State on behalf of Ja'Quezz G. v. Teablo P.

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
Nebraska Supreme Court
I attest to the accuracy and integrity
of this certified document.
-- Nebraska Reporter of Decisions
State of Nebraska on behalf of Ja’Quezz G.,
a minor child, appellant, v. Teablo P.,
defendant and third-party plaintiff,
appellee, and Sasha G., third-party
defendant, appellee.
878 N.W.2d 358
Filed April 15, 2016. 	No. S-15-291.
1. Appeal and Error. An appellate court resolves questions of law and
issues of statutory interpretation independently of the lower court’s
conclusion.
2. Summary Judgment. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. In the absence of anything to the contrary,
statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. An
appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning
of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
Appeal 	from 	the 	District 	Court 	for 	Douglas 	County:
Kimberly Miller Pankonin, Judge. Reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
Sarah E. Preisinger, of Child Support Services, for appellant.
Marian G. Heaney and Katherine H. Owen, of Legal Aid of
Nebraska, for appellee Teablo P.
Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Miller-Lerman, Cassel,
Stacy, and Kelch, JJ.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:27 AM CST

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
Wright, J.
NATURE OF CASE
This case presents the question of what method of service
of process upon the putative father is required in a paternity
proceeding brought under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1411 (Reissue
2008). The district court determined that personal service of
process was required in an action for paternity, and because
Teablo P. had not been personally served, it granted Teablo’s
motion for summary judgment and vacated the default judg-
ment of paternity and support. The State appeals.
BACKGROUND
Ja’Quezz G. is a minor child born out of wedlock and resid-
ing in the State of Nebraska. It is not disputed that Teablo is
not Ja’Quezz’ biological father, and there are no other material
facts in dispute.
On September 28, 2008, Ja’Quezz’ mother, Sasha G., com-
pleted a paternity questionnaire for the Nebraska Department
of Health and Human Services. She affirmatively represented
that she had not had sexual intercourse with any man other
than Teablo either 2 months before or after the probable date of
Ja’Quezz’ conception. Based on that representation, the State
of Nebraska sued Teablo on behalf of Ja’Quezz to establish
paternity and an award for child support. The complaint was
filed on December 12, 2008.
Notice
The State attempted twice to have Teablo personally served
with notice of the paternity proceeding at two different street
addresses in Omaha, Nebraska, and on two separate dates:
December 12, 2008, and January 29, 2009. Both attempts were
unsuccessful. The service returns indicated that Teablo did not
reside at either location.
Having been unsuccessful in its attempts to personally serve
Teablo, the State elected to serve Teablo with notice of the
paternity proceeding by certified mail. It did not request the
court’s permission to change the manner of service upon

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
Teablo. On April 13, 2009, notice was mailed to a third address
in Omaha. This was the address that Teablo had provided to
his probation officer. At this address, Teablo’s grandmother
signed a return receipt indicating that she accepted delivery of
the summons and complaint. In a subsequent proceeding to set
aside the paternity and order for child support, Teablo filed a
sworn statement stating that he was homeless and did not have
an address of his own when the original complaint for paternity
was filed.
Default
On or about May 20, 2009, notice of a default hearing to be
held on May 27 was sent to Teablo at the same address pro-
vided to his probation officer. The hearing was held, but Teablo
did not appear. On May 29, the court entered a default order
finding Teablo to be Ja’Quezz’ father and requiring him to pay
$91 per month in child support.
After Default
On January 7, 2010, Teablo, acting pro se, moved to vacate
the “Order of Support.” The motion did not contain a cer-
tificate of service and was never set for hearing. The motion
identified Teablo’s current address in Omaha. At an October
2012 contempt proceeding, Teablo requested genetic test-
ing. The testing conclusively determined that Teablo was not
Ja’Quezz’ father.
On January 3, 2014, with the aid of counsel, Teablo filed
a complaint to set aside the order of paternity and the award
of child support. Teablo moved to vacate the order for lack
of service. Teablo subsequently filed an amended motion to
vacate the order, because the order was obtained as a result
of the fraudulent misrepresentation to the State by Ja’Quezz’
mother, Sasha.
On July 17, 2014, Teablo moved for summary judgment,
alleging that no material facts were in dispute that Teablo was
not properly served with notice of the paternity action. He
claimed the order should be vacated as a matter a law on the

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction when the order
was entered.
In support of that motion, Teablo argued that the appli-
cable service statute, § 43-1411, required that defendants
in paternity actions be provided with actual notice through
personal service, and not by constructive notice by using
another method of service. Teablo asserted that before service
by another method other than personal service can be used in
a paternity action, the party seeking alternative service must
comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-517.02 (Reissue 2008),
which states:
Upon motion and showing by affidavit that service
cannot be made with reasonable diligence by any other
method provided by statute, the court may permit service
to be made (1) by leaving the process at the defendant’s
usual place of residence and mailing a copy by first-class
mail to the defendant’s last-known address, (2) by publi-
cation, or (3) by any manner reasonably calculated under
the circumstances to provide the party with actual notice
of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
Teablo asserted that the court never acquired jurisdiction
over him, because he was not provided notice by personal
service and because the State failed to obtain the court’s per-
mission before proceeding with service by another method of
providing notice. As a result, Teablo claimed that the order
establishing paternity and support was void. Teablo did not
argue that summary judgment was appropriate on the issue
whether the order should be vacated because it was obtained
by fraud.
Teablo’s motion for summary judgment was denied by the
referee of the Douglas County District Court. Teablo timely
filed his exception to the referee’s report. After a hearing
on Teablo’s motion for summary judgment, the district court
determined as a matter of law that § 43-1411 requires that the
State either personally serve a putative father with notice of a
paternity proceeding or receive approval from the court before

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
attempting another method of service. Therefore, it concluded
that the district court did not have jurisdiction when it entered
the order establishing paternity and support, and it vacated that
order. The State appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The State assigns, combined and restated, that the district
court erred (1) in finding that service of process was not proper
under § 43-1411 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-508.01 (Reissue
2008) and (2) by granting equitable relief to Teablo when
he has an adequate remedy under the law at Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-1412.01 (Reissue 2008).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] An appellate court resolves questions of law and issues
of statutory interpretation independently of the lower court’s
conclusion.1
ANALYSIS
[2] The issue presented is whether the district court prop-
erly granted Teablo’s motion for summary judgment. A motion
for summary judgment shall be granted where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 As noted, the parties
agree on the material facts, but disagree whether Teablo was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the par-
ties disagree whether Teablo was properly served with notice
of the proceeding, such that the district court had personal
jurisdiction over Teablo when it entered the order establishing
paternity and support.
The Legislature has provided the method of service of process
in paternity proceedings. Section 43-1411 provides, “Summons
shall issue and be served as in other civil proceedings . . . .”
1 Fox v. Whitbeck, 280 Neb. 75, 783 N.W.2d 774 (2010).
2 Roskop Dairy v. GEA Farm Tech., 292 Neb. 148, 871 N.W.2d 776 (2015).

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-505.01 (Reissue 2008) governs service in
civil proceedings and, at the time relevant to this appeal, pro-
vided in part:
(1) Unless otherwise limited by statute or by the court,
a plaintiff may elect to have service made by any of the
following methods:
(a) Personal service which shall be made by leaving the
summons with the individual to be served;
(b) Residence service which shall be made by leaving
the summons at the usual place of residence of the indi-
vidual to be served, with some person of suitable age and
discretion residing therein; or
(c) Certified mail service which shall be made by (i)
within ten days of issuance, sending the summons to the
defendant by certified mail with a return receipt requested
showing to whom and where delivered and the date of
delivery, and (ii) filing with the court proof of service
with the signed receipt attached.
[3] In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory
language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.3
An appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascer-
tain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct,
and unambiguous.4 The plain language of §§ 43-1411 and
25-505.01 shows the Legislature’s intent that a putative father
may be served by any one of the three methods listed in
§ 25-505.01.
3 Shipler v. General Motors Corp., 271 Neb. 194, 710 N.W.2d 807 (2006);
Kimminau v. Uribe Refuse Serv., 270 Neb. 682, 707 N.W.2d 229 (2005);
Mason v. City of Lincoln, 266 Neb. 399, 665 N.W.2d 600 (2003); Morello
v. Land Reutil. Comm. of Cty. of Douglas, 265 Neb. 735, 659 N.W.2d 310
(2003).
4 24th & Dodge Ltd. Part. v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 269 Neb. 31, 690 N.W.2d
769 (2005); Mitchell v. French, 267 Neb. 656, 676 N.W.2d 361 (2004);
Mathews v. Mathews, 267 Neb. 604, 676 N.W.2d 42 (2004); Unisys Corp.
v. Nebraska Life & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 267 Neb. 158, 673 N.W.2d 15
(2004); Salazar v. Scotts Bluff Cty., 266 Neb. 444, 665 N.W.2d 659 (2003).

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
The district court erred in concluding the language in
§ 25-505.01, “[u]nless otherwise limited by . . . the court,”
meant that the court must approve the method of service of
process in cases involving a parent-child relationship. But
although we have recognized that the parent-child relationship
is afforded due process protection,5 we have never held that
due process requires that a party to a proceeding involving a
parent-child relationship must be personally served with actual
notice of those proceedings, as opposed to other methods of
issuance of service of summons in civil proceedings.6
In determining whether due process requires that a putative
father receive actual notice by personal service, the district
court considered the factors outlined in the U.S. Supreme
Court case Mathews v. Eldridge.7 Those factors were generally
to be considered in deciding what process was due a defendant,
for example, in deciding whether a party was entitled to notice,
a hearing, or appointed counsel.8 But in determining whether
the method used to give notice was constitutionally adequate,
the U.S. Supreme Court has regularly turned to the test set
forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co.9
In Mullane, the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process
requires that notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”10
Under the circumstances herein presented, we conclude that
the notice was reasonably calculated to apprise Teablo of the
5 See In re Interest of L.V., 240 Neb. 404, 482 N.W.2d 250 (1992).
6 See § 25-505.01.
7 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).
8 State v. Norman, 282 Neb. 990, 808 N.W.2d 48 (2012); Carroll v. Moore,
228 Neb. 561, 423 N.W.2d 757 (1988).
9 Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L.
Ed. 865 (1950).
10 Id., 339 U.S. at 314.

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293 Nebraska Reports
STATE ON BEHALF OF JA’QUEZZ G. v. TEABLO P.
Cite as 293 Neb. 337
pendency of the paternity action. The notice was sent by certi-
fied mail to the address Teablo provided to his probation offi-
cer and was signed for by Teablo’s grandmother at that address.
Although Teablo claims he “was homeless and did not have an
address of [his] own” at that time, due process does not require
heroic efforts by the State in locating the defendant.11
Instead, “[t]he means employed must be such as one desir-
ous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it.”12 It is undisputed that the State attempted
twice to personally serve Teablo at two different addresses.
After those attempts failed, the State sent notice by certified
mail to the address Teablo provided to his probation officer,
and Teablo’s grandmother signed for the notice. We find that
the means employed by the State were permitted by statute
and that the notice sent by certified mail was reasonably
calculated to apprise Teablo of the pendency of the pater-
nity action.
CONCLUSION
Because the State complied with both § 43-1411 and due
process, we find that service was proper and that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Teablo.
We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the cause for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Because we reverse, and remand for further proceedings,
we do not reach the State’s assignment that the district court
erred in granting equitable relief when Teablo has an adequate
remedy under the law.
Reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
11 See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 122 S. Ct. 694, 151 L. Ed.
2d 597 (2002).
12 Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra note 9, 339 U.S. at 315.