State v. Langley

- 67 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
William B. Langley, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed May 30, 2025. 	No. S-23-1039.
1. Motions to Suppress: Trial: Pretrial Procedure: Appeal and Error.
When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and again during trial on
renewed objection, an appellate court considers all the evidence, both
from the trial and from the hearings on the motion to suppress.
2. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress:
Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
press evidence based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,
an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding
historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for
clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment
protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews indepen-
dently of the trial court’s determination.
3. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. The Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
4. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Words and Phrases. A
search under the Fourth Amendment occurs whenever an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.
5. Search and Seizure. A seizure of property occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property.
6. Search and Seizure: Evidence: Police Officers and Sheriffs. The
exclusionary rule is implicated when the evidence to which the objec-
tion is made has been obtained through exploitation of the illegal
actions of the police, not simply because the evidence would not have
come to light but for the police’s illegal actions.
7. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Police Officers and Sheriffs.
It does not violate the Fourth Amendment for a law enforcement officer
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/14/2026 08:02 AM CDT

- 68 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
to accept and use evidence that a private party discovers pursuant to the
party’s own private search.
8. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. The constitutional protec-
tion against an unreasonable search and seizure proscribes only gov-
ernmental action and is inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent
of the government or with the participation and knowledge of a govern-
mental official.
9. Search and Seizure. To determine whether a private person’s search
is actually a search by the state depends on whether the private person
must be regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of the state.
10. Agents: Evidence: Proof. A defendant bears the burden of proving by
the greater weight of the evidence that a private party acted as a govern-
ment agent.
11. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. The determination of whether
a citizen’s search was private, which would not be barred by the Fourth
Amendment, or whether it instead was conducted by an instrument or
agent of the government, is a question of fact.
12. Search and Seizure: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts review a trial
court’s ruling on whether a search was private like any other factual
finding.
13. Agents. Whether a private party was acting as an agent of the govern-
ment turns on the degree of the government’s participation in the private
party’s activities, a question that can only be resolved in light of all the
circumstances.
14. Search and Seizure: Agents. A private person’s status as a state or gov-
ernment agent in a search is not restricted to a search ordered, requested,
or initiated by the state or government official but may include a search
which is a joint endeavor between a private person and a state or gov-
ernment official.
15. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. A search is subject to the
constitutional safeguard against an unreasonable search, prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of
the Nebraska Constitution, if the search is a joint endeavor involving a
private person and a state or government official.
16. Search and Seizure. There must be a great deal of entanglement
between the conduct of a private individual and the police before a
search in which they cooperate can be considered state action.
17. Constitutional Law: Agents. A private citizen’s desire to assist law
enforcement does not by itself convert that citizen into a government
agent for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis.

- 69 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
18. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Police Officers and
Sheriffs. A private party who has conducted a search and seizure does
not become an agent of the government for purposes of the constitu-
tional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure merely by
turning over to the police the property seized.
19. Search and Seizure. Once a private search has been completed, subse-
quent involvement of government agents does not transform the original
intrusion into a governmental search.
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Riedmann, Chief Judge, and Moore and Welch, Judges, on
appeal thereto from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County,
Leo P. Dobrovolny, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Jessica R. Meyers and Helen O. Winston, of Scotts Bluff
County Public Defender’s Office, for appellant.
Michael 	T. 	Hilgers, Attorney 	General, 	and 	Melissa 	R.
Vincent for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Miller-Lerman, 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik,
Freudenberg, and Bergevin, JJ.
Freudenberg, J.
INTRODUCTION
We granted further review of the Nebraska Court of Appeals’
decision affirming the defendant’s conviction for possession of
a firearm by a prohibited person. He was sentenced to a term
of 3 to 3 years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeals found
no merit to his sole assignment of error, which was that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a hand-
gun located in his residence, a trailer house. The defendant’s
girlfriend’s mother had given a law enforcement officer a
locked case containing the handgun when the officer stopped
at the defendant’s house after noticing it was occupied. The
house had been left empty and locked following the defend-
ant’s arrest. The case was not opened until law enforcement

- 70 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
obtained a warrant. We hold that the Fourth Amendment was
not violated because the search that discovered the case was
conducted by private citizens who were not acting as govern-
ment agents.
BACKGROUND
William B. Langley was charged with two counts of a
prohibited person in possession of firearm—one count for a
handgun and the other count for a rifle. Following a jury trial,
Langley was found guilty of the handgun count and acquitted
of the rifle count.
A search of Langley’s residence was conducted by his
probation officer after the probation officer suspected that
Langley was intoxicated. Consuming alcohol was in violation
of one of Langley’s conditions of probation. The probation
officer informed Langley he was initiating a search to dispose
of any alcohol that might still be in the home. Langley’s pro-
bation orders also prohibited him from possessing or having
access to firearms and contained a “search and seizure clause.”
The probation officer found alcohol. The probation officer
also found a loaded rifle in Langley’s son’s room, along with
some BB guns. Langley denied knowledge of the rifle. At the
time of the search, the son was 17 years old and was at school.
Eventually, the probation officer found an empty handgun
box in Langley’s bedroom dresser. Langley gave multiple,
different stories about where the handgun was located. When
Langley told the probation officer that his son had the hand-
gun, the probation officer told Langley that his son was not old
enough to have a gun.
The probation officer messaged Robert Hackett, who was
both a sergeant with the sheriff’s office and the chief of police.
When Hackett confirmed that Langley was a felon, Hackett
dispatched officers to Langley’s home to assist in the search.
The officers were unable to find a handgun. The house was
then locked, and Langley was arrested.
Later that evening, Langley’s girlfriend and the girlfriend’s
mother were at the home with Langley’s son, collecting the

- 71 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
son’s belongings so that he could stay with the girlfriend and
her mother while Langley was in jail. The son testified that
he, Langley’s girlfriend, and the girlfriend’s mother were also
searching for the handgun. The son explained that the girl-
friend and her mother had told him he might be charged with
minor in possession of a firearm if they could not find the
handgun; however, there was no further questioning as to why
the girlfriend and her mother may have held this belief.
The probation officer testified he had contacted the son to
let him know that Langley was in jail and that the son was
“going to be cared for.” The probation officer described the son
as “a really good kid.”
The probation officer testified that in that same telephone
call, he also spoke with the girlfriend’s mother. The probation
officer was familiar with the mother, who had experience run-
ning rehabilitation programs for incarcerated individuals and
had previously communicated with the probation officer con-
cerns about Langley’s behavior while on probation. Langley’s
girlfriend and her mother lived near Langley’s home, and both
functioned as part of the son’s family. The probation officer
confirmed with the girlfriend’s mother that the son had a place
to stay. Also, the probation officer brought up the concern that
a handgun might be in the home. During that conversation, the
mother provided the probation officer with information about
a case and the possible location of the handgun.
The probation officer testified that he spoke with Hackett
around the same time. Hackett, who took possession of the
locked case that later was discovered to contain the handgun,
testified at trial and the pretrial hearing. A video from the body
camera Hackett was wearing when he stopped at the home was
entered into evidence. Langley did not object to Hackett’s tes-
timony or the video evidence.
Hackett testified that the probation officer told Hackett that
he had concerns about a handgun’s still being in the home
and about the son’s placement. The probation officer informed
Hackett that the girlfriend was going to be taking care of the

- 72 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
son. The probation officer also informed Hackett that the girl-
friend and the son had possibly located the handgun. After
being so informed, Hackett drove by Langley’s home and
noticed there was a vehicle parked outside.
Hackett stopped at the trailer house and knocked. Hackett
heard someone from inside tell him he could come in. That
person was later identified as Langley’s girlfriend. Neither
the mother nor the girlfriend lived with Langley, and Hackett
was aware of that fact. Hackett also knew that the son was a
minor. As Hackett stepped inside, the son emerged from the
back of the residence and greeted him. The son did not ask
Hackett to leave or otherwise object to his presence. They
discussed the son’s plans to join the military after graduating
from high school.
Hackett said to the son, “[The probation officer] called you.
We’re worried about a gun.” Hackett testified at trial that he
was concerned about the son’s possibly being around a fire-
arm, as well as the small community’s learning that there was
a vacant house with a firearm inside. The girlfriend’s mother
immediately led Hackett into the living room and handed him
a locked silver case that was sitting in plain view. The mother
told Hackett that the son had last seen the handgun inside the
case. The son told Hackett, “I’m fairly confident the gun’s
in there.”
The son and the girlfriend subsequently continued to search
around the house for anywhere else the gun might be. Hackett
observed, looking at areas opened by the son, but nothing more
was found.
Over the telephone, the probation officer gave Hackett per-
mission to seize and open the locked silver case. Hackett took
the case and placed it into evidence at the sheriff’s office.
The following day, Hackett obtained a search warrant to
open the case. The search warrant to open the case was
not challenged by Langley at trial and is not challenged on
appeal. Hackett testified that upon opening the case pursu-
ant to the warrant, he discovered it contained a handgun and

- 73 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
ammunition. The make and model of the handgun matched
those of the empty box found in Langley’s dresser.
Langley had moved before trial to suppress all fruits of
an alleged search by Hackett of Langley’s home without a
warrant, which he alleged violated his constitutional protec-
tion against unreasonable seizures under the 4th and 14th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I §§ 1, 3,
and 7 of the Nebraska Constitution. The district court denied
Langley’s motion to suppress the handgun. First, the district
court found that Hackett was granted entry by the girlfriend,
who had apparent authority to admit him. The district court
did not make any findings with respect to whether the son was
of sufficient age and maturity to consent to entry, or whether
he did so. Second, the district court found that Hackett did
not conduct a search. Rather, after Hackett “simply [made] a
general inquiry about the handgun,” Hackett was handed the
locked case, which had been discovered by a private indi-
vidual. The court said Hackett “did nothing other than come
in the door after being invited to do so, and ask about a hand-
gun.” The district court concluded that there was not a search
by law enforcement, so the Fourth Amendment was not impli-
cated when the locked case was taken into law enforcement’s
possession. At trial, Langley renewed the motion to suppress
by objecting to the admission of the handgun.
Langley appealed to the Court of Appeals. On appeal,
Langley argued that the handgun should have been suppressed
because Hackett violated Langley’s Fourth Amendment rights
by entering his home without authorized consent or a war-
rant. Langley asserted the girlfriend did not have apparent
authority to let Hackett into the house and Hackett did not
obtain permission from the son to enter the house; instead, the
son, a minor, merely acquiesced to Hackett’s claim of lawful
authority. Langley said that the locked silver case was not in
plain view until “the unauthorized trek into the living room
occurred” and that Hackett’s “wandering through the home”

- 74 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
was a search. 1 Langley concluded that because Hackett “did
not have permission to be in the house nor in the living room,
and [the girlfriend] did not have the authority to let him in,
[the locked silver case] and all evidence stemming from the
seizure of the silver case ought to be suppressed.” 2
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 3 It agreed
with the district court that Hackett entered the residence with
consent; however, it focused on the son, rather than the girl-
friend. The Court of Appeals found the record established that
the son had common authority over the premises. Applying
State v. Butzke 4 and analyzing the specific facts of the case, the
Court of Appeals found that the son was of an age and maturity
to voluntarily grant consent for Hackett to enter the residence.
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the district court that
the recovery of the locked silver case was not the result of a
search by Hackett.
The Court of Appeals alternatively found that any error
in overruling the motion to suppress was harmless, because
Langley did not object to either Hackett’s or the probation
officer’s testimony at trial describing the recovery of the hand-
gun. Furthermore, Langley did not object to the body camera
footage that included a custodial statement by Langley that his
DNA would probably be on the gun.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Langley assigns that the district court erred in
concluding no search occurred, which resulted in the over-
ruling of his motion to suppress. On further review, Langley
assigns that the Court of Appeals erred by finding that the
handgun seized was not the fruit of an illegal search.
1 Brief for appellant at 13.
2 Id. at 11.
3 State v. Langley, 33 Neb. App. 297, 15 N.W.3d 722 (2024).
4 State v. Butzke, 7 Neb. App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449 (1998), disapproved on
other grounds, State v. Hammond, 315 Neb. 362, 996 N.W.2d 270 (2023).

- 75 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and again
during trial on renewed objection, an appellate court considers
all the evidence, both from the trial and from the hearings on
the motion to suppress. 5
[2] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-
press evidence based on a claimed violation of the Fourth
Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of
review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews
the trial court’s findings for clear error, but whether those
facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a
question of law that an appellate court reviews independently
of the trial court’s determination. 6
ANALYSIS
Langley argues that the exclusionary rule applies to the
handgun admitted at trial, because there was no warrant for
Hackett to enter the home and the State did not sustain its bur-
den to prove one of the few specifically established exceptions
to the warrant requirements. Langley’s argument misses the
mark. The State did not have the burden to show an exception
to the warrant requirement because the handgun was found in
a private search and not through governmental action.
[3-5] The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution prohibit unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. 7 A search under the Fourth
Amendment occurs whenever an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. 8 A
seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful
5 State v. Hammond, supra note 4.
6 Id.
7 State v. Rush, 317 Neb. 622, 11 N.W.3d 394 (2024), modified on denial of
rehearing 317 Neb. 917, 12 N.W.3d 787.
8 Id.

- 76 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that
property. 9
[6-8] The exclusionary rule is implicated when the evidence
to which the objection is made has been obtained through
exploitation of the illegal actions of the police, not simply
because the evidence would not have come to light but for
the police’s illegal actions. 10 The U.S. Supreme Court has
long held that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment for
a law enforcement officer to accept and use evidence that a
private party discovers pursuant to the party’s own private
search. 11 The constitutional protection against an unreasonable
search and seizure proscribes only governmental action and
is inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable
one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of
the government or with the participation and knowledge of a
governmental official. 12 In Burdeau v. McDowell, 13 the U.S.
Supreme Court said that the origin and history of the Fourth
Amendment
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agen-
cies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the
9 See State v. Nolt, 298 Neb. 910, 906 N.W.2d 309 (2018). See, also, United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984).
10 See, United States v. Jacobsen, supra note 9; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). See, also, In re
Interest of Ashley W., 284 Neb. 424, 821 N.W.2d 706 (2012).
11 See, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed.
2d 564 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L.
Ed. 1048 (1921).
12 See, State v. Dixon, 237 Neb. 630, 467 N.W.2d 397 (1991); State v. Ware,
219 Neb. 594, 365 N.W.2d 418 (1985); State v. Skonberg, 194 Neb. 550,
233 N.W.2d 919 (1975); State v. Gundlach, 192 Neb. 692, 224 N.W.2d
167 (1974); State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 274, 167 N.W.2d 80 (1969). See,
also, United States v. Jacobsen, supra note 9; Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 100 S. Ct. 2395, 65 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1980).
13 Burdeau v. McDowell, supra note 11, 256 U.S. at 475.

- 77 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the posses-
sion of his property, subject to the right of seizure by
process duly issued.
[9] We held in State v. Gundlach 14 that “[u]nless a private
citizen in making a search is acting as an agent for the police,
his acts may not be attributed to them.” To determine whether
a private person’s search is actually a search by the state
depends on whether the private person “‘must be regarded as
having acted as an “instrument” or agent of the state.’” 15
[10-12] A defendant bears the burden of proving by the
greater weight of the evidence that a private party acted as a
government agent. 16 The determination of whether a citizen’s
search was private, which would not be barred by the Fourth
Amendment, or whether it instead was conducted by an instru-
ment or agent of the government, is a question of fact. 17 Thus,
we review the trial court’s ruling on whether a search was
private like any other factual finding. 18
[13] Whether the private party was acting as an agent of
the government “turns on the degree of the Government’s
participation in the private party’s activities, . . . a question
that can only be resolved ‘in light of all the circumstances.’” 19
14 State v. Gundlach, supra note 12, 192 Neb. at 695, 224 N.W.2d at 170.
15 State v. Abdouch, 230 Neb. 929, 937, 434 N.W.2d 317, 323 (1989),
quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra note 11.
16 See, e.g., U.S. v. Kramer, 75 F.4th 339 (3d Cir. 2023); U.S. v. Ellyson, 326
F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Highbull, 894 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 2018);
U.S. v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1997).
17 See, U.S. v. Leffall, 82 F.3d 343 (10th Cir. 1996); State v. Brockman, 339
S.C. 57, 528 S.E.2d 661 (2000), modified, State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625,
879 S.E.2d 762 (2022).
18 See id. See, also, U.S. v. Hudson, 86 F.4th 806 (7th Cir. 2023); U.S.
v. Johnson, 505 Fed. Appx. 606 (8th Cir. 2013); State v. Buswell, 460
N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990).
19 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 614, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989). See, also, e.g., U.S. v. Highbull, supra
note 16.

- 78 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
In evaluating agency in the Fourth Amendment context, the
Eighth Circuit focuses on three relevant factors: “‘[1] whether
the government had knowledge of and acquiesced in the intru-
sive conduct; [2] whether the citizen intended to assist law
enforcement or instead acted to further his own purposes; and
[3] whether the citizen acted at the government’s request.’” 20
Other courts’ lists of factors are more numerous and specific.
For instance, the court in State v. Smith 21 set out a nonexclu-
sive list of 13 factors: (1) the subsidiary facts of who or
what initiated the action by the private individual, (2) who
decides whether the fruit of the action is to be given to the
state, (3) who determined the way in which the action was
to be conducted, (4) the extent of the contact between the
state and the individual, (5) whether the individual receives a
monetary or other form of inducement from the government,
(6) whether the government had prior knowledge that the
individual would act as she or he did, (7) whether the primary
purpose of the state and the actor was the same, (8) whether
a statute mandates the private action, (9) whether the purpose
of the individual was to benefit the government, (10) whether
the government’s role was active or passive, (11) whether the
government exercised coercive means, (12) whether the act
involved a power that was the exclusive prerogative of the
government, and (13) whether at the time of the act the private
citizen was engaged in assisting the government in its public
purpose. In contrast, several federal courts distill the inquiry
into two broader primary factors: (1) whether the government
knew of and acquiesced in the private individual’s challenged
conduct and (2) whether the private individual intended to
assist law enforcement or had some other independent moti-
vation. 22 Under the first factor of this two-factor approach,
20 U.S. v. Highbull, supra note 16, 894 F.3d at 992.
21 State v. Smith, 40 Conn. App. 789, 673 A.2d 1149 (1996).
22 See, U.S. v. Day, 591 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Paige, 136 F.3d
1012 (5th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).

- 79 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
however, evidence of more than mere knowledge and passive
acquiescence by the government is required before finding an
agency relationship; 23 the government must, in “some affirma-
tive way . . . instigate, orchestrate, encourage or exceed the
scope of the private search to trigger application of the Fourth
Amendment.” 24 Furthermore, both prongs must be satisfied
considering the totality of the circumstances before the seem-
ingly private search may be deemed a government search. 25
[14,15] In State v. Abdouch, 26 we held that a private per-
son’s status as a state or government agent in a search is not
restricted to a search ordered, requested, or initiated by the
state or government official but may include a search which
is a joint endeavor between a private person and a state or
government official. Thus, a search is subject to the consti-
tutional safeguard against an unreasonable search, prohibited
by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article
I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, if the search is a joint
endeavor involving a private person and a state or govern-
ment official. 27
We explained in Abdouch that while the “‘silver platter
doctrine’” has been rejected as between state and federal offi-
cials, it still applies to searches by private parties. 28 Under that
doctrine, as applied to a private party, a search by a private
party is not a search by law enforcement if the evidence was
turned over by the private party to law enforcement “‘on a
silver platter.’” 29 The decisive factor is “‘the actuality of a
share by [law enforcement] in the total enterprise of securing
23 U.S. v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003).
24 U.S. v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 9 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
25 Id.
26 State v. Abdouch, supra note 15.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 940, 434 N.W.2d at 324.
29 Id. at 939, 434 N.W.2d at 324.

- 80 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means.’” 30
In Abdouch, we held there was a joint endeavor violative
of the Fourth Amendment where the warrantless search was
conducted jointly by law enforcement and private citizens
who lacked authorization to enter the defendant’s home but
were granted entry by the adult babysitter in response to law
enforcement’s display of government authority.
[16] Other courts have elaborated that “there must be ‘a
great deal of entanglement’ between the conduct of the private
individual and the police before the search can be considered
state action.” 31 De minimis or incidental contacts between
the citizen and law enforcement agents prior to or during the
course of a search or seizure will not subject the search to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 32 “A government agent must be
involved either directly as a participant—not merely as a wit-
ness—or indirectly as an encourager of the private person’s
search before we will deem the person to be an instrument of
the government.” 33
[17,18] A private citizen’s desire to assist law enforcement
does not by itself convert that citizen into a government agent
for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. 34 Likewise, a
private party who has conducted a search and seizure does
not become an agent of the government for purposes of the
constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and
seizure merely by turning over to the police the property
seized. 35
30 Id.
31 State v. Archer, 197 Ohio App. 3d 570, 576, 968 N.E.2d 495, 499 (2011).
32 United States v. Walther, supra note 22.
33 U.S. v. Leffall, supra note 17, 82 F.3d at 347. See, also, State v. Kopsa, 126
Idaho 512, 887 P.2d 57 (1994).
34 See, U.S. v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Koenig, 856 F.2d
843 (7th Cir. 1988); Kourakis v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 612, 474 S.W.3d
536 (2015).
35 31 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law: Procedure § 254 (2025).

- 81 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
[19] Once a private search has been completed, subsequent
involvement of government agents does not transform the
original intrusion into a governmental search. 36 As explained
by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Jacobsen, 37
the exercise of governmental dominion and control over an
item made available by a private party and obtained through a
private search is not unreasonable, because the private search
has already compromised the expectation of privacy. Thus, a
closed container given to law enforcement by a private party
can be seized, at least temporarily, without a warrant, where
there is probable cause to believe the container contains con-
traband. 38 This is consistent with our discussion in Abdouch
that so long as the search became a joint endeavor “‘“before
the object of the search was completely accomplished,”’” it is
immaterial whether the government official “‘“originated the
idea or joined in it while the search was in progress.”’” 39
There was no dispute that the handgun, the object of the
search conducted by the son, girlfriend, and girlfriend’s mother,
was found before Hackett arrived. In other words, law enforce-
ment was not involved in the relevant search, which had been
completed when Hackett arrived at the house.
While there was evidence that the son, girlfriend, and
girlfriend’s mother may have been attempting to assist law
enforcement or believed the son might be in legal jeopardy
if the handgun were not found, Langley did not demonstrate
that law enforcement directed them to conduct the search or
threatened the son with criminal prosecution if he could not
36 State v. Weaver, 231 N.C. App. 473, 752 S.E.2d 240 (2013).
37 See United States v. Jacobsen, supra note 9.
38 See id.
39 State v. Abdouch, supra note 15, 230 Neb. at 941, 434 N.W.2d at 325
(emphasis supplied), quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure,
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 1.8(b) (2d ed. 1987). See, also,
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L. Ed. 1819
(1949).

- 82 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
find the handgun. The record shows that any communication
leading up to the search between a government agent and the
son, girlfriend, and girlfriend’s mother was with the probation
officer, and Langley does not question the constitutionality of
a search conducted by the probation officer or upon his direc-
tion. Langley’s challenge is limited to the actions of Hackett
when he returned to the house.
The district court did not clearly err when it found that
Hackett “did nothing other than come in the door after being
invited to do so, and ask about a handgun.” Thus, it did not err
in concluding that Hackett did not conduct a search relevant to
the object Langley sought to suppress. The facts demonstrate
that the son, girlfriend, and girlfriend’s mother, three private
individuals, handed the locked silver case over to Hackett on
a “silver platter,” explaining to Hackett why they believed the
handgun was located inside. It was not unconstitutional for
Hackett to accept the case and place it in police custody until
a warrant could be obtained to open it.
The relevancy under the Fourth Amendment of the legality
of Hackett’s location when accepting, on a “silver platter,”
the fruits of the private search is unclear. As stated, once a
private search has been completed, subsequent involvement
of government agents does not transform the original intru-
sion into a governmental search. Under the facts of this case,
one of the three private individuals would likely have handed
over the locked silver case had the same conversation occurred
while Hackett stood outside the house instead of in the liv-
ing room. Even if Hackett’s entry was the “but for” cause of
his possession of the case, it would be insufficient under all
the circumstances here presented to transform private actions
into governmental action implicating the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, especially given the limited scope of Hackett’s
activities inside the house before coming into possession of
the case, we agree with the lower courts that Hackett’s entry
into the house did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even

- 83 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
319 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. LANGLEY
Cite as 319 Neb. 67
guests can have actual authority to admit law enforcement into
common areas for a limited purpose. 40
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming Langley’s conviction.
Affirmed.
40 See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 8.5(e) (6th ed. 2020) (consent by guest).