January 20, 2011 – Tyler Glynn v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, No. 29,453

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: 	JANUARY 20, 2011
NO. 29,453
TYLER GLYNN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW MEXICO TAXATION
AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR
VEHICLE DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
Williams C. Birdsall, District Judge
Titus & Murphy, P.C.
Victor A. Titus
Farmington, NM
for Appellant
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Julia Belles, Special Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee

OPINION
FRY, Judge.
{1} 	Petitioner Tyler Glynn (Driver) appeals the district court’s ruling affirming the
Motor Vehicle Division’s (MVD) revocation of his driver’s license. Driver contends
that the district court and the MVD erred in concluding that at the license revocation
hearing the MVD could consider the constitutionality of the traffic stop that resulted
in his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Driver also contends that the MVD
and the district court were collaterally estopped from considering the constitutionality
of the stop by a prior municipal court ruling that there was no probable cause to stop
Driver. 	For the following reasons, we affirm and conclude that the validity of the
traffic stop is irrelevant to the issues to be decided by the MVD in a license revocation
proceeding and, further, that the exclusionary rule does not apply in such a
proceeding. 	Because of our disposition, we need not consider Driver’s collateral
estoppel argument.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Driver was arrested in March 2008 for DWI. 	A Farmington police officer
observed Driver’s vehicle strike a curb and fail to maintain its lane. After making
contact with Driver, the officer observed that Driver had an odor of alcohol, and
Driver admitted to drinking alcohol. Driver failed field sobriety tests, and his breath

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alcohol test resulted in readings of .09 and .08. Driver was then served with a notice
of license revocation pursuant to the Implied Consent Act (the Act), NMSA 1978,
Sections 66-8-105 to -112 (1978, as amended through 2010). Following his arrest, a
criminal charge of DWI was filed in the Farmington, New Mexico, municipal court.
Driver filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop,
which the municipal court granted, finding that there was “insufficient probable cause
for [the] stop.” As a result of the suppression, the charge against Driver in municipal
court was dismissed with prejudice.
{3} 	Meanwhile, Driver had requested a license revocation hearing before the MVD
pursuant to Section 66-8-112. After the municipal court dismissed the DWI charge
against him, Driver filed a motion with the MVD to dismiss the revocation
proceedings, arguing that the MVD was now collaterally estopped from reconsidering
whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify his stop because the issue had
already been decided by the municipal court. Driver also filed a motion to suppress
the evidence obtained after his stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop Driver’s vehicle.
{4} 	At the revocation hearing, the MVD hearing officer concluded that collateral
estoppel was inapplicable because the municipal court had employed the wrong
standard in analyzing the legality of the traffic stop; the municipal court had decided

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that there was no probable cause to stop Driver and not that there was no reasonable
suspicion. 	In addition, the hearing officer concluded that even if the elements of
collateral 	estoppel 	had 	been 	met, 	it 	was 	inapplicable 	because 	MVD, 	as 	an
administrative agency, was unable to grant equitable remedies such as collateral
estoppel. The hearing officer then determined that the police officer had reasonable
suspicion to stop Driver and that all of the evidence obtained after the stop was
admissible. 	After finding that all elements necessary for revocation had been
established, the hearing officer revoked Driver’s license for six months.
{5} 	Following the hearing, Driver appealed the MVD’s revocation of his license to
the district court. 	On appeal, Driver argued that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop him, that collateral estoppel applied, and that the breath alcohol tests
were invalid. 	In addition to requesting that the district court exercise its appellate
jurisdiction to review the MVD’s decision, Driver asked the district court to invoke
its original jurisdiction to decide the constitutional question of whether there was
reasonable suspicion for the stop. Driver contended that the MVD was not permitted
to decide constitutional questions and that the issue of reasonable suspicion could only
be considered in the district court. 	The district court affirmed the revocation of
Driver’s license, concluding that the MVD’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence, that there was sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion, that collateral

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estoppel did not apply, and that the results of the breath alcohol tests were admissible.
However, the district court did not make any ruling on whether the MVD had the
authority to decide the constitutional question raised by Driver.
{6} 	Driver appeals the judgment of the district court, arguing that the MVD does
not have the statutory authority to consider whether a stop is supported by reasonable
suspicion and that only the district court has jurisdiction to consider the issue. 	In
addition, Driver maintains that collateral estoppel barred the district court from
reconsidering whether the stop was lawful. For the following reasons, we affirm the
revocation of Driver’s license.
DISCUSSION
Driver’s Appeal Was Timely Filed
{7} 	As an initial matter, the MVD argues that Driver’s appeal was untimely because
he filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 12-201 NMRA, not a petition for certiorari
in accordance with Rule 12-505 NMRA (2006). The district court entered an order
affirming the judgment of the MVD on March 18, 2009. 	Driver filed a notice of
appeal on March 30, 2009, twelve days after the entry of the district court’s order. On
April 21, 2009, thirty-four days after the entry of the district court’s order, Driver filed
a docketing statement. Driver’s docketing statement requested, for the first time, a
writ of certiorari to review the district court’s decision. 	The MVD contends that

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because the district court exercised only its appellate jurisdiction, Driver was required
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari within twenty days of the district court’s
decision and that Driver’s notice of appeal was insufficient to meet this requirement.
{8} 	When a party appeals from a judgment reflecting the district court’s exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, Rule 12-505 requires the party to file a petition for a writ
of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. At the time Driver filed his notice of appeal,
Rule 12-505(C) provided that a “petition for writ of certiorari shall be filed with the
clerk of the Court of Appeals within twenty (20) days after entry of the final action by
the district court.” However, when a party appeals the district court’s exercise of its
original jurisdiction, the party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the
district court’s final order. Rule 12-201(A)(2).
{9} 	The MVD argues that because the district court exercised only its appellate
jurisdiction, Driver was required to file a petition for certiorari within twenty days of
the district court’s final order. Because Driver filed a notice of appeal within twenty
days, but not a petition for a writ of certiorari, the MVD contends that Driver’s appeal
was untimely. In response, Driver argues that the district court declined to exercise
its original jurisdiction, despite Driver’s request that it do so in order to determine
whether the traffic stop was constitutionally sound. Consequently, Driver maintains
the proper procedure for appealing from the district court’s refusal to exercise its

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original jurisdiction is a direct appeal, not a petition for writ of certiorari. 	Driver
further contends that it is unclear what mechanism should be used by a party seeking
review if the district court concurrently exercises both its appellate and original
jurisdiction.
{10} 	We first observe that the district court’s order does not unambiguously state that
the court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction. Rather, the order is conflicting
regarding what type of jurisdiction the court exercised. On the one hand, the order
states the findings necessary to uphold the MVD’s statutory determinations “[i]n
accordance with [Section] 66-8-12, and Rule 1-074 NMRA,” which suggests that the
district court was acting in its appellate capacity. However, the order also goes on to
state that “there was sufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion to stop [Driver’s]
vehicle.” This conclusion suggests that the district court was acting in accordance
with its original jurisdiction.
{11} 	We have previously noted that “this Court may, at its discretion, elect to treat
a notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari if the notice of appeal was filed
within twenty days after the district court’s final action.” Dixon v. State Taxation &
Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-044, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 431, 89 P.3d 680. Because of the
uncertainty regarding the district court’s order and the uncertainty regarding the
correct procedure for appealing a district court’s decision involving both its appellate

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and original jurisdiction, we elect to treat Driver’s notice of appeal as a timely petition
for writ of certiorari since it was filed within twenty days of the district court’s order.
See Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 2004-NMCA-025, ¶ 17 n.1, 135 N.M.
152, 85 P.3d 276 (declining to decide whether an appeal from a decision in which the
district court exercises both appellate and original jurisdiction would be made by
filing a notice of appeal, a petition for certiorari, or both). We therefore address the
merits of Driver’s appeal.
The Legality of the Traffic Stop Is Not an Issue to Be Decided by the MVD
{12} 	Driver argues that the MVD lacks subject matter jurisdiction in revocation
proceedings to decide whether a stop is justified by reasonable suspicion. 	Driver
relies on Maso, in which the driver untimely requested an MVD hearing on the
revocation of his driver’s license and argued that his request was late because he did
not understand the English-language notice of revocation served on him. Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
The driver argued that the MVD’s denial of a hearing due to the late request
constituted a denial of due process of law. Id. ¶ 6. This Court held that “[b]ecause
Section 66-8-112(E) specifies the issues that MVD can consider in a revocation
proceeding, MVD cannot adjudicate constitutional questions,” such as the due process
question asserted by the driver. Id. ¶ 12.
{13} 	Driver contends that because the determination of whether the stopping officer

8
had reasonable suspicion is a constitutional question, Maso prohibits the MVD from
considering the question. 	Driver argues that while the MVD is not permitted to
consider whether a stop is justified by reasonable suspicion, the district court,
exercising its original jurisdiction, can consider whether reasonable suspicion justified
a stop. In response, the MVD argues that consideration of whether a stop is justified
by reasonable suspicion is implicitly within the scope of MVD’s statutory authority.
The MVD maintains that the district court can only consider whether reasonable
suspicion justified a stop when reviewing the MVD’s decision while exercising its
appellate jurisdiction.
{14} 	Determining the MVD’s authority in revocation hearings under the Act is a
question of law that we review de novo. 	Cf. Martinez v. N.M. State Eng’r Office,
2000-NMCA-074, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 413, 9 P.3d 657 (stating that determining what
issues may be decided by the state personnel board under the applicable statutory
scheme is a question of law). To the extent that Driver contends the MVD lacks the
statutory authority to consider the validity of a traffic stop that results in license
revocation, we agree. 	As we explain below, we conclude that a traffic stop that
complies with Fourth Amendment requirements is not a necessary element of a license
revocation under the Act.
{15} 	The Act provides that “[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle within this

9
state shall be deemed to have given consent . . . to chemical tests of his breath or blood
or both . . . for the purpose of determining the drug or alcohol content of his blood if
arrested” for any driving-related offense allegedly committed while the person was
under the influence. Section 66-8-107(A). When an officer arrests a driver for DWI,
if the arrested driver refuses to submit to a chemical test or if the test of the driver’s
blood or breath reveals an alcohol concentration above specified statutory levels, the
arresting officer serves the driver with written notice of revocation and of the driver’s
right to a hearing, takes the driver’s license, and issues a temporary license to the
driver. Section 66-8-111.1. Within ten days of receiving the notice of revocation, the
driver may then request a hearing before the MVD. Section 66-8-112(B).
{16} 	If the driver requests a hearing, the applicable statute limits the MVD hearing
officer’s authority as follows:
F. 	The [MVD] shall enter an order sustaining the revocation
or denial of the person’s license or privilege to drive if the [MVD] finds
that:
(1) 	the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds
to believe the driver was driving a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs;
(2) 	the person was arrested;
(3) 	this hearing is held no later than ninety days after
notice of revocation; and
(4) 	either:

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(a) 	the person refused to submit to the test upon
request of the law enforcement officer after the law enforcement officer
advised him that his failure to submit to the test could result in the
revocation of his privilege to drive; or
(b) 	that a chemical test was administered pursuant
to the provisions of the Implied Consent Act and the test results indicated
an alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath of eight one
hundredths or more if the person is twenty-one years of age or older, four
one hundredths or more if the person is driving a commercial motor
vehicle or two one hundredths or more if the person is less than
twenty-one years of age.
Section 66-8-112(F).
{17} 	“In reviewing a statute, this Court’s role is to effect the [L]egislature’s intent
as evidenced by the statute’s plain terms and to avoid strained or absurd construction.
The first rule of statutory construction is that the plain language of a statute is the
primary indicator of legislative intent.” 	Dixon, 2004-NMCA-044, ¶ 6 (internal
citation omitted).
{18} 	Notably, Section 66-8-112(F) does not indicate that the validity of the traffic
stop that resulted in a DWI arrest is an issue. The only issues to be decided by the
hearing officer are whether (1) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver
was driving while under the influence, (2) the person was arrested, (3) the hearing was
held within ninety days after notice of revocation, and (4) the driver either refused
chemical testing or his/her test resulted in specified blood alcohol concentrations. The
plain language of the statute says nothing about the preliminary traffic stop. Thus,

11
even assuming that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the driver’s
vehicle, the statute states that revocation of a driver’s license will be upheld as long
as the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was DWI and the other
three elements are satisfied.
{19} 	The MVD maintains that the hearing officer’s authority to determine the
validity of the traffic stop is implicit. In support of its argument, the MVD relies on
State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t v. Van Ruiten, 107 N.M. 536, 760 P.2d 1302
(Ct. App. 1988). 	In that case, the driver appealing the revocation of his driver’s
license argued that the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to instigate the
traffic stop. 	Id. at 538, 760 P.2d at 1304. This Court stated, “we assume, as do the
parties, that such is implicit in the issues to be decided at the administrative hearing.”
Id. 	Because this statement was an assumption rather than a determination of a
contested issue, it constitutes dicta. 	See State v. Sims, 2010-NMSC-027, ¶ 20, 148
N.M. 330, 236 P.3d 642 (explaining that “dicta is language unnecessary to the
decision of the issues before the court and is not binding as a rule of law” (internal
citation omitted)). We conclude that by its plain terms, the Act does not require the
MVD hearing officer to consider the validity of the traffic stop underlying the license
revocation at issue.
{20} 	Driver does not disagree with our reading of the elements to be decided by the

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MVD hearing officer. 	Instead, Driver assumes that reasonable suspicion for the
underlying traffic stop is constitutionally mandated and that only the district court has
the authority to decide the issue. We agree that the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 	State v.
Johnson, 2010-NMSC-016, ¶ 13, 148 N.M. 50, 229 P.3d 523. However, the actual
question we must consider is whether the exclusionary rule applies in administrative
license revocation proceedings. 	If the exclusionary rule does not apply to the
proceedings, then the authority of the MVD to consider the legality of a stop is
irrelevant because the evidence would be admitted regardless of the legality of the
stop. See Scanlon v. Las Cruces Pub. Schs., 2007-NMCA-150, ¶ 9 143 N.M. 48, 172
P.3d 185 (noting that a constitutional violation would only affect the outcome of an
administrative proceeding “if the evidence obtained during the search could not be
considered as a basis for the hearing authority’s disciplinary action”). The question
of whether the exclusionary rule applies to a license revocation proceeding is a
constitutional question that we review de novo. See State ex rel. Children, Youth &
Families Dep’t. v. Michael T., 2007-NMCA-163, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 75, 172 P.3d 1287.
The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply in License Revocation Hearings
{21} 	Both Driver and the MVD maintain that the exclusionary rule should apply in
license revocation hearings. 	However, we are not bound by the MVD’s apparent

13
concession on this issue, and we conduct our own analysis as to whether the rule is
applicable under these circumstances. Cf. State v. Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 8,
143 N.M. 792, 182 P.3d 775 (explaining that appellate courts are not bound by the
state’s concession that conduct was unitary for purposes of double jeopardy analysis
and that this Court will conduct its own analysis).
{22} 	This 	Court 	first 	considered 	whether 	the 	exclusionary 	rule 	applies 	in
administrative proceedings in Scanlon, 2007-NMCA-150, ¶ 11. In that case, we noted
that under federal law, the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right but a
prudential rule designed to deter future unconstitutional government conduct. Federal
law does not extend application of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings. Id. We
further noted that our Supreme Court has interpreted the New Mexico Constitution to
implicitly provide a personal right to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Id.
¶¶ 11-12. 	The exclusionary rule “safeguard[s] the right to be protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures by putting the parties in the same position they
would have been in had the constitutional violation not occurred.” Id. ¶ 12. However,
the “core application” of the right to exclude evidence “is in the context of criminal
prosecution brought to bear after violation of that right.” Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
{23} 	Despite the fact that the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence is primarily

14
reserved for criminal prosecutions, our Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary
rule in at least one type of proceeding that is not a criminal trial—probation revocation
proceedings. 	Id. 	We explained in Scanlon that the exclusionary rule applied in
probation proceedings because “the liberty interest at stake in a probation revocation
hearing is the same as the liberty interest at stake in a criminal proceeding.” 	Id.
Specifically, in both criminal trials and probation revocation proceedings, an
individual’s freedom can be affected by the admission or exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. Id. We noted that “a probation revocation proceeding is closely
related to the core purpose of preventing the use of illegally obtained evidence against
a person accused of a crime.” Id.
{24} 	We then concluded that the exclusionary rule did not apply in a school
disciplinary hearing because the “child’s interest in continuing his education” was
“unrelated to the liberty interest at stake in a criminal trial or in a probation revocation
proceeding.” Id. ¶ 14. We explained that “[b]ecause school disciplinary proceedings
are so far removed from the context of criminal prosecution brought to bear after
violation of the right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, . . . they are
not the intended context for the protections provided by New Mexico’s constitutional
exclusionary rule.” Id. We concluded that the “hearing authority properly considered
the evidence” that was allegedly illegally seized from the student’s car. Id.

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{25} 	Relying on Scanlon, we later concluded that the exclusionary rule also does not
apply in abuse and neglect proceedings. 	Michael T., 2007-NMCA-163, ¶ 14. We
rejected the father’s argument that the exclusionary rule should apply because the
proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. 	Id. ¶ 12. 	We explained that while the
proceedings might ultimately result in the termination of a parent’s right to his or her
children, the nature of the proceeding is to protect the children, not to punish the
parents. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	11-12. 	We 	noted 	that 	the 	“purposes 	of 	the 	exclusionary
rule—deterring 	unreasonable 	searches 	and 	seizures 	(under 	the 	United 	States
Constitution) and preserving the status quo in order to protect a person’s liberty
interest (under the New Mexico Constitution)—would not be advanced if the evidence
[was] suppressed.” Id. ¶ 12.
{26} 	Thus, whether the exclusionary rule applies to MVD driver’s license revocation
proceedings depends on whether the purposes of the rule would be furthered by its
application to these proceedings. A license revocation proceeding, like a proceeding
for termination of parental rights, is quasi-criminal in nature. 	See Dente v. State
Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1997-NMCA-099, ¶ 7, 124 N.M. 93, 946 P.2d 1104
(noting that “[l]icense revocation proceedings are much in the nature of criminal or
quasi-criminal proceedings”), overruled on other grounds by State Taxation &
Revenue Dep’t v. Bargas, 2000-NMCA-103, ¶ 15, 129 N.M. 800, 14 P.3d 538. While

16
the proceedings are quasi-criminal, our Supreme Court has held that a driver’s license
revocation is remedial, not punitive, and that it “serves the legitimate nonpunitive
purpose of protecting the public from the dangers presented by drunk drivers and
helps enforce regulatory compliance with the laws governing the licensed activity of
driving.” State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 632, 904 P.2d 1044, 1057
(1995). 	Unlike a criminal trial or a probation revocation proceeding, a person’s
liberty interests are not at stake in an MVD license revocation proceeding. Rather, the
only interest at stake for a driver in a revocation proceeding is his or her ability to
drive a vehicle. But the loss of this ability constitutes the loss of a privilege, not the
loss of a right. See generally NMSA 1978, § 66-5-30 (2003) (authorizing the MVD
to suspend or revoke licenses); see also Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 631, 904 P.2d at 1056
(explaining that driving is an activity regulated by the government and that
“administrative revocation of the person’s license is not considered punishment for
a crime”); Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 46, 351 P.2d 449, 452 (1960) (holding
that a driver’s license is a privilege). 	Consequently, a driver who loses his or her
license has even less at stake than does a parent in a proceeding for termination of
parental rights. 	See State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. John R.,
2009-NMCA-025, ¶ 27, 145 N.M. 636, 203 P.3d 167 (explaining that “a parent has
a fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children”). Just

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as we concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings for the
termination of parental rights, we now conclude that the rule has no applicability in
license revocation proceedings. The primary purpose of both types of proceedings is
the protection of someone other than the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were
allegedly violated—the children in a termination proceeding and the driving public
in a license revocation proceeding.
{27} 	The majority of courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have
concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings for the revocation
of a driver’s license. See, e.g., Martin v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 953
(Kan. 2008) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in administrative
proceeding to revoke a driver’s license under a statutory scheme substantially similar
to New Mexico’s Implied Consent Act); Lopez v. Dir., N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles,
761 A.2d 448, 451 (N.H. 2000) (same); Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 743 A.2d 1110, 1119
(Conn. 1999) (same); Powell v. Sec’y of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1306-07 (Me. 1992)
(same ); see also Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep’t, 54 P.3d 355,
¶¶ 25-26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (same). 	The Maine Supreme Judicial Court aptly
observed that “[r]equiring hearing examiners to apply the exclusionary rule would
unnecessarily complicate and burden an administrative proceeding designed to focus
on the single issue of whether a person was operating a vehicle with excessive alcohol

18
in his blood.” 	Powell, 614 A.2d at 1307; see Dente, 1997-NMCA-099, ¶ 7
(explaining that a license revocation hearing is “designed to be a summary
administrative proceeding that handles revocation matters quickly”).
{28} 	Driver analogizes license revocation to civil forfeiture of property under the
Controlled Substances Act and argues that because the exclusionary rule applies in
forfeiture proceedings, it should also apply in license revocation proceedings. See In
re Forfeiture of Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Nine Dollars ($14,639), 120
N.M. 408, 413, 902 P.2d 563, 568 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that exclusionary rule
applies in forfeiture proceedings). He maintains that forfeiture of property is tied to
the commission of drug offenses just as license revocation is tied to the commission
of DWI.
{29} 	We are not persuaded. 	Forfeiture proceedings have no purpose other than
punishment of the person who has violated the Controlled Substances Act. See id. at
412-13, 902 P.2d at 567-68 (noting that the purpose of forfeiture “is to penalize for
the commission of an offense against law” and that “the [L]egislature’s choice to tie
forfeiture directly to the commission of drug offenses . . . confirms the punitive nature
of these provisions” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In contrast, a
license revocation may penalize a driver, but its primary goal “is to provide the public
with safe roadways.” Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 635, 904 P.2d at 1060.

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{30} 	The 	MVD’s 	primary 	argument 	in 	support 	of 	the 	exclusionary 	rule’s
applicability appears to be that the MVD has always interpreted the Act to require
hearing officers to determine whether an arrest of a driver was lawful and that if the
exclusionary rule does not apply, a person who was improperly arrested but not
charged could still face license revocation. 	We agree with the MVD that the Act
requires a hearing officer to determine whether a law enforcement officer “had
reasonable grounds to believe” that a driver was DWI, Section 66-8-112(F)(1), and
that this determination is similar to a determination of whether 	probable cause
supports an arrest. See State v. Richerson, 87 N.M. 437, 440, 535 P.2d 644, 647 (Ct.
App. 1975) (stating that “a lawful arrest [is] the essential introductory step to implied
consent provisions”). However, by the Act’s express terms, this determination does
not include a determination regarding the reasonableness of the stop preceding the
arrest.
{31} 	Furthermore, we see no inherent inconsistency in a scenario in which a driver’s
license is revoked even if the same driver is not charged with or convicted of DWI due
to, for example, an illegal stop. A license revocation hearing “is entirely separate and
distinct from the proceeding to determine the guilt or innocence of the person as to the
crime of DWI.” See Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 626, 904 P.2d at 1051 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The exclusionary rule excludes evidence of the illegal

20
stop from the criminal DWI proceeding, thereby preventing the loss of the driver’s
liberty interest and deterring future police misconduct. The driver nonetheless loses
his or her driver’s license in order to temporarily remove the driver from the roads of
the state if the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was DWI
and if the other elements necessary for revocation are met. The revocation serves to
protect the public from a driver who has chosen either to refuse chemical testing or
to ingest intoxicating alcohol or drugs before driving, regardless of whether the initial
traffic stop was valid or not.
{32} 	In response to the concern that police will be encouraged to heedlessly stop
drivers without reasonable suspicion in order to secure license revocations, we quote
the apt observation of the Arizona Court of Appeals that “it [is] unlikely that law
enforcement officers, lacking any reasonable suspicion of D[W]I, will assign scarce
resources to randomly stop motorists on the chance that the officers will develop
reasonable grounds to permit them to request the motorist to submit to testing.”
Tornabene, 54 P.3d at 365.
{33} 	In conclusion, we explain Maso in light of our holding in the present case.
Maso involved a challenge to the procedure giving rise to a license revocation hearing
and specifically addressed whether service of an English-language notice of
revocation complied with the requirements of due process. 	Thus, our holding in

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Maso—that the constitutional question of what constituted due process could be
decided only by the district court and not by the MVD—has continuing vitality today.
Our decision in the present case is distinguished from Maso because the present case
addresses the substantive issues to be decided by the MVD in a license revocation
hearing, not the procedural aspects of such a hearing. 	Because the Act does not
require the MVD to address the validity of the underlying traffic stop and because the
exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation proceedings, the constitutionality of the
stop need not be decided by any tribunal for purposes of license revocation under the
Act.
{34} 	Because we conclude that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in an MVD
proceeding, we do not address Driver’s argument that the MVD was collaterally
estopped from considering the legality of the stop. 	Even if, as Driver argues, the
MVD could not reconsider the ruling of the municipal court, the evidence obtained
during the stop would still have been admissible.

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CONCLUSION
{35} 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the revocation of Driver’s license.
{36} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
WE CONCUR:
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge