Brian Nelson v. Board of Education of the Township of Stafford, Ocean County, 4/21/26 (#138-26)

138-26
OAL Dkt. No. EDU 18264-25
Agency Dkt. No. 289-9/25
New Jersey Commissioner of Education
Final Decision
Brian Nelson,
Petitioner,
v.
Board of Education of the Township of Stafford,
Ocean County,
Respondent.
The record of this matter, the Initial Decision of the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),
the exceptions filed by petitioner Brian Nelson pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4, and the reply filed
by the Stafford Board of Education (Board), have been reviewed and considered.
In this matter, petitioner challenges the Board Superintendent’s written directives issued
June 16 and August 5, 2025, that he submit to a “Fit to Return examination in accordance with
Policy 3161” (the Policy). 	The Board filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary
decision, which petitioner opposed. 	The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the Board’s
motion for summary decision upon concluding that no genuine issues of material fact existed and
that the Board acted properly in compelling petitioner to either undergo a psychiatric
examination or produce a letter from his own medical provider confirming his fitness to return
to duty.
In his exceptions, petitioner argues that the ALJ misapplied the summary decision
standard because some of the material facts were indeed disputed in his certification opposing

2
the Board’s motion. He further argues that even if the facts were true as alleged by the Board,
they do not justify a psychiatric examination. 	The Board maintains that the ALJ’s decision is
correct and that it is entitled to summary judgment because petitioner has not shown that its
directive was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Upon review, the Commissioner rejects the Initial Decision because this matter is not ripe
for review. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2, boards of education “may require individual psychiatric
or physical examinations of any employee, whenever, in the judgment of the board, an employee
shows evidence of deviation from normal, physical or mental health.” 	N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.2(b)
requires boards of education to adopt written policies and procedures that “shall provide for
notification to school employees regarding the requirements for physical or psychiatric
examinations.”
Citing N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2 and N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3, the Policy reiterates that the Board may
require a psychiatric examination of a teaching staff member “whenever, in the judgment of the
Board, a teaching staff member shows evidence of deviation from normal physical or mental
health,” to determine their fitness. In addition, the Policy states that the Board must provide the
teaching staff member with a written statement of the reasons for the required examination, as
well as a hearing before the Board if requested. See N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b)(1) and (2) (requiring a
written statement of reasons and a board hearing, if requested). 	The Policy also states that
notice of the teaching staff member’s right to a hearing shall be provided with the statement of
reasons for the required examination. 	Moreover, the Policy provides that the teaching staff
member must request the Board hearing in writing within five working days of receipt of the
written statement of reasons.

3
Regarding the nature of the Board hearing, the Policy explains that it “shall be conducted
in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A. 18A:25-7 and will offer the teaching staff member
the opportunity to appear before the Board to refute the reason(s) for the required
examination(s).” 	The Policy directs that “if the teaching staff member failed to persuade the
Board at the hearing that [they] should not be required to submit to the appropriate
examination(s),” then they “shall be ordered to submit to the appropriate examination(s) by the
physician or institution designated by the Board.” Finally, quoting the applicable regulation, the
Policy instructs that “[t]he determination of such a hearing shall be appealable to the
Commissioner.” 	See N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b)(2)(i) (“The determination of such a hearing shall be
appealable to the Commissioner . . . .”).
Here, the Board Superintendent provided letters to petitioner dated June 16 and August
5, 2025, requesting that he submit to a Fit to Return examination. The August 5, 2025, letter
specifically cited the Policy and provided a more detailed statement of the reasons for the
request. However, the letters did not advise petitioner of his right to request a Board hearing
within five working days of receipt of the written statement of reasons. Thus, the Policy was not
adhered to by the Board and petitioner was not “afforded the opportunity to be heard after the
specific reasons were furnished to him.” Gish v. Bd. of Educ. of Paramus, 145 N.J. Super. 96, 107
(App. Div. 1976), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 251 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
Upon review of the record, the Commissioner became aware for the first time that on
August 21, 2025, the parties executed a document titled “Stipulation As To Commencement of
the Proceedings Directly Before the Commissioner Of Education” stating they agreed that
petitioner may challenge the Board’s directive via the filing of a Petition of Appeal before the

4
Commissioner “without requesting nor appearing for any predicate hearing before the Board.”
However, the Commissioner finds that the parties are not permitted to circumvent the Policy or
regulations via stipulation. 	Because the statement of reasons did not advise petitioner of his
right to request a Board hearing to refute the stated reasons for the examination, and no Board
hearing occurred, this matter is not ripe for review before the Commissioner.
For these reasons, the matter is remanded to the Board. See Gish, 145 N.J. Super. at 104
(“School boards are entrusted by our Legislature with the duty of determining the general issue
of fitness of teachers” and are “sufficiently equipped to conduct a fair and impartial inquiry
whenever such issue legitimately comes into question.”). 	Should petitioner desire the
opportunity to refute the stated reasons for the required examination, he shall request a Board
hearing in writing within five working days of receipt of this decision. If he fails to persuade the
Board at the hearing that he should not be required to submit to the examination, then the Board
shall order him to submit to the examination by the designated physician. The determination of
that hearing shall be appealable to the Commissioner.
Accordingly, the Initial Decision is rejected and the petition of appeal is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.1
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION
Date of Decision: 	April 21, 2026
Date of Mailing: 	April 22, 2026
1 This decision may be appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9.1. Under
N.J.Ct.R. 2:4-1(b), a notice of appeal must be filed with the Appellate Division within 45 days from the date of mailing
of this decision.

New Jersey is an Equal Opportunity Employer
State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
INITIAL DECISION
SUMMARY DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
AGENCY DKT. NO. 289-9/25
BRIAN NELSON,
Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
TOWNSHIP OF STAFFORD, OCEAN
COUNTY
Respondent.
Edward A. Cridge, for petitioner (Mellk Cridge LLC, attorneys)
Giulia L. Lima, and Jacob K. Mintun, Esqs., for respondent (Comegno Law
Group, P.C., attorneys)
Record Closed: December 23, 2025 Decided: February 9, 2026
BEFORE MARY ANN BOGAN, ALJ:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Brian Nelson (Nelson), a tenured teaching staff member employed by
the Stafford Township Board of Education (the Board or District) appeals the Board’s

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
2
directive to undergo a fitness to return examination or psychiatric examination
(examination) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2 and N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b). The Board
maintains that the petition of appeal fails to state a claim of relief to challenge the Board’s
decision that the petitioner’s behavior showed evidence of a harmful, significant deviation
from normal physical or mental health affecting his ability to teach, discipline, or associate
with children when he called and sent text messages to other employees and colleagues
that were described as irrational and caused fear. In the alternative, the Board maintains
that even if petitioner sufficiently provides a cause of action, there is no longer a disputed
issue as to any material facts challenging the Board’s request. For the reasons set forth
below, there is sufficient evidence to compel petitioner to undergo an examination in order
to return to duty.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 14, 2025, the Department of Education, Office of Controversies and
Disputes transmitted this matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a contested
case. In lieu of filing an answer, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition of Appeal
and alternatively filed a Motion for Summary Decision, under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5. Under
that rule, “[a] party may move for summary decision upon all or any of the substantive
issues in a contested case.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). Such motion “shall be served with
briefs and with or without supporting affidavits” and “[t]he decision sought may be
rendered if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the
moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). When the
motion “is made and supported, an adverse party in order to prevail must by responding
affidavit set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can only be
determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” Ibid. No further papers were filed, and the
motion for summary decision is now ripe for review.1
1 Although petitioner requested oral argument, this matter would be decided on the papers. See N.J.A.C.
1:1-12.2(d).

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
3
FACTUAL DISCUSSION
Based on the papers filed in this matter, including the certifications of counsel and
petitioner, I FIND that the following FACTS are undisputed:
On June 16, 2025, the Superintendent George Chidiac issued a directive ordering
Mr. Nelson to undergo an examination). The Board in lieu of the examination proposed
to Mr. Nelson that he may provide correspondence from his healthcare provider
confirming his fitness to return to duty. The directive was issued based upon reports from
staff members who reported Mr. Nelson missed a scheduled student conference, spent
extended time in the gym teacher’s office, arrived late to school or left early, failed to
observe a student leaving school grounds, and inconsistent attendance. Beginning on
June 11, 2025, Mr. Nelson “sent text messages to teachers outside of the workday and
about his employment and [made baseless], yet concerning, threats related to the
Superintendent of Schools.” After Mr. Nelson “demanded” a meeting with Superintendent
Chidiac he rescinded his meeting request. Exhibit K. The meeting took place with staff
members who reported and signed statements concerning Mr. Nelson’s “irrational text
messages”. It was also reported that Mr. Nelson was “defensive and anxious” when
approached about his conduct. See Exhibit L; Certification of George Chidiac (Chidiac
Cert.); see also Exhibit F; H, I, J.
Mr. Nelson has a disciplinary history of unbecoming conduct, which began in
2015 when he was placed on administrative leave with pay after being arrested four times
for driving while under the influence. Mr. Nelson was observed at work walking wobbly,
and beer cans were found in his office. His conduct violated District Policy 3159 when he
failed to report three of the arrests. Exhibits L; A; and B. He attended an inpatient
treatment center. In November 20192, the Board contends he was denied workers’
compensation when video surveillance did not show him injuring his ankle as he reported.
Two years later, it was reported that Mr. Nelson was observed walking erratically at work.
Mr. Nelson was again placed on administrative leave pending an investigation of him
being under the influence of alcohol while working. As part of that disciplinary action, Mr.
2 Mr. Nelson was again denied workers’ compensation for a second time beginning in early 2023 when
documents and footage did not reveal the claims he had made about an injury in the school.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
4
Nelson and the District entered into a Last Chance Agreement, which included terms such
as waiving his right to grieve, contest, or challenge any transfer to another position or
work location, and an agreement to submit to random drug/alcohol testing. See Chidiac
Cert. at 11; Exhibit E. The agreement was in effect until June 30, 2023.
On August 5, 2025, Superintendent Chidiac issued a letter to Mr. Nelson
summarizing his behavior that caused him to issue the directive to be examined. Exhibit
R. In response, Mr. Nelson requested an order declaring that the Board does not have
the legal authority to compel him to undergo the examination; specifically, he claims that
the Board “did not demonstrate evidence of conduct of a harmful, significant deviation
from normal physical or mental health affecting his ability to teach, discipline, or associate
with children of the age of the children subject to the teacher’s control in the school
district”. Instead, Mr. Nelson contends that “he does not suffer from or manifest any
evidence of a harmful, significant deviation from normal physical or mental health
affecting his ability to teach, discipline, or associate with the children subject to his control
in the District”.
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
According to the Board, dismissal of the petition, or in the alternative, summary
decision in its favor, is appropriate, and there is no need for a hearing because there is
no genuine issue of material fact regarding Mr. Nelson’s prior discipline, his dispute with
colleagues, and his misconduct that gave rise to the current directive to undergo an
examination in order to return to work.
The Board argues that the petition “fails to state a legal basis for relief” as
petitioner’s submission is conclusionary, merely setting forth his own self-assessment as
to whether he should be tested or not, without providing any factual support to
demonstrate that the Board’s directive “lacked a reasonable basis.”
Thereafter, Mr. Nelson filed a brief in opposition to the District’s motion for
summary decision. A certification signed by Mr. Nelson was included in the filed
opposition. Exhibit B. In his certification opposing the District’s motion, Mr. Nelson denied

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
5
prior disciplinary history for acting “erratically or wobbly” and having empty beer bottles in
his office, and admitted he entered into a Last Chance Agreement after the incident in
which he was found to have alcohol on school grounds. Mr. Nelson also responded to
current complaints of conduct in a general manner admitting that he contacted staff who
reported his behavior and that he does not “suffer from, nor manifest any evidence of a
harmful, significant deviation from normal physical or mental health affecting his ability to
teach, discipline or associate with the children subject to his control in the School District.”
See Petitioner’s Verified Petition ¶ 5.
To the extent that Mr. Nelson addresses the District’s examples of his specific acts
of conduct that resulted in discipline, he generally denies certain conduct and explains
that his conduct did not rise to the level of warranting an examination. Mr. Nelson also
disputes the District’s contention that he misled the District when he filed for workers’
compensation without demonstrating a valid injury.
Based on these arguments, Mr. Nelson also asserts that the District’s motion for
summary decision should be denied because the District represents in its pleadings a
“fundamental misunderstanding as to the procedure attendant to demands for psychiatric
evaluation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2.”
In response to Mr. Nelson’s opposition, the District argues that Mr. Nelson failed
to dispute the facts and evidentiary support provided for each relevant fact and statement.
Furthermore, the District argues that the petitioner’s opposition mischaracterized the
statutory framework governing psychiatric examination under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2. In
particular, Mr. Nelson “overstates his procedural rights, and misrepresents the evidentiary
requirements necessary to challenge the Board’s determination.”
The Board restates its position that no genuine issues of material fact have been
set forth through a responding affidavit; therefore, it is entitled to summary decision
directing Mr. Nelson to undergo an examination.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
6
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Under the procedural rules governing petitions of appeal filed with the
Commissioner of Education, a respondent can move to dismiss in lieu of an answer for
various reasons, including “on the grounds that the petitioner has advanced no cause of
action even if the petitioner’s factual allegations are accepted as true . . . .” N.J.A.C. 6A:3-
1.10; N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g). Such a motion is assessed under the same standards as a
motion to dismiss for a complainant’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under New Jersey Court Rule 4:6-2(e), which like N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g) and
N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10 allows for the motions for judgment on the pleading.
Under those standards, “the test for determining the adequacy of [the] pleading [is]
whether a cause of action is ‘suggested’ by the facts,” such that the “inquiry is limited to
examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint.” Printing
Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citing R. 4:6-2(e);
Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988); Rieder v. Dep’t of Transp.,
221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)).
While the Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules governing motions, N.J.A.C.
1:1-12.1 to -12.7, do not specifically limit the types of motions that may be made in
administrative hearings or otherwise preclude a “motion to dismiss,” the more common
method for resolving a case on the papers without a plenary hearing is by a motion for
summary decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5.
Under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5, “[a] party may move for summary decision upon all or
any of the substantive issues in a contested case.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(a). Such motion
“shall be served with briefs and with or without supporting affidavits,” and “[t]he decision
sought may be rendered if the papers and discovery which have been filed, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged
and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b).
However, a motion for summary decision shall be denied if, by responding affidavit, an
adverse party “set[s] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue which can
only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” Ibid.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
7
Summary decision is analyzed in accordance with the principles established by the
Supreme Court in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995):
[A] determination whether there exists a “genuine issue” of
material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the
motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the
non-moving party. The “judge’s function is not . . . to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
[Citation omitted.]
See also Nat’l Transfer, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 347 N.J. Super. 401, 408–09
(App. Div. 2002).
A summary decision “may be rendered if the papers and discovery which have
been filed, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of
law.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b). That rule is substantially similar to the summary judgment
rule embodied in the New Jersey Court Rules. See R. 4:46-2; Judson v. Peoples Bank
& Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74 (1954).
Having considered the parties’ submissions, I CONCLUDE that the evidence at
this juncture is sufficient to properly dispose of this matter by way of summary decision
because there are no genuine issues of material fact.
Petitioner challenges the Board’s decision to direct him to undergo an examination
confirming his fitness to return to duty.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
8
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2, the Board of Education has discretion to request an
evaluation of its employees:
Every board of education may require its employees and shall
require any candidate for employment who has received a
conditional offer of employment to undergo a physical
examination. The board may require individual psychiatric or
physical examinations of any employee, whenever, in the
judgment of the board, an employee shows evidence of
deviation from normal, physical or mental health.
[N.J.S.A. 18A:16-2(a).]
Under N.J.A.C. 6A:32-6.3(b):
When a district board of education requires an employee to
undergo a physical or psychiatric examination:
1. The district board of education shall provide the
employee with a written statement of the reason(s)
for the required examination.
2. The district board of education shall provide the
employee with a hearing, if requested.
i. The determination of such a hearing shall be
appealable to the Commissioner pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 18A:6-9 . . . .
[Ibid.]
On appeal, the question is whether “the board's determination was a fair and
reasonable one—a determination which . . . is ‘one which could logically be made by
reasonable and fair-minded men who have evaluated petitioner’s behavior and who are
concerned with petitioner’s fitness to be a teacher in intimate contact with numbers of
impressionable, adolescent pupils.’” Gish v. Bd. of Educ. of Bor. of Paramus, 145 N.J.
Super. 96, 105 (App. Div. 1976). Thus, “[t]he issue to be determined is whether petitioner
has shown by a preponderance of the credible evidence that it was unreasonable for the
Board to conclude, based upon the facts before it . . . that there was ‘evidence of deviation
from normal, physical or mental health.’” Mahan v. Bd. of Educ. of Bor. of Haddon
Heights, 1984 S.L.D. 642, 664.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
9
In evaluating the merits of the motion, “[a]ll inferences of doubt are drawn against
the movant and in favor of the opponent of the motion.” Judson, 17 N.J. at 75. “When a
motion for summary decision is made and supported, an adverse party in order to prevail
must by responding affidavit set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
which can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b)
(emphases added). “If the opposing party offers no affidavits or matter in opposition, or
only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, ‘fanciful,
frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,’ [they] will not be heard to complain if the court
grants summary [decision.]” Judson, 17 N.J. at 75 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
Petitioner’s responding affidavit merely offers a denial of the facts. It fails to
respond specifically to each of respondent’s facts and statements that were found to be
credible and buttressed by signed and dated statements written on the same day staff
members reported Mr. Nelson’s behavior to the Superintendent, and the submissions of
text messages.
In light of petitioner’s arguments about the need for a hearing in this matter, some
discussion of the laws governing contested case hearings is necessary. As the Supreme
Court has explained, the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, the
Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1-1.1 to -21.6, and the statute
establishing and governing the OAL, N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -23, set forth “basic ground
rules for the conduct of administrative hearings in contested matters within an agency’s
area of responsibility.” Dep’t of Children & Families v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 166, 190 (2015).
A “contested case” is defined as “an adversary proceeding . . . in which the legal
rights, duties, obligations, privileges, benefits or other legal relations of specific parties
are required by constitutional right or by statute to be determined by an agency by
decisions, determinations, or orders, addressed to them or disposing of their interests,
after opportunity for an agency hearing.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1; N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2. If “an
agency renders a decision and a person seeks review of the decision,” and the agency
head determines that “the request for review constitutes a contested case,” then the
agency will transmit the matter to the OAL for a contested case hearing. E.D.-O., 223

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
10
N.J. at 190–91; N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) (providing that “[a]ll hearings of a State agency
required to be conducted as a contested case . . . shall be conducted by an administrative
law judge assigned by the Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of
Administrative Law”); but see N.J.S.A. 52:14F-8 (stating that, “[u]nless a specific request
is made by the agency, no administrative law judge shall be assigned by the director to
hear contested cases with respect to . . . [t]he State Board of Parole; the Public
Employment Relations Commission; the Division of Workers’ Compensation; [or] the
Division of Tax Appeals . . . .”).
However, and importantly, not all contested cases transmitted to the OAL require
a hearing. A “hearing” is “a proceeding conducted by a judge for the purpose of
determining disputed issues of fact, law or disposition.” N.J.A.C. 1:1-2.1. After an agency
sends a contested case to the OAL, it could turn out that there are no “disputed issues of
fact, law or disposition,” and thus a contested case may be resolved without the need for
a hearing. “It is well-established that where no disputed issues of material fact exist, an
administrative agency need not hold an evidential hearing in a contested case.” Frank v.
Ivy Club, 120 N.J. 73, 98 (1990).
Like summary judgment, summary decision “is designed to provide a prompt,
businesslike and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause which a discriminating
search of the merits in the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits submitted on the motion clearly shows not to present any genuine issue of
material fact requiring disposition at a [hearing].” Judson, 17 N.J. at 74.
Here, the Commissioner sent petitioner’s appeal to the OAL for a contested case
hearing. However, petitioner failed to meet the requirements of N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 by not
raising any genuine issues of material fact by responding affidavit in opposition to
respondent’s motion for summary decision. Accordingly, there is no need for a hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, I CONCLUDE that the respondent Board proved by a
preponderance of the competent, credible evidence that petitioner’s behavior was found
to be harmful, significant deviation from mental health affecting the teacher’s ability to
teach, discipline, or associate with children of the age of the children subject to the

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
11
teacher’s control in the school district, as reported by fair minded teaching staff and
administrators and I further CONCLUDE that respondent acted properly in compelling
petitioner to undergo a psychiatric examination or submit a letter from his medical provider
confirming his fitness to return to duty, in order to keep his tenured teaching job for the
District.
ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the Board of Education of the Township of Stafford’s
motion for summary decision is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the
action taken by the Board of Education of the Township of Stafford in directing Nelson to
undergo a Fitness for Duty Examination or submit a letter from his medical provider
confirming his fitness to return to duty is GRANTED, and the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED.
I hereby FILE this initial decision with the COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION for consideration.
This recommended decision may be adopted, modified, or rejected by the
COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, who by law is authorized
to make a final decision in this matter. If the Commissioner of the Department of
Education does not adopt, modify, or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless
such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final
decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

OAL DKT. NO. EDU 18264-25
12
Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was
mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the COMMISSIONER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION. Exceptions may be filed by email to
ControversiesDisputesFilings@doe.nj.gov or by mail to Office of Controversies
and Disputes, 100 Riverview Plaza, 4th Floor, PO Box 500, Trenton, New Jersey
08625-0500. A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.
February 9, 2026
DATE MARY ANN BOGAN, ALJ
Date Received at Agency:
Date Mailed to Parties:
MAB/sa