Monmouth-Ocean Educational Services Commission, Monmouth County v. Board of Education of the Township of Hillside, Union County, 10/20/25 (#494-25)

494-25
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 08311-24
Agency Dkt. No. 113-4/24
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Monmouth-Ocean 	Educational 	Services
Commission,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Hillside,
Union County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) have
been reviewed and considered. The parties did not file exceptions.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurs with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that respondent
Board of Education of the Township of Hillside is responsible for student J.W.’s transportation costs for
the 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 school years in the amount of $44,195.59.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition of
appeal is hereby granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	October 20, 2025
Date of Mailing: 	October 20, 2025
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08311-24
AGENCY DKT. NO. 113-04/24
MONMOUTH-OCEAN EDUCATIONAL
SERVICES COMMISSION,
Petitioner,
v.
TOWNSHIP 	OF 	HILLSIDE 	BOARD 	OF
EDUCATION, UNION COUNTY,
Respondent.
___________________________________________
Eltia I. Galarza, Esq. for petitioner (Taylor Law Group, LLC, attorneys)
Noelle van Barren, Esq. for respondents (Hunt, Hamlin and Ridley, attorneys)
Record Closed: January 7, 2025 	Decided: August 7, 2025
BEFORE WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, ALJ:
PROCEEDURAL HISTORY
On April 24, 2024, Petitioner Monmouth-Ocean Educational Services Commission
(MOESC”) filed a petition with the New Jersey Commissioner of Education seeking and
order compelling respondent Township of Hillside Board of Education (“Hillside”) to pay

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08311-24
2
petitioner $44,195.59 for transportation services rendered to a disabled minor student
who originally resided in Hillside, New Jersey. On June 12, 2024, Hillside filed an Answer
to the Petition and on June 14, 2024 the matter was referred to The Office of
Administrative Law for resolution. On September 6, 2024, respondent Hillside filed a
Motion for Summary Decision based on MOESC’s alleged failure to join the Manchester
Township Board of Education as a necessary party. On December 3, 2024, MOESC filed
its opposition to the Motion for Summary Decision and the record was closed on January
7, 2025 after receiving Hillside’s Reply.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I FIND the following as FACT:
1. 	J.W. is a special education student who originally resided in Hillside, New
Jersey.
2. 	During the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms J.W. was placed into a
residential 	treatment 	facility 	(Archertown 	Meadows 	Respite 	Home 	“AMRH”)
located in New Egypt, NJ.
3. 	During the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms J.W. attended Regional Day
School (“RDS”), a choice school located in Manchester Township, NJ.
4. 	MOESC is a public educational agency, established under New Jersey
Statute 18A, that assists public and non-public schools in numerous areas
including cooperative transportation.
5. 	During 	the 	2017-18 	and 	2018-19 	school 	terms 	MOESC 	provided
transportation services for J.W. to and from AMRH and seeks recovery from
Hillside in the amount of $44,195.59 for transporting J.W. too and from AMRH and
RDS.
6. 	MOESC seeks recovery from Hillside in the amount of $44,195.59 for
transporting J.W. to and from AMRH.
7. 	On July 19, 2019, the New Jersey Department of Education found that Hillside
was J.W.’s district of residence.

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8. 	The parties do not dispute that The New Jersey Department of Education has
determined that Hillside is J.W.’s resident district.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In its motion for summary decision, Hillside maintains that it is not liable for J.W.’s
transportation cost and that MOESC’S petition must be dismissed because they failed to
join Manchester Township as a party. They claim that Manchester Township is the entity
responsible for J.W.’s transportation costs and thus a necessary party to this action. 	I
disagree.
In support of its Motion, Hillside relies upon language contained in the current
version of N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1, which limits the exposure of the resident district board of
education (in this case, Hillside) for transportation costs to the maximum per student
expenditure for non-public school transportation. 	That language, however, was not
contained in the version of the regulation in place at the time the transportation costs at
issue were incurred.
It was not until June 3, 2020, an entire year after the last transportation costs were
incurred that the New Jersey Board of Education (“BOE”) held a public meeting on the
proposed readoption, with amendments, of regulations “pertaining to the transportation
of students.” In re N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1(b); See also 2023 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 1110
at *2 (App. Div. July 3, 2023). The proposed amendment adding subsections 5.1(b)(1)
and (b)(2) were meant to “[d]efine the maximum expenditure of the resident district board
of education for the transportation of eligible charter school students with disabilities who
reside outside the school district in which the charter school is located and eligible choice
program students with disabilities.” 	Id. at *3. 	Those are the amendments establishing
that the expenditure of the resident district shall not exceed the maximum allowable
expenditure per student set out in N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1, and if so, shall be covered by the
choice school district. Id. at *3-4. On September 21, 2020, the proposed readoption with
amendments was published at 52 N.J.R. 1730(a) in the New Jersey Register. Id. at *5.

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4
On January 6, 2021, after the notice and comment period, The Board of Education
approved the readoption with amendments. Id. at *6.
Hillside’s Transportation Policy, adopted on October 19, 2000, and amended on
October 17, 2019, was in effect at the time transportation costs were incurred and that
Policy indicated that the Board of Education shall provide transportation services for
students with special needs in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1 and with their
Individualized Education Program. (See Pet. Opp. to Resp. Motion to Dismiss, Exh. A.)
Notably, there is no mention of the amendment adding subsection (b) to N.J.A.C. 6A:27-
5.1 because it had not yet been added at that time. Ibid.
I. 	Standards for a Motion for Summary Decision
In an Office of Administrative Law matter, “Summary decision is the administrative
counterpart to summary judgment in the judicial arena.” 	Bacchues v. Bd. of Trustees,
Police and Firemen’s Retirement System of New Jersey, 2021 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 744
(2021) (initial decision). N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 states that a Motion for Summary Decision is
granted when “the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged
and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b).
Furthermore, “When a motion for summary decision is made and supported, an adverse
party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.”
N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	As the Office of Administrative Law has previously stated, “The
standard governing a motion for summary decision is substantially the same as a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2. Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J.
Super. 106, 121 (Appellant Div. 1995) (citing Frank v. Ivy Club, 228 N.J. Super. 40, 62
(Appellant Div. 1988)).” Middletown Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. R.A. and B.A. o/b/o H.A., 2022
N.J. AGEN LEXIS 274 (2022). Furthermore:
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must
determine whether the evidence presented, assumed to be
true, and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party is "sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08311-24
5
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party.” Brill
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
The "judge's function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial." Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). In other
words, 	the 	essential 	question 	is 	"whether 	the 	evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require [a hearing] or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law." Brill, 142 N.J. at 533 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 250).
[Middletown Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. R.A. and B.A. o/b/o H.A.,
2022 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 274 (2022)].
II. 	Transportation Costs
A. Determining District of Residence
The 	present 	district 	of 	residence 	"[r]eferred 	to 	in 	the 	first 	paragraph
of N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(b) means the New Jersey district of residence of the child's
parent(s) or guardian(s) as of the last school day prior to October 16." N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-
19.2(a)(1). 	Alternatively, the present district of residence may be determined to be the
district of the child's parent(s) or guardian(s) as of the date of the child's most recent
placement by the State agency. Id. at § (a)(2).
The Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee shall determine the “present
district of residence” or “district of residence” based upon the address submitted by the
Department of Children and Families. Id. at § (b). As noted above, it is undisputed that
respondent Hillside is J.W.’s resident district for purposes of educational funding and was
the resident district during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms.
In this case, The Department of Children and Families requested that the DOE
determine the district of residence for J.W. who had been placed at AMRH since April
18, 2018. 	The DOE found that Hillside was the district of residence and responsible
district for J.W. (See Exhibit A to Petition).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 08311-24
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B. Allocating the Cost of Transportation
The expenditure of a resident district board of education for the transportation of
eligible charter school students with disabilities who reside outside the district in which
the charter school is located and eligible choice program students with disabilities shall
not exceed the maximum per student expenditure for nonpublic school transportation.
N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1. As of the January 6, 2021, amendment to this regulation, if the cost
of transportation does exceed the maximum allowable for a given year, the charter school
or choice district shall pay the full amount in excess of the annual maximum set for that
school term to be paid by the resident district. 	Id. at § (b)(1). 	Under no circumstances
are the parents or guardians of a student with disabilities responsible for payment of the
cost of transportation services required by the student’s IEP. Id. at § (b)(2).
I. 	Dismissal for Failure to Join a Necessary Party
A person subject to service of process shall be joined as a party to an action if (1)
complete relief cannot be accorded among the existing parties in that person’s absence,
or (2) the person claims an interest in the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in that person’s absence may either (i) impair or impede the
person’s ability to protect their interest, or (ii) cause any of the existing parties to be
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other inconsistent obligations
by reason of the claimed interest. R. 4:28-1(a). If a person should be joined pursuant to
this rule but cannot be served with process, the court shall determine whether it is
appropriate to proceed with the existing parties or dismiss the case because that person
is deemed an indispensable party. Id. at § (b). A judge is to consider the following factors
when making such determination: the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence might be prejudicial to that person or existing parties; the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; whether a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence will be adequate; and whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the
action is dismissed for nonjoinder. Ibid.

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The New Jersey Supreme Court has described an indispensable party as one
having "an interest inevitably involved in the subject matter before the court and a
judgment cannot justly be made between litigants without either adjudging or necessarily
affecting the absentee's interest." H.S. o/b/o A.S. v. Cherry Hill Twp. Bd. of Educ., EDS
10013-20, 2020 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 683 at *9, Final Decision (Oct. 28, 2020) (quoting Allen
B. DuMont Labs v Marcalus Mfg. Co., 30 N.J. 290, 298 (1959)). In Carol Graves v. The
State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, the ALJ dismissed count four of the petition
regarding alleged segregation violations because certain omitted charter schools were
deemed indispensable parties so far as they would have had to comply with N.J.S.A.
18A:36A-7 and N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8 to grant petitioners requested relief but were not
joined. EDU 10677-14, 2015 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 250 at *28-29, Initial Decision (Apr. 28,
2015), adopted, Comm’r (June 15, 2015).
II. 	Hillside’s Motion to Dismiss Must be Denied Because Manchester Township
is not a Necessary Party to this Matter
The Manchester Township Charter School that J.W. attended during 2017-18 and
2018-19 is not a necessary or indispensable party whose absence affects the ability of
this Tribunal to afford complete relief to the parties. Unlike H.S. o/b/o A.S. v. Cherry Hill
Twp. Bd. of Educ., the charter school does not have an interest inevitably involved in the
subject matter before the court and a judgment can justly be made between litigants
without either adjudging or necessarily affecting the absentee's interest. 	Likewise, the
charter school does not have an interest in this matter such that the disposition of the
action in its absence may either (i) impair or impede its ability to protect its interest, or (ii)
cause any of the existing parties to be subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or other inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the present
dispute took place after the adoption of N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1(b), then respondent would be
correct 	in 	asserting 	that 	the 	charter 	school 	would 	be 	responsible 	for 	covering
transportation expenses in excess of the annual maximum required for a resident district
school. 	Since that is not the case, respondent is misguided in its application of the
regulation to the present matter.

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Unlike in Carol Graves v. The State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, when joining
the various charter schools was necessary because they needed to comply with N.J.S.A.
18A:36A-7 and N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8 in order to grant petitioners’ requested relief, the
present matter does not require joining Manchester Township because they are not liable
for any share of J.W.’s transportation cost for either the 2017-18 or 2018-19 school terms.
Even if Manchester Township was liable under NJAC 6A:27-5.1(b), and therefore
a necessary party to this matter, the proper step would be to add it as a party rather than
dismiss the case because there is no evidence that Manchester Township is an
indispensable party due to an inability to serve the process upon it.
III. Respondent was the Party Liable for J.W.’s Transportation Costs during the
2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms
MOESC accurately argues that the regulation which Hillside relies on, N.J.A.C.
6A:27-5.1(b), was not adopted until after the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms. 	It is
clear that Hillside’s own transportation policy, enacted in 2000 and revised in October
2019, evinces its duty to provide transportation to students with special needs as a
“related service” pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1 and N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1 et seq. The New
Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency determined J.W.’s resident district
to be Hillside. The parties do not contest this assignment.
Hillside argues that the lack of explicit allocation of excess transportation expenses
during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms “[l]eaves the matter open to interpretation,
providing grounds to dismiss petitioner’s claims.” 	This argument, however, rests solely
upon a lack of precedent rather than the existence of precedent and is therefore
unavailing because it fails to provide a basis for allocating this cost to the choice school
in Manchester Township during the relevant period preceding the amendment to N.J.A.C.
6A:27-5.1.
Respondent also argues that the legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-13 is a
“[d]eliberate delegation of regulatory authority over non-resident student transportation to
the State Board [which] indicates an intent to shift financial responsibility for excess costs

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to charter schools. 	This distinction logically extends to disabled students attending out-
of-district charter schools . . ..” 	However, N.J.S.A. 18A:36-13 does not address special
education students with disabilities. 	Also, that statute does not address choice schools
whereas N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1(b) does differentiate between (1) eligible charter school
students with disabilities who reside outside the district in which the charter is located and
(2) students with disabilities who attend an eligible choice program (J.W. in this matter).
Lastly, respondent argues that subjecting it to liability for J.W.’s transportation
costs is unduly burdensome because it would “[d]disincentivize charter schools from
responsibly managing transportation costs, knowing resident districts bear the financial
burden.” 	This argument has little merit because the opposite has been true ever since
the amendment to N.J.A.C. 6A:27-5.1. What was once respondent’s valid concern is no
longer a valid reason to dismiss petitioner’s claim because settling this matter under the
laws and regulations in effect during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms has no
bearing upon management of transportation costs thereafter. 	The present framework
actually does the opposite and ensures that a charter or choice school will cover the cost
of transporting a student once the resident district has paid the statutory maximum under
N.J.S.A. 18A:39-1.
For the foregoing reasons, I CONCLUDE Hillside’s Motion for Summary Decision
should be denied.
I also CONCLUDE, that Hillside, as the resident district in this matter, was the party
liable for providing transportation for J.W. to his choice charter school in Manchester
Township because the regulation providing that the choice charter school covers the cost
of transportation in excess of the annual maximum was not yet effective during the
relevant 	time 	period. 	Moreover, 	Hillside’s 	own 	Policy, 	in 	place 	at 	the 	time 	the
transportation costs were incurred, indicated that the Board of Education shall provide
transportation services for students with special needs in accordance with N.J.A.C.
6A:27-5.1 and with their Individualized Education Program. 	(See Pet. Opp. to Resp.
Motion to Dismiss, Exh. A.)

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In this case, Hillside served its motion with a brief and Certification. MOESC then
opposed the motion but did not cross-move for summary decision. 	Nevertheless, in
viewing the certifications and pleadings in the light most favorable to respondent Hillside
I CONCLUDE that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that MOSC is entitled to
prevail as a matter of Law on its claim against Hillside in for the cost of transportation
services it provided to J.W. during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 school terms.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS on this 6 th day of August 2025 ORDERED that:
1. 	Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision is DENIED.
2. 	Summary Decision be and hereby is GRANTED in favor of Petitioner
MOESC on its claim against Respondent for $44,195.59 in transportation
services.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies and

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Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
August 7, 2025
DATE 	WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
WJC/db

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PAPERS CONSIDERED
1. 	April 24, 2024 Petition, with exhibits
2. 	June 12, 2024 Answer
3. 	September 6, 2024 Notice of Motion for Failure to Join a Necessary Party
4. 	Undated Certification of Raymond Hamlin filed with Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Join a Necessary Party
5. 	Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement
6. 	December 3, 2024 letter Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Join a Necessary Party
7. 	February 2018 IEP
8. 	Hillside’s Reply to MOESC opposition to Motion to Dismiss Petitioners’ Claims