Patricia E. McRae v. Elizabeth Board of Education, Union County and Elizabethport Presbyterian Center, 9/3/26 (#350-26)

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350-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 04834-26
Agency Dkt. No. 053-02-26

New Jersey Commissioner of Education

Final Decision

Patricia E. McRae,

Petitioner,

Elizabeth Board of Education, Union County and
Elizabethport Presbyterian Center,

Respondents.

The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the reply filed by respondent
Elizabeth Board of Education (Board) have been reviewed and considered. Respondent
Elizabethport Presbyterian Center (Center) did not file a reply to petitioner’s exceptions.

Petitioner is the Director of Early Childhood Education for the Center. She is not
employed by the Board, and although the Board provides certain funding to the Center, the Board
does not pay petitioner directly and is not involved in the Center’s employment decisions. In
Spring 2025, the Center advised petitioner that it would be decreasing her salary from $100,968

to $59,150 for the upcoming school year? because the Board had reduced the number of

1The Commissioner did not consider petitioner’s additional submissions because they are not permitted
by N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4.

> Petitioner continued to receive her $100,968 salary for the remainder of the 2024-2025 school year.

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classrooms allotted to the Center from six to three.3 Petitioner’s 2025-2026 salary was set in
accordance with the Director’s Salary Scale,4 which is based on the employee’s education and
experience, as well as the number of classrooms the employee oversees.
On May 8, 2025, petitioner requested that the Center supplement her $59,150 salary by
$25,000. On May 12, 2025, following a formal vote, the Center denied petitioner’s request due
to lack of funds. 	The Center offered petitioner a teaching position with a higher salary, but
petitioner opted to continue as Director for the 2025-2026 school year. In November 2025, the
Center increased petitioner’s salary to approximately $77,500. 	However, in December 2025,
following another budget cut, the Center reduced petitioner’s salary to approximately $65,000.
On February 12, 2026, petitioner filed the appeal in this matter and alleged that she was
not provided the proper salary for the 2025-2026 school year considering her education and
experience. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that petitioner was not an employee
of the Board and that the petition of appeal was untimely. The Center also filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming that petitioner failed to state a lawful basis for relief and that the petition of
appeal was untimely. The Center argued that petitioner accepted the Director position for the
2025-2026 school year at the reduced salary in Spring 2025, and she began receiving the reduced
salary in September 2025. 	Thus, her petition of appeal should have been filed no later than
December 2025 to comply with the 90-day appeal timeframe.
3 The reduction in the number of allotted classrooms was based on a reduction in the number of students
that were attending the Center’s programs.
4 The Board provides the Salary Scale in accordance with guidelines from the New Jersey Department of
Education.

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Following review of the record and oral argument, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
granted the motions to dismiss the appeal. Initially, the ALJ concluded that because petitioner
was not an employee of the Board, any claims against it must be dismissed. 	The ALJ also
concluded that the petition was untimely filed because petitioner was notified of the Center’s
final decision regarding her salary for the 2025-2026 school year on May 12, 2025, and thus
should have filed her appeal within 90 days of that date. The ALJ rejected petitioner’s argument
that there was a continuing violation, because the November and December 2025 salary
adjustments did not decrease petitioner’s salary below the $59,150 threshold set forth in the
Director’s Salary Scale. The ALJ further found that the issue raised does not involve an important
and novel constitutional question or a matter of public interest that would warrant relaxation of
the 90-day timeframe for filing.
In her exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ should have considered the changes to
her salary that occurred after May 12, 2025, when determining the date her claim accrued for
purposes of the 90-day filing requirement. 	She references numerous email communications
between her and staff from the Center and the Board between September 2025 and December
2025 wherein her salary situation continued to be discussed. 	Per petitioner, those emails
establish that the May 12, 2025, decision was not a final decision regarding her salary.
Furthermore, she argues that her salary was not actually reduced until September 2025, and that
the Center continued to adjust it in November and December 2025. 	For these reasons, the

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determination she received in May 2025 was not the Center’s final decision and did not start the
90-day limitation period for the filing of an appeal.5
Upon review, the Commissioner adopts the Initial Decision as the final decision in this
matter. The threshold procedural issue in this case is whether the petition should be dismissed
pursuant to the 90-day rule, N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i). Kaprow v. Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley Twp., 131 N.J.
572, 582 (1993). The Commissioner concurs with the ALJ’s factual findings and conclusion that
the petition was untimely filed. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) mandates that petitions shall be filed “no
later than the 90 th day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final . . . action by the district
board of education.” “Adequate notice must be sufficient to inform an individual of some fact
that he or she has a right to know and that the communicating party has a duty to communicate.”
Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 587. 	Notice that is “unofficial and informal,” if otherwise adequate, can
trigger the 90-day limitation period. Id. at 588. The 90-day limitation period “represents a fair
and reasonably-necessary requirement for the proper and efficient resolution of disputes under
the school laws.” Id. at 582. It “provides a measure of repose” and “gives school districts the
security of knowing that administrative decisions regarding the operation of the school cannot
be challenged after ninety days.” Ibid.
Petitioner’s exceptions are unavailing. 	The ALJ considered and rejected petitioner’s
position that the Center’s decision regarding her salary was not finalized in May 2025. As of May
12, 2025, when the Center denied petitioner’s request for supplementation of the $59,150 salary
5 In response to petitioner’s exceptions, the Board highlights the fact that petitioner is not challenging the
ALJ’s conclusion that she has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to the Board.
Consequently, the Board asserts that there is no reason for the Commissioner to disturb that part of the
Initial Decision. The Commissioner agrees.

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for the 2025-2026 school year due to lack of funds, petitioner had adequate notice to inform her
that her salary would decrease substantially in September 2025 when the new school year began.
As the ALJ explained, the Center’s good faith attempts to find ways to increase petitioner’s salary
after September 2025 despite the budget shortfalls do not change the fact that she was on notice
of the decrease for the 2025-2026 school year in May 2025. Even assuming the 90-day limitation
period did not begin to run until petitioner actually received a reduced paycheck in September
2025, her February 2026 petition of appeal would still be deemed untimely.
Finally, the Commissioner agrees with the ALJ that the issue raised does not involve an
important and novel constitutional question or a significant matter of public interest that
warrants relaxation of the 90-day filing timeframe. Smith v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of
Paterson, OAL Dkt. No. EDU 06076-14, Initial Decision at 6 (Nov. 6, 2014), adopted, Commissioner
Decision No. 491-14 (Dec. 18, 2014).
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the
petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	September 3, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	September 4, 2026
6 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
9.1. Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days
from the date of mailing of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer.
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
DISMISSAL
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
AGENCY DKT. NO. 053-02-26
PATRICIA E. MCRAE,
Petitioner,
v.
ELIZABETH BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
ELIZABETHPORT PRESBYTERIAN CENTER,
Respondents.
_____________________________________
Patricia E. McRae, (pro-se)
Thomas J. Eicher, Board President, for respondent, Elizabethport Presbyterian
Center, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-5.4(a)5
Brian J. Kane, Esq., for respondent, Elizabeth Board of Education (La Corte, Bundy,
Varady & Kinsella, attorneys)
Record Closed: May 19, 2026 	Decided: June 18, 2026
BEFORE BINDI MERCHANT, ALJ:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner filed a petition of appeal of her salary with the Department of Education
on February 12, 2026, more than five (5) months after being notified that the Director
position would be at a reduced salary. Is the petition time-barred? Yes. Petitioner filed her
petition more than ninety days after the receipt of notice for the allegedly objectionable
employment decision. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 12, 2026, petitioner filed an appeal with the New Jersey Department
of Education, alleging that she was denied salary parity mandated by N.J.A.C. 6A:13A
based on a verbal claim that she is in a non-teaching position. Petitioner alleges that she
was never paid at a Master’s level salary despite being listed in the Tier 4 category pay
scale. 	Petitioner is requesting the following relief: (1) recognition of her Master’s degree
for salary purposes; (2) retroactive back pay to September 2025; and (3) correct placement
on the salary scale moving forward.
On February 20, 2026, the Board of Education of the City of Elizabeth (“respondent
BOE”) filed a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an answer on the basis that petitioner failed to
state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to R. 4:6-2(e). On March 20, 2026,
respondent Elizabethport 	(“respondent Elizabethport” or “Center”) filed its separate
Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an answer on the basis that petitioner’s claims are time-barred,
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i). On April 24, 2026, petitioner filed Opposition. 	On April
28, 2026, respondent BOE filed its reply, and on May 4, 2026, respondent Elizabethport
filed its reply.
On May 19, 2026, oral argument was heard, and the record was closed.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the documents submitted and oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss,
I FIND the following as FACT for purposes of this Motion:
1. 	Petitioner is not an employee of respondent BOE.
2. 	Respondent BOE only implements funding for the Center. The Center does
not control petitioner’s salary or the pay scale.
3. 	Respondent Elizabethport uses the salary determined by the New Jersey
Department of Education for its employees.
4. 	In 	2024, 	petitioner 	accepted 	a 	Director 	position 	with 	respondent
Elizabethport. Prior to accepting the position, petitioner was advised that her
salary would be based on her education, experience, and on the number of
classrooms.
5. 	For 2024-2025, petitioner was paid $100,968 as a Tier 4 candidate with 11
or more years of experience overseeing six (6) classrooms, pursuant to the
Director Salary Scale.
6. 	In December 2024, respondent BOE reduced respondent Elizabethport’s
budget based on the actual number of students that were attending the
Center’s programs. The number of classrooms allocated to Elizabethport by
the BOE decreased from six (6) to three (3) classrooms.
7. 	Despite this reduction in the budget, the Center still paid petitioner her full
$100,968 salary for the remainder of the school year.
8. 	In the Spring of 2025, petitioner was advised that her Director salary would
be decreased for the following school year based on the classroom allocation
reduction.
9. 	Petitioner was offered a teaching position with a higher salary and instead
accepted the Director at a lower salary.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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10. 	For the 2025-2026 school year, petitioner’s Director salary was $59,150 as a
Tier 4 candidate with 11 or more years of experience overseeing three (3)
classrooms, pursuant to the Director Salary Scale.
11. 	On 	May 	8, 	2025, 	petitioner 	requested 	that 	respondent 	Elizabethport
supplement her new decreased salary by $25,000.
12. 	On May 12, 2025, following a formal vote, respondent Elizabethport denied
petitioner’s requested salary supplement, citing financial inability.
13. 	On 	September 	20, 2025, petitioner 	requested 	written 	clarification 	from
respondent Elizabethport on how her $59,150 salary as a Tier 4 candidate
was determined.
14. 	On September 23, 2025, respondent Elizabethport clarified that petitioner’s
salary was calculated using the 2025-26 Director Salary Scale and explained
that the salary change resulted from the reduction in allocated classrooms.
15. 	In November of 2025, the Board of Directors for respondent Elizabethport
approved a discretionary salary adjustment, subject to the availability of funds
from the BOE budget, which raised petitioner’s annual compensation to
$77,500.
16. 	In December 2025, the BOE again reduced its monthly payments to
Elizabethport, reflecting a decrease in the number of students enrolled.
17. 	As a result of the December 2025 budget decrease, petitioner’s discretionary
salary adjustment was reduced, making her annual compensation $65,000.
18. 	On February 12, 2026, petitioner filed an appeal with the New Jersey
Department of Education.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under R. 4:6-2(e), a responding party may, in lieu of an answer, file a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-
1.5(g), a party can likewise file a motion to dismiss a petition instead of filing an answer
in a dispute concerning school laws. 	In ruling on a R. 4:6-2(e) motion, a judge must

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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examine ‘the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint’ while giving
the petitioner ‘the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact.’ Baskin v. P.C. Richard
& Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley,
Vignulo, Hyman, & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). Similarly, in ruling on a motion
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g):
The judge considers whether all the evidence together with all
legitimate inferences therefrom could sustain a judgment in
favor of the party opposing the motion. The judge is not
concerned 	with 	weight, 	worth, 	nature 	or 	extent 	of 	the
evidence. The judge must accept all the evidence supporting
the party defending against the motion and accord that party
the 	benefit 	of 	all 	inferences 	that 	can 	reasonably 	and
legitimately be deduced therefrom. If reasonable minds could
differ, the motion must be denied.
[37 New Jersey Practice, Administrative Law
and Practice § 5.19, at 259-60 (Steven Lefelt,
Anthony Miragliotta & Patricia Prunty) (2d ed.
2000).]
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), petitions shall be filed “no later than the 90th day from
the date of receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling, or other action by the district board
of education.” 	The ninety-day limitation period 	“represents a fair 	and 	reasonably
necessary requirement for the proper and efficient resolution of disputes under the school
laws.” 	Kaprow v. Board of Educ. of Berkeley Twp., 131 N.J. 572, 582 (1993). It “provides
a 	measure 	of 	repose” 	and 	“gives 	school 	districts 	the 	security 	of 	knowing 	that
administrative decisions regarding the operation of the school cannot be challenged after
ninety days.” Ibid.
Courts strictly construe and consistently apply the ninety-day limitation period.
Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 588-89; Nissman v. Bd. of Educ., 272 N.J. Super. 373, 380-81, (App.
Div. 1994); Riely v. Bd. of Educ., 173 N.J. Super. 109, 112-14, (App. Div. 1980). 	This
period begins to run when the petitioner “learn[s] from the Local Board the existence of
that state of facts that would enable him to file a timely claim.” Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 588-
89. 	Indeed, the “notice of a final order, ruling or other action” is “sufficient to inform an
individual of some fact that he or she has a right to know and that the communicating

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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party has a duty to communicate.” Id. at 587. 	Notably, even “unofficial and informal”
notice is “sufficient to trigger the ninety-day limitations period.” Id. at 588.
The main purpose of the ninety-day limitation “is to stimulate litigants to pursue a
right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party may have a fair
opportunity to defend, thus preventing the litigation of stale claims.” Kaprow, 131 N.J. at
587 (citing Ochs v. Federal Ins. Co., 90 N.J. 108, 112 (1982)). The second purpose of
this limitation is “to penalize dilatoriness and serve as a measure of repose.” Farrell v.
Votator Div., 62 N.J. 111, 115 (1973). “When a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that
he has a cause of action against an identifiable defendant and voluntarily sleeps on his
rights so long as to permit the customary period of limitations to expire, the pertinent
considerations of individual justice as well as the broader considerations of repose,
coincide to bar his action.” Ibid.
Under 	certain 	exceptional 	circumstances, 	the 	Commissioner 	has 	discretionary
authority to relax the ninety-day rule, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.16. See Kaprow, 131 N.J.
at 590-91 (discussing Commissioner’s authority “to relax procedural rules in his discretion
where a strict adherence thereto may be deemed inappropriate or unnecessary or may result
in injustice”); see also Mauro DeGennaro v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Hoboken, Hudson Cty.
and John R. Raslowsky, Superintendent, 2009 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 578, *10-11 (noting that
the “extraordinary relief” of rule relaxation is generally “reserved only for those situations
where a substantial constitutional issue is presented or where a matter of significant public
interest is involved, beyond that of concern only to the parties”). Relaxation of the ninety-day
rule is rarely invoked. In the instant matter, there are no constitutional issues, exceptional
circumstances, or public interests warranting relaxation.
Oral argument and review of the documents submitted demonstrate that petitioner is
not an employee of respondent BOE. Respondent BOE argues that since petitioner is not
an employee, her claims against them must be dismissed under R. 4:6-2(e). 	Respondent
BOE is only responsible for providing funding to respondent Elizabethport. Respondent BOE
does not control the specifics of petitioner’s salary, nor are they involved in hiring, firing, or
payroll decisions at the Center. Considering all record evidence and extending petitioner the
benefit of all inferences, no complaint can reasonably be maintained against respondent

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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BOE. Therefore, since petitioner is not an employee of respondent BOE, her claims must be
dismissed under R. 4:6-2(e).
Regarding the timeliness of the petition, petitioner’s appeal was not filed until February
2026. The ninety-day filing period for an appeal begins when the petitioner receives notice
of an objectionable employment decision. 	Here, petitioner received notice of her new
Director salary in Spring of 2025 and elected to continue in the position. Any claim petitioner
had regarding her reduced salary accrued (at the latest) on May 12, 2025, with the Center’s
denial of her initial request to supplement the Director’s salary by $25,000. 	Petitioner
received two (2) additional discretionary adjustments to her annual compensation in
November 2025 and December 2025, neither of which changed the salary to which she was
entitled pursuant to the Director Salary Scale. 	Petitioner was put on notice of respondent
Elizabethport’s final decision regarding her salary on May 12, 2025, the day her salary
increase request was denied. Petitioner should have brought her appeal claim within ninety
days of that date. Instead, petitioner delayed filing her appeal for more than six (6) months.
The only explanation petitioner provides for the late petition is that the 2025
adjustments to her annual compensation represent a continuing violation. 	This argument
fails for two reasons. First, petitioner was never entitled to more than the amount described
on the Director Salary Scale. Any subsequent adjustments to her annual compensation
were solely an exercise of beneficence on the part of respondent Elizabethport, and said
adjustments 	were 	specifically 	conditioned 	on 	BOE 	funding. 	Second, 	petitioner’s
argument asks this tribunal to find that the Center’s actions in (1) reallocating already
budgeted funds in order to supplement petitioner’s salary by almost $20,000, and (2)
continuing to supplement her salary by almost $6,000 despite a second round of BOE
budget cuts, amount to ongoing salary violations. 	Petitioner has chosen to remain
employed at an early education center that has experienced year-over-year drops in
enrollment. 	The fact that the Center’s BOE funding and petitioner’s salary as Director
have, consequently, fallen alongside enrollment cannot alone provide a basis for a
continuing violation claim. Considering all record evidence and extending petitioner the
benefit of all inferences, the instant appeal was filed well past the ninety-day limit,
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.16. Therefore, petitioner’s appeal is properly dismissed.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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Since petitioner is not an employee of respondent BOE, I CONCLUDE that the
claims against them must be dismissed. Additionally, since this case does not involve an
important and novel constitutional question or an important question of public interest
beyond that of concern only to the parties themselves that warrants a relaxation of the
limitation period, I CONCLUDE that the petition in this matter was filed in violation of the
ninety-day statute of limitations under N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), and that this case must be
dismissed.
ORDER
Given my findings of fact and conclusions of law, I ORDER that the Board’s Motion
to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Board is DISMISSED as a party. 	I ORDER that the
Center’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED in its entirety.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized to
make a final decision in this matter. If the Acting Commissioner of the Department of Education
does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit
is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance
with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26
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Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed
to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
THE 	DEPARTMENT 	OF 	EDUCATION. 	Exceptions 	may 	be 	filed 	by 	email 	to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
June 18, 2026
DATE 	BINDI MERCHANT, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: 	_June 22, 2026_____________________
Date Mailed to Parties: 	_________________________________
ke

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 04834-26

For Petitioner:

None

For Respondent:

None

APPENDIX

EXHIBITS

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