In re Interest of Shaleia M.

and hearsay analysis are not the same, we conclude that Britt’s
preserving the confrontation issue did not also preserve the
hearsay issue and that hearsay issues were not encompassed by
Britt’s assignments of error regarding a purported confronta-
tion violation. The Court of Appeals did not err when it did not
consider Britt’s hearsay arguments as plain error.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err when
it determined that the certificate was not testimonial and not
subject to confrontation analysis. We further conclude that the
Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion when it did not
note plain error with regard to Britt’s hearsay objections. We
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals which
determined that the admission of the certificate was not error
and affirmed the decision of the district court which affirmed
Britt’s conviction and sentence.
A ffirmed.
IN re INTereST Of ShALeIA m. 	609
Cite as 283 Neb. 609
in re interest of shAleiA m., A child
under 18 yeArs of Age .
stAte of nebrAskA, Appellee , v. shAleiA m. And
JAne m. mcneil , guArdiAn Ad litem , Appellees ,
And nebrAskA depArtment of heAlth And
humAn services , AppellAnt.
812 N.W.2d 277
filed march 30, 2012. 	Nos. S-11-532, S-11-553.
1. Judgments: Justiciable Issues: Appeal and Error. Justiciability issues that do
not involve a factual dispute present a question of law, for which an appellate
court reaches a conclusion independent of the court below.
2. Moot Question: Appeal and Error. A case becomes moot when the issues ini-
tially presented in the litigation cease to exist, when the litigants lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of litigation, or when the litigants seek to
determine a question which does not rest upon existing facts or rights, in which
the issues presented are no longer alive.
3. Courts: Judgments. In the absence of an actual case or controversy requiring
judicial resolution, it is not the function of the courts to render a judgment that is
merely advisory.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:43 AM CST

Appeals from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
elizAbeth crnkovich, Judge. Appeals dismissed.
Carla 	heathershaw 	risko, 	Special 	Assistant 	Attorney
General, for appellant.
Thomas C. riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
Allyson A. mendoza for appellee Shaleia m.
Jane m. mcNeil, of mcNeil Law Office, P.C., L.L.O., guard-
ian ad litem.
heAvicAn, c.J., Wright, connolly, stephAn, mccormAck ,
and miller-lermAn, JJ.
mccormAck , J.
NATUre Of CASe
The juvenile court signed a written order committing a
juvenile to the Youth rehabilitation and Treatment Center
(YrTC) in Geneva, Nebraska, and further written orders
transferring her to the YrTC. The orders were made in error
and did not reflect the court’s orally pronounced intention
to pursue foster placement for the juvenile. In a subsequent
written order, the court vacated and corrected the erroneous
orders, but the juvenile had already been transferred to the
YrTC. Despite the court’s insistence that the juvenile be
returned, the Nebraska Department of health and human
Services (DhhS) refused to do so and appealed the juvenile
court’s corrected order. While the appeal was pending, DhhS
obtained an order from the Nebraska Court of Appeals stay-
ing the juvenile court’s corrected order. This left the juvenile
in the YrTC, where she completed her program, was paroled,
and was subsequently discharged from parole. We dismiss the
case as moot.
BACKGrOUND
Shaleia m. was adjudicated under Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-247(1)
(Cum. Supp. 2006) as a juvenile who had committed an act
other than a traffic offense which would constitute a misde-
meanor or infraction under state law or a violation of a city or
village ordinance. She was being held at the Douglas County
610 	283 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

Youth Center (DCYC) pending disposition. At the disposi-
tional hearing held on may 17, 2011, DhhS and the county
attorney recommended that Shaleia be sent to the YrTC. The
guardian ad litem (GAL) argued that Shaleia should be placed
in foster care or Boys Town instead. The court agreed, stating
it was “going to hold off on [the YrTC in] Geneva.” from the
bench, the court ordered DhhS to apply with Boys Town for
Shaleia to be placed there. The court’s written order on may
26, however, committed Shaleia to the YrTC.
The may 26, 2011, order stated that Shaleia should remain
in the custody of DhhS and the Office of Juvenile Services
(OJS) until discharged, as provided by law, and that the juris-
diction of the juvenile court was terminated. An order issued
that same date authorized Shaleia’s release from the DCYC
to the custody of DhhS for transportation to the YrTC. A
mittimus order filed may 27, 2011, authorized the Douglas
County Sheriff’s Department to transport her to the YrTC.
In accordance with these orders, Shaleia was transferred to
the YrTC.
Soon thereafter, the GAL alerted the juvenile court that its
written orders did not reflect the court’s stated intention at
the dispositional hearing. On June 3, 2011, the juvenile court
issued an order vacating and setting aside the may 26 order
on the ground that it was made in error. The court then set
forth its “true and intended Order” that Shaleia remain at the
DCYC until further order of the court and that DhhS apply
with Boys Town for a placement for Shaleia. The court stated
that DhhS’ recommendations for commitment to the YrTC
were still “under advisement” and ordered a “Placement Status
Check hearing” for June 13.
At the hearing on June 13, 2011, the court discovered
Shaleia was still at the YrTC. DhhS explained to the court
that it did not believe the juvenile court had jurisdiction to cor-
rect its order committing Shaleia to the YrTC. DhhS asserted
that when a mistaken order operates to terminate the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, there is no longer jurisdiction to correct
that order.
The juvenile court disagreed. The court stated it had an
“ethical obligation” to correct the mistake, which it considered
IN re INTereST Of ShALeIA m. 	611
Cite as 283 Neb. 609

a clerical error. The court further explained that it had made
an assurance to a child and that it did not “believe in breaking
promises to children.” The court said: “I stand by my order
to return this child to Douglas County and to make applica-
tion to the full Boys Town continuum, group home on up, and
appropriate foster care.” DhhS continued to object, noting that
Boys Town had, in fact, rejected its application and that there
were no foster care placements available. The court responded:
“[Y]ou will bring her back here to the [DCYC], as I ordered
weeks ago.”
On June 22, 2011, the court issued a written order finding
that the June 3 order still stood and ordering DhhS to comply
with that order.
In case No. S-11-532, DhhS appealed the June 3, 2011,
order. In case No. S-11-553, DhhS appealed the June 22 order.
Subsequently, the two appeals were consolidated.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, DhhS
asked the court to stay the juvenile court’s June 3 and 22,
2011, orders. DhhS explained that Shaleia was still at the
YrTC. DhhS argued that it was in Shaleia’s best interests to
continue at the YrTC pending the outcome of DhhS’ appeals.
The YrTC offered services and treatment, while the DCYC
did not. furthermore, if DhhS complied with the order to
transport Shaleia back to the DCYC, she would not be given
“‘credit’” for the work she had accomplished since arriving at
the YrTC. On July 8, the Court of Appeals granted the stay,
subject to reconsideration upon timely objection. No objection
was filed.
On December 7, 2011, we moved the consolidated case to
our docket. All parties agree that Shaleia has now completed
her program at the YrTC. She was paroled from the YrTC on
August 26. Shaleia was discharged from parole and from the
custody of OJS in September.
ASSIGNmeNTS Of errOr
DhhS assigns that the juvenile court erred in (1) entering
a subsequent order after terminating its jurisdiction over the
case and (2) entering a nunc pro tunc order which substantially
changed the original order.
612 	283 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

STANDArD Of reVIeW
[1] Justiciability issues that do not involve a factual dispute
present a question of law, for which an appellate court reaches
a conclusion independent of the court below.1
ANALYSIS
[2] A case becomes moot when the issues initially presented
in the litigation cease to exist, when the litigants lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of litigation, or when the
litigants seek to determine a question which does not rest
upon existing facts or rights, in which the issues presented
are no longer alive.2 The underlying question in this appeal
was whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to correct its
mistaken orders which sent Shaleia to the YrTC instead of to
foster care. The Court of Appeals’ stay effectively determined
the outcome of that question.
Because of the stay, the previous orders committing Shaleia
to the YrTC remained in effect while the appeal was pend-
ing. Shaleia completed the YrTC program and was discharged
from OJS before this case came on for argument. No one pro-
poses that in addition to a fully completed program through
OJS, Shaleia could now be committed to foster care for the
same offense for which she was adjudicated. Therefore, what
remains is an abstract question of a juvenile court’s jurisdiction
to vacate prior erroneous orders—a question which no longer
rests upon existing facts or rights of the parties.
Shaleia’s attorney and DhhS argue that we should accord-
ingly dismiss DhhS’ appeals as moot. DhhS has obtained the
outcome it desired, and Shaleia is content to be done. Shaleia
and DhhS concede they no longer have any legally cognizable
interest in the outcome of this litigation, and both assert that no
exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
But the GAL, an appellee in this case, argues that exceptions
to the mootness doctrine apply and that we should address the
merits of the underlying issues presented by DhhS’ assign-
ments of error.
1 See In re Interest of Justin V., 18 Neb. App. 960, 797 N.W.2d 755 (2011).
2 In re Interest of Anaya, 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
IN re INTereST Of ShALeIA m. 	613
Cite as 283 Neb. 609

The GAL first argues that the collateral consequences excep-
tion applies. According to the GAL, because of Shaleia’s
commitment to the YrTC, Shaleia will have to apply to have
her juvenile record sealed. But if she had been committed to
foster care, the records would have been sealed automatically.
furthermore, the GAL points out that any sealed record is
accessible for certain law enforcement purposes and for sen-
tencing criminal defendants.3 According to the GAL, commit-
ment to the YrTC, unlike commitment to foster care, “carries
a message to all knowledgeable prosecutors, probation officers
and judges that this person is not amenable to treatment and
services.”4 Commitment to the YrTC is, according to the GAL,
“a proverbial black eye on a person’s record.”5
The GAL asserts that these collateral consequences are simi-
lar to those justifying the collateral consequences exception
to the mootness doctrine in In re Interest of Justin V.6 In that
case, the juvenile had been discharged from OJS. Nevertheless,
the juvenile argued that he should be allowed to proceed with
the appeal seeking to set aside his admission to the underlying
charges that formed the basis for his adjudication. The Court
of Appeals agreed. The court explained that there were various
collateral consequences as a result of having a juvenile record.7
These include consideration of juvenile records if the juvenile
is later subjected to sentencing in an adult criminal case and
a lifelong duty to divulge the dispositional order on various
admissions and applications.8 Therefore, the court considered
the merits of the juvenile’s appeal, despite the fact that he had
been discharged from the juvenile system while the appeal
was pending.
Shaleia may have similar consequences from having a juve-
nile record, but being sent to foster care versus the YrTC will
3 See Neb. rev. Stat. § 43-2,108.05(3) (Supp. 2011).
4 Brief for appellee GAL in case No. S-11-532 at 11.
5 Id.
6 In re Interest of Justin V., supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
614 	283 NeBrASKA rePOrTS

not change the fact that Shaleia has a juvenile record. The
GAL fails to cite any case where the collateral consequence
that justified an exception to the mootness doctrine concerned
one disposition over another for the adjudicated juvenile. As
illustrated by the Court of Appeals’ discussion in In re Interest
of Justin V., the collateral consequences exception usually war-
rants review of a moot case when the underlying issue to be
addressed could exonerate the juvenile—and thus result in the
absence of a juvenile record at all.9
There is no issue here that Shaleia was properly adjudi-
cated under § 43-247(1) and that her case thus demanded
some dispositional order. furthermore, upon our review of
the statutes pertaining to sealing juvenile records, we find no
discernible difference between the rights of juveniles commit-
ted to foster care and those committed to the YrTC.10 This
leaves us with only the stigma alleged by the GAL of a YrTC
commitment versus a foster home placement. even if this is
so, it is an insufficient collateral consequence to compel our
review of an appeal which has ceased to present an actual case
or controversy.
The GAL also argues that a public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine should apply to this case. The GAL
argues that our determination of the question of juvenile court
jurisdiction to correct erroneous orders can provide guidance
to the juvenile court and the parties usually before it. Under
the public interest exception, we may review an otherwise
moot case if it involves a matter affecting the public inter-
est or when other rights or liabilities may be affected by
its determination.11
however, an application of the public interest exception to
the mootness doctrine is inappropriate when the issue presented
on appeal does not inherently evade appellate review.12 Not all
commitments to the YrTC and the custody of OJS are so short
9 See id.
10 See Neb. rev. Stat. §§ 43-2,108.01 to 43-2,108.05 (Supp. 2011).
11 In re Interest of Thomas M., 282 Neb. 316, 803 N.W.2d 46 (2011).
12 Johnston v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 270 Neb. 987, 709 N.W.2d 321
(2006).
IN re INTereST Of ShALeIA m. 	615
Cite as 283 Neb. 609

as Shaleia’s. To the extent that this scenario is likely to recur,
and we hope it does not, the GAL has not demonstrated it will
likely again evade review.
[3] The GAL is frustrated by the fact that DhhS has
obtained its desired outcome through obstinacy and procedural
maneuverings. But such complaints fail to provide an exception
to the mootness doctrine. Shaleia, the party whose interests are
most at stake, asks that we dismiss the appeals. In the absence
of an actual case or controversy requiring judicial resolution,
it is not the function of our court to render a judgment that is
merely advisory.13 We dismiss the appeals as moot.
A ppeAls dismissed.
13 Kuhn v. Wells Fargo Bank of Neb., 278 Neb. 428, 771 N.W.2d 103
(2009).
616 	283 NeBrASKA rePOrTS