Czech v. Allen

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
Victoria A. Czech, Personal Representative of
the Estate of Brett Allen Torres, appellee,
v. Keith L. Allen, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 9, 2025. 	Nos. S-23-1037, S-24-047.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does not
involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law.
2. Venue: Appeal and Error. Where the record does not show an abuse of
discretion, a ruling on a motion to transfer venue will not be disturbed
on appeal.
3. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists when
the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly
depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in
matters submitted for disposition.
4. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews
the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing
all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
5. ____: ____. An appellate court will affirm a lower court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences
that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
6. Appeal and Error. The grant or denial of a stay of proceedings is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
7. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
8. Final Orders. Final orders are defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
(Cum. Supp. 2024), which currently recognizes four categories of final
orders; some categories pertain to actions, and one pertains to special
proceedings.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:10 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
9. Venue: Actions. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-410 (Cum. Supp.
2024), any civil action may be transferred to the district court of any
county in the state for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or in
the interest of justice.
10. Appeal and Error. Plain error may be found on appeal when an error
unasserted or uncomplained of at trial, but plainly evident from the
record, prejudicially affects a litigant’s substantial right and, if uncor-
rected, would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness
of the judicial process.
11. Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings: Evidence: Juries: Appeal and Error.
A motion in limine is a procedural step to prevent prejudicial evidence
from reaching the jury. It is not the office of a motion in limine to obtain
a final ruling upon the ultimate admissibility of the evidence. Therefore,
when a court overrules a motion in limine to exclude particular evi-
dence, the movant must object when the particular evidence is offered
at trial in order to predicate error before an appellate court.
12. Summary Judgment: Records: Appeal and Error. Affidavits, deposi-
tions, and other evidence considered at a hearing on a motion for sum-
mary judgment must be preserved in a bill of exceptions filed in the
court before an order on such a motion may be reviewed.
13. Records: Appeal and Error. It is incumbent on the party appealing to
present a record that supports the errors assigned; absent such a record,
as a general rule, the decision of the lower court as to those errors will
be affirmed.
14. Moot Question. Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of a
suit that eradicates the requisite personal interest in the dispute’s resolu-
tion that existed at the beginning of the litigation.
15. ____. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether changes in
circumstances have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.
16. Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Although mootness
does not prevent appellate jurisdiction, it is a justiciability doctrine that
can prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction.
17. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. An appeal
is not perfected and an appellate court acquires no jurisdiction unless
the appellant has satisfied the statutory requirements for appellate juris-
diction by appealing from a final order or a judgment.
Appeals from the District Court for Lincoln County: Cindy
R. Volkmer, Judge. Appeal in No. S-23-1037 dismissed.
Judgment in No. S-24-047 affirmed.
Keith L. Allen, pro se.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
Brock D. Wurl, of Paloucek, Herman & Wurl Law Offices,
for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Bergevin, JJ.
Funke, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
These consolidated appeals challenge orders issued by the
district court for Lincoln County, Nebraska, in a wrongful
death suit brought against Keith L. Allen by Victoria A. Czech,
the personal representative of the estate of Brett Allen Torres.
The first appeal, docketed as case No. S-23-1037, was filed
during the trial. The second appeal, docketed as case No.
S-24-047, challenges, in part, the same orders as the first
appeal but was filed after a judgment in Czech’s favor. Because
the orders challenged in case No. S-23-1037 are not final
orders, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As to
case No. S-24-047, finding no merit to Allen’s arguments, we
affirm the orders of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Initial Filings
After Allen shot and killed Torres in May 2020, he was
prosecuted and convicted of first degree murder and use of a
firearm to commit a felony. 1
Separate and apart from the criminal charges, Czech sued
Allen for wrongful death and conscious suffering in Torres’
death. Czech also sought an order of prejudgment attach-
ment upon Allen’s assets based on information and belief that
he “may attempt to conceal, hide, convert, or remove” from
Lincoln County assets that could be used to satisfy a future
judgment in the case. The district court granted Czech’s motion
and ordered prejudgment attachment.
1 See State v. Allen, 314 Neb. 663, 992 N.W.2d 712 (2023), modified on
denial of rehearing 315 Neb. 255, 995 N.W.2d 446, cert. denied ___ U.S.
____, 144 S. Ct. 1070, 218 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2024).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
Allen, proceeding pro se, filed an answer generally deny-
ing the substance of Czech’s claims and alleging affirmative
defenses, including that he acted in defense of himself and oth-
ers. In his answer, Allen did not request a jury trial. However,
over 2 years after filing his answer, Allen sought and was
granted a jury trial.
The district court set a deadline of March 31, 2023, for all
“pretrial motions,” except motions for summary judgment.
Motion for Change of Venue and Motion in Limine
to Exclude Evidence of Allen’s Convictions
On April 11, 2023, Allen moved for change of venue, claim-
ing that a fair and impartial jury could not be impaneled in
Lincoln County due to the publicity surrounding the “criminal
charges” against him in Torres’ death. That same day, Allen
also filed a motion in limine to exclude “documents, state-
ments, and/or other information or evidence” relating to his
convictions in Torres’ death. Allen argued that such evidence
was inadmissible under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-609(5) (Reissue
2016), because he had appealed his convictions and, as such,
that the convictions were not final. Allen also argued that evi-
dence of his convictions should be excluded under Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016), because it had “no impeach-
ment value” and would be unduly prejudicial to him, confuse
or mislead the jury, and cause undue delay.
The district court initially overruled both motions because
they were untimely. However, upon Allen’s motion for recon-
sideration, the court overruled his motion for change of venue
because it was not “appropriate” to request a jury trial and
then seek change of venue, “especially given the late nature of
the request for the jury trial.” Also, upon reconsideration, the
court overruled Allen’s motion in limine on the ground that it
was moot. The court reasoned that when Allen filed his motion
in limine, his convictions were on appeal, but that they had
subsequently been affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. 2
2 See Allen, supra note 1.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Czech then filed a motion for partial summary judgment
as to Allen’s liability for Torres’ death. At the hearing on that
motion, Czech argued that Allen’s conviction for first degree
murder supported a finding that he was liable because it
involved the “same set of facts” that led to the civil action, but
the burden of proof is “much lower” in the civil action. Allen
did not make any substantive response to Czech’s motion at
the hearing, beyond noting that he was “actively trying to
appeal” and “working on” postconviction relief. Exhibit 6,
which contained Allen’s written response to Czech’s motion, is
not part of the record on appeal.
After the hearing, the district court sustained Czech’s motion
for partial summary judgment. The court noted that Czech had
offered evidence of Allen’s convictions, as well as “evidence
of the alleged crime” and “trial testimony” from several wit-
nesses. According to the court, that evidence “show[ed] that
there is no material issue of fact regarding the fact that Allen
killed Torres.” The court also noted that although Allen had
previously argued that § 27-609(5) “prevent[s] summary judg-
ment[,] . . . he did not make this argument as it directly relates”
to the motion for partial summary judgment. Nonetheless,
the court stated that it “wanted to be clear” that § 27-609(5)
“became 	inapplicable” 	once 	the 	Nebraska 	Supreme 	Court
affirmed Allen’s convictions.
Objection and Motion to Vacate
Order of Prejudgment Attachment and
Motion to Discharge Attachment
Allen then objected and moved to vacate the order grant-
ing Czech’s motion for prejudgment attachment. In that filing,
Allen claimed that he was not aware of Czech’s motion or
the court’s order until the order was received into evidence
in State v. Allen 3 in conjunction with his motion for return of
seized property. As such, Allen claimed his due process rights
were violated.
3 See State v. Allen, ante p. 627, 17 N.W.3d 794 (2025).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
318 Nebraska Reports
CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
The district court overruled Allen’s objection because it
found that both Czech’s motion and the order of prejudgment
attachment were “sent” to him. The court also concluded that
there was no violation of Allen’s due process rights because
the statute authorizing prejudgment attachment did not require
a hearing prior to the issuance of an order of prejudgment
attachment.
Allen subsequently moved to discharge attachment, claiming
“lack of service of process” and that Czech “lack[ed] standing”
to seek prejudgment attachment under Nebraska law.
Motion to Stay Proceedings, Jury Selection, Motion
for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum,
and Appeal in Case No. S-23-1037
A jury trial was held on December 19, 2023. Early that
day, Allen asked the court to stay the proceedings because he
had filed an appeal challenging the overruling of his pretrial
motions and his objection and motion to vacate the order of
prejudgment attachment, as well as the court’s failure to rule
on his motion to discharge attachment. Allen also argued that
evidence of his convictions was inadmissible because he had
“appeal[ed]” those convictions to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The district court declined to stay the proceedings. The court
checked the record and observed that no notice of appeal had
been filed with the clerk’s office. The court also opined that all
the orders issued to date had been interlocutory orders and not
final, appealable orders.
The court then stated that Allen’s motion to discharge
attachment was untimely. The court then moved forward with
jury selection.
During voir dire, one prospective juror identified himself
as a police dispatcher. When asked whether his work as a
police dispatcher would affect his ability to be a fair and
impartial juror, he said he “was on duty” the day Torres was
shot, and he questioned why Allen did not appear to be in
jail. He also said he was not sure he would be able to “set

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CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
aside” his prior knowledge and “make a decision” based on
the evidence presented in court. Upon the court’s motion, that
prospective juror was stricken for cause.
Another prospective juror said that he knew Torres and
that he felt like he “can be partial.” However, questioning by
the court revealed that the prospective juror had confused the
terms “partial” and “impartial.” The prospective juror then
agreed that his knowledge of Torres would be “set aside” and
would “not affect [his] decision.” Allen did not move to strike
that prospective juror, who was ultimately selected to serve
on the jury.
Later that day, the court said that while the morning session
of trial was ongoing, it had received several filings by Allen.
Among those filings were the notice of appeal in case No.
S-23-1037 and a motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifi-
candum. However, the court did not view the appeal as divest-
ing it of jurisdiction, and it proceeded with other matters.
Those matters included arguments on Allen’s motion for
writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Allen sought to have a
witness, who was imprisoned, be produced for trial or be able
to testify by video conferencing. Allen argued that the witness
was present when he shot Torres and could “shed some light”
on matters. Czech countered that the motion was untimely.
Czech also argued that the witness’ testimony would not be
relevant because all that remained to be determined at trial
was damages, and there was no indication the witness could
testify to that. The court overruled Allen’s motion.
Jury Verdict, Appeal in Case No. S-24-047, and
Consolidation With Case No. S-23-1037
The parties presented testimony and other evidence. At the
close of evidence, the matter was submitted to the jury. The jury
returned a verdict of $130,000 for Czech and against Allen.
Allen then filed the notice of appeal in case No. S-24-047.
The Nebraska Court of Appeals ordered both of Allen’s

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
appeals to be consolidated for briefing and further disposition,
and we moved the matter to our docket. 4
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In his brief on the consolidated appeals, Allen assigns,
restated and reordered, that the district court erred in (1) deny-
ing his motion for change of venue, (2) denying his motion
in limine to exclude evidence of his convictions, (3) granting
Czech’s motion for partial summary judgment, (4) denying
his objection and motion to vacate the order of prejudgment
attachment and his motion to discharge attachment, (5) deny-
ing his motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and
(6) denying his motion to stay proceedings, pending the appeal
in case No. S-23-1037.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law. 5
[2,3] Where the record does not show an abuse of discre-
tion, a ruling on a motion to transfer venue will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. 6 A judicial abuse of discretion exists when
the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable,
unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying
just results in matters submitted for disposition. 7
[4,5] An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all rea-
sonable inferences in that party’s favor. 8 An appellate court
will affirm a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the
pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
5 In re Hessler Living Trust, 316 Neb. 600, 5 N.W.3d 723 (2024).
6 Id.
7 State v. Haas, 317 Neb. 919, 12 N.W.3d 787 (2024).
8 Main St Properties v. City of Bellevue, ante p. 116, 13 N.W.3d 911 (2024).

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CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 9
[6] The grant or denial of a stay of proceedings is also
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 10
ANALYSIS
Lack of Jurisdiction Over Case No. S-23-1037,
But Not Over Case No. S-24-047
[7] We begin with the question of whether we have jurisdic-
tion over Allen’s appeals. Before reaching the legal issues pre-
sented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to deter-
mine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. 11
In determining whether we have jurisdiction, we look to
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1911 (Reissue 2016) and 25-1912 (Cum.
Supp. 2024). 12 Together, those statutes generally prescribe that
for an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the
party must be appealing from a judgment or decree rendered
or from a final order. 13
When Allen filed his appeal in case No. S-23-1037, no
judgment had yet been rendered against him in the wrong-
ful death suit. 14 Instead, Allen challenged the court orders
9 Id.
10 Great Plains Livestock v. Midwest Ins. Exch., 312 Neb. 367, 979 N.W.2d
113 (2022).
11 In re Estate of Weeder, ante p. 393, 16 N.W.3d 137 (2025).
12 See, e.g., D&M Roofing & Siding v. Distribution, Inc., 316 Neb. 952, 7
N.W.3d 868 (2024); Johnson v. Vosberg, 316 Neb. 658, 6 N.W.3d 216
(2024).
13 But see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 2016) (when more than
one claim for relief is presented in action, or when multiple parties are
involved, court may direct entry of final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of claims or parties under specified circumstances).
14 Cf. D&M Roofing & Siding, supra note 12 (“judgment” is court’s
final consideration and determination of parties’ respective rights and
obligations as they presently exist upon matters submitted to court and
must dispose of case fully and leave nothing for further determination,
except compliance with its terms).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
overruling his pretrial motions and his objection and motion
to vacate the order of prejudgment attachment. Allen also
challenged the court’s refusal to address his motion to dis-
charge attachment, which, for present purposes, we treat as
a denial of that motion. As a result, our jurisdiction over the
appeal in case No. S-23-1037 depends on whether the orders
from which Allen appeals constitute “final orders.” We find
that they do not.
[8] Final orders are defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902(1)
(Cum. Supp. 2024), which currently recognizes four categories
of final orders; some categories pertain to actions, and one per-
tains to special proceedings. 15 Those categories in § 25-1902(1)
include:
(a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action,
when such order in effect determines the action and pre-
vents a judgment;
(b) An order affecting a substantial right made during a
special proceeding;
(c) An order affecting a substantial right made on
summary application in an action after a judgment is
entered; and
(d) An order denying a motion for summary judgment
when such motion is based on the assertion of sovereign
immunity or the immunity of a government official.
The orders at issue in case No. S-23-1037 do not fall
within any of the aforementioned categories. They do not,
in effect, determine the action or prevent a judgment, per
§ 25-1902(1)(a). 16 Neither do they affect the subject matter of
the litigation in a special proceeding, such that a right cannot
be effectively vindicated in an appeal from a final judgment,
15 Johnson, supra note 12.
16 Cf. Wilson v. Shepherd, 15 Neb. 15, 16 N.W. 826 (1883) (order discharging
attachment is final order because attached property is released and plaintiff
may thereby be deprived of substantial right; however, where court
overrules motion, order is not final and is still subject to review by court
up to time of rendering final judgment).

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CZECH v. ALLEN
Cite as 318 Neb. 904
per § 25-1902(1)(b). 17 Nor were the orders made on a sum-
mary application after a judgment or on a motion for summary
judgment based on the assertion of sovereign immunity or the
immunity of a government official, per § 25-1902(1)(c) and
(d). As such, we lack jurisdiction over case No. S-23-1037.
Case No. S-24-047 is another matter. That appeal challenges,
in part, the same orders at issue in case No. S-23-1037. But in
case No. S-24-047, the jury returned a verdict of $130,000 for
Czech and against Allen. Allen then appealed, and the district
court entered judgment in favor of Czech. 18 Therefore, we have
jurisdiction over case No. S-24-047, and we turn to the merits
of the claims Allen raises in that appeal.
No Abuse of Discretion in Overruling
Allen’s Motion for Change of Venue
In his first assignment of error, Allen argues that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
change of venue. Allen points to pretrial publicity regarding
his prosecution for Torres’ murder and claims that the pre-
trial publicity made it “impossible” for a fair and impartial
jury to be impaneled in Lincoln County. 19 Allen also argues
that pretrial publicity “create[s] a presumption of prejudice,”
such that we disbelieve jurors’ claims that they can be fair
and impartial. 20 In addition, Allen points to statements by
two prospective jurors that he claims “taint[ed]” the jury or
otherwise “presented plain error.” 21 Czech counters that Allen
17 See, e.g., In re Hessler Living Trust, supra note 5.
18 See § 25-1912(2) (“[a] notice of appeal or docket fee filed or deposited
after the announcement of a decision or final order but before the entry of
the judgment, decree, or final order shall be treated as filed or deposited
after the entry of the judgment, decree, or final order and on the date of
entry”); In re Change of Name of Whilde, 298 Neb. 510, 904 N.W.2d 707
(2017).
19 Brief for appellant at 17.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 18.

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CZECH v. ALLEN
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failed to meet the burden of showing that pretrial publicity
made it impossible to secure a fair trial and an impartial jury
in Lincoln County.
[9] Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-410 (Cum. Supp. 2024),
any civil action may be transferred to the district court of any
county in the state “[f]or the convenience of the parties and
witnesses or in the interest of justice.” 22 We understand Allen’s
arguments to implicate the interest of justice. However, we
see nothing in the record on appeal to suggest that the dis-
trict court abused its discretion in denying Allen’s motion for
change of venue.
Both 	parties 	rely 	on 	criminal 	cases 	regarding 	what 	a
defendant must do to establish that local conditions and pre-
trial publicity make it impossible to secure a fair and impar-
tial jury, such that the trial court can be seen to have abused
its discretion in denying a motion for change of venue. 23
Assuming without deciding that the same standard applies in
a civil case, 24 we agree with Czech that Allen failed to meet
his burden here.
In his pretrial motion for change of venue, Allen alleged
that newspapers in North Platte, Nebraska, had published
“numerous” articles about the criminal charges against him in
Torres’ death. Allen also alleged that radio stations broadcasted
“many” reports about those charges and that the population
of North Platte was 25,000. However, as we have previously
explained, “mere jury exposure to news accounts of a crime
does not presumptively deprive a criminal defendant of due
22 See, e.g., Community First State Bank v. Olsen, 255 Neb. 617, 587 N.W.2d
364 (1998).
23 See, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961);
State v. Rodriguez, 272 Neb. 930, 726 N.W.2d 157 (2007). Cf., Bittner
v. Miller, 226 Neb. 206, 410 N.W.2d 478 (1987) (discussing motion for
change of venue in civil case); Regier v. Nebraska P. P. Dist., 189 Neb. 56,
199 N.W.2d 742 (1972) (same).
24 See, e.g., Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511 (10th Cir. 1998)
(comparing constitutional bases for right to impartial jury in civil cases
and in criminal cases).

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process.” 25 Instead, the defendant must show the existence of
“pervasive misleading pretrial publicity.” 26 We see no such
evidence here.
Allen did not provide any evidence regarding the substance
of the newspaper and radio coverage, 27 the pervasiveness
of the coverage, 28 or the degree to which prospective jurors
recalled that coverage, given that approximately 18 months
had passed between his criminal trial and his motion for
change of venue. 29 All that Allen offered at the hearing on his
motion for change of venue was a vague argument that
[c]hange of venue might be appropriate in this matter
because of any rumors or . . . false speakings that’s been
had since . . . the start of all this.
It’s a small town, everybody knows pretty much every-
body around there, and I think that it would be . . . better
tried somewhere where people are less knowledgeable
about the case.
. . . .
. . . [T]here’s a lot of influence of the . . . family there,
of [Torres] and . . . friendships with them, and I thought
moving . . . the trial to somewhere further away would be
more fair.
25 Rodriguez, supra note 23, 272 Neb. at 940, 726 N.W.2d at 169.
26 Id.
27 Cf. Irvin, supra note 23, 366 U.S. at 725 (defendant attached 46 exhibits
to his motion for change of venue, illustrating “barrage of newspaper
headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures . . . unleashed” against him).
28 Cf. id. (defendant’s motion for change of venue alleged that newspapers
in which stories appeared were “delivered regularly” to 95 percent
of dwellings in county and that similar stories appeared on radio and
television stations that were equally pervasive in county).
29 See, e.g., id. (defendant complaining of publicity 6 to 7 months prior to
trial); Rodriguez, supra note 23 (length of time between dissemination of
publicity complained of and date of trial is one factor that trial court must
consider in determining whether defendant met burden of showing that
pretrial publicity made it impossible to secure fair trial and impartial jury).

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On appeal, Allen does not point to any evidence of pre-
trial publicity, except perhaps statements by two prospective
jurors indicating that they might not be able to be impartial.
However, we do not view those statements to reflect pretrial
publicity. Instead, one statement reflected prior knowledge of
the shooting obtained from the prospective juror’s work as a
police dispatcher. That prospective juror was stricken for cause
on the court’s motion. The other statement reflected the juror’s
personal knowledge of Torres. Moreover, once the court clari-
fied the meanings of the terms “impartial” and “partial,” that
juror agreed his personal knowledge of Torres would be “set
aside” and would “not affect [his] decision.” We also observe
that Allen’s sole motion for change of venue had been over-
ruled before the statements were made and that Allen did not
subsequently file another motion for change of venue. 30
In sum, Allen’s failure to produce any evidence of the
alleged pretrial publicity, rumors, or “false speakings” is
fatal to his claim that a fair and impartial jury could not be
impaneled in Lincoln County. It is also fatal to his claim that
under Irvin v. Dowd, 31 we should presume prejudice on the
part of all the prospective or impaneled jurors in his case who
said they could be fair and impartial. It is true that in Irvin,
the U.S. Supreme Court found that the defendant had been
denied a fair trial by an impartial jury, even though each of
the prospective jurors whom the presiding judge personally
examined after the defendant ran out of peremptory chal-
lenges said “he could render an impartial verdict.” 32 However,
the defendant in Irvin produced evidence of the nature and
30 Cf. Irvin, supra note 23 (after defendant’s second motion for change of
venue was overruled, defendant filed two additional motions for change
of venue during jury selection). See, also, Lefferts v. Bell, 57 Neb. 248,
77 N.W. 680 (1898) (court’s own motion cannot transfer case for trial to
another county).
31 Irvin, supra note 23.
32 Id., 366 U.S. at 724.

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extent of the pretrial publicity regarding him. 33 Allen did not,
as explained above.
As to Allen’s argument that the statement by the prospec-
tive juror who was a police dispatcher “taint[ed]” the jury, 34
we disagree. Even if the statement was seen to pertain to
Allen’s culpability in the civil case, the sole issue before
the jury in this matter was damages. The question of Allen’s
liability for Torres’ death had already been decided in Czech’s
favor on her motion for partial summary judgment. Otherwise,
the prospective juror said only that he was not sure he would
be able to “set aside” the knowledge he had acquired from
his work as a police dispatcher and “make a decision based
on what’s presented here in court.” The jury selection process
is intended to elicit precisely this information. 35 As such, a
prospective juror’s statement that he or she is unsure he or she
could set aside his or her personal knowledge and be impartial
cannot, without more, be seen to taint the other jurors.
[10] There was also no plain error “presented” by this
statement, 36 or by the statement of the juror who confused the
terms “partial” and “impartial.” Plain error may be found on
appeal when an error unasserted or uncomplained of at trial,
but plainly evident from the record, prejudicially affects a
litigant’s substantial right and, if uncorrected, would result in
damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial
process. 37 However, we see nothing in the statements here
33 See Irvin, supra note 23 (attaching of 46 exhibits by defendant to motion
for change of venue).
34 Brief for appellant at 18.
35 See, e.g., Davis v. McBride, 221 W. Va. 240, 245, 654 S.E.2d 364, 369
(2007) (“[t]he primary goal of the jury selection process is to obtain a
jury that will fairly and impartially decide the case at hand”); State v.
Fullwood, 343 N.C. 725, 732, 472 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1996) (“‘[t]he primary
goal of the jury selection process is to ensure selection of a jury comprised
only of persons who will render a fair and impartial verdict’”).
36 Brief for appellant at 18.
37 State v. Horne, 315 Neb. 766, 1 N.W.3d 457 (2024).

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that prejudicially affected Allen’s substantial rights or that
resulted in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of
the judicial process.
Allen Failed to Preserve Claim Regarding
Overruling of Motion in Limine
In his second assignment of error, Allen argues that the dis-
trict court erred in overruling his motion in limine to exclude
evidence of his criminal convictions. Allen argues that this
evidence was inadmissible under § 27-609(5) because the time
for him to seek certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court had not
yet expired. Allen also argues that the evidence should have
been excluded under § 27-403 because it was unfairly prejudi-
cial to him. Czech, in turn, argues primarily that Allen failed
to preserve this claim for appellate review.
[11] As we have stated, a motion in limine is a procedural
step to prevent prejudicial evidence from reaching the jury. 38 It
is not the office of a motion in limine to obtain a final ruling
upon the ultimate admissibility of the evidence. 39 Therefore,
when a court overrules a motion in limine to exclude par-
ticular evidence, the movant must object when the particular
evidence is offered at trial in order to predicate error before
an appellate court. 40 We also note that while the foregoing
propositions expressly refer to “the jury” and “trial,” they have
previously been applied to hearings on motions for summary
judgment when an issue is resolved there, and not at trial. 41
Based on the record before us, we agree with Czech that
Allen failed to preserve his claim regarding the overruling of
his motion in limine. In this case, Allen’s liability for Torres’
38 State v. Clark, 315 Neb. 736, 1 N.W.3d 487 (2024).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Molt v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 248 Neb. 81, 532 N.W.2d 11 (1995)
(plaintiff who did not object when evidence was offered at summary
judgment hearing failed to preserve his objection to evidence and waived
any complaint about it on appeal).

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death was determined on Czech’s motion for partial summary
judgment. Among the evidence that Czech offered in support
of that motion was an exhibit showing Allen’s convictions.
Allen apparently did not file an objection to that exhibit.
(We say “apparently” because the record on appeal does not
include the exhibit with Allen’s written response to Czech’s
motion for partial summary judgment.) However, the record
does contain an order from the district court stating that Allen
did not file an objection to Czech’s exhibit showing his con-
victions. Insofar as Allen may wish to contest that statement
by the district court, he failed to present a record that would
support such a claim. 42
In finding that Allen failed to preserve this assignment of
error, we are cognizant that at various points during the pro-
ceedings below, Allen argued that his convictions were not
final because of purported appeals. However, we view the term
“objection” to be a term of art, denoting a “formal statement”
opposing, as relevant here, the offer of an item of evidence
and “seeking the judge’s immediate ruling on the point.” 43
As such, we decline to view Allen’s recurring argument that
his convictions were not final as an “objection” in the sense
described above.
Allen’s Claim Regarding Grant of Partial Summary
Judgment to Czech Is Without Merit
Allen’s 	third 	assignment 	of 	error 	concerns 	the 	district
court’s grant of partial summary judgment in Czech’s favor
on the question of liability for Torres’ death. Allen argues that
summary judgment was not proper because there was a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether his convictions were
42 See, e.g., State v. Lara, 315 Neb. 856, 2 N.W.3d 1 (2024) (absent record
supporting errors assigned by appellant, appellate court will affirm lower
court’s decision regarding those errors), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 144 S.
Ct. 2608, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1256.
43 Black’s Law Dictionary 1241 (10th ed. 2014). See, also, 2 Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia 2390-91 (8th ed. 1914).

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final. Allen also claims that the district court plainly erred in
granting Czech’s motion for partial summary judgment. Czech
takes a different view. Czech argues that the question to which
Allen points is a question of law, and not a genuine issue of
material fact. Czech also argues that Allen’s convictions were
final because that had been affirmed on direct appeal.
[12] Even assuming that Allen is correct and that evidence
of his convictions should not have been considered at the hear-
ing on Czech’s motion for partial summary judgment, we must
affirm the order of the district court here. We do so because
the record on appeal is insufficient to determine whether it
was error for the district court to grant Czech’s motion for
partial summary judgment. “‘Affidavits, depositions, and other
evidence considered at a hearing on a motion for summary
judgment must be preserved in a bill of exceptions filed in the
court before an order on such a motion may be reviewed.’” 44
Where such materials are lacking, it is “presumed that the
order of the trial court was supported by the evidence and
was correct.” 45
For example, in Keystone Ranch Co. v. Central Neb. Pub.
Power & Irr. Dist., 46 we found that the parties’ assignments of
error relating to the motions for summary judgment were with-
out merit because the requisite materials were not preserved
in the record on appeal. In particular, we noted that there was
“no bill of exceptions concerning the evidence which may
have been offered at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment.” 47 Given the absence of those materials, we con-
cluded that “there is nothing to review” and that we “cannot
determine whether error occurred.” 48
44 Shuck v. Jacob, 250 Neb. 126, 131, 548 N.W.2d 332, 336 (1996).
45 Keystone Ranch Co. v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 237 Neb.
188, 192, 465 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1991).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 191, 465 N.W.2d at 475.
48 Id.

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We took a similar view of the record on appeal in Shuck
v. Jacob, 49 although we disagreed with the Court of Appeals’
holding that the defendant’s original and supplemental praeci-
pes in that case were not specific enough to impose an obliga-
tion on the court reporter to create a record of the summary
judgment proceedings. We reasoned that while it is incumbent
upon the party appealing to present a record which supports
the errors assigned, once the appellant has made an adequate
request, the preparation of the bill of exceptions becomes
an internal court matter and it is the duty of the reporter to
properly fulfill the request. 50 In that case, the defendant’s
request for a praecipe included “‘[a]ll exhibits entered into
evidence.’” 51 As such, we concluded that the omission should
be charged to the reporter and not the defendant.
In the present case, as in Keystone Ranch Co. and Shuck,
the record does not contain all the affidavits, depositions,
and other evidence considered at the hearing on the motion
for partial summary judgment. Specifically, the record lacks
exhibit 6, which contained Allen’s letter and affidavit in
opposition to Czech’s motion for partial summary judgment.
Moreover, unlike in Shuck, the record before us in case No.
24-047 lacks Allen’s praecipes, precluding us from concluding
that the omission of exhibit 6 is to be attributed to the reporter,
and not to Allen.
[13] It is incumbent on the party appealing to present a
record that supports the errors assigned; absent such a record,
as a general rule, the decision of the lower court as to those
errors will be affirmed. 52 Allen failed to meet his burden here.
We thus presume that the order of the trial court granting
49 Shuck, supra note 44.
50 See id.
51 Id. at 132, 548 N.W.2d at 337.
52 JCB Enters. v. Nebraska Liq. Cont. Comm., 275 Neb. 797, 749 N.W.2d
873 (2008).

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partial summary judgment to Czech was supported by the evi-
dence and was correct.
Allen’s Claims Regarding Order of
Prejudgment Attachment Are Moot
Allen’s fourth assignment of error concerns the overruling of
his objection and motions challenging the order of prejudgment
attachment. Allen argues that the district court’s rulings here
abridged his due process and statutory rights and that Czech
was not entitled to prejudgment attachment under Nebraska
law. Czech disagrees and argues that the issue of the order of
prejudgment attachment is moot, given the subsequent jury
verdict of $130,000 in favor of her and against Allen.
[14-16] Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing
of a suit that eradicate the requisite personal interest in the
dispute’s resolution that existed at the beginning of the litiga-
tion. 53 The central question in a mootness analysis is whether
changes in circumstances have forestalled any occasion for
meaningful relief. 54 Although mootness does not prevent appel-
late jurisdiction, it is a justiciability doctrine that can prevent
courts from exercising jurisdiction. 55
Recently, in an unpublished portion of its opinion in Keading
v. Keading, 56 a California appellate court declined to consider
the defendant’s arguments challenging a prejudgment writ of
attachment because it found those issues to be moot in light
of the subsequent judgment in the case. The court began by
noting that “[a]ttachment is an ancillary or provisional rem-
edy to aid in the collection of a money demand by seizure of
property in advance of trial and judgment.” 57 The court then
reasoned that even if the defendant was correct in his claims
53 City of Hastings v. Sheets, 317 Neb. 88, 8 N.W.3d 771 (2024).
54 Id.
55 Chaney v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 512, 949 N.W.2d 761 (2020).
56 Keading v. Keading, 60 Cal. App. 5th 1115, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338 (2021).
57 Id. at 1130, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 349 (unpublished portion) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

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that the writ should not have been issued ex parte and that he
had no legal or equitable interest in the property for which the
writ was issued, the court could not provide him meaningful
relief because of the subsequent judgment against him. 58 The
court explained that “the challenged prejudgment attachment
order has now been superseded by the amended judgment in
the case.” 59 As such, the court concluded that the appeal of that
order is moot. 60 Other courts have taken a similar view. 61
We agree with the reasoning of those courts. An order of
prejudgment attachment is a “‘provisional remedy’ that aims
only to protect the property until final disposition of the
case.” 62 Once there is a final disposition, it is that disposition,
and not the order of prejudgment attachment, that is control-
ling. 63 In this case, a judgment has now been entered in favor
of Czech and against Allen, and Allen does not assign any
error on appeal as to that judgment. As such, even if we were
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., Lakeshore House Limited Partnership v. Bank of the West,
No. 75501, 2019 WL 1875608 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished disposition)
(appellants’ argument that prejudgment writ of attachment was improv-
idently issued is moot in light of final judgment); New Hartford v. CT
Resources Recovery Auth., 291 Conn. 502, 506, 970 A.2d 578, 581
(2009) (defendant’s claim that trial court improperly granted plaintiff
prejudgment attachment is moot because that order “expired upon issuance
of the judgment”); Cull v. Vadnais, 122 R.I. 249, 252, 406 A.2d 1241,
1242 (1979) (questions regarding whether order granting prejudgment
attachment of real property is properly appealable and whether property
held as tenancy by entirety is exempt from prejudgment attachment “have
become moot as a result of the [trial court’s] disposition of this case on its
merits”).
62 Blackmore v. L & D Development, Inc., 274 P.3d 316, 317 (Utah 2012).
63 Cf. Mo Dept of Health & Sr Services v. Dickson, 530 S.W.3d 516, 521
(Mo. App. 2017) (“‘[t]emporary orders, which by their nature expire and
are superseded by a subsequent judgment on the merits, generally are not
subject to review, either by interlocutory appeal or couched in an appeal of
the final judgment’”).

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to agree with Allen that the order of prejudgment attachment
in this case was improperly granted and should have been
vacated, our doing so would not provide him any meaningful
relief in the present appeal because it would not change his
obligations under the judgment.
We are aware that Allen also raised issues with the order
of prejudgment attachment in conjunction with his appeal of
the partial denial of his motion for return of seized property
in State v. Allen. 64 However, Allen does not renew those argu-
ments here, and in that case, the district court did not rely on
the order of prejudgment attachment in declining to return
any property. 65
No Error or Abuse of Discretion in Denying Motion
for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum
Allen’s fifth assignment of error concerns the denial of his
motion to have a witness, who was imprisoned, be produced
at trial or be able to testify by video conferencing. On appeal,
Allen argues that this witness was present when he shot Torres
and had “direct knowledge” of matters at issue, including “any
pain [Torres] may have suffered.” 66 As such, Allen argues that
the “exclusion” of the witness’ testimony “substantially preju-
diced” him and deprived him of his right to fundamentally fair
judicial proceedings. 67
Czech, on the other hand, points to Allen’s statement at
trial that the only testimony he anticipated from the witness
was that she and Allen were “chased and cornered” by Torres
and that Allen “didn’t provoke anybody with violence.” Based
on that statement, Czech argues that the witness’ testimony
was not relevant to the question of damages, which was all
that remained to be determined at trial.
64 See Allen, supra note 3.
65 See id.
66 Brief for appellant at 11, 16.
67 Id. at 16.

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Czech is correct that neither Allen’s motion for writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum, nor his arguments at trial,
contemplated the witness’ testifying about Torres’ pain and
suffering. However, even if we were to view the witness’
testimony as relevant to that question, the district court still
cannot be seen to have erred or abused its discretion in deny-
ing Allen’s motion because that motion was not filed until
after the trial had started. As such, we agree with the district
court that Allen’s motion was untimely, a factor that courts in
other jurisdictions have noted when affirming the denial of a
motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 68 As one
court explained, “[I]f the right to the writ for the production
of a jailed witness were absolute in the sense that the writ
must be issued and executed whenever demand is made, it
would be within the power of [the defendant] to compel a
continuance by making a late demand.” 69
In the hearing on his motion, Allen did argue that he had
only recently learned the witness’ address within the Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services system. However, Allen
also said that he knew the witness’ location prior to that.
According to Allen, the witness was previously in jail in
Lincoln County and he “didn’t have a way of contacting her
there.” However, insofar as Allen knew the witness’ location
at an earlier date, he could have filed a motion for writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum at that time.
District Court Was Not Divested of Jurisdiction
by Appeal in Case No. S-23-1307
Allen’s final assignment of error concerns the denial of his
motion to stay proceedings, pending his appeal in case No.
S-23-1037. Allen argues that the district court erred in deny-
ing his motion to stay proceedings because he had filed an
appeal, and “[g]enerally, a trial court loses jurisdiction once
68 See, e.g., Neufield v. United States, 118 F.2d 375 (1941); Armstrong v.
Randle, 881 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. App. 1994); Ross v. Com., 577 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.
App. 1977).
69 Neufield, supra note 68, 118 F.2d at 385.

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a party appeals.” 70 Czech, in contrast, argues primarily that
no appeal had yet been filed when Allen’s motion to stay pro-
ceedings was overruled.
[17] Although Czech is correct that no appeal had been
filed when the district court overruled Allen’s motion to stay
proceedings, the appeal in case No. S-23-1037 was filed later
that same day. However, even after that appeal was filed,
the district court was not “divested” of jurisdiction, as Allen
argues. 71 That is because notwithstanding the language from
our prior opinions quoted by Allen, with the exception of
limited acts of continuing jurisdiction not applicable here, an
appeal must have been perfected for the trial court to lose its
jurisdiction. 72 And an appeal is not perfected and an appellate
court acquires no jurisdiction unless the appellant has satis-
fied the statutory requirements for appellate jurisdiction by
appealing from a final order or a judgment. 73
Here, for the reasons set forth above, the appeal in case No.
S-23-1037 was not from a final order or a judgment or decree
rendered. Therefore, the district court did not lose its jurisdic-
tion as a result of that appeal, and it cannot be said to have
erred or abused its discretion in denying Allen’s motion to stay
proceedings based on its purported lack of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Because 	the 	orders 	that Allen 	challenges 	in 	case 	No.
S-23-1037 are not final orders, that case is dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Finding no merit to Allen’s arguments in case
No. S-24-047, we affirm the orders of the district court.
Appeal in No. S-23-1037 dismissed.
Judgment in No. S-24-047 affirmed.
Miller-Lerman, J., participating on briefs.
70 Brief for appellant at 12 (citing Brozek v. Brozek, 292 Neb. 681, 874
N.W.2d 17 (2016)).
71 Brief for appellant at 12.
72 See Dugan v. State, 297 Neb. 444, 900 N.W.2d 528 (2017).
73 Id.