State v. Reinpold

950 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
the court approves the conditional admission and enters the
orders as indicated below.
CONCLUSION
Respondent 	is 	publicly 	reprimanded. 	Respondent 	is
directed to pay costs and expenses in accordance with Neb.
Ct. R. §§ 3-310(P) and 3-323(B) within 60 days after the
order imposing costs and expenses, if any, is entered by
the court.
Judgment of public reprimand.
State of nebraSka, appellee, v.
tyler f. reinpold, appellant.
824 N.W.2d 713
Filed January 4, 2013. 	No. S-12-206.
1. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. Both the U.S. and Nebraska
Constitutions guarantee an individual the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
2. Search and Seizure: Waiver. The right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures may be waived by consent of the citizen.
3. Warrantless Searches: Proof. When the prosecution seeks to justify a war-
rantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that the
consent was given by the defendant, but may show that the permission to search
was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.
4. Warrantless Searches: Police Officers and Sheriffs. A warrantless search is
valid when based upon consent of a third party whom the police, at the time
of the search, reasonably believed possessed authority to consent to a search of
the premises, even if it is later demonstrated that the individual did not possess
such authority.
5. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure: Evidence. A warrantless sei-
zure is justified under the plain view doctrine if (1) a law enforcement officer has
a legal right to be in the place from which the object subject to seizure could be
plainly viewed, (2) the seized object’s incriminating nature is immediately appar-
ent, and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the seized object itself.
6. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure: Probable Cause. For an
object’s incriminating nature to be immediately apparent, the officer must have
probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.
7. Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. Probable cause is a flexible, common-
sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:41 AM CST

STATE v. REINPOLD 	951
Cite as 284 Neb. 950
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be
useful as evidence of a crime.
8. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure: Probable Cause. The prob-
able cause standard, with regard to the plain view doctrine, does not demand any
showing that a belief that certain items may be useful as evidence of a crime be
correct or more likely true than false. Ultimately, satisfaction of the probable
cause standard may leave the reporting officer with further need to investigate the
items seized to confirm the incriminating nature of those items.
9. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure. Under the plain view doc-
trine, an officer does not need to have imminent concern regarding the disappear-
ance of an item in question in order to legally seize the item.
10. Obscenity: Minors: Words and Phrases. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1463.02 (Cum.
Supp. 2012) defines “child” as any person under the age of 18 years and, in the
case of a portrayed observer, means any person under the age of 16 years.
11. 	Obscenity: Minors: Expert Witnesses. It is not always necessary for the gov-
ernment to present expert testimony on the issue of age for a fact finder to con-
clude that pornographic images depict a minor.
12. Jury Instructions: Appeal and Error. Failure to object to a jury instruction
after it has been submitted to counsel for review precludes raising an objection
on appeal absent plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice.
Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County:
randall l. lippStreu, Judge. Affirmed.
John S. Berry, of Berry Law Firm, for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and George R. Love for
appellee.
H eavican, c.J., WrigHt, connolly, StepHan, mccormack,
miller-lerman, and caSSel, JJ.
H eavican, c.J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Tyler F. Reinpold, a former police officer, was
convicted after a jury trial of 10 counts of possession of
child pornography. On March 9, 2012, Reinpold was sen-
tenced on all counts to 60 to 120 months’ imprisonment.
Reinpold appeals.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April 2003, Reinpold’s parents purchased a house located
in Mitchell, Nebraska. This house is their primary residence.
In November 2007, Reinpold’s parents purchased the adjoining

952 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
house located at 1462 19th Avenue (the 1462 house) and sub-
sequently began using the 1462 house as a rental property.
At the time relevant to this appeal, there were six apartments
located at the 1462 house: two smaller basement apartments,
a main floor apartment, two apartments on the second floor,
and a studio apartment on the third floor. Reinpold moved into
one of the basement apartments when his parents first pur-
chased the 1462 house, but eventually moved to a farmstead.
However, Reinpold returned to the 1462 house in January 2010
and moved into one of the second-floor apartments. At this
point in time, the 1462 house was also occupied by Reinpold’s
grandparents, Lyle and Janice Wakeley, and Reinpold’s uncle,
Michael Wakeley, son of Lyle and Janice.
From January through July 1, 2010, only Reinpold, Lyle,
Janice, and Michael resided at the 1462 house, and no one was
living in either basement apartment. Reinpold, Lyle, Janice, and
Michael used the basement for storage, and they all had unfet-
tered access to the basement. The basement could be accessed
from both inside and outside the 1462 house. Reinpold and
Michael both stored property in the northeast corner of the
basement. Also at that time, Lyle had been assisting Reinpold’s
father with certain renovation tasks in the basement.
Reinpold moved from the 1462 house again in late June
2010, to a house in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. After the move,
however, Reinpold left some of his belongings at the 1462
house in both the second floor apartment and the basement
storage area.
On or about July 10, 2010, upon Janice’s request, Lyle
located a laptop computer in Reinpold’s former second floor
apartment. Janice wanted to use the laptop computer dur-
ing a trip she had planned for the near future. Lyle asked
Michael to examine the computer. While examining the com-
puter, Michael and Lyle discovered that the computer owner
was listed as either “Reinpold or Tyler.” They also discov-
ered what they described as disturbing images of suspected
child pornography.
Michael text-messaged Reinpold regarding the computer.
Reinpold denied he owned the computer and claimed, via

STATE v. REINPOLD 	953
Cite as 284 Neb. 950
text message, that the computer belonged to a “pedo” named
“Heath” he was investigating. That evening, Reinpold came to
the 1462 house to retrieve the computer. Michael recorded their
conversation about the computer. The audio recording reveals
Reinpold again denied the computer belonged to him. The
whereabouts of this computer are unknown to this date.
On August 9, 2010, Stacie Lundgren, a Nebraska State
Patrol investigator specializing in Internet crimes against chil-
dren, was assigned to investigate a rumor that Reinpold was
involved with child pornography. Three days later, on August
12, Lundgren interviewed Michael at the 1462 house. Later
that same day or the next day, Lundgren returned to the
1462 house to interview Lyle and Janice. Michael and Lyle
told Lundgren about the disturbing images they had seen on
Reinpold’s computer, showed her the text messages Reinpold
had sent to Michael regarding such, and played Michael’s
recording for Lundgren.
They also told Lundgren that Reinpold had several com-
puter hard drives stored in the basement. Michael and Janice
led Lundgren to the northeast corner of the basement. There,
Lundgren viewed an open cardboard box with three hard drives.
Lundgren took possession of the hard drives. On August 23,
2010, Lundgren obtained a search warrant to search the data
stored on the hard drives. The data stored on the hard drives
included suspected child pornography.
Reinpold was subsequently arrested and charged with 10
counts of possession of child pornography. He pled not guilty
and filed a motion to suppress the evidence Lundgren found
on the hard drives. At the December 28, 2011, motion to sup-
press hearing, Reinpold claimed he was renting the northeast
corner of the basement from his father for storage, that the
doors leading to the northeast corner of the basement were
locked in 2010, and that someone had broken into the northeast
corner of the basement to take possession of his items. This
testimony was in conflict with the testimony of Michael, Lyle,
and Lundgren.
Reinpold’s motion to suppress was denied as to this issue.
The district court found that Michael and Janice had common

954 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
authority over the basement to consent to Lundgren’s search of
the basement and that the hard drives were in plain view and
lawfully seized by Lundgren. The district court further found
Lundgren did not make a deliberate falsehood or act with reck-
less disregard for the truth in executing a search warrant for the
subsequent search of the hard drives.
Reinpold was later tried by a jury. At trial, he renewed his
motion to suppress evidence, which was denied. In present-
ing its case, the State did not offer expert testimony regard-
ing the ages of the persons in the images and videos found
on Reinpold’s hard drives. Reinpold subsequently submitted
a motion for directed verdict, arguing that this evidence was
necessary for the State to prove Reinpold’s charges beyond a
reasonable doubt. The district court denied that motion.
In instructing the jury, the district court provided in jury
instruction No. 3:
The elements of Possession of Child Pornography as
charged in Counts I through X are:
1. That [Reinpold] knowingly possessed a visual depic-
tion of sexually explicit conduct, wherein a child (as
defined in these instructions) was one of its participants
or portrayed observers; and
2. That at the time [Reinpold] was nineteen years of
age or older; and
3. That [Reinpold] did so on or about the dates charged
in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska.
Reinpold did not object to jury instruction No. 3 at trial.
At the conclusion of trial, Reinpold was convicted on all 10
counts of possession of child pornography. Reinpold appeals.
We granted the State’s petition to bypass.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Reinpold assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district
court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence
found on his computer hard drives, (2) finding there was suf-
ficient evidence to support his convictions when the State did
not present independent evidence establishing that the actors in
the photographs and videos admitted against him were under
the age of 18, and (3) giving jury instruction No. 3.

STATE v. REINPOLD 	955
Cite as 284 Neb. 950
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court applies a two-part standard of review to suppres-
sion issues. With regard to historical facts, we review the trial
court’s findings for clear error.1 We review independently of
the trial court’s determinations whether those facts suffice to
meet the constitutional standards of actual shared authority,
apparent shared authority, warrantless seizure under the plain
view exception, and the legal sufficiency of the law pertinent
to the instant case.2
When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the conviction, the relevant question for an
appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.3 In reviewing a criminal conviction, an
appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence.4
Plain error may be asserted for the first time on appeal.5
Plain error exists where there is an error, plainly evident from
the record but not complained of at trial, which prejudicially
affects a substantial right of a litigant and is of such a nature
that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of jus-
tice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness
of the judicial process.6
ANALYSIS
Motions to Suppress.
On appeal, Reinpold argues the district court erred in deny-
ing his motions to suppress the evidence found on his computer
hard drives for four separate reasons. We will consider each of
Reinpold’s four arguments in separate analyses.
1 State v. Hedgcock, 277 Neb. 805, 765 N.W.2d 469 (2009).
2 See id.
3 State v. Muro, 269 Neb. 703, 695 N.W.2d 425 (2005).
4 State v. Jonusas, 269 Neb. 644, 694 N.W.2d 651 (2005).
5 Worth v. Kolbeck, 273 Neb. 163, 728 N.W.2d 282 (2007).
6 Id.

956 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
[1-4] Reinpold first argues the district court erred in find-
ing Michael and Janice had shared authority to consent to
the search of the northeast corner of the basement of the
1462 house. This court has previously ruled upon the Fourth
Amendment issues present in this case. Both the U.S. and
Nebraska Constitutions guarantee an individual the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.7 In State v.
Konfrst,8 this court held:
The 	right 	to 	be 	free 	from 	unreasonable 	searches
and seizures may be waived by consent of the citizen.
[Citation omitted.] When the prosecution seeks to justify
a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is
not limited to proof that the consent was given by the
defendant, but may show that the permission to search
was obtained from a third party who possessed com-
mon authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
premises or effects sought to be inspected. [Citations
omitted.] Furthermore, a warrantless search is valid when
based upon consent of a third party whom the police, at
the time of the search, reasonably believed possessed
authority to consent to a search of the premises, even if
it is later demonstrated that the individual did not possess
such authority.
Here, Michael and Janice had actual and/or apparent author-
ity to consent to the search of the northeast corner of the
basement area of the 1462 house. It is uncontested that the
basement was not for the exclusive use of Reinpold. Michael,
Janice, and Lyle had unfettered access to the basement area
and used it for storage. At the suppression hearing, however,
Reinpold attempted to argue that the northeast corner of the
basement was for his exclusive use and that he paid his father
rent to use such space.
The record shows that there are two doorways to the north-
east corner of the basement. Reinpold argues on appeal that
7 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Neb. Const. art. I, § 7.
8 State v. Konfrst, 251 Neb. 214, 224-25, 556 N.W.2d 250, 259 (1996).
See, also, State v. Walker, 236 Neb. 155, 459 N.W.2d 527 (1990); State v.
Billups, 209 Neb. 737, 311 N.W.2d 512 (1981).

STATE v. REINPOLD 	957
Cite as 284 Neb. 950
these doors were locked at the time of the search. He provided
photographs of the alleged locked doors taken close to the time
of the suppression hearing. The photographs of the northeast
corner provided by Lundgren at the time of the seizure of the
hard drives, however, show no locks on the doors, and there
appears to be an abundant amount of clutter in the storage area
and doorways. The clutter is arranged in such a manner that
does not allow the doors to be closed. Furthermore, there is no
evidence in the record indicating Michael and Janice reported
to Lundgren that the northeast corner of the basement was for
Reinpold’s exclusive use and that they were forbidden from
entering that area.
The district court rejected Reinpold’s contention that the
northeast corner of the basement was for his exclusive use.
Instead, 	the 	district 	court 	found 	Lundgren’s 	photographs
properly demonstrated how the northeast corner of the base-
ment appeared at the time of the search. In considering these
photographs, the testimony that Michael, Janice, and Lyle
had unfettered access to the basement, and the testimony
that Michael stored items in the northeast corner of the base-
ment, the district court concluded that Michael and Janice
had actual and/or apparent common authority to consent to
the search of the northeast corner of the basement area of the
1462 house.9
This finding is not clearly erroneous. Reinpold’s argument
as to this issue is without merit.
Plain View Doctrine.
[5] Reinpold further argues his hard drives were not subject
to the plain view doctrine. A warrantless seizure is justified
under the plain view doctrine if (1) a law enforcement offi-
cer has a legal right to be in the place from which the object
subject to seizure could be plainly viewed, (2) the seized
object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent, and (3)
the officer has a lawful right of access to the seized object
9 See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 222 Neb. 850, 388 N.W.2d 446 (1986); State v.
Van Ackeren, 194 Neb. 650, 235 N.W.2d 210 (1975).

958 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
itself.10 As previously discussed, Lundgren had a legal right
to be in the place where the hard drives were located and had
a lawful right of access to the room where the hard drives
were found, because Michael and Janice had common, shared
authority to consent to the search of the northeast corner of
the basement. Once at the northeast corner of the basement,
Lundgren could plainly view the hard drives in an open card-
board box.
[6,7] In addition to being in plain view, in order to be seized,
the incriminating nature of the hard drives needed to be imme-
diately apparent. For an object’s incriminating nature to be
immediately apparent, the officer must have probable cause to
associate the property with criminal activity.11 “Probable cause
is a flexible, commonsense standard. . . . It merely requires
that the facts available to the officer would warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be . . .
useful as evidence of a crime . . . .”12
The district court found that the seizure of the hard drives
was based upon probable cause, because at that time, Lundgren
(1) had received background information through her investi-
gation that Reinpold’s laptop computer had not worked for 5
or 6 months and had been thrown away prior to moving to
his new residence; (2) had interviewed Michael, Lyle, and
Janice; (3) knew that both Michael and Lyle had recently seen
suspected child pornography on Reinpold’s laptop computer;
(4) had seen a text message conversation of July 10, 2010,
between Michael and Reinpold wherein Reinpold implicitly
acknowledged 	child 	pornography 	on 	the 	laptop 	computer
located in his former residence; (5) listened to the July 10,
2010, recorded conversation between Michael and Reinpold
wherein Reinpold again acknowledged the child pornogra-
phy on his laptop computer, but claimed it was part of an
10 State v. Keup, 265 Neb. 96, 655 N.W.2d 25 (2003); State v. Buckman,
259 Neb. 924, 613 N.W.2d 463 (2000); State v. Shurter, 238 Neb. 54, 468
N.W.2d 628 (1991).
11 Keup, supra note 10.
12 Id. at 104, 655 N.W.2d at 33.

STATE v. REINPOLD 	959
Cite as 284 Neb. 950
investigation of “Heath,” a “pedo”; (6) learned there was no
official investigation of “Heath” by Scottsbluff police; (7)
knew Reinpold had retrieved the laptop computer on July 10,
2010, and its whereabouts were unknown after that date; (8)
knew that Reinpold’s family members, including his father,
grandparents, and uncle, would now be aware that Reinpold
was under investigation by the State Patrol for possession of
child pornography; (9) knew that pornography users tend to
keep their pornography libraries rather than discard them; and
(10) was told by Janice that the hard drives in the basement
belonged to Reinpold.
[8] As the U.S. Supreme Court has held several times, the
probable cause standard, with regard to the plain view doc-
trine, “does not demand any showing that . . . a belief [that
certain items may be useful as evidence of a crime] be correct
or more likely true than false.”13 Ultimately, satisfaction of the
probable cause standard may leave the reporting officer with
further need to investigate the items seized in order to confirm
the incriminating nature of those items.14 Thus, the facts on
record before the district court suffice to meet the constitu-
tional standards for the plain view exception regarding seizure
of property.
In light of all of these facts, it was reasonable for Lundgren
to believe, especially with her expertise and experience within
the field of Internet crimes against children, that the hard
drives could be evidence of a crime. Lundgren had uncovered
more than enough facts regarding Reinpold’s suspected illegal
activity and knew that pornography users tend to keep their
pornography libraries electronically stored rather than discard
them. This evidence, as well as her background, warranted
Lundgren, as a person of reasonable caution, in the belief that
the hard drives may be useful as evidence of a crime. Certainly
13 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502
(1983).
14 Brown, supra note 13. See, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S. Ct.
1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, a
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 6.7(a) (4th ed. 2004).

960 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
such facts suffice to meet the constitutional standards discussed
above for a finding of probable cause. Reinpold’s argument as
to this issue is without merit.
Imminent Concern for Seizure.
[9] Reinpold argues Lundgren did not have a justifiably
“imminent” concern regarding the disappearance of the hard
drives at the time she seized the hard drives.15 But this court
held in Keup that an officer does not need to have imminent
concern regarding the disappearance of an item in question in
order to legally seize the item.16 Thus, Reinpold’s argument as
to this point is without merit.
Lundgren’s Affidavit.
Finally, Reinpold argues that Lundgren acted in reckless
disregard of the truth in her affidavit in support of the warrant
to search the seized hard drives. Reinpold contends Lundgren
acted in reckless disregard for the truth in her affidavit in
averring that Reinpold’s property was abandoned when she
knew that Reinpold had instructed Michael not to touch “his”
property, the hard drives. Reinpold did not object to this state-
ment before the district court regarding the constitutionality of
the search warrant executed by Lundgren. Thus, we need not
address this issue further on appeal.17
Reinpold did argue before the district court, however, that
Lundgren acted in reckless disregard of the truth in her affi-
davit, because she told Michael she would need to look at
the images before she could say whether they were illegal. In
making this statement, Lundgren explained the need to search
the hard drives subsequent to her lawful seizure of Reinpold’s
property within the constitutional boundaries of the plain view
exception to warrantless seizures of property.18 Thus, Lundgren
did not act in reckless disregard of the truth in her affidavit.
Reinpold’s argument as to this issue is without merit.
15 Brief for appellant at 37.
16 Keup, supra note 10.
17 See State v. Wetherell, 259 Neb. 341, 609 N.W.2d 672 (2000).
18 See Keup, supra note 10.

STATE v. REINPOLD 	961
Cite as 284 Neb. 950
Sufficiency of Evidence.
Reinpold next assigns that the evidence adduced by the
State was insufficient to support his convictions for posses-
sion of child pornography, because the State did not present
independent evidence establishing that the actors in the pho-
tographs and videos admitted against him were under the age
of 18.
[10] Reinpold was charged with 10 counts of knowingly
possessing a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct as
defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1463.02 (Cum. Supp. 2012),
which has a child, as defined in such section, as one of its par-
ticipants or portrayed observers. The statute defines “[c]hild”
as “any person under the age of eighteen years and, in the case
of a portrayed observer, means any person under the age of
sixteen years.”19 Reinpold argues the State did not present any
evidence that the persons visually depicted in the video clips or
photographs were children as defined by the statute. Instead of
providing expert testimony as to the age of the actors, Reinpold
notes the district court merely instructed the jury to make a
determination of the age of the actors based upon their own
personal experience, observation, common sense, or knowl-
edge as a parent, person, and adult. Reinpold contends such
a presentation of the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions for possession of child pornography.
[11] Various courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that it is not always
necessary for the government to present expert testimony on
the issue of age for a fact finder to conclude that porno-
graphic images depict a minor.20 When presented with a similar
19 § 28-1463.02(1).
20 U.S. v. O’Malley, 854 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1988). See, also, U.S. v. Riccardi,
405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999);
U.S. v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D. Me. 2011), affirmed in part, and
in part reversed on other grounds 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012); U.S. v.
Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803 (D.N.J. 1988); U.S. v. Gallo, No. 87-5151, 1988
U.S. App. LEXIS 19550 (4th Cir. May 12, 1988) (unpublished disposition
listed in table of “Decisions Without Published Opinions” at 846 F.2d 74
(4th Cir. 1995)).

962 	284 NEBRASKA REPORTS
argument on appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the standard
of review regarding claims of insufficiency of the evidence
was “‘whether or not there is substantial evidence, taking the
view most favorable to the government, to support the factual
determination.’”21 The Eighth Circuit then engaged in an inde-
pendent review of the pornographic photographs and found that
the photographs depicted minors and that there was substantial
evidence for the defendant’s conviction.22
We 	concur 	with 	the 	reasoning 	of 	the 	Eighth 	Circuit.
Although it is upon the State to make the judgment as to
whether to present expert testimony regarding the age of
actors in alleged child pornography, it is a question of fact
for the jury to decide whether the actors in alleged child por-
nography are under the age of 18. The State may indeed risk
losing the case by not presenting expert testimony regarding
such, but ultimately, it is for the jury to decide, with or with-
out an expert’s opinion, whether the evidence exhibits child
pornography.
The jury here viewed all of the videos and photographs and
determined the actors were under the age of 18. Upon inde-
pendent review of the evidence, this court determines that the
photographic and video evidence presented to the jury by the
State is sufficient to support Reinpold’s convictions. Any ratio-
nal trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the actors in the videos and photographs were under the
age of 18, pursuant to statute. The State did not have to provide
the jury with expert testimony regarding the age of the actors
in order to make this determination. Reinpold’s argument as to
this issue is also without merit.
Whether District Court Erred in
Giving Jury Instruction No. 3.
[12] Finally, Reinpold assigns jury instruction No. 3 is
fatally defective because it failed to instruct the jury that
“Reinpold’s knowing possession of [child] pornography” is
21 O’Malley, supra note 20, 854 F.2d at 1087.
22 O’Malley, supra note 20.

MOYERA v. QUALITY PORK INTERNAT. 	963
Cite as 284 Neb. 963
a separate element from the element requiring that the visual
depiction in the pornography be that of a child.23 Reinpold,
however, did not object to jury instruction No. 3 at the time
of trial. Failure to object to a jury instruction after it has been
submitted to counsel for review precludes raising an objec-
tion on appeal absent plain error indicative of a probable
miscarriage of justice.24 Thus, we need not address this issue
further on appeal. Accordingly, Reinpold’s convictions should
be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
affirmed.
23 Brief for appellant at 40. See § 28-1463.02(1).
24 State v. Mowell, 267 Neb. 83, 672 N.W.2d 389 (2003).
ricardo moyera, alSo knoWn aS david
gutierrez, appellee, v. Q uality pork
international, appellant.
825 N.W.2d 409
Filed January 4, 2013. 	No. S-12-208.
1. Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. A judgment, order, or award of
the Workers’ Compensation Court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only
upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its
powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not
sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order,
judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not
support the order or award.
2. ____: ____. On appellate review of a workers’ compensation award, the trial
judge’s factual findings have the effect of a jury verdict, and an appellate court
will not disturb those findings unless they are clearly wrong.
3. ____: ____. An appellate court independently reviews questions of law decided
by a lower court.
4. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
5. Workers’ Compensation: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The Nebraska Workers’
Compensation Act provides benefits for employees who are injured on the job,
and an appellate court broadly construes the act to accomplish this benefi-
cent purpose.