Continental Indem. Co. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
Continental Indemnity Company, a New Mexico
corporation, appellant, v. Starr Indemnity &
Liability Co., a New York insurance
corporation, appellee.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed December 19, 2025. 	No. S-25-087.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. The question of appellate jurisdiction
is a question of law.
2. Jurisdiction: Judgments: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. To deter-
mine whether it has jurisdiction, an appellate court looks to Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 25-1911 (Reissue 2016) and 25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2024).
Together, these statutes generally prescribe that for an appellate court
to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from a
judgment or decree rendered or from a final order.
3. Judgments: Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A “judgment ren-
dered,” as required by Neb. Rev. Stat § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016), is a
final determination of the rights of the parties in an action, which is set
forth by the court in a single, signed written document stating all of the
relief granted or denied in an action.
4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. In cases that present multiple claims
for relief or involve multiple parties, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1)
(Reissue 2016) permits a trial court to certify an otherwise interlocutory
order as a final, appealable judgment under the limited circumstances set
forth in the statute.
5. Claims: Parties: Judgments. Absent the entry of a final judgment
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016), orders adjudicating
fewer than all claims against all parties are not final and are subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
6. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
analysis that is not needed to adjudicate the controversy before it.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:59 AM CDT

- 575 -
Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
Riedmann, Chief Judge, and Moore and Freeman, Judges,
on appeal thereto from the District Court for Douglas County,
Duane C. Dougherty, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Jeffrey A. Silver for appellant.
Dwyer Arce, Amy L. Van Horne, and Michael T. McDonnell,
pro hac vice, of Kutak Rock, L.L.P., for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, and
Bergevin, JJ.
Cassel, J.
INTRODUCTION
Continental Indemnity Company (Continental) filed a com-
plaint suing two defendants. Via separate orders, the dis-
trict court dismissed each defendant. Continental appealed
following the entry of each order, but the Nebraska Court of
Appeals summarily dismissed each appeal. Because the district
court has not yet rendered a judgment 1 nor certified a final
judgment, 2 we affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Complaint, Motions, and
September 2024 Orders
Continental sued AXIS Surplus Insurance Co. (AXIS) and
Starr Indemnity & Liability Co. (Starr). The complaint set forth
causes of action for contribution and indemnity.
The record contains respective motions filed by Starr and by
AXIS. Starr moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(2) (codified 2008). Our
appellate record does not contain a default judgment, but AXIS
1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301(2) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
filed a “Special Appearance & Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment.” AXIS alleged that it had meritorious defenses to
the judgment and sought leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On September 4, 2024, the court entered separate orders with
respect to each motion. One order sustained Starr’s motion to
dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The other order set aside
the default judgment against AXIS and gave AXIS time to file
a responsive pleading.
First Appeal
Within 30 days, Continental gave notice of its intent to
appeal the September 4, 2024, order dismissing Starr. Upon
Starr’s motion for summary dismissal, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 3 Continental did
not file a petition for further review.
Dismissal of AXIS
Upon issuance of the Court of Appeals’ mandate, the matter
returned to the district court. Continental moved to dismiss its
complaint against AXIS without prejudice, with each party to
pay its own costs. The court sustained the motion. Its order of
dismissal did not mention any other relief granted or denied—
in other words, it said nothing about Starr’s dismissal.
Second Appeal
Within 30 days, Continental filed an appeal to again chal-
lenge the September 4, 2024, order dismissing the complaint
against Starr. This is the appeal before us now.
Starr moved for summary dismissal. The Court of Appeals
overruled the motion and directed the parties to address juris-
diction in their briefing.
One week after the release of our decision in Elbert v.
Keating, O’Gara, 4 Starr filed a renewed motion for summary
dismissal. The Court of Appeals sustained the motion and
3 See Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-107(B)(1) (rev. 2022).
4 Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara, 319 Neb. 390, 22 N.W.3d 671 (2025).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
dismissed the appeal. Its minute entry cited Elbert, along with
this parenthetical: “single, signed written document stating all
of relief granted or denied in action is required for judgment;
appellate jurisdiction cannot be created through voluntary dis-
missal of claim without prejudice.”
Continental filed a petition for further review, which we
granted. 5
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Continental assigns that the Court of Appeals erroneously
relied on Elbert.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] The question of appellate jurisdiction is a question of
law. 6
ANALYSIS
We start by recalling statutes critical to our decision. Next,
we discuss our jurisdictional analysis in Elbert. Then, we
set forth the parties’ arguments involving Elbert. Finally,
we resolve the issue by reaffirming our discussion in Elbert
concerning rendition of judgment.
Statutes
[2] To determine whether it has jurisdiction, an appellate
court looks to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1911 (Reissue 2016) and
25-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2024). Together, these statutes generally
prescribe that for an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of
an appeal, the party must be appealing from a judgment or
decree rendered or from a final order. 7
[3] “A judgment is the final determination of the rights
of the parties in an action.” 8 Section 25-1301(2) defines
5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1107 (Reissue 2016).
6 Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara, supra note 4.
7 Id.
8 § 25-1301(1).

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
“[r]endition of a judgment” as “the act of the court, or a judge
thereof, in signing a single written document stating all of
the relief granted or denied in an action.” Thus, a “judgment
rendered,” as required by § 25-1911, is a final determination
of the rights of the parties in an action, which is set forth by
the court in a single, signed written document stating all of the
relief granted or denied in an action. 9
[4,5] In cases that present multiple claims for relief or
involve multiple parties, § 25-1315(1) permits a trial court to
certify an otherwise interlocutory order as a final, appealable
judgment under the limited circumstances set forth in the stat-
ute. 10 Absent the entry of a final judgment under § 25-1315(1),
orders adjudicating fewer than all claims against all parties
are not final and are subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties. 11
Elbert Decision
Because the arguments focus on our decision in Elbert, we
discuss it in some detail. Mark D. Elbert filed two defamation
actions against a law firm and one of its attorneys. The appeal
concerned only the second action, but because it shared much
of the same factual and procedural background as the first
action, our opinion summarized both actions.
Elbert filed the second action while the first action was still
pending. The attorney was dismissed by operation of law after
not being served, so the action proceeded against the law firm.
The firm filed a counterclaim that requested compensatory
damages, costs, and fees. After the first action was resolved,
the firm moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court sus-
tained the motion but gave Elbert leave to file an amended
complaint. After Elbert did so, the firm moved to dismiss the
9 Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara, supra note 4.
10 Mann v. Mann, 312 Neb. 275, 978 N.W.2d 606 (2022).
11 Id.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
complaint for failure to state a claim. The court sustained the
motion. Its order did not address the counterclaim or request
for attorney fees.
Elbert appealed. The Court of Appeals summarily dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
When the case returned to the district court, the law firm
filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaim without
prejudice. The court sustained the motion. Its order did not
mention any other relief granted or denied in the action.
Elbert filed another notice of appeal. After moving the
appeal to our docket, we dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
Our opinion demonstrated that there were two independent
grounds upon which to dismiss the appeal.
First, we explained that no judgment had been rendered. We
recalled that the function of § 25-1301(2) was “to add clarity
so that the parties know whether and when the court has ren-
dered a judgment from which they must timely file a notice
of appeal to protect their right to appellate review.” 12 But
because the district court had entered one order dismissing the
operative complaint and another order dismissing the pending
counterclaim, the court had “not yet signed a ‘single written
document’ as now specified in § 25-1301(2) constituting the
final determination of the rights of the parties and stating all
the relief granted or denied in the action.” 13 We concluded that
“[b]ecause no judgment has yet been rendered in this action,
we lack appellate jurisdiction.” 14
Although that determination could have been the end of our
jurisdictional analysis, we addressed an argument made by
both parties. They contended that when the district court dis-
missed without prejudice the law firm’s unresolved counter-
claim, there was no contested issue left for the district court
12 Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara, supra note 4, 319 Neb. at 398, 22 N.W.3d at
677.
13 Id. at 398-99, 22 N.W.3d at 678.
14 Id. at 399, 22 N.W.3d at 678.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
to resolve; therefore, they asserted that Elbert could appeal
from the prior order dismissing his complaint.
Our rejection of that argument formed the second basis for
dismissing the appeal. We explained that appellate jurisdiction
cannot be created by voluntarily dismissing, without prejudice,
unadjudicated claims. And we clarified that it did not matter
which party filed the motion to dismiss. We declared, “We
continue to adhere to this bright line rule [that where] the court
has neither rendered a judgment, certified a final judgment
under § 25-1315, nor entered a final order, [that] appellate
jurisdiction cannot be created merely by voluntarily dismissing
. . . without prejudice” 15 “claims on which the court has not
yet ruled.” 16
Parties’ Arguments
Continental asserts that this appeal “is easily distinguished
from Elbert.” 17 According to Continental, in Elbert, neither
the order dismissing the complaint nor the order dismissing
the defendant’s counterclaim rendered a judgment. In contrast,
Continental claims that the district court rendered two judg-
ments. According to Continental, “The order dismissing Starr
was a judgment because there was no other claim and the order
dismissing [Continental’s] claim against AXIS . . . was a judg-
ment because no other claim remained.” 18 Continental further
asserts that we have jurisdiction as a result of the dismissal
of Starr with prejudice and the dismissal of AXIS without
prejudice, because the concern of piecemeal litigation “just
does not exist in this case.” 19 At oral argument, Continental
represented that it sought dismissal without prejudice in order
to pursue litigation in another state.
15 Id. at 400, 22 N.W.3d at 678-79.
16 Id. at 400, 22 N.W.3d at 678.
17 Brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 2.
18 Id. at 3.
19 Id. at 4.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
Starr, on the other hand, contends that “longstanding prec-
edent dictates that appellate jurisdiction is lacking here on two
independent grounds,” as Elbert reaffirmed. 20 According to
Starr, because “[n]either order [appealed from] ‘stat[ed] all of
the relief granted or denied in an action[,]’ . . . like in Elbert,
‘no judgment has yet been rendered in this action.’” 21 Further,
Starr submits that voluntary dismissal without prejudice cannot
create jurisdiction.
Resolution
Continental attempts to distinguish Elbert on several fronts,
but its efforts are unavailing. First, the fact that the back-
ground section of Elbert discussed two separate lawsuits and
that there is but a single lawsuit here is of no moment. The
jurisdictional analysis in Elbert was premised upon the orders
and appeals in the second lawsuit only. Second, for purposes
of our appellate jurisdiction inquiry, it is not important that
the basis for sustaining a motion to dismiss was for failure to
state a claim in Elbert, while here it was for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Third, Continental points out that this case did
not involve multiple claims as in Elbert. But at oral argument,
Continental admitted that multiple parties were present here.
That is a distinction without a difference. Section 25-1315(1)
is implicated in either scenario if the court enters an order
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties. 22
The similarities between Elbert and this case are more
compelling than the differences. In both cases, the first order
adjudicated fewer than all claims against all parties. In both,
no party requested that the court certify a final judgment pur-
suant to § 25-1315(1). In both, a second order dismissed the
remaining claim or party. Here, as in Elbert, the district court
20 Supplemental brief for appellee at 5.
21 Id. at 7, quoting Elbert v. Keating, O’Gara, supra note 4.
22 See Mann v. Mann, supra note 10.

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
320 Nebraska Reports
CONTINENTAL INDEM. CO. v. STARR INDEM. & LIAB. CO.
Cite as 320 Neb. 574
had yet to sign a single written document stating all of the
relief granted or denied in an action. In both cases, no judg-
ment has been rendered. The same result follows: We lack
appellate jurisdiction.
At 	oral 	argument, 	Continental 	acknowledged 	that 	the
order dismissing Starr was interlocutory when entered. And
Continental did not dispute that the order granting its motion
to voluntarily dismiss AXIS made no mention of the Starr
dismissal. Continental then asserted that § 25-1315’s language
contemplated a sort of “springing” final order. We find no such
language there. Moreover, that assertion conflicts with our
understanding of the legislative intent explained in Elbert.
[6] We need not determine whether we also lack jurisdic-
tion because Continental’s dismissal of AXIS was voluntary
and without prejudice. An appellate court is not obligated to
engage in an analysis that is not needed to adjudicate the con-
troversy before it. 23
CONCLUSION
We conclude the following:
• Although the district court entered one order dismissing Starr
for lack of personal jurisdiction and entered another order
sustaining a motion to dismiss AXIS without prejudice, the
district court has neither certified a final judgment under
§ 25-1315(1) nor signed a single written document stating all
of the relief granted or denied in the action.
• Because the district court has not certified a final judgment nor
rendered a judgment, there is no appellate jurisdiction.
• In the absence of a final judgment or final order, jurisdiction to
complete the proceeding by appropriate action remains vested
in the district court.
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ summary dis-
missal of the appeal.
Affirmed.
23 U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. D S Avionics, ante p. 287, 26 N.W.3d 761 (2025).