
the vehicle in violation of this section shall be guilty of
a traffic infraction and shall, upon conviction, be fined
twenty-five dollars for each one thousand pounds or frac-
tion thereof in excess of the weight allowed to be carried
under this section with tolerance.
the district court concluded that Halverstadt violated this
statute because he was over the statutory gross weight and,
even though he had obtained a special permit, it was revoked
pursuant to § 60-6,298(4). Halverstadt’s violation of the county
permit properly falls within § 60-6,298(4)(a), and thus his
county permit was not properly revoked. therefore, § 60-6,300
does not apply to him, because he was operating under a special
permit issued pursuant to § 60-6,298. We further note that there
is no evidence in the record which could support a finding that
Halverstadt was the owner of the vehicle so as to subject him
to liability under § 60-6,300. We reverse Halverstadt’s convic-
tion for violating § 60-6,300 and remand the cause to the dis-
trict court with directions to reverse that conviction and remand
the case to the county court with directions to dismiss.
v. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Halverstadt’s con-
victions under § 60-6,294 and reverse his conviction under
§ 60-6,300.
A ffirmed iN pArt, ANd iN pArt reverSed
ANd remANded With directioNS.
Wright and gerrArd, JJ., not participating.
StAte v. HALverStADt 	745
Cite as 282 Neb. 736