Lancaster County v. Slezak

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
Lancaster County, Nebraska, appellee, v.
Shawn Slezak and Local 1536 Engineering
of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, appellants.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 19, 2024. 	No. S-23-694.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Determination of a juris-
dictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of
law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions indepen-
dent from a trial court.
2. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an administra-
tive agency decision on a petition in error, both the district court and
the appellate court review the decision to determine whether the agency
acted within its jurisdiction and whether sufficient, relevant evidence
supports the decision of the agency.
3. Administrative Law: Evidence. The evidence is sufficient, as a matter
of law, if an administrative tribunal could reasonably find the facts as
it did on the basis of the testimony and exhibits contained in the record
before it.
4. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. The reviewing court in an
error proceeding is restricted to the record before the administrative
agency and does not reweigh evidence or make independent findings
of fact.
5. Administrative Law: Judgments: Words and Phrases. An adminis-
trative agency decision must not be arbitrary and capricious. Agency
action is “arbitrary and capricious” if it is taken in disregard of the facts
or circumstances of the case, without some basis which would lead a
reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion.
6. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts independently review
questions of law decided by a lower court.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:23 AM CDT

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
7. Administrative Law: Judgments. Whether an agency decision con-
forms to the law is by definition a question of law.
8. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Where a lower court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question,
an appellate court also lacks the power to determine the merits of the
claim, issue, or question presented to the lower court.
9. Administrative Law: Time: Appeal and Error. Pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-1905 (Reissue 2016), filing of the praecipe for transcript with
the clerk of the district court satisfies the 30-day appeal requirement,
even if the tribunal does not timely prepare and furnish the transcript to
the appellants for filing with the clerk of the district court.
10. Public Officers and Employees: Appeal and Error. Where a duty
is placed upon a public officer to perform acts necessary to perfect an
appeal, the public officer’s failure to perform cannot be charged to the
litigant or operate to defeat the appeal.
11. Administrative Law: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The proper inquiry
for an appellate court when reviewing the decision of an administrative
agency on a petition in error is whether there was sufficient, relevant
evidence to support the conclusion that the agency did make and not
whether the evidence would support a contrary conclusion.
12. ____: ____: ____. When reviewing a decision of an administrative
agency, as in reviewing a jury verdict, if there is sufficient evidence
to support the decision, the reviewing court must affirm even if it may
be of the opinion that had it been the trier of the case, it would have
reached a different conclusion.
13. Breach of Contract: Damages. In a breach of contract case, the ulti-
mate objective of a damages award is to put the injured party in the
same position the injured party would have occupied if the contract had
been performed, that is, to make the injured party whole.
14. Stipulations. Stipulations are not binding on the rights of a person
who is not a party to a proceeding and who does not assent to the
stipulations.
15. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court may affirm a lower
court’s ruling that reaches the correct result, albeit based on different
reasoning.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County, Darla
S. Ideus, Judge. Affirmed.
John 	E. 	Corrigan, 	of 	Dowd 	& 	Corrigan, 	L.L.C., 	for
appellants.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
Patrick 	F. 	Condon, 	Lancaster 	County Attorney, Ashley
J. Bohnet, and Delaney Baumgartner, Senior Certified Law
Student, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Funke, J.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises from a grievance regarding a county’s
failure to prepare an employee’s performance evaluation by
the date prescribed under a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). A personnel policy board found that preparing the
evaluation after the deadline was a breach of contract and, as
a remedy, awarded the employee a merit increase, even though
the rating given to the employee in the evaluation did not war-
rant a merit increase. The county then filed a petition in error
challenging the board’s decision. The district court agreed with
the county that the remedy was improper and reversed the
board’s decision. The employee and the labor union to which
he belongs appeal the district court’s order, arguing primarily
that the board’s decision was supported by sufficient relevant
evidence and, thus, should not have been reversed. We dis-
agree and affirm the order of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Factual Background
Shawn Slezak worked for Lancaster County, Nebraska, as a
mechanic in a position covered by a CBA between the county
and Local 1536 Engineering of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers (Local 1536). The CBA authorized
grievances to be filed by or on behalf of employees about
“matters of interpretation or uniform enforcement of express
provisions” of the CBA, the Lancaster County Personnel
Rules, or the “conditions of employment.”
The personnel rules, in turn, required that the perform-
ance of “status employees” be reviewed annually and that

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
department heads recommend the “advancement in salary” of
employees who met the requirements for advancement and had
not reached the maximum pay grade for their position. The
personnel rules also prescribed that the date on which employ-
ees receive their “annual performance evaluation and poten-
tial merit increase” was their “[e]ligibility date” or “anniver-
sary date,” which was generally the date when the employee
obtained status in a classified position. An “Employee Position
Description [and] Performance Evaluation Manual” further
prescribed that the annual or merit evaluation be prepared 3
weeks prior to the eligibility date and that the “rating supervi-
sor” was responsible for the evaluation.
There does not appear to be any dispute that at the time of
the events described below, Slezak was a status employee who
was eligible for a potential merit increase, or that his eligibil-
ity date was November 26.
Slezak’s Performance Evaluation
for 2021 Leads to Grievance
Slezak’s direct supervisor made four attempts to complete
Slezak’s performance evaluation between November 24, 2021,
and January 5, 2022. The first three times, higher-level super-
visors declined to sign off on the evaluation because of dispar-
ities between the numerical rating given to Slezak and written
comments on the evaluation. On the fourth attempt, higher-
level supervisors became concerned that the evaluation was
“bias[ed],” because Slezak’s direct supervisor made comments
indicating that his rating was influenced by the fact that Slezak
had three children and a lengthy commute. Thereafter, higher-
level supervisors completed Slezak’s performance evaluation,
which gave Slezak a rating below the threshold required for a
merit increase.
Slezak filed a grievance alleging, liberally construed, that
his annual performance evaluation was untimely and was not
completed by his direct supervisor.
The county denied the grievance on the ground that it failed
to allege a violation of the CBA. The county also asserted

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
that “performance evaluations may not be grieved” and that
“[e]valuating and rating” employee performance were manage-
ment rights under the CBA and the personnel rules.
Slezak and Local 1536
Appeal to Board
Slezak and Local 1536 appealed to the Lancaster County
Personnel Policy Board, seeking a hearing on whether the mat-
ter was grievable, as well as the alleged issues with Slezak’s
evaluation.
Initially, the board heard arguments as to whether it had
jurisdiction over the grievance. Slezak and Local 1536 argued
that the matter was grievable under the CBA because it
involved 	the 	“[c]onditions 	of 	employment.” 	Specifically,
Slezak and Local 1536 argued that “those things that touch
upon the economic life of the employee” constituted condi-
tions of employment. Slezak and Local 1536 also pointed
to language in the CBA effectively requiring that employee
performance be evaluated annually and that eligible employ-
ees be recommended for merit increases. The county dis-
agreed, essentially arguing that the dispute concerned the
substance of Slezak’s evaluation and, thus, was not griev-
able. The board agreed that it had historically taken the view
that performance evaluations were not grievable. But one
board member recalled the board’s having heard challenges
to untimely performance evaluations in the past. Ultimately,
the board decided to hear Slezak’s grievance, but limited its
review to “the issue of [whether he was] entitled to his merit
increase as a result of the failure to get the evaluation done in
a timely manner.”
Several months later, the board held a hearing at which
it received evidence and heard testimony from Slezak and
several witnesses about the merits of the grievance. That tes-
timony is summarized below. Additional evidence is discussed
later in the opinion as it relates to the parties’ arguments
on appeal.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
317 Nebraska Reports
LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
Slezak testified that “[t]he majority” of his prior evalua-
tions were 1 to 3 months late. Slezak also testified that all
those evaluations were positive and that thus, “it wouldn’t
[have made] much . . . sense” for him to grieve that they were
not prepared on time. Other witnesses testified similarly that
while the county sought to prepare performance evaluations
on time, approximately 10 percent of evaluations were 6 to 8
weeks late.
The witnesses also testified that higher level supervisors
were tasked with ensuring that direct supervisors “[gave]
accurate scores” and that there frequently were discrepan-
cies between numerical scores and written comments. The
witnesses stated that the evaluations completed by Slezak’s
direct supervisor often had such discrepancies and were sent
back for him to correct the issue. According to the wit-
nesses, Slezak’s direct supervisor was not instructed to lower
Slezak’s score or not give him a raise, but, rather, was
instructed to ensure the numbers matched the comments. The
witnesses also testified that when employees qualified for a
merit increase based on a performance evaluation that was
prepared after the deadline, the employees were awarded a
salary increase retroactive to their eligibility date.
The board adjourned at the end of the hearing, but when it
reconvened a month later, it sustained Slezak’s grievance on
the ground that his late evaluation constituted a breach of con-
tract. As a remedy, the board granted Slezak a merit increase
retroactive to November 26, 2021, apparently on the theory
that when an evaluation was late, “all [the board had] to look
at” was the previous year’s evaluation.
The board’s decision was an oral one. It was not reduced to
writing, as is required under the personnel rules.
County Files Petition in Error
The county then filed a petition in error in the district court
for Lancaster County, assigning several errors by the board.
As is relevant to the present appeal, the county alleged that

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
the board’s decision to provide a retroactive merit increase
was not supported by the CBA, the personnel rules, or
the manual.
Contemporaneously with the petition in error, the county
filed a “Praecipe for Transcript [and] Bill of Exceptions”
with the board, requesting “[t]he final order of decision of the
[b]oard,” among other things, and asking that all documents
be authenticated as required under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1906
(Reissue 2016). The county also filed a copy of the praecipe
in the district court that same day. Several volumes containing
the proceedings before the board and the documentary exhib-
its from those proceedings were subsequently provided to the
county, which filed them in the district court. However, as
Slezak and Local 1536 observe on appeal, those filings were
not authenticated by the board’s secretary or “any other offi-
cial” of the board. 1
The district court reversed the board’s decision on the
ground that the “remedy . . . was inappropriate.” The district
court observed that the board viewed Slezak’s grievance as
a claim for breach of contract and properly recognized that
the remedy for such a breach was to “make the wronged
party whole.” But in the district court’s view, granting Slezak
a retroactive merit increase made him “more than whole.”
In reaching this conclusion, the district court reasoned that
Slezak did not receive a merit increase because his score was
too low, and not because the review was late. The district
court based this conclusion partly on opinions from other
jurisdictions finding that late evaluations, in and of them-
selves, do not adversely affect employees. The district court
also observed that Slezak himself had “effectively admit[ted]
as much,” insofar as he acknowledged that the county had
a practice of awarding retroactive merit increases where the
evaluation was not prepared on time, but the employee quali-
fied for a merit increase.
1 Supplemental brief for appellants at 8.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
The district court similarly found that Slezak’s claim that
his performance evaluation was required to have been com-
pleted by his direct supervisor was “inconsistent with the
[c]ounty’s 	reserved 	management 	rights 	under 	the 	CBA,”
among other things.
Slezak and Local 1536 timely appealed, and we moved the
matter to our docket. 2
Thereafter, Slezak and Local 1536 moved for expanded
briefing regarding whether the district court had jurisdiction
over the county’s petition in error, insofar as “there does not
appear to be a [t]ranscript of the [board’s] final order duly
authenticated by the [board] in accordance with” § 25-1906.
We granted that motion, and the parties provided further brief-
ing, which we have reviewed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Slezak and Local 1536 assign, restated, that the district court
(1) erred in reversing the board’s decision, because there was a
“reasonable and fact based rationale relied upon by the [b]oard
that supported the remedy . . . ordered,” and (2) erred insofar
as it based its decision on the argument that Slezak’s perform-
ance evaluation was not completed by his direct supervisor,
because Slezak made no such argument on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not
involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an
appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from a
trial court. 3
[2-4] In reviewing an administrative agency decision on
a petition in error, both the district court and the appellate
court review the decision to determine whether the agency
acted within its jurisdiction and whether sufficient, relevant
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
3 Paxton v. Paxton, 314 Neb. 197, 989 N.W.2d 420 (2023).

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
evidence supports the decision of the agency. 4 The evidence
is sufficient, as a matter of law, if an administrative tribunal
could reasonably find the facts as it did on the basis of the
testimony and exhibits contained in the record before it. 5 The
reviewing court in an error proceeding is restricted to the
record before the administrative agency and does not reweigh
evidence or make independent findings of fact. 6
[5] An administrative agency decision must not be arbitrary
and capricious. 7 Agency action is “arbitrary and capricious”
if it is taken in disregard of the facts or circumstances of the
case, without some basis which would lead a reasonable and
honest person to the same conclusion. 8
[6,7] Appellate courts independently review questions of
law decided by a lower court. 9 Whether an agency decision
conforms to the law is by definition a question of law. 10
ANALYSIS
District Court Had Subject
Matter Jurisdiction
[8] We begin with the question of whether the district court
had subject matter jurisdiction over the county’s petition in
error, because if the district court lacked subject matter juris-
diction, this court also lacks such jurisdiction. Where a lower
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits
of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the
power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question
presented to the lower court. 11
4 Douglas County v. Archie, 295 Neb. 674, 891 N.W.2d 93 (2017).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Charter West Bank v. Riddle, 314 Neb. 263, 989 N.W.2d 428 (2023).

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
Slezak and Local 1536 argue that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the present matter because
the district court “did not have before it an authenticated
transcript of the proceedings before the [board],” containing
the final order of the board. 12 As such, Slezak and Local 1536
argue that the district court had no jurisdiction to proceed
further than to dismiss the county’s petition in error. The
county, on the other hand, argues that it was “not at fault for
the lack of an authenticated transcript” containing a copy of
the board’s final order, because its praecipe for a transcript
and bill of exceptions expressly requested this. 13 Thus, the
county argues that the board’s failure to perform its duty
under § 25-1906 to provide an authenticated transcript can-
not be charged to the county or defeat the county’s petition
in error. We agree with the county that the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction here and that we thus have juris-
diction over this appeal.
Slezak and Local 1536’s argument that subject matter juris-
diction is lacking is based on Anania v. City of Omaha, 14 one
in a long line of cases wherein we discussed earlier versions
of the statutes presently codified in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1905
(Reissue 2016) and § 25-1906. 15 When we issued our opinion
12 Supplemental brief for appellants at 9.
13 Supplemental brief for appellee at 9.
14 Anania v. City of Omaha, 170 Neb. 160, 102 N.W.2d 49 (1960).
15 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 231 Neb. 108, 435 N.W.2d 184
(1989); School Dist. No. 39 v. Farber, 215 Neb. 791, 341 N.W.2d 320
(1983); Marcotte v. City of Omaha, 196 Neb. 217, 241 N.W.2d 838 (1976);
Friedman v. State, 183 Neb. 9, 157 N.W.2d 855 (1968); Adams v. City of
Omaha, 179 Neb. 684, 139 N.W.2d 885 (1966); Ostler v. City of Omaha,
179 Neb. 515, 138 N.W.2d 826 (1965); Dlouhy v. City of Fremont, 175
Neb. 115, 120 N.W.2d 590 (1963); McDonald v. Rentfrow, 171 Neb. 479,
106 N.W.2d 682 (1960); From v. Sutton, 156 Neb. 411, 56 N.W.2d 441
(1953); Fike v. Ott, 76 Neb. 439, 107 N.W. 774 (1906); Smith v. Delane,
74 Neb. 594, 104 N.W. 1054 (1905); Brabham v. Custer County, 3 Neb.
(Unoff.) 801, 92 N.W. 989 (1902).

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
in Anania, § 25-1905 (1943) required, in relevant part, that
plaintiffs in error file with their petitions “a transcript of the
proceedings containing the final judgment or order sought to
be reversed, vacated, or modified,” while § 25-1906 (1943)
required that officers of the tribunal whose judgment or order
was appealed furnish “authenticated transcript[s] of the pro-
ceedings.” Particularly when confronted with cases where the
petitioner had failed to timely file an authenticated transcript
containing a copy of the final judgment or order appealed
from, we construed these statutory requirements to be manda-
tory and jurisdictional. 16 In such cases, we found that without
the timely filing of an authenticated transcript—or a record of
the proceedings below 17 —containing a copy of the final judg-
ment or order appealed from, the court in which a petition in
error was filed generally had no jurisdiction to proceed further
than to dismiss the petition in error. 18
[9] However, some years after our decision in Anania, the
Legislature amended § 25-1905 to allow plaintiffs in error to
file with their petition either a transcript of the proceedings or
a “praecipe directing the tribunal, board, or officer to prepare
the transcript of the proceedings.” 19 We subsequently con-
strued this amended language, in conjunction with § 25-1906
(Reissue 2016), to mean that the “jurisdictional requirements
for the timely filing of a petition in error” were met where
the petitioner in error filed a praecipe for transcript within
16 Anania, supra note 14.
17 Dlouhy, supra note 15 (record of proceedings before tribunal is transcript
of proceedings that must be filed with district court in petition in error).
18 Id. But see Glup v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 355, 383 N.W.2d 773 (1986)
(recognizing possibility that petitioner in error could demonstrate that lack
of timely filed transcript was result of failure in performance of public
duty owed by official charged with preparing or furnishing transcript).
19 See 1991 Neb. Laws, L.B. 561, § 1. See, also, § 25-1905 (Reissue 2016).

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
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30 days of the final judgment or order appealed from. 20 Or
otherwise stated, pursuant to § 25-1905, filing of the prae-
cipe for transcript with the clerk of the district court satisfies
the 30-day appeal requirement, even if the tribunal does not
timely prepare and furnish the transcript to the appellants for
filing with the clerk of the district court. 21
[10] We take a similar view of the timely filing of a prae-
cipe for transcript where, as here, the tribunal fails to produce
an authenticated copy of the transcript containing a copy of
the final order or judgment appealed from without any neg-
ligence on the part of the petitioner. Slezak and Local 1536
do not dispute that the county timely filed its praecipe for a
transcript and bill of exceptions with the district court along
with its petition in error, as contemplated by § 25-1905.
That praecipe expressly requested that the transcript and bill
of exceptions include “[t]he final order of decision of the
[b]oard” and be authenticated as required under § 25-1906.
The bill of exceptions ultimately provided to the county was
not a “transcript for purposes of § 25-1905,” as the county
acknowledges on appeal. 22 However, as we have explained in
other contexts, where a duty is placed upon a public officer to
perform acts necessary to perfect an appeal, the public offi-
cer’s failure to perform cannot be charged to the litigant or
operate to defeat the appeal. 23 This rule holds absent circum-
stances not alleged to have been present here. 24
20 McNally v. City of Omaha, 273 Neb. 558, 565, 731 N.W.2d 573, 581
(2007). See, also, River City Life Ctr. v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 265
Neb. 723, 658 N.W.2d 717 (2003); Meints v. City of Beatrice, 20 Neb.
App. 129, 820 N.W.2d 90 (2012).
21 McNally, supra note 20.
22 Supplemental brief for appellee at 8.
23 Purdy v. City of York, 243 Neb. 593, 500 N.W.2d 841 (1993).
24 State v. Brown, 312 Neb. 654, 980 N.W.2d 834 (2022) (failure of public
officer to perform duty may operate to defeat appeal where negligence of
appellant or appellant’s agent concurs with that of officer).

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
Granted, the board’s final order was never reduced to writ-
ing, as required under the personnel regulations. However, the
parties forfeited any right to a final order reduced to writing
that they might otherwise have had by failing to raise this issue
before the district court. 25
District Court Did Not Err in Reversing
Board’s Decision as to Remedy
We next consider Slezak and Local 1536’s argument that
the district court exceeded its scope of review by reversing
the board’s decision as to the proper remedy for the breach of
the CBA that the board found to have occurred here. Slezak
and Local 1536 argue that the board’s decision to grant him
a retroactive merit increase was supported by “sufficient rel-
evant evidence” and, thus, should not have been reversed by
the district court. 26 The county, in contrast, argues that Slezak
suffered no harm from the late evaluation and that the board’s
remedy thus made him “‘more than whole.’” 27 Assuming,
without deciding, that the late evaluation was a breach of con-
tract, we agree with the county that the board’s remedy was
not consistent with the ultimate objective of a damages award
in the case of a breach of contract.
[11,12] Slezak and Local 1536 correctly suggest that if
two inconsistent conclusions could have been drawn from the
evidence, the district court would have exceeded its scope of
review in substituting the conclusion it would have drawn
from the evidence for the board’s conclusion. As we have
explained, the proper inquiry for an appellate court when
reviewing the decision of an administrative agency on a peti-
tion in error is whether there was sufficient, relevant evidence
to support the conclusion that the agency did make and not
25 See State v. Horne, 315 Neb. 766, 1 N.W.3d 457 (2024) (forfeiture is
failure to make timely assertion of right, while waiver is intentional
relinquishment of known right).
26 Brief for appellants at 17.
27 Brief for appellee at 13.

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whether the evidence would support a contrary conclusion. 28
When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, as
in reviewing a jury verdict, if there is sufficient evidence to
support the decision, the reviewing court must affirm even if
it may be of the opinion that had it been the trier of the case,
it would have reached a different conclusion. 29
[13] However, the evidence here cannot be seen to sup-
port the board’s decision, insofar as the remedy crafted by the
board exceeded the scope of a damages award in a breach of
contract case. In a breach of contract case, the ultimate objec-
tive of a damages award is to put the injured party in the same
position the injured party would have occupied if the contract
had been performed, that is, to make the injured party whole. 30
Awarding Slezak a retroactive merit increase did not meet that
ultimate objective, because there was uncontroverted evidence
that Slezak would not have received a merit increase based on
the evaluation he ultimately received for 2021 if that evalua-
tion had been prepared by the date required under the CBA.
Slezak’s score on the late-completed evaluation was below
the threshold required for a merit increase, and it was this
fact, and not the fact that the county was late in preparing his
evaluation, that caused his injury. Courts in other jurisdictions
have taken a similar view, finding that it is the contents of the
evaluation, and not the evaluation’s untimeliness per se, that
may adversely affect employees. 31
As to the specific evidence that Slezak and Local 1536 cite
in support of the board’s decision, we take a different view.
Slezak and Local 1536 point to an exhibit that they main-
tain demonstrates that the county stipulated to a retroactive
28 Douglas County, supra note 4.
29 Id.
30 Dietzel Enters. v. J. A. Wever Constr., 312 Neb. 426, 979 N.W.2d 517
(2022).
31 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Department of Transp., 71 Wash. App. 317, 858 P.2d
283 (1993) (declining employees’ requests to remove evaluations from
their personnel files because those evaluations were late).

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LANCASTER COUNTY v. SLEZAK
Cite as 317 Neb. 157
merit increase as the remedy for a prior grievance wherein
an employee grieved “both . . . the fact that the performance
evaluation was late and that she received an unsatisfactory
performance score.” 32 Slezak and Local 1536 claim that the
exhibit shows a “past practice” of awarding merit increases
when an evaluation is late even if the evaluation is unsat-
isfactory. 33 The county states in its brief on appeal that it
“stipulated to the facts in [the previous] case,” 34 which we
take to mean that the county agrees that the grievance in that
case concerned both the timeliness of the evaluation and the
employee’s rating. However, we do not see anything in the
exhibit itself that suggests that the previous grievance was
based partly on the evaluation’s being unsatisfactory.
[14] But as the county observes, while it may have stipu-
lated that a merit increase was an appropriate remedy in the
previous case, it did not stipulate that a merit increase was the
appropriate remedy in the present case. This is a separate pro-
ceeding. Stipulations are not binding on the rights of a person
who is not a party to a proceeding and who does not assent to
the stipulations. 35
Slezak and Local 1536 also point to Slezak’s 2020 annual
performance evaluation, which was his most recently com-
pleted evaluation as of November 26, 2021. There was evi-
dence showing that this evaluation met the threshold for a
merit increase, and Slezak and Local 1536 note that one board
member, in particular, cited this fact “in voicing his support”
for awarding Slezak a retroactive merit increase. 36 However,
the evidence also showed that Slezak already received a merit
increase based on that evaluation.
32 Brief for appellants at 17.
33 Id.
34 Brief for appellee at 12.
35 Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Lancaster, 260 Neb. 585, 618 N.W.2d 676 (2000).
36 Brief for appellants at 18.

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There Are Grounds to Affirm District Court’s Order
Even if District Court Erred in Considering
“Manner” of Slezak’s Evaluation
Finally, we turn to Slezak and Local 1536’s argument that
the district court erred in addressing Slezak’s argument that
the manner of his evaluation did not comport with the CBA
because the evaluation was not prepared by his direct supervi-
sor. In particular, Slezak and Local 1536 take issue with the
district court’s suggestion that he might not have “adequately
raised that issue in these error proceedings.” 37 Instead, Slezak
and Local 1536 argue that it was the county’s burden, as the
petitioner in error, to raise any issues before the district court.
[15] While Slezak did raise the manner of his evaluation
with the board, the board’s decision was not based on this
issue, and the county’s petition in the district court did not
assign any error related to the board’s handling of the issue.
However, even if the district court erred in addressing the man-
ner of Slezak’s evaluation, such error would not warrant the
reversal of the district court’s order. An appellate court may
affirm a lower court’s ruling that reaches the correct result,
albeit based on different reasoning. 38 Here, we agree that rever-
sal of the board’s remedy was warranted because it was not
consistent with the ultimate objective of a damages award in
the case of a breach of contract, regardless of which supervisor
completed the evaluation.
CONCLUSION
Because the board’s remedy made Slezak “more than whole,”
the district court did not err in reversing the board’s decision.
Any error in the district court’s discussion of the manner of
Slezak’s evaluation does not warrant reversal of the district
37 Id. at 21.
38 Edwards v. Estate of Clark, 313 Neb. 94, 982 N.W.2d 788 (2022).

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court’s order, because the district court reached the correct
result. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court.
Affirmed.
Cassel, J., concurring.
I have some doubt that the County Civil Service Act 1 or the
rules and regulations adopted by Lancaster County pursuant
to that act empower a personnel policy board to adjudicate a
grievance asserting a claim for breach of contract. Because I
do not read the court’s opinion to so hold, I join the opinion
based on that understanding.
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-2517 to 23-2533 (Reissue 2022).