Spady v. Spady

SPADY v. SPADY 	885
Cite as 284 Neb. 885
and (3) the flagrancy of the governmental misconduct involved
in the case.19
On this record, I am convinced that the exclusionary rule
does not apply because sufficient attenuation existed between
the consent to search and the illegal stop. Although Magallanes
gave the consent to search soon after the illegal stop, other
circumstances outweigh this temporal proximity. The officer
gave Magallanes a warning ticket, which would indicate that
the stop was essentially over. This weakens the causal chain
between the illegal stop and the consent to search. It also
lessens any concern that the consent was simply a resigna-
tion or submission to police authority20—Magallanes would
have understood that the stop was over before agreeing to
the search. Peterson also told Magallanes more than once
that he did not have to consent to the search, and Peterson
informed Magallanes that if, at any time, he wanted to end
the search, he could do so by honking the cruiser’s horn.
Finally, the governmental misconduct—the allegedly illegal
stop—was slight because it was unclear at the time exactly
what constituted “driv[ing] on” the shoulder and the officer
believed that Magallanes had committed a traffic infraction.
Considering these facts, I conclude that the court properly
denied Magallanes’ motion to suppress because sufficient
attenuation existed between the allegedly illegal stop and the
consent to search. I concur in the judgment.
MccorMack, J., joins in this concurrence.
19 See State v. Gorup, 279 Neb. 841, 782 N.W.2d 16 (2010).
20 See id.
carolyn Jean Spady, appellee, v.
roger paul Spady, appellant.
824 N.W.2d 366
Filed December 21, 2012. 	No. S-12-139.
1. Contempt: Appeal and Error. In a civil contempt proceeding where a party
seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, an appellate court
employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) the trial court’s resolution
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:41 AM CST

886 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) the trial court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error, and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether a
party is in contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for abuse
of discretion.
2. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
3. Appeal and Error. An appellate court resolves questions of law independently of
the trial court.
4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordi-
nary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain
the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
5. Contempt: Proof. Outside of statutory procedures imposing a different standard,
it is the complainant’s burden to prove civil contempt by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
6. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a
tribunal to hear and determine a case of the general class or category to which
the proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general subject mat-
ter involved.
7. Judgments: Jurisdiction. A ruling made in the absence of subject matter juris-
diction is a nullity.
8. Collateral Attack: Jurisdiction. Collateral attacks on previous proceedings are
impermissible unless the attack is grounded upon the court’s lack of jurisdiction
over the parties or subject matter.
9. Judgments: Collateral Attack. Only a void judgment is subject to collat-
eral attack.
10. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Generally, once an appeal has been perfected,
the trial court no longer has jurisdiction.
11. 	Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of statutes
pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunc-
tively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that
different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.
12. Alimony: Statutes: Words and Phrases. The word “support” in Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 42-351(2) (Reissue 2008) includes spousal support, i.e., alimony.
13. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis
that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.
Appeal from the District Court for Adams County: Stephen
r. I llIngworth, Judge. Affirmed.
Kent A. Schroeder and Luke M. Simpson, of Ross, Schroeder
& George, L.L.C., for appellant.
Mitchel 	L. 	Greenwall, 	of 	Greenwall, 	Bruner 	& 	Frank,
L.L.C., for appellee.
heavIcan, c.J., wrIght, Stephan, MccorMack, and MIller-
lerMan, JJ.

SPADY v. SPADY 	887
Cite as 284 Neb. 885
MIller-lerMan, J.
NATURE OF CASE
This case involves the appeal from an order of contempt
stemming from a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Roger
Paul Spady (Paul) appeals the order of the district court for
Adams County in which the court found Paul to be in con-
tempt for failing to obey the court’s order to pay temporary
alimony and for failing to appear at the contempt hearing.
Paul argues that the court did not have jurisdiction to order
him to pay temporary alimony when an appeal of the decree
of dissolution was pending. Paul contends that the temporary
alimony order is void and that he cannot be properly found to
be in violation of such order. He also asserts that his failure to
appear at the contempt hearing was due to his doctor’s order
that he should not travel while recovering from major surgery
and that the district court erred when it found him in contempt
on the basis that he failed to appear for the hearing. Because
the district court had jurisdiction to issue the temporary ali-
mony order, it is not void. Thus, Paul is subject to contempt
for violating the order to pay temporary alimony, and the find-
ing of contempt was not error. As explained below, it is not
necessary for us to review the finding of contempt for failure
to appear. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Paul and Carolyn Jean Spady were married in 1966. Carolyn
filed for dissolution of the marriage in 2004. The parties’ chil-
dren had reached the age of majority, and so the issues for
trial generally involved valuation and division of the marital
estate. On January 25, 2006, while dissolution proceedings
were pending, the district court entered an order requiring
Paul to pay temporary alimony for the benefit of Carolyn in
the amount of $13,500 per month commencing January 1,
2006, and “every month thereafter during the pendency of
this action.”
After a trial and various other proceedings, the court on
January 20, 2011, entered a decree dissolving the marriage and
dividing the marital estate. In the decree of dissolution, the
court stated the following with regard to alimony:

888 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
[Paul] shall pay alimony to [Carolyn] in the amount
of one dollar per year starting on the first month after
this Decree becomes final and be due each year for
five years. Alimony shall terminate upon the death of
either party or remarriage of [Carolyn] or payment in
full of the Judgment on behalf of [Carolyn]. The tem-
porary alimony shall remain in effect until this Decree
becomes final.
Paul filed a motion to alter or amend the decree. The court
overruled the motion. Paul timely filed a notice of appeal on
April 1, 2011. That case became a previous appeal, case No.
A-11-271, before the Nebraska Court of Appeals.
On May 17, 2011, the district court ordered that Paul post
a supersedeas bond in a designated amount effective July 7,
2011. No bond was posted.
On June 7, 2011, while the appeal was pending before the
Court of Appeals but before the parties filed their appellate
briefs, Carolyn filed a motion asking the district court to award
her temporary alimony pending the appeal. In her motion,
Carolyn asserted that Paul had not paid alimony as directed in
the decree.
On June 22, 2011, Paul filed his appellate brief in case
No. A-11-271. Paul assigned errors relating to the division of
property in the decree. Notwithstanding the provision of ali-
mony in Carolyn’s favor in the decree and the dispute regard-
ing alimony as evidenced by Carolyn’s motion filed June 7,
Paul did not assign error regarding alimony. Paul also did not
assign error regarding the bond. Carolyn filed her appellee
brief in case No. A-11-271 on August 3, and Paul was granted
leave to exceed page limitations and filed his reply brief on
August 17.
During the pendency of the appeal, the district court took up
Carolyn’s motion and filed an order on June 28, 2011, which
awarded Carolyn temporary alimony. It is the violation of this
order which gives rise to the contempt order which is the sub-
ject of the instant appeal. In its June 28 order, the district court
referred to the portion of the decree of dissolution quoted above
regarding temporary alimony and said that it had included the
temporary alimony provision in favor of Carolyn because Paul

SPADY v. SPADY 	889
Cite as 284 Neb. 885
had control of all the income producing property and would
continue to have control during the period of appeal. The court
stated that the decree had not become final and that temporary
alimony of $13,500 per month remained in effect until there
was a final order from the Court of Appeals. However, the
court went on to note that Carolyn had new sources of income
totaling $1,376 per month that were not previously available;
the court found that appropriate temporary alimony during
the appeal period would be $12,124 per month, representing
the previously ordered monthly alimony less Carolyn’s new
sources of monthly income. The court therefore ordered Paul
to pay Carolyn temporary alimony in the amount of $12,124
per month effective July 1, 2011. Neither party appealed the
June 28 order.
The appeal of the decree of dissolution in case No. A-11-271
was submitted to the Court of Appeals. In its opinion, the Court
of Appeals considered the issues which had been raised by
Paul in his assignments of error. Those matters were limited to
property issues. The Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged
property division matters contained in the decree of dissolu-
tion in a memorandum opinion filed February 14, 2012. See
Spady v. Spady, No. A-11-271, 2012 WL 502702 (Neb. App.
Feb. 14, 2012) (selected for posting to court Web site). A peti-
tion for further review was denied by the Nebraska Supreme
Court on May 16, 2012, thus concluding the appeal in case
No. A-11-271.
During the pendency of the appeal in case No. A-11-271, on
October 5, 2011, Carolyn filed in the district court a motion
for an order for Paul to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt for violating the temporary alimony orders
of that court. She alleged that since December 29, 2010, Paul
had paid only $1 toward the ordered temporary support. She
asserted that by virtue of the initial temporary alimony award
which was embodied in the January 2011 decree, unpaid tem-
porary alimony had continued to accrue at the rate of $13,500
per month from January 1 through July 1, 2011. She further
asserted that by virtue of the June 28, 2011, order, unpaid tem-
porary alimony had accrued at the rate of $12,124 per month
from July 1 through the date of her filing. Carolyn alleged that

890 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
Paul owed her $129,495 in unpaid temporary alimony plus
interest, less the $1 he had paid.
On October 6, 2011, the court entered an order that Paul
should appear before the court on December 13 to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to obey
the court’s orders. A summons and the order to show cause
were personally served on Paul in Nebraska on October 7.
Paul did not personally appear at the December 13, 2011,
contempt hearing. Counsel appeared on Paul’s behalf. With
respect to his failure to appear, Paul’s counsel stated that Paul
was recovering from surgery and that Paul intended to remain
in Phoenix, Arizona, until his physician told him he could
travel. Paul’s counsel offered into evidence an unsworn note
written on a prescription tablet page signed by a doctor at a
hospital in Phoenix stating that Paul was “immunocompro-
mised” and should limit travel if possible. The note was dated
November 1, 2011, which was 3 weeks after Paul was served
contempt related pleadings and approximately 6 weeks before
the contempt hearing.
With regard to temporary alimony, Paul’s counsel referred
to the decree of dissolution which provided that temporary
alimony was to end when the decree became final and that
Paul would then be required to pay alimony of only $1 per
year. Counsel explained Paul’s failure to pay alimony based on
Paul’s argument that the decree of January 20, 2011, became
final 30 days after it was entered. Counsel apparently relied
on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-372.01 (Reissue 2008), which states,
in part, that except for purposes of appeal, remarriage, and
continuation of health insurance coverage, a decree dissolv-
ing a marriage becomes final and operative 30 days after it
is entered. Counsel for Paul argued that 30 days after entry
of the decree, temporary alimony was no longer due under
the decree.
At the contempt hearing, Paul also contended that the dis-
trict court had not had jurisdiction to enter the June 28, 2011,
order regarding temporary alimony, the contempt of which was
before the court. Paul’s counsel specifically asserted that while
the decree was on appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction.
Counsel for Paul contended that Paul had complied with the

SPADY v. SPADY 	891
Cite as 284 Neb. 885
court’s operative order in the decree regarding alimony when
he paid $1.
In an order entered January 27, 2012, the district court
rejected Paul’s explanations as to why he should not be held
in contempt. This order gives rise to the instant appeal. The
court noted that although its intent in the decree was to pro-
vide Carolyn with continued temporary alimony pending an
appeal, it was concerned that its use of the language “‘Until
this Decree becomes final’” could plausibly be viewed as
though temporary alimony ended 30 days after the decree was
entered. The court stated that in the decree, it had intended by
its language that it had ordered temporary alimony to continue
until completion of the appeal; however, out of caution, it
did not include amounts accrued from January to June 2011
in its analysis in the contempt proceeding or in its arrear-
age calculation.
In its contempt order of January 27, 2012, the court deter-
mined that on June 28, 2011, it had had concurrent jurisdiction
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-351(2) (Reissue 2008), while the
decree was on appeal, to enter orders regarding spousal sup-
port and that therefore, its June 28 order awarding temporary
alimony of $12,124 per month starting July 1 was valid. The
court further noted that Paul had not filed a supersedeas bond
and that therefore the court retained jurisdiction to enforce
the terms of its judgment. The court determined that as of the
December 13 hearing, Paul was in arrears on 5 months’ worth
of the temporary alimony that had been ordered in the June 28
order. Because of the plausibility of a mistaken understanding
of the terms of the decree, the district court did not find Paul
in contempt for the period of January to June 2011. However, it
did find Paul in contempt for failure to pay temporary alimony
after the issue was addressed in the June 28 order.
The court concluded in the January 27, 2012, order that
Paul was in contempt of the court because he had failed to pay
temporary support as ordered on June 28, 2011, and because
he had failed to appear for the December 13 hearing. The court
issued a bench warrant for Paul’s arrest that was enforceable
only in the State of Nebraska and ordered that if Paul was
arrested on the bench warrant, he could purge his contempt and

892 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
be released from custody by paying all alimony that was past
due from July 1 through the date of arrest.
Paul appeals the January 27, 2012, order finding him in
contempt.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Paul claims generally that the district court erred when
it found him to be in contempt. He asserts that because the
court did not have jurisdiction to order him to pay temporary
alimony in June 2011 while the appeal of the decree of disso-
lution was pending, the order of June 28, 2011, was void, and
that he was not required to obey such order. He also asserts that
because he was recovering from surgery, his failure to appear
at the contempt hearing should have been excused.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks reme-
dial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, an appel-
late court employs a three-part standard of review in which
(1) the trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de
novo, (2) the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for
clear error, and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether
a party is in contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, 283
Neb. 369, 808 N.W.2d 867 (2012).
[2,3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
Downey v. Western Comm. College Area, 282 Neb. 970, 808
N.W.2d 839 (2012). An appellate court resolves questions of
law independently of the trial court. Id.
[4] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary
meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpre-
tation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which
are plain, direct, and unambiguous. American Amusements
Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 282 Neb. 908, 807 N.W.2d
492 (2011).
ANALYSIS
In its contempt order filed January 27, 2012, now on appeal,
the district court determined that under § 42-351(2), it had juris-
diction to issue its order of June 28, 2011, awarding Carolyn

SPADY v. SPADY 	893
Cite as 284 Neb. 885
temporary alimony of $12,124 per month, notwithstanding the
pendency of Paul’s appeal from the decree. The district court
declined to find Paul in contempt for the period of January to
June 2011, because of the plausibility of Paul’s explanation.
However, by his willful failure to pay alimony as ordered on
June 28, 2011, the district court found Paul in contempt. The
district court also found Paul in contempt for failing to appear
at the contempt hearing. Paul challenges the contempt order.
We find no merit to Paul’s assignments of error.
[5] We apply the standard of review taken from Hossaini
recited above. We also stated in Hossaini that “[o]utside of
statutory procedures imposing a different standard, it is the
complainant’s burden to prove civil contempt by clear and con-
vincing evidence.” 283 Neb. at 376, 808 N.W.2d at 873.
Temporary Alimony: The District Court’s Jurisdiction
Is Properly Subject to Challenge.
As an initial matter, we note that Paul’s challenge to the
June 28, 2011, order of which he was found in contempt is
properly limited to the authority of the district court to have
issued the temporary alimony order while his appeal from
the decree was pending. That is, Paul’s challenge before us is
limited to whether the district court had jurisdiction to issue
the June 28 order. He made this jurisdictional argument at the
contempt hearing. While Paul cannot collaterally attack the
amount of temporary alimony, the court’s jurisdiction to enter
the temporary alimony order was subject to challenge in the
contempt proceeding.
[6-9] We have stated that subject matter jurisdiction is the
power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case of the gen-
eral class or category to which the proceedings in question
belong and to deal with the general subject matter involved. In
re Interest of Devin W. et al., 270 Neb. 640, 707 N.W.2d 758
(2005). A ruling made in the absence of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is a nullity. Hunt v. Trackwell, 262 Neb. 688, 635 N.W.2d
106 (2001).
We have also stated:
Collateral attacks on previous proceedings are imper-
missible unless the attack is grounded upon the court’s

894 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject mat-
ter. State v. Smith, 269 Neb. 773, 696 N.W.2d 871
(2005). Only a void judgment is subject to collateral
attack. Mayfield v. Hartmann, 221 Neb. 122, 375 N.W.2d
146 (1985).
State v. Keen, 272 Neb. 123, 130, 718 N.W.2d 494, 500
(2006). See, also, Hofferber v. Hastings Utilities, 282 Neb.
215, 803 N.W.2d 1 (2011); In re Interest of Ty M. & Devon
M., 265 Neb. 150, 655 N.W.2d 672 (2003); In re Interest
of Ramon N., 18 Neb. App. 574, 789 N.W.2d 272 (2010).
We have applied these principles in dissolution of marriage
actions. See Ryan v. Ryan, 257 Neb. 682, 600 N.W.2d 739
(1999) (cases collected).
Although Paul makes mention of the $12,124 monthly
amount in his brief, we do not read Paul’s brief as chal-
lenging the propriety of the $12,124-per-month temporary
alimony award ordered on June 28, 2011. Furthermore, any
such challenge to the propriety of the amount of temporary
alimony in the June 28 order would be an impermissible col-
lateral attack.
In this dissolution of marriage action, the record shows that
notwithstanding the award of temporary alimony in the decree
and the dispute evidenced by Carolyn’s motion for temporary
alimony due to Paul’s failure to pay filed before Paul’s appel-
late brief was filed in the Court of Appeals, Paul limited his
assignments of error in case No. A-11-271 to issues of property
division. Although postdecree matters may be considered on
appeal when raised in assigned errors, postdecree matters were
not before the Court of Appeals in case No. A-11-271. See
Kricsfeld v. Kricsfeld, 8 Neb. App. 1, 588 N.W.2d 210 (1999).
The award of temporary alimony was not challenged in case
No. A-11-271, and the award could not thereafter be collater-
ally attacked in this contempt proceeding. See Jessen v. Jessen,
259 Neb. 644, 611 N.W.2d 834 (2000).
The record further shows that Paul did not post a superse-
deas bond or assign error related to the bond order. The district
court was not denied jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the
judgment occasioned by the posting of a bond. See Kula v.
Kula, 180 Neb. 893, 146 N.W.2d 384 (1966).

SPADY v. SPADY 	895
Cite as 284 Neb. 885
For the several reasons recited above, we do not review the
propriety of the $12,124 amount of monthly temporary ali-
mony in the June 28, 2011, order. However, Paul’s challenge to
the district court’s jurisdiction to enter such order was properly
raised in this contempt proceeding.
Temporary Alimony: The District Court Retained
Jurisdiction to Enter the June 28, 2011, Order,
and the District Court’s Finding and
Corresponding Contempt Order
Are Not in Error.
[10] During the contempt proceeding, the parties and the
district court acknowledged that generally, once an appeal
has been perfected, the trial court no longer has jurisdiction.
See Russell v. Kerry, Inc., 278 Neb. 981, 775 N.W.2d 420
(2009). However, the order of contempt refers to § 42-351(2)
as the specific statutory authority forming an exception to the
rule and providing the basis for the jurisdictional authority
pursuant to which the district court properly awarded tempo-
rary alimony during the pendency of the appeal in case No.
A-11-271. We agree that the district court had jurisdiction
under this and related statutes to order temporary alimony on
June 28, 2011.
Section 42-351 provides:
(1) In proceedings under sections 42-347 to 42-381,
the court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into such
matters, make such investigations, and render such judg-
ments and make such orders, both temporary and final,
as are appropriate concerning the status of the marriage,
the custody and support of minor children, the support of
either party, the settlement of the property rights of the
parties, and the award of costs and attorney’s fees. The
court shall determine jurisdiction for child custody pro-
ceedings under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act.
(2) When final orders relating to proceedings governed
by sections 42-347 to 42-381 are on appeal and such appeal
is pending, the court that issued such orders shall retain
jurisdiction to provide for such orders regarding support,

896 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
custody, parenting time, visitation, or other access, orders
shown to be necessary to allow the use of property or to
prevent the irreparable harm to or loss of property during
the pendency of such appeal, or other appropriate orders
in aid of the appeal process. Such orders shall not be con-
strued to prejudice any party on appeal.
Paul focuses on § 42-351(2), which provides for the reten-
tion of jurisdiction for certain matters in the trial court “during
the pendency of [an] appeal.” He contends that the word “sup-
port” as used in the phrase “retain jurisdiction to provide for
such orders regarding support, custody, parenting time, visita-
tion, or other access” in § 42-351(2) is limited to the reten-
tion of matters of child support. He asserts that “support” in
§ 42-351(2) cannot refer to alimony and that the district court
did not retain jurisdiction. We disagree.
We 	accord 	§ 	42-351 	a 	plain 	reading. 	See 	American
Amusements Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 282 Neb. 908, 807
N.W.2d 492 (2011) (statutory language is to be given its plain
and ordinary meaning). The word “support” in § 42-351(2) is
not by its terms limited to child support. Further, we look to
the immediately preceding provision, § 42-351(1), which refers
to “support of minor children [and] the support of either party.”
Section 42-351(1) shows that the word “support” is used statu-
torily in § 42-351 to refer to child support and spousal support,
i.e., alimony.
[11,12] Components of a series or collection of statutes
pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and
should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine
the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are
consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Gridiron Mgmt. Group, 281 Neb. 113, 794 N.W.2d 143 (2011).
In so doing we see that elsewhere in the domestic relations
statutes, the definition of “[s]upport order” in the definitional
statute, § 42-347(11), refers us to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1717
(Cum. Supp. 2012), which in turn defines “[s]upport order”
as including “spousal” support. We conclude the word “sup-
port” in § 42-351(2) includes spousal support, i.e., alimony,
and the district court retained jurisdiction regarding temporary
alimony. We therefore reject Paul’s argument that the district

SPADY v. SPADY 	897
Cite as 284 Neb. 885
court lacked jurisdiction under § 42-351(2) when it entered its
order of temporary alimony on June 28, 2011, while the decree
was on appeal.
Our conclusion is consistent with the cases which have long
used the word “support” when referring to temporary alimony.
See, e.g., Overton v. Overton, 178 Neb. 267, 133 N.W.2d 7
(1965). Our analysis and the district court’s continuation of
“temporary alimony” during the appeal are also consistent with
the historical jurisprudence surrounding the manner by which
an alimony award can be accepted pending appeal without los-
ing the potential to challenge the adequacy of the amount on
appeal. See Larabee v. Larabee, 128 Neb. 560, 259 N.W. 520
(1935) (stating that one who voluntarily accepts payment of
part of judgment in his or her favor loses right to prosecute
appeal). But see Reynek v. Reynek, 193 Neb. 404, 227 N.W.2d
578 (1975) (concluding that acceptance of property settlement
did not forfeit right to appeal child custody).
In this regard, we stated in Berigan v. Berigan, 194 Neb.
185, 187, 231 N.W.2d 131, 133 (1975), that
[t]he proper procedure where an appeal is contemplated
is to apply to the trial court for temporary allowances
pending appeal. If the trial court has fully adjusted the
property rights of the parties, the court may make the
temporary allowances during the pendency of the appeal
applicable on the alimony awarded in the decree.
By making the alimony award “temporary” pending appeal, the
recipient is not at risk of losing the opportunity to challenge
the award. Id.
The district court’s order of June 28, 2011, followed the
practice of awarding “temporary alimony” pending appeal
and was both authorized statutorily and consistent with our
jurisprudence. The district court had jurisdiction to issue
the June 28 order, and it is not void. Paul’s failure to pay
temporary alimony to Carolyn in violation of the June 28
order was subject to contempt, and the evidence at the con-
tempt proceeding established Paul’s contempt by clear and
convincing evidence. We reject Paul’s assignment of error
wherein he claimed that he was not in contempt for failure
to pay temporary alimony. The finding and order of contempt

898 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
on the basis that Paul failed to pay temporary alimony were
not error.
Failure to Appear: We Need Not Consider
Whether the Finding of Contempt Based
on Failure to Appear Was Correct.
[13] Paul also challenges the district court’s determina-
tion that his failure to appear justified a finding of contempt.
Following its findings of contempt, the district court issued
the bench warrant. The district court ordered that Paul could
purge his contempt and be released from custody by paying
all alimony that was past due through the date of his arrest.
The terms of the order corresponded solely to Paul’s failure
to pay temporary alimony. There was no separate punishment
or sanction imposed due to Paul’s failure to appear. Because
there is no order attributable to the failure to appear for us to
review, we decline to analyze the correctness of the district
court’s finding of contempt based on a failure to appear. An
appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that
is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before
it. In re Trust Created by Hansen, 281 Neb. 693, 798 N.W.2d
398 (2011).
CONCLUSION
The district court found Paul in contempt based on his fail-
ure to pay temporary alimony. Such finding supported the con-
tempt order which provided that Paul could purge his contempt
by paying past-due temporary alimony. We need not separately
consider whether the court properly found Paul in contempt
for his failure to appear at the contempt hearing. For the rea-
sons recited above, we find no error by the district court in its
finding that Paul was in contempt based on his failure to pay
temporary alimony and its corresponding order. Accordingly,
we affirm.
affIrMed.
connolly and caSSel, JJ., not participating.