State v. Cook

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
322 Nebraska Reports
STATE v. COOK
Cite as 322 Neb. 114
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Brittany C. Cook, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed September 4, 2026. 	No. S-24-863.
1. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, whether the evidence is
direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same:
An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on
the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are
for the finder of fact. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
2. Rules of Evidence. In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules
apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska
Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make
discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
3. Rules of Evidence: Appeal and Error. Where the Nebraska Evidence
Rules commit the evidentiary question at issue to the discretion of the
trial court, an appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence for
an abuse of discretion.
4. Evidence: Appeal and Error. A trial court has the discretion to deter-
mine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and such determina-
tions will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of
that discretion.
5. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a
trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unrea-
sonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
and evidence.
6. Sentences: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not disturb a sen-
tence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion
by the trial court.
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
10/18/2026 12:31 AM CDT

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STATE v. COOK
Cite as 322 Neb. 114
7. Criminal Law: Minors: Intent: Words and Phrases. Under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-707(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024), child abuse is committed
if a person knowingly, intentionally, or negligently causes or permits a
minor child to be “(a) [p]laced in a situation that endangers [the minor
child’s] life or physical . . . health; [or] (c) [d]eprived of necessary . . .
care . . . .”
8. Convictions: Minors: Intent: Words and Phrases. For a conviction
of intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, the offense
must be committed knowingly and intentionally and result in the serious
bodily injury of the minor child as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-109
(Reissue 2016).
9. Intent: Words and Phrases. Intent is the state of the actor’s mind when
the actor’s conduct occurs.
10. ____: ____. “Intentionally” means willfully or purposely, and not acci-
dently or involuntarily.
11. ____: ____. The intent involved in conduct is a mental process and may
be inferred from the conduct itself, the actor’s language in reference to
the conduct, and the circumstances surrounding an incident.
12. Criminal Law: Words and Phrases. The meaning of “knowledge” in a
criminal action can vary with the context in which it is used, but it com-
monly imports a perception of facts requisite to make up a crime.
13. ____: ____. Knowledge, like intent, may be inferred from the circum-
stances surrounding the act.
14. ____: ____. In the context of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-308 (Reissue 2016),
which also utilizes the “serious bodily injury” definition contained in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-109 (Reissue 2016), it is not necessary that the
injury caused death, or serious permanent disfigurement or impair-
ment of the function of any part or organ of the body, but only that it
involved a substantial risk of producing those results.
15. Criminal Law: Minors: Intent. For a conviction of intentional child
abuse resulting in death, the offense must be committed knowingly and
intentionally and result in the death of such child.
16. ____: ____: ____. For a conviction of intentional child abuse resulting
in death, it is not necessary to have intended the abuse to result in the
child’s death.
17. Criminal Law: Minors: Intent: Proof. For a conviction of intentional
child abuse resulting in death, the State is required to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that (1) the defendant caused or permitted the
victim to be (a) placed in a situation that endangered his or her life or
physical health, (b) cruelly punished, or (c) deprived of necessary care;
(2) he or she did so knowingly and intentionally; (3) at the time the

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STATE v. COOK
Cite as 322 Neb. 114
defendant did so, the victim was a minor child; and (4) the defendant’s
offense proximately caused the death of the victim.
18. Pretrial Procedure: Evidence: Appeal and Error. When a motion in
limine to exclude evidence is overruled, the movant must object when
the particular evidence which was sought to be excluded by the motion
is offered during trial to preserve error for appeal.
19. Evidence: Proof. The bar for establishing evidentiary relevance is not
a high one; it requires only that the probative value of the evidence be
something more than nothing.
20. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Evidence is relevant if it tends in any
degree to alter the probability of a material fact.
21. Photographs. A court may admit into evidence photographs of a victim
to show the condition of the body, to show the nature and extent of
wounds and injuries to it, and to establish intent.
22. Criminal Law: Evidence. A defendant cannot negate an exhibit’s pro-
bative value through a tactical decision to stipulate.
23. ____: ____. The State is allowed to present a coherent picture of the
facts of the crimes charged, and it may generally choose its evidence in
so doing.
24. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Unfair prejudice means an undue ten-
dency to suggest a decision based on an improper basis.
25. ____: ____. Unfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly
relevant evidence to lure the fact finder into declaring guilt on a ground
different from proof specific to the offense charged, commonly on an
emotional basis.
26. Evidence: Other Acts: Convictions. When considering whether evi-
dence of other acts is unfairly prejudicial, courts consider whether the
evidence tends to make conviction of the defendant more probable for
an incorrect reason.
27. Criminal Law: Photographs. Gruesome crimes produce gruesome
photographs.
28. Trial: Photographs. When the State lays proper foundation, photo-
graphs that illustrate or make clear a controverted issue are admissible,
even if gruesome.
29. ____: ____. The gruesome nature of photographs alone will not keep
them from the trier of fact, so long as the probative value is not out-
weighed by the prejudicial effect.
30. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When reviewing
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, the ques-
tion is whether the record affirmatively shows that the defendant’s trial
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.

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STATE v. COOK
Cite as 322 Neb. 114
31. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. A court may examine performance
and prejudice in any order and need not examine both prongs if a
defendant fails to demonstrate either.
32. ____: ____. To show deficient performance, the defendant must show
that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary
training and skill in criminal law.
33. ____: ____. To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
34. Proof: Words and Phrases. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
35. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. In determining whether
there is a reasonable probability that any deficient performance of trial
counsel would have resulted in a different outcome in the proceeding,
an appellate court may properly consider the strength of the admis-
sible evidence relating to the controverted issues in the case.
36. Effectiveness of Counsel: Trial: Appeal and Error. When review-
ing claims of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, trial counsel is
afforded due deference to formulate trial strategy and tactics.
37. Effectiveness of Counsel: Presumptions: Appeal and Error. There
is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an appellate
court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions.
38. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Effectiveness of Counsel.
Ultimately, the federal Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only
a fair trial and a competent attorney.
39. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. An ineffective assistance
of counsel claim will not be addressed on direct appeal if it requires
examination of facts not contained in the record.
40. Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Records: Appeal and
Error. When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or
her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on direct
appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is
known to the defendant or is apparent from the record; otherwise,
the issue will be procedurally barred in a subsequent postconvic-
tion proceeding.
41. Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the
appellant is not required to allege prejudice.
42. Appeal and Error. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned
and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to
be considered by an appellate court.

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STATE v. COOK
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43. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. On direct appeal in a
criminal case, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be both
specifically assigned and specifically argued in the appellant’s brief.
44. ____: ____. Assignments of error on direct appeal regarding ineffective
assistance of trial counsel must specifically allege the conduct that is
claimed to constitute deficient performance.
45. Appeal and Error. A generalized and vague assignment of error that
does not advise an appellate court of the issue submitted for decision
will not be considered.
46. ____. An assignment of error is specific when it addresses a specific
issue that does not require additional information to understand pre-
cisely what the assignment attacks.
47. Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Records: Appeal and
Error. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct
appeal when the claim alleges deficient performance with enough par-
ticularity for (1) an appellate court to make a determination of whether
the claim can be decided upon the trial record and (2) a district court
later reviewing a petition for postconviction relief to recognize whether
the claim was brought before the appellate court.
48. Claims: Effectiveness of Counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel insufficiently stated is no different than a claim not stated
at all.
49. Appeal and Error. An argument that does little more than restate an
assignment of error does not support the assignment, and an appellate
court will not address it.
50. ____. Where an appellant’s brief contains conclusory assertions unsup-
ported by a coherent analytical argument, the appellant has failed to
include a specific argument sufficient to raise a claim.
51. Criminal Law: Rules of Evidence: Other Acts. In a criminal case, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 27-404(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024) operates as a broad exclusion-
ary rule of relevant evidence that speaks to a criminal defendant’s pro-
pensity to have committed the crime or crimes charged.
52. Rules of Evidence: Other Acts. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2)
(Cum. Supp. 2024), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or
she acted in conformity therewith.
53. ____: ____. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2) (Cum. Supp. 2024) does not
apply to evidence of a defendant’s other crimes or bad acts if the evi-
dence is inextricably intertwined with the charged crime.
54. ____: ____. Inextricably intertwined evidence includes evidence that
forms part of the factual setting of the crime and evidence that is so

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STATE v. COOK
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blended or connected to the charged crime that proof of the charged
crime will necessarily require proof of the other crimes or bad acts.
55. ____: ____. Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is also inextricably
intertwined with the charged crime if the other crimes or bad acts
are necessary for the prosecution to present a coherent picture of the
charged crime.
56. Witnesses: Judgments. The credibility of witnesses is a determination
within the province of the trier of fact.
57. Rules of Evidence: Testimony. Because making credibility deter-
minations is the role of the trier of fact, testimony that usurps that
role is not helpful and thus is improper opinion testimony under Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 27-701 and 27-702 (Reissue 2016). However, such com-
ments upon the patently obvious generally pose little, if any, danger
of prejudice.
58. Sentences: Appeal and Error. Where a sentence imposed within the
statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court
must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in
considering and applying the relevant factors, as well as any applicable
legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed.
59. Sentences. In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors
customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s (1) age, (2)
mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural back-
ground, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct,
and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the
offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of
the crime. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjec-
tive judgment that includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the
defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the defendant’s life.
60. ____. It is within the discretion of the trial court to impose consecutive
rather than concurrent sentences for separate crimes, even when the
crimes arise out of the same incident.
61. Sentences: Appeal and Error. The mere fact that a defendant’s sen-
tence differs from those which have been imposed on coperpetrators
in the same court does not, in and of itself, make the defendant’s
sentence an abuse of discretion; each defendant’s life, character, and
previous conduct may be considered in determining the propriety of
the sentence.
62. Constitutional Law: Sentences: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Once
it is determined that the sentence prescribed by statute is constitutional
and that the sentence imposed is within statutory limits, the issue in

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STATE v. COOK
Cite as 322 Neb. 114
reviewing a sentence is not whether someone else in a different case
received a lesser sentence, but whether the defendant in the subject
case received an appropriate one.
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Kevin
R. McManaman, Judge. Affirmed.
Candice C. Wooster and Sydney J. Clark, Senior Certified
Law Student, for appellant.
Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and P. Christian
Adamski for appellee.
Funke, 	C.J., 	Cassel, 	Stacy, 	Papik, 	Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Vaughn, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Brittany C. Cook was convicted by a jury of intentional
child abuse resulting in death, intentional child abuse result-
ing in serious bodily injury, and possession with the intent
to deliver or delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000
feet of a school. On direct appeal, Cook assigns errors fall-
ing into the general categories of insufficiency of evidence,
admission of gruesome photographs, ineffective assistance of
counsel, and excessive sentences. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
At approximately 4 p.m. on March 12, 2023, Cook brought
her almost 2-year-old nonverbal son, R.R.Y., to the emer-
gency room at a hospital in Lincoln, Nebraska. He was limp
and “kind of grey” in color. R.R.Y. had multiple bruises in
various stages of healing, swelling to his genital area, a swol-
len left leg, and abrasions. A CT scan revealed swelling of his
brain, multiple broken ribs, and a lung contusion. R.R.Y. was
transferred by helicopter to a hospital in Omaha, Nebraska,

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and ultimately died from his injuries. Following his death,
Cook was charged with intentional child abuse resulting
in death, intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily
injury resulting from R.R.Y.’s leg injury, and possession with
the intent to deliver or delivery of a controlled substance
within 1,000 feet of a school.
1. Pretrial Proceedings
Prior to trial, Cook filed a motion in limine seeking to pro-
hibit the State from introducing photographs of R.R.Y. “while
alive, particularly any family pictures or photographs depicting
his medical treatment and excluding certain autopsy photo-
graphs as gruesome and irrelevant.” The district court denied
the motion.
2. Jury Trial
Following R.R.Y.’s hospitalization, police conducted a series
of interviews with Cook. Portions of these interviews were
received into evidence at trial. The jury also heard testimony
from several witnesses. Other evidence received included pho-
tographs, text messages, and internet searches. None of Cook’s
assignments of error on appeal relate to her drug conviction.
Thus, we focus on the evidence at trial relevant to her convic-
tion for intentional child abuse resulting in death and inten-
tional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury resulting
from R.R.Y.’s leg injury.
(a) Evidence Regarding R.R.Y.’s Leg Injury
(i) Cook’s Interviews
At the hospital, Cook told an officer that she had started
dating Joshua Tackett in January 2023. During a later inter-
view with Investigator Michael Barry, Cook explained that
on “like the 9th or 10th” of February, while Cook was out
running an errand, Tackett called and explained that, while
holding R.R.Y., Tackett saw blood, passed out, and fell on
R.R.Y.’s ankle. Cook disclosed she had witnessed Tackett

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pass out at the sight of blood on a prior occasion. Cook
told Investigator Barry that an icepack was put on R.R.Y.’s
left ankle when Cook arrived home but she never took him
to the doctor. She told Investigator Barry that within a few
days after the injury, R.R.Y. was able to crawl. She told
Investigator Barry that in the 2-week period following the leg
injury, R.R.Y. was able to pull himself up to a standing posi-
tion, bear weight, and climb into a rolling chair, but he never
fully walked on his left leg again.
Explaining why she did not take R.R.Y. for medical treat-
ment Cook stated Tackett had her convinced the injury was
just a sprain. She also explained that R.R.Y.’s father has bad
ankles and that she thought R.R.Y. had reinjured himself
when he tumbled down the stairs, starting the healing pro-
cess over.
(ii) Testimony of Cook’s Aunt
At trial, Cook’s aunt, Shari Pring, testified that in November
2022, she moved in with Cook to help her take care of the chil-
dren. Pring testified that her friend Dawn Foreman also lived
at Cook’s residence “on and off.” Pring testified that she was
present when R.R.Y.’s leg was injured but had gone back to the
bedroom to get ready to shower while Cook ran an errand. A
minute later, Pring heard that R.R.Y. was crying and a “thud.”
Pring was told by Cook’s oldest child that Tackett had fallen
with R.R.Y. Tackett and Cook left with R.R.Y. The follow-
ing day, when Cook arrived home with Tackett and R.R.Y.,
R.R.Y.’s leg was “a little swollen” and wrapped in an “ACE
bandage.” Pring asked Cook if she took R.R.Y. to a doctor.
Cook told Pring that she had taken him to the doctor and that
the doctor said it was a sprain. Cook had an icepack and told
Pring that R.R.Y.’s leg was to be iced and elevated. Pring testi-
fied that R.R.Y. was given Tylenol but never had a cast. After
the injury, R.R.Y. could no longer walk independently but
would “scoot” on his bottom and “kind of drag that leg” and
was eventually able to pull himself up against the couch and

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walk while holding onto the couch. Pring testified that R.R.Y.
would whine if his leg was hit on something and was crankier
than before.
(iii) Testimony of Foreman and Messages
At trial, Foreman testified that she was at work when
R.R.Y.’s leg was injured and had been staying at a friend’s
for a couple days. She testified that on February 18, 2023, she
messaged Cook, asking if she could return to Cook’s home.
Messages between Cook and Foreman were admitted into evi-
dence. Cook responded by text: “I would actually really appre-
ciate it. Baby has a high ankle sprain. And can’t even walk.”
Cook went on to message that she had received a message from
her oldest child that Pring had not been up all day. Cook mes-
saged Foreman that R.R.Y.’s leg was “so swollen” and that he
had “so many bruises all over his body because [Cook’s oldest
child] ha[d] been taking care of him the last few days.” Finally,
Cook messaged Foreman: “There’s [an] ice pack there and I’ve
just been trying to keep his leg up. It’s really sore. There’s ibu-
profen there that he is probably ready for.”
(iv) Internet Searches
On February 18, 2023, between the hours of 9:21 a.m. and
3:22 p.m., internet searches were conducted on one of Cook’s
cell phones for “sign[s] of a fracture,” “sign[s] of a sprain,”
“[s]prained knee,” “can a spr[a]ined ankle make the leg swol-
len,” “swollen bruisned [sic] leg and knee,” “torn leg liga-
ment,” and “what’s good for a high knee ankle sprain at home.”
(v) Testimony of Sarah Boone
Boone, a nurse at the hospital in Lincoln, testified that she
treated R.R.Y. on March 12, 2023. Boone testified that R.R.Y.’s
left leg “didn’t really look right. It was swollen and kind of
laying weird, kind of out to the side.”
(vi) Testimony of Dr. Suzanne Haney
On March 13, 2023, after R.R.Y. was hospitalized, he
was first seen by a pediatrician specializing in child abuse,

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Dr. Haney. Dr. Haney testified that R.R.Y. had swelling of his
leg. She testified that he had a left tibia fracture that was “a
spiral or oblique fracture” probably caused by a twisting injury
and that the healing “[c]ertainly could be” consistent with an
occurrence on February 16 through 18. Dr. Haney testified she
would expect a child with this type of injury to cry, to not be
able to bear weight or walk, and to probably get upset when he
was moved.
When Dr. Haney was asked what sort of treatment is neces-
sary for this type of fracture, Dr. Haney testified that it should
be immobilized with a cast to keep it from moving, both for
pain and to keep it from injuring any of the “soft tissue in that
area.” She opined that an “ACE bandage,” icing, and elevating
were not the recommended medical treatment for a break like
R.R.Y.’s. When asked why, she testified that “one of the big-
gest things is making sure that it heals correctly, that it doesn’t
heal distracted. To keep the ends of the bone from injuring the
soft tissue, it heals faster when you put a cast on it. And then
finally, it reduces the amount of pain.” Dr. Haney agreed that
not treating this type of injury could mean it would not heal
correctly and testified that this could result in a leg length
discrepancy and corresponding limp. Finally, Dr. Haney agreed
that not providing proper treatment would certainly lengthen
the time that it would need to heal and that this could immobi-
lize a child longer.
Dr. Haney further testified that R.R.Y. also had a metaphy-
seal fracture at the end of his left tibia. She testified that when
the bone is subjected to excessive pulling or traction, a chip
of bone “like that” breaks off, and that this type of fracture is
almost only seen in abuse, with the exception of a few scenar-
ios inapplicable to R.R.Y. She was unable to give a timeframe
for this second fracture.
(vii) Testimony of Dr. Michelle Elieff
General 	and 	forensic 	pathologist 	Dr. 	Elieff 	performed
R.R.Y.’s autopsy on March 20, 2023. Dr. Elieff testified that

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R.R.Y. had swelling and bruising from the knee to the ankle
area on the left leg and that an internal examination of the
“larger shin bone” revealed
an angled fracture that was healing and had a little gap
between the broken parts of it, so was at an angle and it
was healing. So there was a healing — what we call a cal-
lous. And the bones were still — you could see in the X
ray and also with the naked eye, they were still separated
a little bit.
Dr. Elieff stated that the fracture to the shaft of the bone
was what had caused the swelling and that the bone was still
separated but was in the process of healing. Dr. Elieff also
noted the metaphyseal fracture to the growth plate of that
same bone.
(b) Evidence Regarding R.R.Y.’s Death
(i) Cook’s Interviews
Cook told Investigator Barry that the day after R.R.Y.’s
leg injury, Cook noticed a bruise on the top of R.R.Y.’s left
ear and scratches on his face. Cook disclosed to Investigator
Barry that by February 18, 2023, she noticed R.R.Y. had a
bruise on his right ear, additional bruising on his left ear, and
fingermark-like bruises on his back and sides of his face. Cook
told Investigator Barry that Tackett was “chalking it up to”
R.R.Y.’s siblings being in R.R.Y.’s crib with him and Cook’s
oldest child babysitting while Pring slept and Cook was at
work. According to Cook, the next couple weeks she worked a
lot, Foreman watched R.R.Y., Tackett stayed at his house, and
R.R.Y.’s bruises started to go away.
Cook informed Investigator Barry that on March 4, 2023,
Cook and her four children, including R.R.Y., moved in with
Tackett. According to Cook, Tackett was alone with the chil-
dren often while Cook ran errands. Cook told Investigator
Barry that Tackett smoked marijuana almost constantly and
that Tackett’s alcohol intake tripled during their relationship.

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Cook stated that she does not “smoke that much.” Cook
confirmed that since they moved in with Tackett, R.R.Y.’s
injuries reappeared, explaining it was “almost like a repeat
of the same things, like the bruises, the scratches, like the
bruises on the back, the scratches, the ears” but that “there
wasn’t as much as there, the first time as it was the sec-
ond time.”
Cook told Investigator Barry that on March 6, 2023, R.R.Y.
had scratches on his neck. Cook told Investigator Barry that
R.R.Y. also had “thick scratches” on his back at that time.
Cook later explained that Tackett admitted R.R.Y. had gotten
scratched on the neck when his shirt got caught while Tackett
was removing it, but Cook stated:
I don’t know like that could be true because the scratches
were like kind of back here then on the side of his neck
and I feel like if you were taking the shirt like it would be
caught right here and the only struggle you would have to
have would be pulling it off the head.
After discussing R.R.Y.’s scratches and bruises, Investigator
Barry asked Cook if she “start[ed] saying we should take
[R.R.Y.] 	to 	the 	doctor, 	we 	should 	take 	him 	in.” 	Cook
responded:
Uhm, not to him, to myself. I kind of started getting
those gut feelings after I noticed like the bruises on his
back and like the scratch on his back and then I noticed
there was like another one fuller down like more down
that’s kind of when I like started getting those thoughts
running through my head like is he—is he doing some-
thing to him like is he hurting him like is he telling me
the truth like is—the baby just freaking out and like
doing crazy stuff, throwing himself around to cause this
stuff to happen or what.
Cook also told Investigator Barry that on March 7, 2023,
she witnessed Tackett use his foot to push a crying R.R.Y.
“on his butt,” scooting him toward Cook, and that Tackett
said to “just get that stupid ass kid away from me.” Cook told

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Investigator Barry that on March 8, R.R.Y caused a toy to hit
himself in the eye, resulting in a small bruise.
During the March 16, 2023, interview, Cook explained that
on March 9, R.R.Y. fell down the stairs, possibly reinjuring his
leg and causing a small bruise above his left eye by his hair-
line. However, during the March 21 interview, Cook admitted
that R.R.Y. never fell down the stairs and that she said he did
because Tackett told her that when she took R.R.Y to the hos-
pital, she needed a believable reason for his injuries.
When asked by Investigator Barry why she put R.R.Y. to
sleep on a blanket the night of March 9, 2023, instead of in his
playpen, Cook told Investigator Barry:
[J]ust in case I mean, maybe if he did you know hit
his head and have like a light concussion I know I just
wanted him to be in a room with me just in case like
whatever happened, you know, like I mean, and at that
point. At that point I thought like not necessarily taking
him to the hospital but like oh I should probably make
him a doctor’s appointment.
Cook stated that the following 2 days R.R.Y. was cranky,
seemed more tired, and did not want to play a lot. Cook told
Investigator Barry that on March 10, she ran multiple errands,
and that at night, she and Tackett went to a casino while
Foreman watched the children. However, Cook later admit-
ted that the children had been left home alone on Friday and
Saturday while she went to the casino.
Cook told Investigator Barry that on March 11, 2023, she
noticed that R.R.Y.’s front left tooth was missing, which she
found in his playpen, and that he had a “like oval shaped”
injury on the back of his head, still wet with blood. Describing
finding the missing tooth, Cook stated:
I don’t know part of me feels like I [maybe] found that
later in the day maybe in the afternoon because I think I
remember leaving and coming back and seeing the baby
laying in the playpen. And I don’t think I asked him
anything about it but I think he just said nonchalantly

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something to me like uh I just went and laid him in there
‘cause he was, you know, he wouldn’t quit crying in the
room. Uhm, and he acted tired and so maybe it was after
he woke up from his nap and I went and got him out that
I noticed his tooth.
Cook stated that Tackett told her R.R.Y. had probably injured
himself 	while 	“freaking 	out” 	in 	his 	playpen. 	Cook 	told
Investigator Barry that the tooth was not missing when she and
Tackett arrived home from the casino the prior night. Cook
explained she questioned whether R.R.Y. was being hurt or
hurting himself and contemplated installing cameras.
When asked about R.R.Y.’s appetite that Saturday, after
his nap and missing tooth, Cook told Investigator Barry that
R.R.Y. was eating but “[n]ot as much.” However, Cook told
Investigator Barry that later that night, R.R.Y. was still drink-
ing “bottles of milk or bottles of water,” but “at this point
he didn’t really want to eat.” Cook recalled R.R.Y.’s vomit-
ing that same night. Cook also told Investigator Barry she
noticed R.R.Y.’s right front tooth was chipped “somewhere in
the beginning” of that same week and that, between March 7
and 10, 2023, she noticed a bruise spanning “pretty much the
whole width” of his right arm. Cook stated that toward the end
of that week, Tackett did not want her around R.R.Y., did not
want her to touch R.R.Y., and did not want her to take R.R.Y.
with her when she left the house.
Cook told Investigator Barry that during the early morning
hours of March 12, 2023, after R.R.Y. was asleep, Cook went
to a fast-food restaurant. Cook stated that Tackett was upset
it had taken so long and that when she returned home, R.R.Y.
had been moved from where he was sleeping in the hall to
his crib in another room. Cook told Investigator Barry that
Tackett threw food at her after becoming upset that his order
was wrong. According to Cook, Tackett had “at least 4 double
shooters” that day and was intoxicated when they went to bed.
Cook said that she checked on R.R.Y. at 5 a.m. and that he
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Cook initially told Investigator Barry in an interview that
R.R.Y. woke up crying the morning of March 12, 2023, and
subsequently became unresponsive after a nap. However, dur-
ing the same interview, she later admitted that R.R.Y. had not
woken up crying and that she had slept until 11 a.m. and was
then unable to wake him.
According to Cook, when she attempted to wake up R.R.Y.,
he was limp, and when she opened his eyes, he had no eye
movement or dilation. Cook stated she bounced him on her
knee and was “squeezing his cheeks a little bit. Like buddy
come on. Like—like you gotta wake up. And he wasn’t really
doing anything. So I had [Tackett] get a wet washcloth. And
I kind of rubbed it on [R.R.Y.’s] head, and on his face. And it
still didn’t do anything.” Cook told Investigator Barry that she
then lay with R.R.Y. for a couple of hours and was rubbing his
back. Cook told Investigator Barry that R.R.Y. had a pattern
injury on his nose and eye in the morning but that she did not
see his pattern injury on his abdomen until she changed his
diaper and noticed his penis injury. She later admitted she had
noticed the penis injury between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. According
to Cook, Tackett did not want Cook to call an ambulance to
the house and told Cook that R.R.Y. was responding to stimu-
lation so she should wait until the next day to take him to the
hospital to see if he woke up.
Cook told Investigator Barry that she left the house at
approximately 3:30 p.m., dropped off two of her children at
her friend’s house, and then drove R.R.Y. to the hospital in
Lincoln, with Cook’s oldest child holding R.R.Y. in the back
seat. When asked if there was a reason she did not initially
tell the truth about when she was first unable to wake R.R.Y.,
she stated “because I waited too long to take him to the hospi-
tal.” Cook admitted that Tackett, Cook, and her children were
the only people with access to R.R.Y. between March 9, 2023,
and his hospitalization.
Cook told Capt. Jake Dilsaver that “the biggest thought
in [her] head is [Tackett] can’t stand the fact that [R.R.Y.]

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cries all the time unless” he is being held by Cook, and she
agreed that he probably cries some of the time when Cook
is gone.
When confronted about R.R.Y.’s appearance, Cook stated,
“And believe me it’s been in the back of my head and I just
don’t think I wanted to believe it.” Cook went on to state
that “looking at him every day with all of these bruises and
I’m like my poor kid dude like this has never happened
before.” Cook elaborated that “this whole two years that he’s
been alive this hasn’t happened until [Tackett] started com-
ing around.” Cook stated that “to be honest I didn’t want to
believe that he was doing that to my son, being mean to my
son and that my son was being abused. But I was also really
scared because [if Child Protective Services] takes my kids
again I’ll never get them back.” During the March 12, 2023,
interview, when asked how she could look at R.R.Y. yester-
day and not think he had the “shit beat out of him,” Cook
stated, “I do . . . like the last five days. It’s been in my head.
Like every time I hear him cry and I’m not around. Every
time I hear huge thuds.”
When asked why she did not get R.R.Y. medical help in
the day or two prior to March 12, 2023, Cook stated it was
because she was scared and “didn’t think anything was like
seriously wrong. Like life threatening wrong and at the same
time not wanting to believe that [her] child was being beat
up.” Cook went on to say that she overlooked her son’s being
hit out of fear of Child Protective Services (CPS). Cook also
stated, “[W]ell if we wanna say that I knew well then yeah I
knew. Deep down . . . I did know. But I never physically saw
him do it.”
When asked what her guilt was in all of this, Cook told
Investigator Barry it was “[n]ot taking him when I should
have, when I felt I should have.” When asked when that was,
she stated, “I felt like I should have . . . taken him when I
knew it was unusual for somebody new to be around and all
this stuff happening when it didn’t happen before.”

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(ii) Testimony of Boone
Boone, a nurse at the hospital in Lincoln, testified that when
she treated R.R.Y. on March 12, 2023, he “was kind of grey
and not moving,” and that he had multiple bruises. She testified
that R.R.Y. came in breathing on his own but was ultimately
intubated. Boone testified that R.R.Y. had bruising to his face
and head, a bump on his head, his eye was swollen, and one
of the undereye bruises was “patterned.” He had bruising to
both ears and bruising and scrapes through his hair. He had
a mark on his neck and a lot of swelling to his genital area.
Throughout his body, there were bruises in multiple stages of
healing. There were also multiple abrasions.
(iii) Internet Searches
On March 10, 2023, at 3:13 p.m., an internet search was
conducted on one of Cook’s cell phones for “signs of a con-
cussion”; at 3:14 p.m., a search was conducted for “signs of
a concussion in a toddler”; and at 3:19 p.m., a search was
conducted for “can my toddler sleep with a concussion.” On
March 11, at 11:08 a.m., an internet search was conducted
for “can my toddler sleep with a concussion,” and at 7:18
p.m., a search was conducted for “can my toddler sleep with
a concussion.”
On March 12, 2023, between the hours of 11:43 a.m. and
1:36 p.m., a variety of internet searches were performed on
Cook’s cell phone, including the following: “what does it mean
if your jaw is locked while sleeping,” “when you[’re] in a
coma can you move and respond,” “how can I help a passed
out person awake,” “can a person in a coma respond to being
shook,” “why would someone[’]s abdom[e]n and penis be hard
and swollen,” and “what does it mean when your eyes won[’]t
dilate inight [sic].”
(iv) Testimony of Dr. Haney
Dr. Haney, who first examined R.R.Y. on March 13, 2023,
testified that R.R.Y had “extensive bruising almost from

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head to toe. Forehead, cheeks, ears, mouth, neck, front of
the chest, his back. Pretty significant bruising on his genita-
lia. Swelling of his leg. . . . [L]ots and lots of bruising. Way
more than we ever see with children who are just normally
active.” Dr. Haney testified that “[w]e don’t see this number
of injuries accidentally.” There was also bruising at the very
end of his penis and what appeared to be burns on the shaft
and down at the base. She testified that R.R.Y. had a fatal
brain injury and that by the time he arrived at the hospital
in Omaha, there was no indication “his brain was working
at all.” She stated R.R.Y. had a subdural hematoma and reti-
nal hemorrhaging. She opined that the most common cause
of a subdural hematoma is “some sort of pretty significant
trauma” and that in an infant or young child, the most com-
mon cause of retinal hemorrhages is “a rotational injury,
such as shaken baby,” but that it can also very rarely be seen
with blunt force trauma.
Dr. Haney testified that immediately after suffering the
brain injury, R.R.Y. would likely have been unresponsive,
very difficult to wake, limp, and maybe vomiting, and cer-
tainly would not have wanted to eat or drink. She agreed
that it would have been very apparent to whomever was
taking care of him that he was not well. She testified that
seeking medical care would have been the appropriate treat-
ment. Dr. Haney testified further that medical care would
have needed to be sought as soon as possible and that she
did not know if the injury was “fatal from the beginning
or not.” She testified that R.R.Y. also had three healing rib
fractures, a splenic laceration, a left tibial fracture, and a
pulmonary contusion.
(v) Testimony of Dr. Elieff
The general and forensic pathologist, Dr. Elieff, deter-
mined that R.R.Y.’s cause of death was blunt force injuries
to the head, torso, and extremities, with the head injury being
the principal cause of death. Dr. Elieff opined that R.R.Y.’s

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brain injuries were “more consistent with multiple instances of
blunt force being applied to multiple areas.”
(vi) Testimony of Cook’s Friend
Cook’s friend testified that she watched Cook’s children,
including R.R.Y., on March 8, 2023. Cook’s friend noticed
that R.R.Y. had a black eye but testified it was not a full black
eye, “kind of just like a little crescent.” Cook told her friend
that R.R.Y. had hit himself with a dumbbell. Cook’s friend did
not notice any other injuries on R.R.Y. She confirmed that the
black eye she saw on March 8 did not look like the black eyes
she observed in the photographs of R.R.Y from the hospital
in Lincoln.
Cook’s friend testified that “because of the past CPS case,
[Cook] was trying to figure out which hospital, I guess, would
have been better at understanding.” Cook’s friend also testified
that Cook dropped off two of her children at her friend’s house
before taking R.R.Y to the hospital. Cook’s friend assumed, at
first, that Cook went to a different Lincoln hospital that was
closest to Cook’s friend’s house.
(vii) Testimony of Mildred Crumbley
Mildred Crumbley, an acquaintance of Cook, testified that
at some point after 11:49 p.m. on March 11, 2023, Cook
arrived at Crumbley’s house. Cook stayed 45 minutes while a
white man, Crumbley believed was probably Tackett, waited
in the car. Cook told Crumbley R.R.Y. was also in the car but
Crumbley testified Cook “may have said he wasn’t feeling well
or something like that.” Crumbley’s additional testimony will
be discussed in the analysis.
(viii) Employment Testimony
A human resources business partner of the hospital where
Cook had worked testified that Cook’s last day of employment
there was January 22, 2023. A Lincoln police officer testified
that starting January 28, Cook and Tackett began advertising

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marijuana sales online. Investigator Barry testified that Tackett
also sold antique toys on social media.
3. Jury Verdicts and Sentencing
Following jury verdicts of guilty on all three counts, Cook
was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 70
years to life on count 1, intentional child abuse resulting in
death, a Class IB felony under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707(1) and
(8) (Cum. Supp. 2024); 20 to 25 years on count 2, intentional
child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class II felony
under § 28-707(1) and (7); and 5 to 10 years on count 3, pos-
session with the intent to deliver or delivery of a controlled
substance within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class II felony under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(1), (2)(b), and (4)(a) (Cum. Supp.
2022). Cook appeals.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Cook assigns, restated, that the district court erred by (1)
holding there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict of intentional child abuse resulting in death under
§ 28-707(1) and (8), (2) holding there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury verdict of intentional child abuse result-
ing in serious bodily injury under § 28-707(1) and (7), (3)
denying Cook’s motion in limine and admitting gruesome
photographs into evidence, and (4) abusing its discretion by
imposing excessive sentences.
Cook also assigns that her counsel was ineffective. Cook
assigns, restated, that counsel was ineffective for his failure
to (5) question a key witness regarding the witness’ involve-
ment in an ongoing sexual misconduct lawsuit to attack
the witness’ credibility; (6) object to the State’s request to
admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts at the pre-
trial hearing and at trial; (7) object to the statements made
by the State’s witness, Crumbley; and (8) object to state-
ments made by the State’s witness, Investigator Barry, about
Cook’s truthfulness.

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
[1] In reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the
evidence, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a
combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate
court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the
credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such mat-
ters are for the finder of fact. State v. Liech, 320 Neb. 843,
30 N.W.3d 847 (2026). The relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
2. Admissibility of Evidence
[2-4] In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules
apply, 	the 	admissibility 	of 	evidence 	is 	controlled 	by 	the
Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only
when the rules make discretion a factor in determining admis-
sibility. State v. Kruger, 320 Neb. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398 (2025).
Where the Nebraska Evidence Rules commit the evidentiary
question at issue to the discretion of the trial court, an appel-
late court reviews the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Id. A trial court has the discretion to determine the
relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and such determina-
tions will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an
abuse of that discretion. State v. Price, 320 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.3d
70 (2025).
[5] An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s deci-
sion is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable
or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
and evidence. State v. Corral, 318 Neb. 940, 20 N.W.3d 372
(2025).
3. Excessive Sentences
[6] An appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed
within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by

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the trial court. State v. Hagens, 320 Neb. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174
(2025).
Additional standards are set forth in our analysis.
V. ANALYSIS
Cook assigns errors falling into the general categories of
insufficiency of evidence, admission of gruesome photographs,
ineffective assistance of counsel, and excessive sentences.
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
Cook challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for her
convictions of intentional child abuse resulting in death and
intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury.
(a) Intentional Child Abuse Resulting
in Serious Bodily Injury
Cook was charged with and convicted of intentional child
abuse resulting in serious bodily injury under § 28-707 due to
R.R.Y.’s broken leg.
[7,8] As relevant here, under § 28-707(1) child abuse is
committed if a person knowingly, intentionally, or negligently
causes or permits a minor child to be “(a) [p]laced in a situ-
ation that endangers [the minor child’s] life or physical . . .
health; [or] (c) [d]eprived of necessary . . . care . . . .” For
a conviction of intentional child abuse resulting in serious
bodily injury, the offense must be committed knowingly and
intentionally and result in the serious bodily injury of the
minor child as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-109 (Reissue
2016). See § 28-707(7).
As such, the State was required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that (1) Cook caused or permitted R.R.Y. to
be placed in a situation that endangered his life or physical
health, or deprived him of necessary care; (2) she did so
knowingly and intentionally; (3) at the time Cook did so,
R.R.Y. was a minor child; and (4) as a result, R.R.Y. sustained
a serious bodily injury. See State v. Olbricht, 294 Neb. 974,
885 N.W.2d 699 (2016).

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On appeal, Cook argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support that she acted knowingly and intentionally and that
R.R.Y.’s leg injury was a serious bodily injury.
(i) Evidence of Intent Was Sufficient
[9-11] Intent is the state of the actor’s mind when the actor’s
conduct occurs. State v. Yah, 317 Neb. 730, 11 N.W.3d 632
(2024). As the jury was correctly instructed, “intentionally”
means willfully or purposely, and not accidently or invol-
untarily. See State v. Rokus, 240 Neb. 613, 483 N.W.2d 149
(1992). The intent involved in conduct is a mental process and
may be inferred from the conduct itself, the actor’s language
in reference to the conduct, and the circumstances surrounding
an incident. Id.
[12,13] The jury was instructed that “knowingly” means
with knowledge or perception of facts requisite to make up
the crime. The meaning of “knowledge” in a criminal action
can vary with the context in which it is used, but it com-
monly imports a perception of facts requisite to make up a
crime. State v. Moore, 317 Neb. 493, 10 N.W.3d 531 (2024).
Knowledge, like intent, may be inferred from the circum-
stances surrounding the act. Id.
Cook argues that Tackett was the only witness to R.R.Y.’s
leg injury and that his account of the injury was that while
holding R.R.Y., Tackett had passed out and fallen on R.R.Y.’s
ankle. Cook also argues that, at the time of R.R.Y.’s leg injury,
there was no evidence that Cook knew it was unsafe to leave
R.R.Y. in the care of Tackett and/or Pring. Cook also argues
that evidence she lied to Pring about obtaining medical care
does not demonstrate intent and is speculative and that Cook
may have lied because she could not afford care, was embar-
rassed, and did not want to explain herself to Pring.
The State correctly argues it is not required to show that
Cook caused R.R.Y.’s injuries—only that she deprived R.R.Y.
of necessary care, the deprivation of which resulted in a pro-
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As outlined in detail above, Cook received information that
R.R.Y.’s leg had been injured the day it occurred. She treated
his injury by wrapping it in a bandage, icing it, elevating
it, and providing him with pain medication. A rational trier
of fact could find that her internet searches on February 18,
2023, showed she was concerned about swelling and bruising
and also demonstrated she was also aware the injury could
possibly be a fracture or torn ligament. Cook’s text message
to Foreman on the same day referred to his leg as being “so
swollen.” Cook acknowledges that after the injury, R.R.Y.
was eventually able to pull himself up to a standing position
and bear weight but that he never fully walked on his left leg
again. Additionally, when he was hospitalized on March 12,
nearly a month after his injury, his leg was still swollen.
Despite Cook’s concerns and R.R.Y.’s lingering symptoms,
Cook never obtained medical care for R.R.Y., even after Pring
asked her if she had. Instead, Cook chose to continue to treat
the injury as a sprain. Based upon the substantial evidence
presented to the jury, a rational trier of fact could conclude
that Cook knew R.R.Y. needed medical care and intentionally
deprived him of it.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we find it is sufficient to support that Cook had
the intent necessary for a conviction of intentional child abuse
resulting in serious bodily injury.
(ii) Evidence of Serious Bodily
Injury Was Sufficient
[14] As the jury was instructed, “[s]erious bodily injury” is
defined as “bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of
death, or which involves substantial risk of serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the func-
tion of any part or organ of the body.” See § 28-109(21). On
appeal, Cook argues that there was a lack of evidence submit-
ted to the jury that R.R.Y.’s leg injury satisfied the definition
in § 28-109(21). In the context of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-308

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(Reissue 2016), which also utilizes the “serious bodily injury”
definition contained in § 28-109, this court has stated that it is
not necessary that the injury caused death, or serious perma-
nent disfigurement or impairment of the function of any part
or organ of the body, but only that it involved a substantial
risk of producing those results. See State v. Pribil, 224 Neb.
28, 395 N.W.2d 543 (1986).
Cook argues that the State’s evidence showed only that
R.R.Y. received his leg injury in the middle of February 2023
and other injuries “during a short time span in March 2023”
and that his leg injury was “labeled a fracture,” which Cook
alleges is “commonly known to not be a serious injury.”
Brief for appellant at 23 (emphasis in original). Cook points
to Dr. Haney’s testimony that the injury was either a spiral
or oblique fracture and that not treating this type of fracture
“means it could heal incorrectly, which could lead to the
individual having a leg length discrepancy and a limp.” Id.
(emphasis in original). However, Cook argues that there was
no evidence submitted as to how long someone would have to
wait to treat a fracture before those risks were apparent. Cook
also argues that a lengthier healing period due to nontreatment
does not equate to a substantial risk of impairment. Finally,
Cook argues that conducting an internet search for symptoms
prior to spending time and money for care is a universal
experience and that “[i]t is not a stretch to imagine” Cook sin-
cerely thought R.R.Y.’s leg injury was a sprain or other injury
that could be treated at home and monitored for a period of
time. Id. at 24.
The State argues the evidence demonstrated that the lack
of medical care led to protracted impairment of R.R.Y.’s leg
because he could not walk, which is an impairment of the
function of a part of the body. Finally, the State argues that
it was not required to show that R.R.Y. had a permanent
disfigurement.
The evidence presented at trial, which was discussed in
detail above, demonstrated that R.R.Y.’s leg injury occurred

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in mid-February and that he was never again able to walk
independently. When the nurse at the hospital in Lincoln saw
R.R.Y. almost a month later, she noticed that his leg “didn’t
really look right” and was “out to the side.” Dr. Haney testi-
fied that this type of fracture would be casted and that one of
the reasons for doing so would be that “it heals faster when
you put a cast on it.” Finally, during R.R.Y.’s autopsy, it could
be seen that although the injury had been healing, the bone
was still separated.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily
injury, including that R.R.Y.’s leg injury was a serious bodily
injury, beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Cook’s assignment of
error is without merit.
(b) Intentional Child Abuse Resulting in Death
[15,16] For a conviction of intentional child abuse result-
ing in death, the offense must be committed knowingly and
intentionally and result in the death of such child. § 28-707(8).
It is not necessary to have intended the abuse to result in the
child’s death. See State v. Montoya, 304 Neb. 96, 933 N.W.2d
558 (2019).
[17] As such, the State was required to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that (1) Cook caused or permitted R.R.Y.
to be (a) placed in a situation that endangered his life or
physical health, (b) cruelly punished, or (c) deprived of nec-
essary care; (2) she did so knowingly and intentionally; (3)
at the time Cook did so, R.R.Y. was a minor child; and (4)
Cook’s offense proximately caused the death of R.R.Y. See
Montoya, supra.
On appeal, Cook does not dispute that R.R.Y. died of
injuries sustained by abuse. Instead, Cook argues there was
not sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that she “knowingly” and “intentionally” caused or permitted
him to be placed in a situation that endangered his life or

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physical health, cruelly punished, or deprived of necessary
care that resulted in his death.
Specifically, Cook argues that the evidence shows she did
not cause R.R.Y.’s injuries and that she never actually saw
Tackett cause injuries to R.R.Y. She also points to evidence
that Tackett was purposely shielding R.R.Y. from her to hide
the extent of his injuries and would lie to her about the cause
of the injuries when she noticed them. While Cook admits her
actions were reckless, she argues they do not rise to the level
of willful and purposeful.
The State argues that “given the sheer number of injuries
to R.R.Y., and the severity of those injuries, it defies common
sense” to believe Cook could have been unaware of the abuse.
Brief for appellee at 13. The State also argues that the evidence
presented that Cook was initially dishonest about R.R.Y.’s fall-
ing down the stairs could be used by the jury to infer Cook was
“covering up” for Tackett. Id. at 15.
As explained in detail above, as early as February 2023,
Cook noticed bruises on R.R.Y. but still decided to move in
with Tackett on March 4. She often left her children with him
thereafter. In interviews, Cook stated that as early as March 6,
she noticed that injuries again began to appear on R.R.Y. She
began to question whether Tackett was hurting R.R.Y. As early
as March 9, Cook had concerns R.R.Y. could have a concus-
sion and thought she should probably make him a doctor’s
appointment. Cook initially stated this was due to a fall down
the stairs, which she later admitted never occurred. She admit-
ted that the following 2 days R.R.Y. was cranky, seemed more
tired, and did not want to play a lot.
Internet searches conducted on Cook’s phone on March
10 and 11, 2023, indicate concerns regarding a concussion.
On March 11, she noticed R.R.Y. had a missing tooth and
an injury on the back of his head. She questioned whether
he was being hurt and even contemplated installing cameras.
By that night, he was not wanting to eat and had vomited.

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Instead of obtaining medical care for R.R.Y., Cook again left
him in the care of Tackett.
The following morning, Cook was unable to wake R.R.Y.
and noticed a pattern injury on his face. He was limp and had
no eye movement or dilation, but instead of calling an ambu-
lance or rushing him to a hospital, Cook tried various tactics
to wake him and internet searches were performed on her
phone. After several hours, she finally took him to the hospital,
stopping to drop off two of her other children on the way. He
arrived with multiple visible bruises and abrasions.
There was substantial evidence from which a rational trier
of fact could conclude that Cook knew she was permitting
R.R.Y. to be placed in a situation that endangered his life or
physical health and depriving him of care and that she did so
intentionally. This evidence includes Cook’s own statements
that “well if we wanna say that I knew well then yeah I knew.
Deep down . . . I did know. But I never physically saw him do
it” and that her guilt in all of this was “[n]ot taking him when
I should have, when I felt I should have.” Followed by Cook’s
explanation that “I felt like I should have . . . taken him when
I knew it was unusual for somebody new to be around and all
this stuff happening when it didn’t happen before.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of intentional child abuse resulting in death
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Cook’s assignment of error
is without merit.
2. Denial of Motion in Limine and Admission
of Gruesome Photographs
Cook 	assigns 	the 	district 	court 	erred 	when 	it 	denied
her motion in limine and admitted evidence of gruesome
photographs.
(a) Procedural History
Prior to trial, Cook filed a motion in limine seeking to
exclude certain photographs. The trial court overruled the

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motion. During trial, Cook renewed her motion, seeking only
to exclude the photographs from R.R.Y.’s autopsy marked as
exhibits 173 through 177, arguing that they were not relevant
and were cumulative and that any probative value was out-
weighed by the possibility of prejudice. The trial court over-
ruled the renewed motion.
When exhibits 173 through 177 were offered into evidence
during the forensic pathologist’s testimony, Cook renewed
her objections. The district court overruled the objections
and admitted exhibits 173 through 177, stating that the pho-
tographs “show different angles,” are not repetitive, show
“different conditions during the autopsy,” and show “things
that are revealed during the autopsy,” and that no internal pho-
tographs were in evidence. The district court went on to state
that the State had the obligation to prove all elements and that
the photographs were “highly probative” of “one of the major
issues that is controverted in the case.” Finally, the district
court explained that if Dr. Haney’s testimony were sufficient
in all respects, there would have been no need for an autopsy,
and that the autopsy was needed to see internal injuries. The
district court determined that the probative value of the photo-
graphs was not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair
prejudice and committed to limiting the amount of time the
photographs were displayed to the jury.
(b) Arguments
On appeal, Cook argues that the trial court erred by admit-
ting exhibits 173 through 177 because they were not rel-
evant and that, even if they were relevant, they should have
been excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016)
because they were cumulative and any probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Cook argues exhibits 173 through 177 were not relevant
and were cumulative because at the time they were admitted,
the State “had already called 22 witnesses” and had offered
numerous photographs of R.R.Y. from before his injuries to

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when he was hospitalized and received medical care, which
included “photographs of nearly every injury on his body and
x-rays of his internal injuries.” Brief for appellant at 25. Cook
further argues that R.R.Y.’s cause of death had already been
established by a prior witness and that Dr. Haney had pro-
vided identification, explanations, and potential timelines of
R.R.Y.’s external and internal injuries, leaving no remaining
controverted issues that the autopsy photographs could have
illustrated or made clear. Finally, Cook argues that the foren-
sic pathologist could have testified about R.R.Y.’s autopsy
and the timeline, nature, and extent of his injuries without the
jury’s being shown exhibits 173 through 177.
As to Cook’s arguments that exhibits 173 through 177 were
unduly prejudicial, Cook argues that even if the photographs
were relevant, they should have been excluded because the
probative value of the photographs was substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically, she
argues that because of their gruesome nature and because the
subject was a young child, the photographs were more likely
to inflame the passions of the jury. Cook argues she was preju-
diced by the trial court’s error in admitting the photographs
because had the jury not seen them, it would have come to a
different conclusion “due to a lesser degree of passion or anger
towards Cook.” Brief for appellant at 26.
The State argues the photographs were minimal in number
and were not duplicative. The State also argues that Cook
cannot negate the photographs’ relevance by choosing not to
dispute an issue or issues at trial because the State is allowed
to present a coherent picture of the facts of the crimes charged,
and it may generally choose its evidence in doing so.
[18] To the extent Cook’s motion and broad assignment of
error encompasses any other photographs, only the admis-
sibility of the autopsy photographs in exhibits 173 through
177 will be discussed. See State v. Huston, 285 Neb. 11,
23, 824 N.W.2d 724, 734 (2013) (“[w]hen a motion in
limine to exclude evidence is overruled, the movant must

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object when the particular evidence which was sought to be
excluded by the motion is offered during trial to preserve
error for appeal”).
(c) Resolution
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 2016). Under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 27-401 (Reissue 2016), “[r]elevant evidence means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
However, even relevant evidence may be “excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” § 27-403.
Cook’s arguments that the photographs were inadmissible
under § 27-402 because they were not relevant and Cook’s
arguments that the photographs should have been excluded
under § 27-403 as cumulative will be analyzed together
because they rely on the same evidence and arguments. For
the reasons explained below, we find exhibits 173 through 177
relevant, not cumulative, and not unduly prejudicial.
(i) Photographs Were Relevant
and Not Cumulative
[19-23] The bar for establishing evidentiary relevance
is not a high one; it requires only that the probative value
of the evidence be something more than nothing. State v.
Prince, 320 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.3d 70 (2025). Evidence is rel-
evant if it tends in any degree to alter the probability of a
material fact. Id. A court may admit into evidence photo-
graphs of a victim to show the condition of the body, to
show the nature and extent of wounds and injuries to it, and
to establish intent. See State v. Dubray, 289 Neb. 208, 854
N.W.2d 584 (2014). A defendant cannot negate an exhibit’s

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probative value through a tactical decision to stipulate. State
v. Abdulkadir, 286 Neb. 417, 837 N.W.2d 510 (2013). The
State is allowed to present a coherent picture of the facts of
the crimes charged, and it may generally choose its evidence
in so doing. Id.
The photographs that comprise exhibits 173 through 177
demonstrate the extent of R.R.Y.’s internal and external injuries
and are relevant to intent. Whether Cook’s actions with respect
to R.R.Y. were committed knowingly and intentionally was a
controverted issue at trial, and none of the other photographs
submitted to the jury show R.R.Y.’s injuries from the same
date, healing stage, and angle as the autopsy photographs con-
tained in exhibits 173 through 177. Thus, exhibits 173 through
177 were relevant and not cumulative. However, we must still
determine if they should be excluded because the probative
value of their admission is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.
(ii) Photographs Not Unfairly Prejudicial
[24-26] As explained above, relevant evidence “may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.” § 27-403. Unfair prejudice
means an undue tendency to suggest a decision based on an
improper basis. Prince, supra. Unfair prejudice speaks to the
capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the fact
finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged, commonly on an emotional
basis. Id. When considering whether evidence of other acts
is unfairly prejudicial, courts consider whether the evidence
tends to make conviction of the defendant more probable for
an incorrect reason. Id.
[27-29] The autopsy photographs reflect the gruesome
nature of the crime and the extent of R.R.Y.’s injuries. This
court has held that gruesome crimes produce gruesome pho-
tographs. See State v. Boswell, 316 Neb. 542, 5 N.W.3d 747
(2024). When the State lays proper foundation, photographs

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that illustrate or make clear a controverted issue are admis-
sible, even if gruesome. See id. The gruesome nature of
photographs alone will not keep them from the trier of fact,
so long as the probative value is not outweighed by the preju-
dicial effect. Id.
We cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the dis-
trict court to find that the photographs were relevant and
that their probative value was not substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice or by the consideration
of needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Thus, we
find no error in the district court’s admission of exhibits 173
through 177.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Before addressing Cook’s claims that she received ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel in multiple respects, we first set
forth certain legal principles and procedural requirements that
govern such claims on direct appeal.
(a) Legal Principles
[30,31] When reviewing an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim on direct appeal, the question is whether the record
affirmatively shows that the defendant’s trial counsel’s per-
formance was deficient and that the deficient performance
actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense. State v. Kruger,
320 Neb. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398 (2025). A court may examine
performance and prejudice in any order and need not examine
both prongs if a defendant fails to demonstrate either. Id.
[32-35] To show deficient performance, the defendant must
show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a law-
yer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law. Id. To
show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. A rea-
sonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. Id. In determining whether there

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is a reasonable probability that any deficient performance of
trial counsel would have resulted in a different outcome in
the proceeding, an appellate court may properly consider the
strength of the admissible evidence relating to the contro-
verted issues in the case. Id.
[36-38] When reviewing claims of alleged ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, trial counsel is afforded due deference to
formulate trial strategy and tactics. Id. There is a strong
presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and an appellate
court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions.
Id. Ultimately, the federal Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. Id.
[39] As mentioned above, on direct appeal, an appellate
court only addresses claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel that can be conclusively determined from the record. Id.
The record on appeal is sufficient if it establishes either that
trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that the appel-
lant will not be able to establish prejudice as a matter of law,
or that trial counsel’s actions could not be justified as a part
of any plausible trial strategy. Id. Conversely, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim will not be addressed on direct
appeal if it requires examination of facts not contained in the
record. Id.
(b) Procedural Requirements
[40,41] When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from
his or her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise
on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective per-
formance which is known to the defendant or is apparent from
the record; otherwise, the issue will be procedurally barred in
a subsequent postconviction proceeding. Id. When a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal,
the appellant is not required to allege prejudice. Id.
[42,43] An alleged error must be both specifically assigned
and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting
the error to be considered by an appellate court. Id. Claims

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of ineffective assistance of counsel are no exception. Id. On
direct appeal in a criminal case, claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel must be both specifically assigned and spe-
cifically argued in the appellant’s brief. Id.
[44-46] Assignments of error on direct appeal regarding
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must specifically allege
the conduct that is claimed to constitute deficient performance.
State v. Kruger, 320 Neb. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398 (2025). A gen-
eralized and vague assignment of error that does not advise an
appellate court of the issue submitted for decision will not be
considered. Id. As we have recently explained, an assignment
is specific when it addresses a specific issue that does not
require additional information to understand precisely what the
assignment attacks. Id.
[47-50] An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised
on direct appeal when the claim alleges deficient performance
with enough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make a
determination of whether the claim can be decided upon the
trial record and (2) a district court later reviewing a petition
for postconviction relief to recognize whether the claim was
brought before the appellate court. Id. A claim insufficiently
stated is no different than a claim not stated at all. Id. An
argument that does little more than restate an assignment of
error does not support the assignment, and an appellate court
will not address it. Id. Likewise, where an appellant’s brief
contains conclusory assertions unsupported by a coherent ana-
lytical argument, the appellant has failed to include a specific
argument sufficient to raise a claim. Id.
For example, when the claim of ineffective assistance on
direct appeal involves uncalled witnesses, it is sufficient that
appellate counsel give on direct appeal the names or descrip-
tions of any uncalled witnesses forming the basis of a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. But the appellate
court does not need specific factual allegations as to what the
person or persons would have said, which will not be found in
the appellate record. Id.

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(c) Cook’s Claims
Cook assigns four separate errors for ineffective assistance
of counsel. We address each separately.
(i) Failure to Attack Witness Credibility
Cook asserts that she received ineffective assistance of
counsel because her trial counsel failed to question Captain
Dilsaver regarding his involvement in an ongoing sexual
misconduct lawsuit filed against the city of Lincoln in 2023
to attack his credibility. According to Cook, the complaint
accused Captain Dilsaver of retaliating against a female ser-
geant following her complaint of sexual harassment and dis-
crimination; sending unwanted sexual text messages to female
dispatchers; and sending unwanted photographs of his geni-
tals, while he was on duty and in uniform, to at least one
female officer.
Cook argues that Captain Dilsaver was the investigator who
conducted Cook’s initial interview that was used to portray her
as untruthful and that if trial counsel had questioned Captain
Dilsaver about his involvement in the lawsuit to attack his
credibility, the jury would not have trusted his police work and
analysis, Cook’s credibility would have been bolstered, and
the jury would have come to a different decision.
The State argues that Cook’s arguments fail because she
does not explain how allegations of sexual misconduct relate
to truthfulness; thus, absent this connection, the information
could not have been used to cross-examine Captain Dilsaver.
The State also argues that any failure was not prejudicial
because Cook offers no explanation of how the lawsuit would
have impacted his credibility and because his credibility was
not relevant in the case as he was not a material witness to
Cook’s guilt or R.R.Y.’s abuse.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-608 (Reissue 2016) provides, in rel-
evant part:
(1) The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of reputation or

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opinion, but subject to these limitations: (a) The evi-
dence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness . . . .
(2) Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for
the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in section
27-609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if proba-
tive of truthfulness or untruthfulness be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness (a) concerning his char-
acter for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .
In Cook’s brief, she does not argue that the allegations
contained in the sexual misconduct lawsuit relate to Captain
Dilsaver’s 	truthfulness 	or 	untruthfulness, 	as 	required 	by
§ 27-608 to be utilized to attack credibility. Additionally,
even if his credibility was attacked, it does not negate the
statements made by Cook. Finally, Cook does not specifically
argue that any of the statements made by Captain Dilsaver
were untruthful. If Captain Dilsaver was not untruthful, then
attacking his credibility served no benefit. For these reasons,
Cook’s argument that trial counsel was deficient for not
questioning Captain Dilsaver about the sexual misconduct
lawsuit to attack his credibility does not demonstrate defi-
cient performance.
(ii) Failure to Object to Evidence of
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
Cook assigns she received ineffective assistance of coun-
sel when trial counsel “failed to object to the State’s Request
to Admit Evidence of other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts at the
Pretrial Hearing and at Trial.”
a. Background
Trial counsel filed a motion asking the State to disclose
any intention to use evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts, and the State disclosed the intent to offer evidence of a

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2021 incident where one of Cook’s other children was uncon-
scious after getting her head caught in a car window and
Cook took her to the hospital, after picking up a third party.
Cook was charged in this matter and found not guilty after a
jury trial. The State also disclosed the intent to offer a second
collection of evidence of CPS involvement with Cook’s other
children that the State asserted involved drugs and domestic
violence. The State did not believe it necessary to get into the
details of this second set of incidents.
The State argued these incidents were allowed under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 27-404 (Cum. Supp. 2024) as they were inex-
tricably intertwined because Cook stated that fear of CPS
involvement was a reason for her not taking R.R.Y. to the
hospital sooner. Trial counsel did not object to the receipt of
the exhibits at the hearing and failed to give any position on
the State’s intention to use the evidence at trial. The district
court issued an order stating the purpose of the evidence was
consistent with § 27-404(2).
On appeal, Cook takes issue with the evidence of prior acts
that came in through exhibit 92, Captain Dilsaver’s interview
of Cook, without objection from trial counsel.
Cook does not specify what specific portions of exhibit 92
she claims are objectionable. However, a review of exhibit 92
reveals the following references to CPS:
• Cook explained that she did not want to believe R.R.Y. was
being abused and that she was also really scared because
“CPS takes my kids again I’ll never get them back, they have
already told me. . . . I don’t want to lose my kids and I love my
kids and I worked hard both times to get them back.”
• When explaining why she did not get R.R.Y. medical help
sooner, Cook stated, “I am so scared of the hospital calling
— look.”
• Cook stated, “I am already throwing it at myself. The fact
that I overlooked my son being hit out of fear of CPS, like
believe me I already know.”

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• Cook explained, “I know that I had a thought in the back of my
head that something was going on. I know that I was scared to
go to the hospital because of [them] taking my kids.”
• When asked if there was anything she felt she should have
done between Wednesday and the day of the interview, Cook
stated: “[Y]eah, I feel like I should have sucked my fucking
pride up and took him whether I was scared of CPS being
called or not. My only concern is that I have done this twice
already and the third time, this is not third times a charm,
like this is probably it.”
• In describing not getting treatment for R.R.Y.’s leg, Cook
stated, “I know I should have taken him, I know I should
have pushed my own fear I mean because . . . I didn’t do
anything wrong except for not tak[ing] him so, if CPS would
have c[o]me, I would have just fought it and not had to worry
about it again.”
• Cook stated, “And yes, the fear of going to the hospital know-
ing he looks battered and having CPS come, I don’t want to
lose my kids. I have worked hard to get my kids back.”
b. Resolution
On appeal, Cook argues that trial counsel was deficient
for failing to object to exhibit 92 and that the statements
should have been redacted from exhibit 92 because hearing
the evidence caused the jury to believe that because Cook
allegedly abused her children in the past, then she must have
intentionally hurt R.R.Y., which was prejudicial to Cook. The
State argues that it did not offer outside proof that CPS had
previously removed Cook’s children and that it was Cook
that gave this involvement as part of her explanation for not
obtaining earlier medical care for R.R.Y., resulting in the
evidence regarding CPS being inextricably intertwined. The
State also argues that Cook has failed to sufficiently assign
and argue any claim related to her trial counsel’s failure to
object to evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts because
she cited to only exhibit 92, which consists of a more than

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2-hour interview and Cook does not specify which statements
were objectionable or where these statements can be located
in the record.
We agree that Cook’s failure to cite which statements or
which portions of exhibit 92 are objectionable makes it dif-
ficult to know exactly which statements she is referring to.
However, Cook cites pretrial arguments and sections of the
record that make it clear she is objecting to evidence of prior
CPS involvement. Thus, this court will analyze the admissibil-
ity of these statements.
[51-53] In a criminal case, § 27-404(1) operates as a broad
exclusionary rule of relevant evidence that speaks to a criminal
defendant’s propensity to have committed the crime or crimes
charged. State v. Wheeler, 314 Neb. 282, 989 N.W.2d 728
(2023). Under § 27-404(2), evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he or she acted in conformity there-
with. State v. Logan, 320 Neb. 554, 28 N.W.3d 510 (2025).
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. § 27-404(2).
Section 27-404(2) does not apply to evidence of a defendant’s
other crimes or bad acts if the evidence is inextricably inter-
twined with the charged crime. See State v. Ash, 286 Neb. 681,
838 N.W.2d 273 (2013).
[54,55] We have explained that inextricably intertwined evi-
dence includes evidence that forms part of the factual setting
of the crime and evidence that is so blended or connected to
the charged crime that proof of the charged crime will neces-
sarily require proof of the other crimes or bad acts. Logan,
supra. Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is also inextricably
intertwined with the charged crime if the other crimes or bad
acts are necessary for the prosecution to present a coherent
picture of the charged crime. Id.
The references to prior CPS involvement contained in
exhibit 92 are inextricably intertwined with the crimes Cook

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was charged with relating to R.R.Y. because they are neces-
sary to present a coherent picture of the events and deci-
sions that comprised the crimes for which she was charged.
Additionally, even if this court were to find the evidence not
to be inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes, the
evidence would still be admissible under § 27-404 as evidence
of motive and/or intent. Counsel was not deficient in failing
to object because an objection would not have been success-
ful. For these reasons, Cook’s argument that trial counsel was
deficient for failing to object to the evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts regarding prior CPS involvement with Cook
has no merit.
(iii) Failure to Object to Crumbley’s Testimony
Cook’s assignment of error alleges that “Cook received
ineffective assistance of counsel when Trial Counsel failed
to object to the statements made by the State’s witness, . . .
Crumbley.” In her brief, Cook argues that Crumbley was per-
mitted to ramble on, making “multiple inadmissible statements
that were also extremely prejudicial to Cook,” and that she
offered “testimony akin to a nosey neighbor — a lot of opin-
ions, but no evidence or foundation to back up any of those
opinions.” Brief for appellant at 31.
Cook’s assignment of error does not specify what state-
ments should have been objected to or even the basis or cat-
egory of the objection. This assignment requires additional
information to understand precisely which of Crumbley’s
statements or category of statements Cook attacks, and it
is, thus, not specifically assigned. See State v. Kruger, 320
Neb. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398 (2025). On this basis alone, Cook’s
assignment fails.
(iv) Failure to Object to Investigator Barry’s
Credibility Testimony
Cook asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because
Investigator Barry was permitted to testify at trial regarding

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Cook’s truthfulness without objection. In the argument section
of her brief, Cook points to two specific instances as being
improper. First, when Investigator Barry responded, “I felt
like she struggled to be honest,” when he was asked whether
he felt Cook was honest with him when she was given the
opportunity to be honest and speak freely during the March
16, 2023, interview. Second, Cook points to Investigator
Barry’s testimony that the reason behind interviewing Cook
again on March 21 was “[t]o see if her story changes any —
even more. Just give her one last opportunity to be truthful
with me.” Cook argues that this testimony was, in essence,
Investigator Barry’s referring to Cook’s statements in her
interview as untruthful.
The State argues that Investigator Barry’s testimony was
not in error because it was just an observation that Cook’s
statements had been contradicted by other statements made by
her and by other evidence. The State further argues that even
if Investigator Barry’s testimony had been inadmissible, Cook
was not prejudiced because the jury had the evidence before
it and knew the reasons why Investigator Barry believed Cook
was being dishonest. We agree.
[56,57] The credibility of witnesses is a determination
within the province of the trier of fact. State v. Rocha, 295
Neb. 716, 890 N.W.2d 178 (2017). Because making credibil-
ity determinations is the role of the trier of fact, testimony
that usurps that role is not helpful and thus is improper opin-
ion testimony under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-701 and 27-702
(Reissue 2016). Rocha, supra. However, “[s]uch comments
upon the patently obvious generally pose little, if any, dan-
ger of prejudice . . . .” Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 407,
738 S.E.2d 74, 81 (2013).
During 	the 	interview 	on 	March 	16, 	2023, 	Cook 	told
Investigator Barry that R.R.Y. fell down the stairs on March
9. During the interview on March 21, Cook admitted R.R.Y.
never fell down the stairs. This inconsistency could be seen
by the jury in its review of the interviews. Thus, Investigator

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Barry’s testimony that he felt Cook “struggled to be honest”
at the March 16 interview and his implying untruthfulness by
his statement that he interviewed Cook again on March 21
to allow her “one last opportunity to be truthful with [him]”
were not prejudicial to Cook because they simply informed
the jury that Cook had not been completely honest in her
prior interview with Investigator Barry, which the jury could
see for itself based on her admission at the March 21 inter-
view. See Butler, supra. Any error in the failing to object to
these statements would not result in a different outcome. See
Kruger, supra.
Cook’s assignment is without merit.
4. Excessive Sentences
Cook argues the district court’s consecutive sentences of 70
years’ to life imprisonment for intentional child abuse result-
ing in death and 20 to 25 years’ imprisonment for intentional
child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury are excessive
and constitute an abuse of discretion. Cook does not challenge
her sentence for possession with intent to deliver or delivery
of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school.
Specifically, Cook argues that her codefendant, Tackett, was
sentenced to only 70 years’ to life imprisonment for inten-
tional child abuse resulting in death, despite that Tackett, not
Cook, inflicted R.R.Y.’s injuries and that Tackett, unlike Cook,
was not also charged with or convicted of intentional child
abuse resulting in serious bodily injury. Cook argues the sen-
tences fail to consider her case separately from Tackett’s and
ignore the evidence of the disparity between the culpability of
Cook compared with that of Tackett. Cook requests that her
sentences be vacated and remanded for imposition of lesser
sentences. We disagree.
[58-60] Where a sentence imposed within the statutory
limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court
must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discre-
tion in considering and applying the relevant factors, as well

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as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence
to be imposed. State v. Rejai, 320 Neb. 599, 29 N.W.3d 225
(2026). It is undisputed that Cook’s sentences fall within
statutory limits. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Cum. Supp.
2024). Thus, the question is whether the district court abused
its discretion in the sentences it imposed. See State v. Hagens,
320 Neb. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174 (2025).
In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant fac-
tors customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s
(1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4)
social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record
or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for
the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and
(8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of
the crime. . . . The appropriateness of a sentence is neces-
sarily a subjective judgment that includes the sentencing
judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and atti-
tude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s life.
Rejai, 320 Neb. at 604, 29 N.W.3d at 230. Additionally, it is
within the discretion of the trial court to impose consecutive
rather than concurrent sentences for separate crimes, even
when the crimes arise out of the same incident. See State v.
Geller, 318 Neb. 441, 16 N.W.3d 365 (2025).
[61,62] This court has considered and compared sentences
of codefendants, who were also coconspirators, in the exces-
sive sentence analysis. See, State v. Kruse, 215 Neb. 408,
338 N.W.2d 781 (1983); State v. Komer, 213 Neb. 376, 329
N.W.2d 120 (1983). However, as this court has explained in
more recent cases, the mere fact that a defendant’s sentence
differs from those which have been imposed on coperpetra-
tors in the same court does not, in and of itself, make the
defendant’s sentence an abuse of discretion; each defendant’s
life, character, and previous conduct may be considered in
determining the propriety of the sentence. See, State v. Vance,
240 Neb. 794, 484 N.W.2d 453 (1992); State v. Boppre,

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234 Neb. 922, 453 N.W.2d 406 (1990); State v. Spotted Elk,
227 Neb. 869, 420 N.W.2d 707 (1988). This court recently
held that once it is determined that the sentence prescribed
by statute is constitutional and that the sentence imposed
is within statutory limits, the issue in reviewing a sentence
is not whether someone else in a different case received a
lesser sentence, but whether the defendant in the subject case
received an appropriate one. See Rejai, supra.
At sentencing, the district court acknowledged that a pre-
sentence investigation report (PSI) had been conducted and
made available to counsel. The State requested that addi-
tional documents and two jail calls be added to the PSI, and
Cook did not object. Cook argued at sentencing that her
codefendant, Tackett, has a “far more extensive criminal his-
tory and much darker past” than Cook and had received 85
years’ to life imprisonment. Cook also presented information
on her “attending AA” and “over 200 classes” while incarcer-
ated. Cook was given an opportunity to make a comment but
relied instead on a letter attached to her allocution letter to
serve as her comments to the district court. The district court
addressed Cook and stated:
I want to let you know the things I’ve considered in
determining the appropriate sentence in this case. The
laws of Nebraska require I examine certain things like
your age, you’re 32, you’re a high school graduate, your
social and cultural background, your past criminal record
are outlined in the PSI. The motivation for the offenses,
the nature of the offenses, and those are evident in the
PSI and were evident throughout the trial.
The presence of violence and the — I’ve considered
these things. The disregard for the — what was happen-
ing to your son. I am taking into account the — your
other minor children as well.
The district court went on to state that
having regard for the nature and circumstance of the
crimes and the history, character, [and] condition of

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[Cook], the Court finds that imprisonment of [Cook] is
necessary for the protection of the public because the risk
is substantial that, during any period of probation, [she]
would engage in additional criminal conduct, because a
lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of [her]
crimes and promote disregard for the law.
The district court then imposed Cook’s consecutive sentences
of imprisonment outlined above.
This court also does not find persuasive Cook’s argument
that a lesser sentence should have been imposed upon her
because she was also charged with and convicted of intentional
child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury. It is within the
purview of the prosecutor to determine what, if any, charges
should be brought against a person accused of committing
a crime. See Polikov v. Neth, 270 Neb. 29, 699 N.W.2d 802
(2005). Cook has cited no case law demonstrating that she is
entitled to a reduction in the sentence for one crime for having
committed multiple crimes.
The district court considered the appropriate and relevant
sentencing factors and imposed sentences within the statutory
limits. This court cannot find that the district court’s sentences
of 70 years’ to life imprisonment for intentional child abuse
resulting in death and 20 to 25 years’ imprisonment for inten-
tional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury were an
abuse of discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
We 	have 	determined 	that 	sufficient 	evidence 	supports
Cook’s convictions, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the autopsy photographs, that Cook’s
sentences were not an abuse of discretion, and that Cook did
not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, we affirm
the judgment of the district court.
Affirmed.