Robin Scheffler v. Board of Trustees of the Sussex County Charter School of Technology, Sussex County, 9/2/21, (#186-21)

186-21
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Robin Scheffler,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Trustees of the Sussex County
Charter School for Technology, Sussex County,
Respondent.
Synopsis
Petitioner – formerly employed by the respondent Board as a non-tenured teacher – filed an appeal on
September 11, 2020 in which she challenged the non-renewal of her employment and alleged violation of tenure
rights. The Board contended that petitioner’s appeal was untimely and should be dismissed pursuant to N.J.A.C.
6A:3-1.3; alternatively, the Board argued that petitioner never attained tenure. Petitioner asserted that her
appeal is not untimely because her claim was not ripe until the end of the school year, on June 23, 2020, and
argued that she was entitled to streamline tenure. The parties filed cross motions for summary decision.
The ALJ found, inter alia, that: there are no material facts at issue in this case, and the matter is ripe for
summary decision; petitioner became employed by the Board as a teacher on September 1, 2015 and remained
employed under annual employment contracts through the 2019-2020 school year; in March 2020, petitioner
was verbally advised by the superintendent that she would not be recommended for renewal for the 2020-2021
school year; on May 12, 2020, petitioner was served with a written notice of non-renewal; petitioner continued
teaching through the end of the 2019-2020 school year; pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), a petition must be
filed no later than the 90th day from the date of receipt of the notice of a final order or action that is the subject
of the appeal; there is no dispute that petitioner was verbally notified in March 2020 that she would not be
offered a contract for 2020–2021, nor that petitioner was served with a written notice of non-renewal on May
12, 2020, which clearly stated that her employment would not be renewed. The ALJ concluded that petitioner
received adequate notice on May 12, 2020 that she was not being offered a contract for the 2020–2021 school
year; the fact that the notice of non-renewal came during her fifth year is immaterial, as her status upon receipt
of the notice was still that of a non-tenured teacher; and petitioner did not timely file her appeal. Accordingly,
the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision and dismissed the petition.
Upon comprehensive review of the record, the Commissioner concurred with the ALJ that the petition of appeal
was untimely and that summary decision is appropriate. In so deciding, the Commissioner noted that the
Appellate Division’s decision in Nissman v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Long Beach Island, Ocean Cty., 272 N.J.
Super. 373 (1994) is controlling. In that case, the court rejected the same argument petitioner made here, that
her appeal could not be filed earlier because she did not acquire tenure until the completion of the required years
of service; the court in Nissman ruled that the 90-day limitations period begins to run on the date of the board’s
action, not on the date when a petitioner claims that a substantive right accrued. Accordingly, the Initial
Decision of the OAL was adopted as the final decision in this matter, and the petition was dismissed.
This synopsis is not part of the Commissioner’s decision. It has been prepared for the convenience of the reader. It has
been neither reviewed nor approved by the Commissioner.

OAL Dkt. No. EDU 09785-20
Agency Dkt. No. 200-9/20
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Robin Scheffler,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Trustees of the Sussex County
Charter School for Technology, Sussex County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law
(OAL), the exceptions filed by petitioner pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the Board’s reply
thereto, have been reviewed and considered.
Petitioner was employed by the Board as a teacher beginning in the 2015-2016
school year. On May 12, 2020, petitioner was served with a written notice of non-renewal. On
September 11, 2020, petitioner filed a petition of appeal, arguing that the Board had violated her
tenure rights. Following cross-motions for summary decision, the ALJ granted the Board’s
motion for summary decision, finding that the petition of appeal was untimely pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i), because it was filed more than 90 days after petitioner was served with the
notice of non-renewal.
In her exceptions, petitioner argues that she earned tenure after five years of
employment, on the last day of the 2019-2020 school year, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:11-6.2(a).
Petitioner contends that her claim did not accrue and was not ripe for review until she earned tenure
186-21

2
on that date, and that her petition of appeal was timely because it was filed within 90 days of that
date. Petitioner claims that tenure is obtained by operation of law at the completion of the statutory
period and that a non-renewal notice cannot circumvent that law.
In reply, the Board argues that the ALJ correctly determined that the petition of
appeal was untimely. According to the Board, the ALJ was not required to address the question of
whether petitioner earned tenure because the petition was untimely. Furthermore, the Board
contends that petitioner did not earn tenure on the last day of the school year, because the statute
provides that tenure is earned “after” five years of employment, meaning that the teacher must be
reemployed following the completion of five years of service.
Upon a comprehensive review of the record, the Commissioner concurs with the
ALJ that the petition of appeal was untimely. The Appellate Division’s decision in Nissman v.
Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Long Beach Island, Ocean Cty., 272 N.J. Super. 373 (1994) is
controlling.1 In that matter, the board of education voted in April not to renew Nissman’s
contract. Nissman continued to work through the expiration of the contract on August 31, at
which time she had been employed in the position for three years, the applicable time period
required for her to earn tenure. Thereafter, she filed a petition of appeal alleging violation of her
tenure rights. The board argued that Nissman’s petition was untimely because it was filed more
than 90 days after she had received the April notice that her contract would not be renewed; she
countered that her cause of action did not accrue until she completed three years of work on
August 31. The ALJ and the Commissioner agreed with Nissman, finding that by failing to
terminate the contract before the three years expired, the tenure statute applied by self-
1 The decisions cited by petitioner for the proposition that her claim was not ripe until the end of the school year
involve differing factual scenarios, while the facts in Nissman are substantially similar to the facts here.
Furthermore, the cases cited by petitioner are Initial or Commissioner decisions, not appellate decisions. Therefore,
petitioner’s reliance on those cases over the on-point holding by the Appellate Division in Nissman is not
persuasive.

3
effectuation, and Nissman’s claim was not time-barred because she challenged the denial of her
tenured status and not the non-renewal. The State Board of Education2 disagreed and reversed
the Commissioner’s decision, concluding that the only action by the board of education was the
termination of her employment in April and the fact that the termination became effective on
August 31 did not change the date on which the action was taken, constitute board action, or give
rise to a separate cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the State Board of
Education’s decision, finding that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Id. at 379.
The court found that Nissman knew in April that she was not going to be offered a new contract,
would be required to serve out the remaining time on her existing contract, and would complete
three years of service, and that, nonetheless, the board had voted not to grant her tenure. Ibid.
The court found that it was not necessary to decide whether the board had acted correctly in not
renewing the contract, indicating that what was important was that the board had the right to
know within 90 days of passing its resolution whether its action was going to be challenged. Id.
at 380.
While petitioner argues that the Nissman decision did not address ripeness, the
Commissioner does not find this argument persuasive. Nissman argued that her claim could not
have been filed earlier because she did not acquire tenure until the completion of the required
years of service – the same argument that petitioner makes here. The court rejected that
argument, stating that the 90-day limitations period begins to run on the date of the board’s
action, not on the date when a petitioner claims that a substantive right accrued. Id. at 381.
Moreover, the court found that an “agency regulation that focuses on the date of the employer’s
wrongful act as the accrual date for the cause of action, rather than the date on which the
2 At that time, appeals of Commissioner decisions were made to the State Board of Education before proceeding to
the Appellate Division.

4
consequences of the act is directly felt by the employee (termination), is not inherently arbitrary
or capricious.” Ibid. While the court did not use the term “ripeness,” it specifically indicated
that Nissman could have filed her petition within 90 days of receiving her notice of non-renewal,
prior to the date on which she would complete the service required for tenure. Ibid. This finding
directly contradicts petitioner’s ripeness argument, which is based on the premise that she could
not have filed the petition until she completed the required service.
Like Nissman, petitioner characterizes her appeal as arising not from the Board’s
action of non-renewing her contract, but from the denial of her alleged tenure status. Applying
the Nissman holding, it is clear that petitioner was required to file her petition on or before
August 10, 2020, 90 days after she received notice of her non-renewal. She did not file her
petition of appeal until September 11, 2020, more than a month later. Therefore, her petition was
untimely pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i).3
Accordingly, the Initial Decision of the OAL is adopted as the final decision in
this matter. The Board’s motion for summary decision is granted and the petition of appeal is
hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.4
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision:
Date of Mailing:
3 For this reason, the Commissioner does not reach the issues of whether petitioner earned tenure or whether the
Board’s notice of non-renewal could prevent any tenure rights from vesting.
4 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1.
Under N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date
of mailing of this decision.
September 3, 2021
September 10, 2021

New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
AGENCY DKT. NO. 200-9/20
ROBIN SCHEFFLER,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
SUSSEX COUNTY CHARTER SCHOOL
FOR TECHNOLOGY, SUSSEX COUNTY,
Respondent.
_________________________________
Gail Oxfeld Kanef, Esq., for petitioner (Oxfeld Cohen, P.C., attorneys)
Patricia C. Melia, Esq., for respondent (Weiner Law Group, LLP, attorneys)
Record Closed: April 2, 2021 Decided: July 20, 2021
BEFORE KELLY J. KIRK, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Robin Scheffler, a teacher, appeals the non-renewal of her employment
by respondent, the Board of Trustees of the Sussex County Charter School for
Technology, Sussex County (Board or SCCST), alleging violation of tenure rights.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about September 11, 2020, Scheffler filed a Petition of Appeal (Petition) with
the Interim Commissioner of Education. On or about September 29, 2020, the Board filed
Respondent’s Answer to Petition of Appeal and Separate Defenses (Answer). The Office
of Controversies and Disputes of the Department of Education (Department) transmitted
the contested case to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), where it was filed on
October 6, 2020.
On January 27, 2021, with the intention of filing cross-motions for summary
decision, the parties submitted a joint Stipulation of Facts with nine exhibits. On March
12, 2021, petitioner and respondent filed cross-motions for summary decision.
Petitioner’s motion was accompanied by a brief. Respondent’s motion was accompanied
by a letter brief and Certification of Patricia Melia, Esq., with two exhibits. On April 1,
2021, petitioner filed a reply letter brief. On April 2, 2021, respondent filed a reply brief.
FACTUAL DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Per the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the parties have stipulated to the following
pertinent FACTS:
On or about September 1, 2015, Robin Scheffler (petitioner) became employed by
the Sussex County Charter School for Technology (respondent) as a teacher.
Petitioner worked for respondent as a teacher from September 1, 2015, until the
last day of school in June 2016.
On or about December 1, 2016, petitioner and respondent entered into an
employment contract for the 2016–2017 academic year. (Joint Exhibit A.)
Petitioner worked for respondent for the 2016–2017 academic year as a teacher.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
3
On or about April 10, 2017, petitioner and respondent entered into an employment
contract for the 2017–2018 academic year. (Joint Exhibit B.)
Petitioner worked for respondent for the 2017–2018 academic year as a teacher.
On or about May 7, 2018, petitioner and respondent entered into an employment
contract for the 2018–2019 academic year. (Joint Exhibit C.)
Petitioner worked for respondent for the 2018–2019 academic year as a teacher.
On or about April 8, 2019, petitioner and respondent entered into an employment
contract for the 2019–2020 academic year. (Joint Exhibit D.)
Petitioner worked for respondent for the 2019–2020 academic year.
The last day of school for the 2019–2020 school year was June 16, 2020.
In or about March 2020, petitioner met with superintendent Noreen Lazariuk
(superintendent), at which time petitioner was verbally advised that the superintendent
would not be recommending that her employment be renewed for the 2020–2021
academic year.
On or about May 12, 2020, petitioner was served with a written Notice of Non-
Renewal by way of email and certified mail, return receipt requested. (Joint Exhibit E.)
Petitioner did not request a statement of reasons.
Petitioner did not request a Donaldson hearing.
On April 6, 2020, the Board voted on a list of employees approved for
reappointment for the 2020–2021 academic year. Petitioner’s name was not included in
the Board’s list of reappointments for the 2020–2021 school year. (Joint Exhibit F.)

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
4
On or about August 13, 2020, New Jersey Education Association field
representative John Ropars (Ropars) requested from the Board specific information and
documentation relating to petitioner’s employment and non-renewal. (Joint Exhibit G.)
On or about August 27, 2020, counsel for respondent answered Ropars’ request
for specific information. (Joint Exhibit H.)
On September 1, 2020, counsel for respondent received correspondence (dated
August 27, 2020) from petitioner’s counsel. (Joint Exhibit I.)
Petitioner did not report for work for Teacher In-Service on September 1, 2020,
and she did not report for work for the students’ start of school on September 8, 2020.
On or about September 11, 2020, petitioner filed the instant appeal with the
Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner).
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Board argues that Scheffler’s appeal is untimely and should be dismissed
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3, and alternatively argues that Scheffler did not attain tenure.
Conversely, Scheffler argues that her appeal is not untimely because her claim was not
ripe until the end of the school year on June 23, 2020,1 and argues that she was entitled
to streamline tenure.
N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-1 to -18 is known as the “Charter School Program Act of 1995”
(the Act), and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-18, the State Board of Education adopted
rules and regulations pursuant to the “Administrative Procedure Act” necessary to
effectuate the provisions of the Act, which are codified at N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1 et seq. A
charter school is a public school operated under a charter granted by the Commissioner,
which is operated independently of a local board of education and is managed,
supervised, and controlled by a board of trustees. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-3(a). Unless
1 Per the Joint Statement of Facts, the last day of school was June 16, 2020.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
5
exempted by the Commissioner, a charter school operates in accordance with its charter
and the laws and regulations that govern other public schools. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-11(a).
To initiate a contested case for the Commissioner’s determination of a controversy
or dispute arising under the school laws, a petitioner must prepare a petition of appeal
conforming to the requirements of N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.4 and serve it upon each respondent,
together with any supporting papers. N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(a). N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.3(i) provides
as follows:
The petitioner shall file a petition no later than the 90th day from the
date of receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling, or other action by
the district board of education, individual party, or agency, that is the
subject of the requested contested case hearing. This rule shall not
apply in instances where a specific statute, regulation, or court order
provides for a period of limitation shorter than 90 days for the filing
of a particular type of appeal.
On or before May 15 in each year, each non-tenured teaching staff member
continuously employed by a board of education since the preceding September 30 shall
receive either a written offer of a contract for employment from the board of education for
the next succeeding year or a written notice from the chief school administrator that such
employment will not be offered. N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10. An employee whose employment
contract is not renewed has the right to a written statement of reasons for non-renewal
and to an informal appearance before the board. N.J.S.A. 18A:27-4.1(b); see also
N.J.S.A. 18A:27-3.2. The purpose of the appearance shall be to permit the staff member
to convince the members of the board to offer reemployment. Ibid.
There is no dispute that in March 2020 Scheffler was verbally notified by
Superintendent Lazariuk that she would not be offered a contract for 2020–2021, or that
on April 6, 2020, the Board voted on the list of teacher contracts for the 2020–2021 school
year, and Scheffler’s name was not on the list. Further, there is no dispute that Scheffler
was served with a written Notice of Non-Renewal by way of email and certified mail, return
receipt requested. The May 12, 2020, Notice of Non-Renewal states:

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
6
Please be advised that you will not be offered reemployment
for the 2020–2021 school-year. Please be advised that you
have a right to request a statement of reasons for your
nonrenewal within fifteen (15) days of your receipt of this
notice, as well as the right to an informal appearance before
the Board for the purpose of trying to convince the Board to
offer you reemployment. If you are inclined to request a
statement of reasons or an informal appearance before the
Board, please communicate your request in writing to me at
the above address.
Accordingly, Scheffler had notice sufficient to trigger the ninety-day time period. Ninety
days from May 12, 2020, would have been August 10, 2020, but Scheffler did not file her
appeal until September 11, 2020, a full month late.
Petitioner argues that Scheffler “had no reason to know that SCCST would
continue to employ her until she earned tenure, or release her from employment early so
that she did not earn tenure”; that SCCST “could have reconsidered its decision or opted
to terminate Scheffler, thus depriving her of her tenure rights”; and that “[i]f SCCST had
terminated her any time before that and issued a termination date before the last day of
school, there would have been no wrongful act as to her tenure rights, notwithstanding
any wrongful act as to the notice of termination.” Petitioner further argues that her “claim
only became ripe and subject to a petition once the school year had ended and the Board
failed to recognize Scheffler’s entitlement to tenure.” However, the applicable statute
references “receipt of the notice of a final order, ruling, or other action by the district board
of education,” and does not specify the end of the school year as an operative date.
Scheffler could have requested a statement of reasons for the non-renewal after
receipt of the non-renewal notice, but she did not do so. Scheffler likewise could have
appeared before the Board to try to convince the Board to offer her reemployment, at
which time she could have presented her argument that unless terminated she would
acquire tenure at the end of the school year, but she did not do so. Further, if petitioner
did not wish to alert the Board to her argument until after the last day of the school year,
she still could have filed her petition after the end of the school year, but still within ninety
days of the non-renewal notice, but she did not do so.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
7
The Board argues that Scheffler “initially “challenged” her non-renewal on or about
July 30, 2020, when she contacted counsel for the Board complaining that the Board had
breached her employment contract for the 2019–2020 school year by terminating her
employment “without 60-days’ notice,” and that “[f]or the first time, on August 27, 2020
(107 days after petitioner was provided written notice of her non-renewal), through
correspondence written by her counsel, petitioner began asserting that she had received
tenure as a teaching staff member,” which correspondence was received by the Board
on September 1, 2020.
In Kaprow v. Board of Education, 131 N.J. 572, 583 (1993), the New Jersey
Supreme Court discussed the ninety-day limitation period and determined that such
period “represents a reasonable procedural requirement,” provides “finality in education
matters,” and has withstood tangential review. Additionally, the Court opined:
Adequate notice must be sufficient to inform an individual of
some fact that he or she has a right to know and that the
communicating party has a duty to communicate. Moreover,
adequate notice under the regulation must be sufficient to
further the purpose of the ninety-day limitations period. A
limitations period has two purposes. The first is to stimulate
litigants to pursue a right of action within a reasonable time so
that the opposing party may have a fair opportunity to defend,
thus preventing the litigation of stale claims. The second
purpose is “‘to penalize dilatoriness and serve as a measure
of repose’” by giving security and stability to human affairs.
[Kaprow, 131 N.J. at 587 (citations omitted).]
Kaprow attempted to resolve his claim through negotiations with the Board.
However, the Supreme Court found that such attempt did not negate that he had received
adequate notice on a date certain, nor did it toll the running of the limitations period. In
the present matter, Scheffler contends that the matter was “not ripe for adjudication” until
the last day of the school year because that was when she acquired streamline tenure.
However, she received adequate notice on May 12, 2020, that she was not being offered
a contract for the 2020–2021 school year, and her attempts to resolve her dispute did not
toll the running of the ninety-day limitations period within which she was permitted to file
a petition. Had Scheffler been issued the exact same notice of non-renewal in a prior

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
8
year, there is no question that the operative date to file a petition would have been the
date of her receipt of the notice of non-renewal. The fact that the notice of non-renewal
was during her fifth year does not change that, as her status upon receipt of the notice
was still that of a non-tenured teacher and she did not timely appeal.
On point is Nissman v. Board of Education of Long Beach Island, Ocean County,
272 N.J. Super. 373 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 315 (1994), wherein Nissman
entered into a contract with a local board to serve as an elementary-school principal for
a term of three years. In March and April of the third year of her contract, meetings were
held by the board with Nissman and her attorney for the purpose of determining whether
Nissman would be offered a contract for the subsequent year. Nissman conceded that
she was not tenured in her position as principal at the time of the meetings. In compliance
with N.J.S.A. 18A:27-10,2 the board adopted a resolution on April 23 resolving that
Nissman’s employment contract expiring August 31 would not be renewed, and she would
not be offered a new contract or granted tenure. Nissman received the resolution on or
about April 27 and continued working until August 31. On August 31, Nissman’s attorney
faxed correspondence to the board, stating, inter alia, that Nissman had “served in the
position for three consecutive calendar years, she has acquired tenure”; “asserts her right
to the position of principal”; and “will report to the principal’s office on . . . September 4
. . . to resume her duties.” 272 N.J. Super. at 375. In response, the board faxed
correspondence to Nissman’s attorney stating, inter alia, that Nissman “does not have
tenure”; “the Board took formal action at its meeting on April 23”; and that she was “duly
notified of this action” and “should not report to work.” On September 21, Nissman filed
a petition alleging that she acquired tenure on August 31, and that her employment was
terminated on September 4.
In Nissman, the court determined that it was not necessary to decide whether the
board acted correctly, and that what was important was that “the Local Board had the
right to know within 90 days whether its action was going to be challenged” because it
would undoubtedly have to contract with another principal to replace Nissman. Id. at 380.
The court inferred that “April 30” was selected by the Legislature to provide “sufficient time
2 At that time, the date in the statute was “on or before April 30,” not “on or before May 15.”

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
9
for a local board to fill vacant positions, and for the terminated teaching staff member to
secure other employment,” and, citing Kaprow, stated, “[t]o allow a teaching staff member
. . . to file a claim after the commencement of a new academic year in these circumstances
defeats the principle of ‘repose, an essential element in the proper and efficient
administration of the school laws.’” Ibid.
Although petitioner argues that “the court in Nissman did not address the ripeness
doctrine and how it related to Nissman’s claim for tenure,” the court in fact rejected
Nissman’s argument that her petition could not have been filed earlier because she did
not acquire tenure until August 31, and specifically stated that such argument “ignores
the Rule’s provision that the 90 days begin on the date on which the final action of the
Local Board took place . . . not the date on which petitioner claims that a substantive right
accrued.” Id. at 381.
Summary Decision
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b), summary decision “may be rendered if the papers
and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to
prevail as a matter of law.” Further, “[w]hen a motion for summary decision is made and
supported, an adverse party in order to prevail must by responding affidavit set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be determined in an evidentiary
proceeding.” Ibid. This standard is substantially similar to that governing a civil motion under
R. 4:46-2 for summary judgment. E.S. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 412 N.J.
Super. 340, 350 (App. Div. 2010); Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J. Super. 106,
121 (App. Div. 1995).
In Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), the New Jersey
Supreme Court set forth the standard governing a motion for summary judgment:
[A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 09785-20
10
the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party. The “judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
[Citation omitted.]
The parties cross-moved for summary decision. Inasmuch as there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact challenged, I CONCLUDE that this matter is appropriate for
summary decision. On May 12, 2020, Scheffler received adequate notice that her contract
would not be renewed, but she failed to file a petition until September 11, 2020, a month
after the applicable ninety-day limitations period had expired. Accordingly, I CONCLUDE
that Scheffler’s Petition of Appeal was untimely filed and should be dismissed. As such, the
alternative issue of tenure is not addressed herein.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that summary decision is GRANTED in favor of the Board,
and that Scheffler’s Petition of Appeal is DISMISSED.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

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11
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ATTN: BUREAU OF CONTROVERSIES AND
DISPUTES, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-
0500, marked “Attention: Exceptions.” A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the
judge and to the other parties.
July 20, 2021
DATE KELLY J. KIRK, ALJ
Date Received at Agency: July 20, 2021
Date Mailed to Parties: July 20, 2021
db