J.C. and C.C., on behalf of minor child, J.C. v. Board of Education of the Ramapo Indian Hills Regional School District, Bergen County, 8/20/2020, (#174-20)

174-20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
J.C. and C.C. on behalf of minor child, J.C.,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the Ramapo Indian Hills
Regional High School District, Bergen County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioners appealed the respondent Board’s determination that J.C. committed an act of harassment,
intimidation and bullying (HIB) in violation of New Jersey’s Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (Act), N.J.S.A.
18A:37-13 et seq., when he removed the pants and exposed the buttocks of another boy, J.K., while G.E. held
him down. The parties filed cross motions for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: the core facts in this case are not in dispute, and the matter is ripe for summary
decision; the Act defines HIB as any gesture, written, verbal or physical act, or electronic communication that is
reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or a mental,
physical or sensory disability, and must also substantially disrupt or interfere with the orderly operation of the
school; an action by a board of education is entitled to a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned
unless it can be shown that the Board’s action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; 	here, there is no
dispute that J.C. pulled down the pants of J.K., exposing him, while G.E. held J.K. down; 	the Board further
determined that J.C. also exposed himself during the incident and that J.K. suffered emotional harm that
required him to undergo counseling; 	moreover, the Board determined that the episode disrupted the orderly
operation of the school because a photograph of the incident circulated among students, leading to harassment of
both J.C. and J.K. by others; and the Board’s determination that J.C.’s conduct was motivated by J.K.’s gender
was reasonable given that the act of removing another person’s pants while that person is restrained, then
removing your own pants, is inherently sexual and based on the gender of the victim. The ALJ concluded that
the petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proving that the Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable manner in finding that HIB occurred in this matter. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.
Upon review, the Commissioner concurred that, based on the evidence in the record, petitioners did not establish
that the Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner in finding that J.C. committed an act of
HIB. 	Accordingly, the Commissioner adopted the Initial Decision of the OAL as the final decision in this
matter. In so doing, the Commissioner noted, inter alia, that while N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.5(a) requires a nexus to a
student’s physical or emotional safety, security, and well-being and a material and substantial interference with
the operation of the school in order to impose a consequence for student conduct away from school, the
Commissioner does not need to decide whether J.C.’s conduct met this definition as the Board did not impose
discipline on J.C. since he is no longer a student in the district.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither
reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.
August 20, 2020

1
174-20
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 12064-19
Agency Dkt. No. 179-7/19
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
J.C. and C.C., on behalf of minor child, J.C.,
Petitioners,
v.
Board of Education of the Ramapo Indian Hills
Regional High School District, Bergen County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter and the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL) have been reviewed, as have the exceptions filed by the petitioners pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4,
and the Board’s reply thereto.1
In this matter, petitioners challenge the Board’s determination that their son committed
an act of harassment, intimidation and bullying (HIB). This case stems from an incident that occurred at a
student’s home in December 2017 or January 2018, in which the Board found J.C. removed the pants and
exposed the buttocks of another boy, J.K., while G.E. held him down. 	The Board also found that J.C.
removed his own pants while on top of J.K. 	A photograph of the incident spread to other students at
school in September 2018, when the students were beginning their freshman year.2 	As a result, the
1 The Board argues that petitioners’ exceptions should not be considered because they were filed
electronically eight minutes after the Department’s close of business at 4:15 p.m. The Commissioner will
exercise his discretion pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.16 and N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.3 to consider petitioners’
exceptions, especially given the closure of the Department’s offices during the COVID-19 pandemic.
2 Petitioners alerted school officials that J.C. was being threatened and called names after the photograph
was distributed; they subsequently filed a HIB complaint against several students. Although a finding of
HIB was substantiated against two students, petitioners transferred J.C. to an out-of-state school because
of the harassment.

2
victim’s parents filed a HIB complaint against J.C. Following an investigation, the Board found that J.C.
committed an act of HIB, specifically finding: (1) the events substantially interfered with the victim’s
rights and the operation of the school given the number of students involved and the effect on the victim,
who subsequently required therapy; (2) a reasonable person would perceive that J.C.’s actions in
removing the pants of a person who is held down and exposing his buttocks is motivated by gender; and
(3) a reasonable person would know that the actions would have the effect of causing the victim
emotional or physical harm. 	Following motions for summary decision, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) found that the Board’s HIB determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
In their exceptions, petitioners argue that the ALJ improperly applied the summary
decision standard by failing to recognize numerous disputed issues of material fact. 	Specifically,
petitioners deny that a sexual assault took place. Additionally, petitioners point out that it was J.K. – and
not J.C. – who spread the rumors about the incident around the school and set any harassment in motion.
Furthermore, according to petitioners, the Board was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable in ignoring
that G.E. submitted conflicting statements during the HIB investigation. G.E. first said that J.C. “never
did anything inappropriate that I saw or remember,” but several days later changed his story and said that
he saw J.C. “half-naked with his thing out.” (Petitioner’s certification, Exhibits L and M). Petitioner’s
maintain that these material facts cannot be reconciled on a motion for summary decision.
Petitioners dispute the Board’s conclusion that the incident was motivated by gender.
Petitioners assert that since the two other students who participated in the same incident were not deemed
to be motivated by a distinguishing characteristic, the Board’s determination that J.C.’s actions were
motivated by gender must be based on the unfounded assumption that J.C. is gay without any evidence of
such. 	While petitioners acknowledge that the conduct may have been inappropriate, the HIB
investigation materials do not provide a basis for the conclusion that his actions were motivated by
gender.
Petitioners also argue that J.K.’s statement in his interview that he had suffered no
emotional distress undermines the Board’s finding of HIB. Specifically, J.K. was asked how much the

3
incident bothered him “in terms of distraction, emotional stress, etc. (10 being extremely, 1 being not at
all)” and J.K. answered “1.” 	(Petitioner’s certification, Exhibit J). 	Petitioners maintain that J.K.’s
statement contradicts his parents’ assertion that he was in therapy, and an essential element of HIB cannot
be met.
Finally, petitioners claim that the Board did not have the authority to regulate conduct
that occurred in a private home. According to petitioners, in order to regulate off campus conduct, the
Board would have to show that there is a nexus to student health or safety and that the behavior materially
and substantially interferes with the orderly operation of school. Here, petitioners maintain that the Board
exceeded its authority because the conduct did not threaten J.K.’s physical or emotional safety or well-
being, as the two remained friends and J.K. filed his HIB complaint nine months later, after J.C. initiated
his own complaint. Petitioners further argue that the ALJ erred in finding a substantial disruption to the
school because any disruption was the harassment that J.C. suffered – not J.K. – and he should not be
blamed for coming forward about being harassed. 	Accordingly, petitioners urge the Commissioner to
reject the Initial Decision.
In reply, the Board contends that there are no genuine disputes of material fact because
the only facts necessary to decide this matter are the HIB record and the conclusions the Board drew from
it. The Board argues that petitioners cannot relitigate the facts of the incident; instead, the only issue here
is whether the Board was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable in determining that J.C. committed an
act of HIB based on the record before it at the time. 	Specifically, in response to petitioners’ disputed
material facts, the Board maintains that: it did not determine that a sexual assault occurred; regardless of
who started the rumor around school, it was J.C.’s conduct that started the chain of events; and the Board
was not arbitrary in crediting G.E.’s second statement, which was consistent with J.K.’s statement.
The Board argues that J.C.’s conduct was inherently of a sexual nature, and a reasonable
person could conclude that it was motivated by gender. 	Additionally, the Board reasonably relied on
J.K.’s need for therapy for its conclusion that he suffered emotional harm. Finally, the Board maintains
that pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:15-7.5(b), it is required to investigate HIB complaints regardless of whether

4
they occurred off school grounds. The Board explains that N.J.A.C. 6A:15-7.5(a) does not apply because
it did not impose any discipline in this matter, so it does not need to demonstrate a nexus to student health
or safety. Accordingly, the Board requests that the Commissioner adopt the Initial Decision.
Upon review, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that, based on the evidence in the
record, petitioners did not establish that the Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
manner in finding that J.C. committed an act of HIB. 	When a local board of education acts within its
discretionary authority, its decision is entitled to a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed
unless there is an affirmative showing that the decision was “patently arbitrary, without rational basis or
induced by improper motives.” Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App. Div.
1960). 	Furthermore, “where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when
exercised honestly and upon due consideration[,]” and the Commissioner will not substitute his judgment
for that of the board. Bayshore Sewerage Co. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div.
1973), aff’d, 131 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1974). The record contains sufficient credible evidence to
support the Board’s determination that J.C. removed the pants and exposed the buttocks of J.K. while he
was held down, and that J.C. removed his own pants while on top of J.K. – specifically, the victim’s
statement recounting the incident and G.E.’s statement that he saw J.C. “half-naked with his thing out.”
While petitioners deny that J.C. removed his own pants and point to G.E.’s first statement, where he said
that J.C. “never did anything inappropriate,” this does not erase the evidence in the record that the Board
relied upon which indicated the opposite. While the evidence may leave room for two opinions, it is not
sufficient to overturn the Board’s decision, as it does not demonstrate that the decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. 	To overturn the Board’s decision would require the Commissioner to
substitute his judgment for the Board’s, which is impermissible.
The Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act (the Act) defines HIB as follows:
[A]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any electronic
communication, whether it be a single incident or a series of incidents,
that is reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any actual or
perceived characteristic, such as race, color, religion, ancestry, national

5
origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or a
mental, physical or sensory disability, or by any other distinguishing
characteristic, that takes place on school property, at any school-
sponsored function, on a school bus, or off school grounds as provided
for in section 16 of P.L. 2010, c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially
disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation of the school or the rights
of other students and that:
a. a reasonable person should know, under the circumstances, will
have the effect of physically or emotionally harming a student or
damaging the student's property, or placing a student in reasonable fear
of physical or emotional harm to his person or damage to his property;
b. has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or group of
students; or
c. creates a hostile educational environment for the student by
interfering with a student's education or by severely or pervasively
causing physical or emotional harm to the student.
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.
Therefore, a finding of HIB requires three elements. First, the conduct must be reasonably perceived as
motivated by any actual or perceived enumerated characteristic or other distinguishing characteristic and,
second, the conduct must substantially disrupt or interfere with the rights of other students or the orderly
operation of the school. 	The third condition is that one of the three criteria enumerated in the Act
regarding the effect of the conduct must also be satisfied. Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Verona,
Essex County, Commissioner Decision No. 51-20 (decided February 4, 2020). The statute also requires
that the conduct take place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off
school grounds as provided for in N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15.3.
Regarding the first element, in defining HIB as an action “that is reasonably perceived
as being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic . . .”, N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 (emphasis
added), the statute requires an analysis of how the actor’s motivation is perceived and whether that
perception is reasonable. It does not require an analysis of the actual motivation of the actor. Wehbeh,
supra. Here, it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for the Board to conclude that a reasonable
person would consider J.C.’s actions to be of an inherently sexual nature and thus motivated by the
gender of the victim.

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Regarding the second element, the Board relied upon the number of students involved in
the incident and the disturbance that resulted when the photograph was shared among students. The
Commissioner finds that – given the incident set in motion a string of events that led to a photograph
being circulated around school – the Board was certainly not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in
finding a substantial interruption of the ordinary operation of the school.
Regarding the third element, an act of HIB is one that “a reasonable person should know,
under the circumstances, will have the effect of physically or emotionally harming a student,” “has the
effect of insulting or demeaning a student,” or “creates a hostile educational environment . . .”. N.J.S.A.
18A:37-14(a) (emphasis added). None of these criteria require the actor to have actual knowledge of the
effect that his actions will have, or to specifically intend to bring about that effect. The first requires only
that a reasonable person should know there would be a harmful effect, not that the actor knows there
would be such an effect. The second two criteria address only the actual effect of the act, without any
reference to what either the actor or a reasonable person does or should know. Wehbeh, supra. As such,
a board of education can find that an individual committed an act of HIB even if the individual did not
intend to cause harm. 	Here, the Board found that J.C.’s actions in removing his own pants and J.K.’s
pants while J.K. was held down resulted in emotional harm to the victim, as demonstrated by his need to
undergo school-sponsored and private therapy. While petitioners point to the victim’s statement that he
was not bothered by the events, evidence in the record supports the Board’s determination. There is no
doubt that a reasonable person would know that J.C.’s actions would result in emotional harm, satisfying
N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14 of the Act, so the Board was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in reaching
that conclusion.
Finally, regarding where the conduct occurred, the Act sets forth that conduct may be
considered HIB when it takes place on school property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school
bus, or off school grounds as provided for in N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15.3, and otherwise satisfies the remaining
elements of HIB. N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15.3 indicates that HIB policies adopted by boards of education shall
include provisions for responses to HIB that occurs off school grounds when a school employee is made

7
aware of such actions. 	Additionally, N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.5(b) requires that school authorities respond to
HIB that occurs off school grounds. 	Accordingly, the Board is required to investigate HIB complaints
even if they occur outside of school. Here, the Board received a HIB complaint involving conduct that
occurred at a private residence, and the Board investigated the allegations as it is required to do.
Although N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.5(a) requires a nexus to a student’s physical or emotional safety, security, and
well-being and a material and substantial interference with the operation of the school in order to impose
a consequence to student conduct away from school, the Commissioner does not need to decide whether
J.C.’s conduct met this definition because the Board did not impose discipline on J.C., as he is no longer a
student in the district. As such, the Board was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in investigating
conduct that occurred off school grounds and finding that it met the definition of HIB.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in this
matter and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
INTERIM COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: August 20, 2020
Date of Mailing: 	August 24, 2020
3 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to P.L. 2008,
c. 36 (N.J.S.A 18A:6-9.1).

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
AGENCY DKT. NO. 179-7/19
J.C. AND C.C. ON BEHALF OF J.C.,
Petitioners,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE RAMAPO
INDIAN HILLS REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
______________________________________
Arla D. Cahill, Esq., for Petitioners (Mandelbaum Salsburg, attorneys)
Stephen R. Fogarty, Esq., for Respondent (Fogarty & Hara, attorneys)
Record Closed: May 15, 2020 	Decided: May 20, 2020
BEFORE THOMAS R. BETANCOURT, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner parents challenges the respondent District’s HIB determination.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
2
The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it
was filed on August 29, 2019, as a contested case. 	N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A.
52:14F-1 to -13.
A prehearing conference was held on September 17, 2019, and a prehearing
Order was entered on September 18, 2019.
Respondent 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	decision 	on 	December 	23, 	2019.
Petitioners 	filed 	a 	cross 	motion 	for 	summary 	decision, 	and 	their 	response 	to
respondent’s motion, on February 10, 2019. Respondent filed its reply brief on March 6,
2020. 	Petitioner, with permission from the undersigned, submitted a sur-reply brief on
May 15, 2020.
ISSUE
Did Respondent err in determining that J.C. committed an act of HIB within the
meaning of the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.2 et seq.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
I find the following FACTS:
1. 	In or around September 2018, J.C. was a high school freshman in the District.
2. 	In or around September 2018, Petitioner’s met with Assistant Principal L. Michael
Mancino to discuss an incident involving their son, J.C., and other boys, that
occurred sometime in December 2017 or January 2018.
3. 	During that incident J.C. removed the pants of J.K. while another boy, G.E., held
down J.K.
4. 	Petitioners advised Mr. Mancino that due to this incident other students at the
High School were threatening J.C. and calling him names.
5. 	J.C. supplied a written statement regarding the incident.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
3
6. 	G.E. and J.K. also supplied written statements. 	G.E. supplied a second written
statement as well.
7. 	A photograph purportedly showing J.C. removing J.K.’s pants was taken during
the incident and was distributed to some members of the student body.
8. 	During the incident J.C. also removed his own pants.
9. 	The parents of J.K. filed a HIB complaint against J.C. and his sister on or about
October 4, 2018.
10. A 	HIB 	investigation 	ensued, 	conducted 	by 	Anti 	Bullying 	Specialist 	Rachel
Calabrese.
11. The conclusion of the HIB investigation was that J.C.’s action during the incident
constitute 	HIB 	because 	he 	committed 	a 	physical 	act 	that 	was 	reasonably
perceived 	to 	be 	motivated 	by 	J.K.’s 	gender 	that 	substantially 	disrupted 	or
interfered with the orderly operation of the school and a reasonable person
should have known, under the circumstances, would have the effect of physically
or emotionally harming a student.
12. As a result of the incident J.K. underwent counselling.
13. The incident substantially disrupted and interfered with J.K.’s rights based upon
his need to attend counseling, and the harassment he faced from other students.
14. The orderly operation of the school was substantially disrupted due to the
incident in that it caused J.C. and J.K. to receive significant harassment from
other students, which included substantiated allegations of HIB by other students
against J.C.
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Standard for Summary Decision
A motion for summary decision may be granted if the papers and discovery
presented, as well as any affidavits which may have been filed with the application,
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law. N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). 	If the motion is sufficiently supported,

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
4
the non-moving party must demonstrate by affidavit that there is a genuine issue of fact
which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding, in order to prevail in such
an application. 	Ibid. 	These provisions mirror the summary judgment language of
R. 4:46-2(c) of the New Jersey Court Rules.
The motion judge must “consider whether the competent evidential materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . , are
sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of
the non-moving party.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).
And even if the non-moving party comes forward with some evidence, this forum must
grant summary decision if the evidence is “so one-sided that [the moving party] must
prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
In the 	instant matter both parties are requesting relief via summary decision.
Petitioners contend that the Board lacked jurisdiction to conduct an HIB investigation as
the 	act 	occurred 	off 	school 	property. 	Petitioners 	further 	contend 	that 	if 	there 	is
jurisdiction that there are sufficient facts in dispute to deny Respondent’s motion for
summary decision.
In 	support 	of 	their 	position 	Petitioners 	submitted 	Petitioners’ 	Response 	to
Respondent’s 	Statement 	of 	Undisputed 	Material 	Facts 	and 	Counter 	Statement 	of
Material Facts. A careful review of the same reveals much of what is set forth as fact is
merely the opinion of the Petitioners. 	Much of what is fact is not material to the HIB
investigation. 	By way of example, Petitioners focus on a C.P., who they maintain “de-
pantsed” J.C. while in 6 th grade. 	Petitioners further maintain that C.P. spread rumors
about the incident. While the above may be facts, they are not material to the finding of
HIB. What is material to the finding of HIB are the facts pertaing to the incident itself.
Respondent 	submitted 	their 	Response 	to 	petitioners’ 	Counter 	Statement 	of
Undisputed Material Facts. I found the same extremely persuasive and concur with the
same.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
5
Respondent contends that the “core” facts are not in dispute and that those facts
lead 	to 	a finding of 	HIB, 	and 	that 	such a finding is 	not 	arbitrary, 	capricious 	or
unreasonable.
I concur with Respondent in this regard. 	The facts alleged to be disputed by
Petitioners are not material to the Board’s determination that J.C. committed an act of
HIB.
Accordingly, I find that the matter is ripe for summary decision.
The 	Anti-Bullying 	Bill 	of 	Rights 	Act 	(“Act”), N.J.S.A. 	18A:37-13 	et seq., 	is
designed 	“to 	strengthen 	the 	standards 	and 	procedures 	for 	preventing, 	reporting,
investigating, and responding to incidents of harassment, intimidation, and bullying of
students that occur in school and off school premises.”3 N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.1.(f). Under
the Act, “harassment, intimidation or bullying” (HIB) is defined as:
[A]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single incident or
a series of incidents, that is reasonably perceived as being
motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic,
such 	as 	race, 	color, 	religion, 	ancestry, 	national 	origin,
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression,
or a mental, physical or sensory disability, or by any other
distinguishing 	characteristic, 	that 	takes 	place 	on 	school
property, at any school-sponsored function, on a school bus,
or 	off 	school 	grounds 	as 	provided 	for 	in 	section 	16
ofP.L.2010, 	c.122 (C.18A:37-15.3), 	that 	substantially
disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation of the school
or the rights of other students and that:
a. 	a 	reasonable 	person 	should 	know, 	under 	the
circumstances, 	will 	have 	the 	effect 	of 	physically 	or
emotionally harming a student or damaging the student's
property, or placing a student in reasonable fear of physical
or emotional harm to his person or damage to his property;
b. has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student or
group of students; or
c. creates a hostile educational environment for the student
by interfering with a student's education or by severely or

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
6
pervasively 	causing 	physical 	or 	emotional 	harm 	to 	the
student.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]
Each school district must adopt a policy that prohibits HIB and provides for a
prompt response to any alleged HIB incident. N.J.S.A 18A:37-15. Once an alleged HIB
incident is reported to the school principal, the principal must initiate an investigation
within one school day of the report. N.J.S.A 18A:37-15(b)(6). The investigation shall be
conducted by a school anti-bullying specialist, and shall take no longer than ten school
days to be completed. The results of the investigation shall then be quickly reported to
the superintendent of schools, who may take certain remedial actions. The results shall
also be reported to the board of education “no later than the date of the board of
education 	meeting 	next 	following 	the 	completion 	of 	the 	investigation, 	along 	with
information on any services provided, training established, discipline imposed, or other
action taken or recommended by the superintendent.” Ibid.
Pursuant to the Act, the parents of the students involved in any alleged HIB
incident are entitled to receive information about the nature of the investigation and the
result of the investigation. The parents may request a hearing before the board, and the
hearing must be held within ten days of the request. Any hearing shall be held in
executive session to protect the identity of any students involved. The board may hear
from the anti-bullying specialist about the incident, recommendations for discipline or
services, and any programs instituted to reduce such incidents. The board must issue a
decision at the first meeting after its receipt of the investigation report. The board may
affirm, reject, or modify the superintendent’s decision. The board’s decision may be
appealed to the Commissioner of Education.
Petitioners raise two issues which need be addressed.
The first issue is regarding a HIB investigation regarding C.P. 	In their reply brief
Petitioners challenge Respondent’s failure to conduct a proper HIB investigation against
C.P. 	As Petitioners did not address the HIB findings regarding C.P. in their Petition, I
shall not consider this issue as it is not before me.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
7
The second issue is that the Board did not have jurisdiction to investigate the HIB
allegation against J.C. as the incident occurred off campus.
N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.5 states:
(a) School 	authorities 	have 	the 	right 	to 	impose 	a
consequence on a student for conduct away from school
grounds 	that 	is 	consistent 	with 	the 	district 	board 	of
education's code of student conduct, pursuant to N.J.A.C.
6A:16-7.1.
1. This 	authority 	shall 	be 	exercised 	only 	when 	it 	is
reasonably necessary for the student's physical or emotional
safety, security and well-being or for reasons relating to the
safety, security and well-being of other students, staff or
school grounds, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:25-2 and 18A:37-
2.
2. This authority shall be exercised only when the conduct
that is the subject of the proposed consequence materially
and 	substantially 	interferes 	with 	the 	requirements 	of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.
3. The consequence pursuant to (a) above shall be handled
in accordance with the district board of education's approved
code of student conduct, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.1,
and 	as 	appropriate, 	in 	accordance 	with N.J.A.C. 	6A:16-
7.2, 7.3, or 7.4.
(b) School 	authorities 	shall 	respond 	to 	harassment,
intimidation, 	or 	bullying 	that 	occurs 	off 	school 	grounds,
pursuant 	to N.J.S.A. 	18A:37-14 and 	15.3 	and 	N.J.A.C.
6A:16-1.3, 7.1, and 7.7.
Clearly the Board had jurisdiction to conduct the HIB investigation in this matter.
See W.D. ex rel. G.D. v. Board of Education of Jefferson, 2018 WL 3609529 (initial
decision Jul 13, 2018), adopted, No. 375-18 (Comm’r Nov. 26, 2018) where the
undersigned determined that a HIB investigation regarding an off campus incident,
which was adopted by the Commissioner, was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

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8
An action by a board of education “is entitled to a presumption of correctness and
will not be upset unless there is an affirmative showing that such decision was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable.” Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327,
332 (App. Div. 1965). Thus, in order to prevail, those challenging an HIB decision made
by a board of education “must demonstrate that the Board acted in bad faith, or in utter
disregard of the circumstances before it.” G.H. & E.H. ex rel. K.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Bor. of Franklin Lakes, EDU 13204-13, Initial Decision (February 24, 2014) (citation
omitted) <http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>, adopted, Comm’r (April 10, 2014).
Also, a board’s decision may be overturned if its determination violates the legislative
policies expressed or implied in the governing act. 	J.A.H. ex rel. C.H. v. Twp. of
Pittsgrove 	Bd. 	of 	Educ., 	EDU 	10826-12, 	Initial 	Decision 	(March 	11, 	2013)
(citing Campbell v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556 (1963), 562 (1963)), adopted,
Comm’r (April 25, 2013) <http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>.
There are reported cases in which HIB determinations by boards of education
have been both affirmed and overturned. In R.G.B. v. Vill. of Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.,
EDU 	14213-12, 	Initial 	Decision 	(May 	15, 	2013)
<http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/oal/>, adopted, Comm’r (June 24, 2013), the ALJ
found that the Board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in
determining that a student engaged in HIB when he repeatedly called a female student
“fat,” “fat ass,” and “horse.” According to the ALJ, such verbal statements satisfied all of
the necessary elements under N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14. And, in G.H., supra, the ALJ also
upheld a Board’s finding that a white student who repeatedly called a black student
“Kool-Aid” engaged in HIB. The ALJ found that the “use of the word ‘kool-aid’ was
directed at [the other student] because of his race; insulted and demeaned [the other
student]; and . . . interfered with [the other student’s] education” because “[u]pset and
embarrassed children are not fully available for learning.” 	However, in J.A.H., supra,
the Board’s finding that an incident in which one student stuffed a crumbled piece of
paper down the shirt of another student constituted an act of bullying was overturned as
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the incident was merely a prank that
was part of an ongoing, mutual conflict between the two boys and did not “contain the
more 	serious 	and 	aggravating 	elements 	either 	‘expressed 	or 	implied’ 	under

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
9
[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]” The ALJ found that the incident was not improperly motivated by
a distinguishing characteristic and that the facts “only support[ed] a finding of ordinary
student conflicts rather than the more serious behavior of bullying.”
Given the facts in the instant matter, I cannot conclude that the Board acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner in determining that an HIB incident did
occur. 	It is not disputed that J.C. pulled down the pants of J.K. exposing him. 	It is not
disputed that this was done while G.E. held down J.K. 	The Board further determined
that J.C. also exposed himself during this incident based upon the statement of J.K. and
the second statement of G.E. The Board then determined that J.K. suffered emotional
harm as he was required to undergo counseling due to the incident. 	The Board further
determined that the incident disrupted the orderly operation of the school due to the
harassment of J.C. and J.K., and that substantiated acts of HIB occurred against J.C.
To argue to the contrary does not ring true.
Lastly, the Board determined in its HIB determination that J.C.’s conduct was
motivated by J.K.’s gender. Petitioners argue there is no basis for this determination. It
is certainly a reasonable conclusion that the act removing another person’s pants while
that person is restrained, then removing your pants, is inherently sexual and based
upon the gender of the victim. It certainly is not an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable
determination.
While clearly Petitioners disagree with the Board’s HIB decision in this matter,
nothing the Board did, either while conducting the HIB investigation or the conclusions
reached during that investigation to conclude J.C. committed an act of HIB, were
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonably.
Accordingly, I CONCLUDE that petitioner has failed to sustain the burden of
establishing that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in finding that
HIB did occur.
Based upon the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that the Petition must be DISMISSED.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
10
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition be DISMISSED with prejudice.
I 	hereby 	FILE 	this 	initial 	decision 	with 	the 	COMMISSIONER 	OF 	THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This 	recommended 	decision 	may 	be 	adopted, 	modified 	or 	rejected 	by 	the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. 	If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: 	BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES
AND DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to
the judge and to the other parties.
May 20, 2020
DATE 	THOMAS R. BETANCOURT, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
db

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 12064-19
11
APPENDIX
List of Moving Papers
For Petitioner:
Cross motion for summary decision
Brief in in support of cross motion and in opposition to motion for summary
decision
Response 	to 	respondent’s 	Statement 	of 	Undisputed 	Material 	and 	Counter
Statement of Material Fact
Certification of J 	C 	, Petitioner, with Exhibits A – O
Certification of Arla D. Cahill, Esq., with Exhibits A & B
Sur-reply letter brief
For Respondent:
Motion for summary decision
Brief in support of motion for summary decision
Certification of L. Michael Mancino, Asst. Prin., with Exhibits A - C
Statement of Undisputed Facts
Certification of Beverly Mackay, Superintendent of Schools with Exhibits A - E
Reply brief
Reply certification of L. Michael Mancino
Response to petitioners’ Counter Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
Other Pleadings and Filings:
Petition of Appeal
Answer to Petition of Appeal and Separate Defenses