March 25, 2009 – Jessie Romero v. Robert Parker and SIVAD Enterprises, LLC and SIVAD Enterprises, LLC v. Jessie Romero, No. 27,027

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:

Filing Date: _March 25, 2009

NO. 27,027
JESSIE ROMERO,

Plaintiff-A ppellant,
V.

ROBERT PARKER and
SIVAD ENTERPRISES, LLC,

Defendants-A ppellees,

and

SIVAD ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Counterclaimant-A ppellee,

V.

JESSIE ROMERO,
Counterdefendant- A ppellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
James A. Hall, District Judge

J. Ronald Boyd
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Mary E. Walta, P.C.
Mary E. Walta
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellees

OPINION
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} 	Plaintiff Jessie Romero (Romero) appeals from the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of Defendants Robert Parker (Parker) and Sivad Enterprises, LLC
(Sivad). We address whether the Construction Industries Licensing Act (the CILA),
NMSA 1978, §§ 60-13-1 to -59 (1967, as amended through 2007), which precludes
an unlicensed contractor from seeking compensation for construction work that can
only be performed by a licensed contractor, also bars an unlicensed subcontractor
from recovering compensation for construction work from the general contractor. We
hold that it does. We also address whether the CILA bars a general contractor who
did not act responsibly in hiring an unlicensed subcontractor from recovering
compensation already paid to the unlicensed subcontractor, and, again, we hold that
it does. Additionally, we hold that equitable principles do not apply in this situation.
We further hold that Parker was not an agent for an undisclosed principal, Sivad, and
is thus not personally liable to Romero. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
{2} 	Romero, who is in the business of construction, performed work for Sivad,
operating a backhoe, laying stone, and performing other masonry work without a
contractor’s license. 	Sivad is a general contractor. 	Parker was Sivad’s agent for

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contracts 	and 	construction 	projects, 	and 	Steve 	Davis 	(Davis) 	was 	Sivad’s
member/manager. Romero dealt primarily with Parker and Davis and claims to have
not known about Sivad until after a conflict arose. Although Romero claims that he
worked for Parker, and much of Romero’s dealings were with Parker, he in fact
worked for Sivad, and Parker was Sivad’s agent. Romero did not bid on any work,
and there were no written contracts. 	Sivad had Romero working on construction
projects at five residences (the construction projects) at once, each with several
assignments. Romero prepared invoices for payment, which show a variety of billing
methods including per hour, per load, per square foot, and per item. Romero was paid
for a portion of his work and filed a complaint for breach of the construction contracts
for the remainder. 	Romero alleges that he fully performed all work under the
contracts, demanded payment, and was refused. 	Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, claiming that Romero could not recover compensation under the
complaint because he was operating as an unlicensed contractor contrary to the CILA
requirements. Romero argued that genuine issues of material fact still existed and that
his compensation claims were not barred because Parker knew that Romero was not
licensed and nevertheless allowed Romero to continue work with reasonable
expectation that he would be fairly compensated at the conclusion of each job
assignment. Parker denies knowing that Romero was not licensed at the time the work

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was assigned.
{3} 	The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on four
of the five construction projects, finding that some portion of Romero’s work at those
construction projects required a contractor’s license, that he did not have one, and that,
therefore, he was barred from recovering compensation pursuant to the CILA and
Gamboa v. Urena, 2004-NMCA-053, 135 N.M. 515, 90 P.3d 534. 	In response to
Romero’s motion to amend the complaint to add an equitable estoppel claim, the
district court denied the motion on the basis that Gamboa made the amendment
“futile.” The order was certified for interlocutory appeal, and this Court denied the
application.
{4} 	Sivad then asserted a counterclaim for a refund of the money that Sivad had
already paid Romero for his work on the construction projects. Romero filed a second
motion to amend the complaint to add a claim of damages against Parker for
misrepresentation, claiming that Parker falsely represented himself, not Sivad, as the
general contractor. 	Thereafter, Sivad filed a motion for summary judgment on its
counterclaim, arguing that the CILA, Gamboa, and Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 111
N.M. 410, 806 P.2d 59 (1991), mandated that Sivad receive a full refund of
compensation already paid to Romero. The district court denied Romero’s second
motion to amend the complaint, again on the basis that “[t]he proposed amendment

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of the Complaint is futile under New Mexico law.” 	Sivad’s motion for summary
judgment on its counterclaim was stricken without prejudice as untimely filed under
the scheduling order.
{5} 	Romero’s answer to Sivad’s counterclaim asserted as affirmative defenses
essentially the same equitable claims he had sought to bring by way of his first and
second motions to amend the complaint. Romero alleged that Parker knew Romero
was unlicensed, that Parker had misrepresented to Romero that Romero did not need
a contractor’s license to work on the construction projects, and that Parker had assured
Romero that he would be paid regardless. Romero also asserted that Sivad was not
entitled to a refund of amounts already paid to Romero under its counterclaim because
Sivad is not the “innocent consumer” protected by the CILA and applicable case law.
Romero added that “[t]he equitable doctrines of unclean hands, unjust enrichment,
estoppel and implied covenant . . . should apply herein.” Although the district court
had previously stricken Sivad’s motion for summary judgment as untimely, it
apparently granted a hearing on the motion at a later date. As a result of that hearing,
the district court granted in part and denied in part Sivad’s motion for summary
judgment on the counterclaim, ruling that, under New Mexico law, Sivad was entitled
to be reimbursed for compensation already paid to Romero, an unlicensed contractor.
{6} 	In its final judgment, the district court adopted Defendants’ proposed findings

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and conclusions and noted the summary judgments already granted against the
complaint and in favor of the counterclaim. The district court ruled that Parker, as
Sivad’s agent, was not individually liable to Romero and required Romero to
reimburse Sivad for work on four of the five construction projects, minus the amount
owed to Romero for the fifth construction project, at which no unlicensed work was
completed by Romero. Romero appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7} 	“Summary judgment is appropriate [when] there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montgomery
v. Lomos Altos, Inc., 2007-NMSC-002, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 21, 150 P.3d 971 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “We review the [district court’s] application
of the law to the undisputed facts de novo.” Gamboa, 2004-NMCA-053, ¶ 7.
RECOVERY BY AN UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR
{8} 	The New Mexico Legislature “casts a harsh eye on contracting without a
license.” Id. ¶ 12; see also Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63 (stating that
unlicensed contractors may not retain payments as a matter of public policy, even if
the consumer had knowledge that the contractor was unlicensed). 	Section 60-13-
30(A) states that “[n]o contractor shall . . . bring or maintain any action . . . for the
collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is

6
required . . . without alleging and proving that such contractor was a duly licensed
contractor at the time the alleged cause of action arose.” 	Contracting includes
“constructing, altering, repairing, installing or demolishing any . . . building, stadium
or other structure; . . . leveling or clearing land; [or] excavating earth.” Section 60-13-
3(A). 	Thus, the express language of Section 60-13-30(A) and the public policy
behind its mandate “to protect the public from incompetent and irresponsible
builders,” Peck v. Ives, 84 N.M. 62, 66, 499 P.2d 684, 688 (1972), operate to bar
unlicensed contractors’ suits for compensation, “even when they seek compensation
for construction work fully and satisfactorily performed.” Triple B Corp. v. Brown
& Root, Inc., 106 N.M. 99, 101, 739 P.2d 968, 970 (1987). 	Mascarenas further
explained that “[t]he public policy behind the licensing requirement of the [CILA] is
so strong that the element of consumer knowledge is of no consequence in our
decision.” 	Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63. 	The definition of
“contractor” includes subcontractors. Section 60-13-3(B).
{9} 	Romero did not have a contractor’s license at any time during his performance
of any of the construction work on all five construction projects, and some of his work
required a license. Romero argues that he should be entitled to payment on the work
that he performed that did not require a license because he was paid wages on some
assignments and because he claims to have contracted with Parker separately for each

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job assignment, some of which did not require a license. Romero further argues that
the district court erred in its initial granting of summary judgment for Defendants on
four of the five properties when a material fact—how many sites required a
license—was disputed.
{10} 	First, we address Romero’s contention that he worked only for wages. 	The
CILA does exempt from its provisions “an individual who works only for wages.”
Section 60-13-3(D)(13). Therefore, if Romero worked only for wages, he would not
be considered an independent contractor, subject to the CILA. The CILA’s definition
of “wages” is “compensation paid to an individual by an employer from which taxes
are required to be withheld by federal and state law.” Section 60-13-2(I). For Romero
to have received wages, he must be deemed Sivad’s employee and not an independent
contractor. 	The CILA states that individuals who provide labor or services to a
contractor for compensation are employees of the contractor unless they meet all of
the standards “indicative of an independent contractor.” Section 60-13-3.1(A). Those
standards are as follows: (1) the individual is “free from direction and control over
the means and manner of providing the labor or services”; (2) the individual is
responsible for obtaining his own business registrations or licenses; (3) the individual
supplies his own tools and equipment; (4) the individual “has the authority to hire and
fire employees”; (5) payment to the individual is made “upon completion of the

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performance of specific portions of a project or . . . on the basis of a periodic retainer”;
and (6) the individual “represents to the public that the labor or services are to be
provided by an independently established business.” Id.
{11} 	The facts of this case do not support a conclusion that Romero was Sivad’s
employee. Although Romero admitted at trial that he was not an employee, he argued
that his situation was unique. However, Romero operated as a masonry contractor
with his own equipment and had his own employees who assisted him in the masonry
and excavation work. His invoices to Sivad for incomplete work were under the name
JR Stone Masonry. These facts satisfy a majority of the standards listed above—that
Romero was responsible for his own registration and licensing, that he had his own
tools and equipment, that he had his own employees, and that he represented to the
public that he was a business. See id.
{12} 	Romero also claims that he should be treated as an employee, not an
independent contractor, because he was assigned work based on individual job
assignments and because he billed for certain work on an hourly basis. Although it
may be true that Romero was assigned specific jobs within each construction project
site and that some of his invoices billed hourly, ultimately he was paid after each
assignment was completed. As stated above, the fifth standard that would result in
characterization as an independent contractor is that payment to the individual is made

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“upon completion of the performance of specific portions of a project or . . . on the
basis of a periodic retainer.” Id. Regardless of how Romero showed his work on his
invoices, it is undisputed that he was paid “upon completion of the performance of
specific portions of a project,” satisfying the fifth standard of an independent
contractor. Id. Moreover, the CILA specifies in its definition of a contractor that an
individual may be exempted from the act if he receives wages and “no other form of
compensation.” Section 60-13-3(D)(10), (12); see also § 60-13-3(D)(13) (specifying
that an individual may be exempt if he works only for wages); § 60-13-3(D)(14)(a)
(specifying that an individual may be exempt if “the work is not part of a larger . . .
operation undertaken by the same individual”). Romero was paid for work in various
forms, not only wages, and his work was part of a larger operation undertaken by him
and his employees.
{13} 	Additionally, Romero provided no evidence that Sivad or its agent Parker
directed or controlled the details of the masonry and excavation work that Romero
provided at the construction sites, the first standard in the list establishing status as an
independent contractor. See § 60-13-3.1(A). Finally, Romero admitted to presenting
no evidence that Sivad withheld applicable employee-related state and federal taxes
from Romero’s invoice amounts or that Sivad contemplated including Romero and his
employees under Sivad’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage. See § 60-13-

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2(I) (including in its definition of “wages” that taxes are withheld by federal and state
law). The district court correctly found that Romero did not receive only wages for
compensation. As such, in consideration with the other factors discussed, he should
be treated as an independent contractor under the CILA.
{14} 	Second, we address Romero’s claim that he was assigned work based on
individual job assignments and that, therefore, he should be allowed to recover
compensation for assignments that did not require a license. 	Romero’s argument
appears to rely on the CILA provision that exempts from the definition of contractor
“any person who merely furnishes materials or supplies at the site without fabricating
them into, or consuming them in the performance of, the work of a contractor.”
Section 60-13-3(D)(1). But Romero did not simply deliver material or supplies to the
construction sites; he excavated the sites and fabricated the stone and other supplies
into walls, patios, and other masonry structures for which a contractor’s license is
required. See §§ 60-13-3(A), 60-13-12.
{15} 	We also reject Romero’s claim that there is a factual dispute as to how many of
the construction projects involved work that required a license. The actual work that
Romero performed is not in dispute, and the district court analyzed those undisputed
facts to determine that, as a matter of law, four of the five construction projects
involved work that required a license. 	Specifically, the district court found that

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Romero was deemed “an unlicensed contractor with respect to certain of the
subcontracted construction work he performed on each of the [c]onstruction
[p]rojects.” In so finding, the district court relied on the affidavit of Andy Dalmy, the
licensing manager of the Construction and Industries Division, which showed the
results of his personal inspection of Romero’s work.
{16} 	Moreover, even if Romero’s work had been assigned individually within each
construction project site, this Court’s opinion in Gamboa does not allow Romero to
separate his construction acts in such a manner to evade the licensing requirements
under the CILA. Gamboa, 2004-NMCA-053, ¶ 16 (explaining in a case in which a
contractor effectively asked this Court to “excuse the construction work he performed
without a license and exempt him from the requirements of the CILA” that doing so
“would encourage contractors to engage in creative contract drafting whereby they
attribute all charges to the cost of materials and supplies and charge nothing for
labor”). Thus, the district court correctly defined the construction projects as the five
residences provided in the record and not by individual job assignments within those
locations.
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES SUPERCEDED BY THE CILA
{17} 	We next address Romero’s argument that the CILA does not expressly deny all
equitable actions for recovery of compensation. We are not persuaded. In Triple B

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Corp., our Supreme Court held that, in addition to claims for breach of contract,
Section 60-13-30(A) also bars an unlicensed contractor from bringing suit for the
recovery of compensation under a quantum meruit or quasi-contract theory. Triple
B Corp., 106 N.M. at 103, 739 P.2d at 972. 	The public policy behind the CILA’s
mandate to protect people from incompetent and irresponsible contractors, see § 60-
13-1.1; Peck, 84 N.M. at 66, 499 P.2d at 688, operates to bar unlicensed contractors’
suits for compensation even when the recipient of the work is thereby unjustly
enriched. Triple B Corp., 106 N.M. at 102, 739 P.2d at 971 (refusing to recognize an
“equitable defense of unjust enrichment because the Legislature . . . necessarily
authorized the unjust enrichment of the recipients of work performed by unlicensed
contractors” and stating that the statute’s policy “must override the judicial principle
that disfavors unjust enrichment”). Further, the express language in Section 60-13-
30(A) prohibiting an unlicensed contractor from bringing “any action in any court of
the state for the collection of compensation” is a broad statement of the prohibition
against unlicensed contractors’ use of the courts to recover compensation under any
theory, whether in law or in equity.
{18} 	In arguing that his equitable claims should not be barred, Romero also relies on
language in Peck, in which our Supreme Court stated that it was “reluctant to construe
the statute more broadly than necessary” and that the “statute should not be

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transformed into an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a just obligation.” Peck,
84 N.M. at 66, 499 P.2d at 688 (internal quotation marks omitted). Peck adopted the
doctrine of substantial compliance to avoid the harshness of Section 60-13-30 for
contractors who had substantially complied with the CILA licensing provisions at the
inception of the construction work. Peck, 84 N.M. at 66, 499 P.2d at 688. 	In the
context of Peck, the words “just obligation” contemplate that a contractor who had
complied with the CILA licensing requirements when beginning the construction
work thereby retained a “just obligation” for the collection of compensation. See id.
The Court did not apply this concept to an unlicensed contractor, such as Romero,
who has not complied at all with the CILA licensing requirements. As such, Romero
does not retain a “just obligation” for the collection of compensation, which the
express language of the CILA bars.
{19} 	Romero further relies on Triple B Corp. as creating a “glimmer of hope” for his
equitable defenses. In that case, the unlicensed contractor had failed to establish the
elements of equitable estoppel, and our Supreme Court, while expressly denying the
unlicensed contractor’s unjust enrichment defense, did not expressly deny an equitable
estoppel exception to Section 60-13-30. Triple B Corp., 106 N.M. at 102, 739 P.2d
at 971. 	Our subsequent cases clearly indicate, however, that an unlicensed
contractor’s action for compensation is barred on all equitable principles due to the

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fact that “the public importance of discouraging such prohibited transactions
outweighs equitable considerations of possible injustice as between the parties.”
Gamboa, 2004-NMCA-053, ¶ 17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63 (“The public policy behind the
licensing requirement of the [CILA] is so strong that the element of consumer
knowledge is of no consequence in our decision.”). We agree with the district court’s
finding that equitable principles were not an appropriate remedy for Romero.
CONTRACTOR’S RECOVERY OF COMPENSATION
PAID TO AN UNLICENSED SUBCONTRACTOR
{20} 	Romero argues that Sivad cannot receive a refund of compensation paid to
Romero for Romero’s alleged violation because the CILA protects only consumers,
of which contractors are excluded. Sivad disagrees and argues that Romero cannot
retain compensation already received because 	Mascarenas 	bars an unlicensed
contractor from retaining compensation for work performed in violation of the CILA.
111 N.M. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63. We address each argument in turn and conclude
that, although a contractor is not excluded from the CILA’s protection of “the people,”
Sivad is nevertheless barred from recovery in this case because of its failure to be a
responsible contractor under the CILA.
{21} 	Although Sivad’s counterclaim for recovery of payments made to Romero
involved the same arguments applied to Defendants’ defense of Romero’s claims, the

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issues are not the same. 	In our discussion above, we address an unlicensed
subcontractor attempting to receive compensation for work he performed that required
a license. Sivad’s counterclaim deals with a licensed contractor attempting to retrieve
compensation paid for work performed by an unlicensed subcontractor that the
licensed contractor hired. This is a matter of first impression in New Mexico. Reule
Sun Corp. v. Valles, 2008-NMCA-115, ¶ 11, 144 N.M. 736, 191 P.3d 1197 (raising,
without addressing, the issue of “whether a duly licensed contractor may recover for
work performed by an unlicensed subcontractor”), cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-008,
145 N.M. 255, 195 P.3d 1267.
{22} 	Romero argues that Section 60-13-30(A) only bars actions for compensation
between the unlicensed contractor or subcontractor and the ultimate consumer of the
construction—that is, the public, the landowner, or the homeowner. We do not agree
that the statute or our case law is as limited as Romero argues. 	Section 60-13-1.1
states that the purpose of the CILA is to “promote the general welfare of the people
of New Mexico by providing for the protection of life and property by adopting and
enforcing codes and standards for construction, alteration, installation, connection,
demolition and repair work.” 	Our case law has indicated that the statute seeks to
protect “the public.” See Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 413, 806 P.2d at 62 (referring to
“consumers” and “the public” when discussing the purpose of the CILA); Peck, 84

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N.M. at 66, 499 P.2d at 688 (including “the public” when discussing the CILA’s
purpose). Yet, no case states that a contractor is not a consumer or a member of “the
people.” See generally Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 413-14, 806 P.2d at 62-63; Gamboa,
2004-NMCA-053 ¶¶ 13, 15-16; see also § 60-13-1.1. The point in Mascarenas was
not to limit the scope of the CILA, but to restate the Legislature’s intent to ensure that
no unlicensed contractor may recover from anybody for work performed that requires
a license. See Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 413-14, 806 P.2d at 62-63. We see no reason
to limit the CILA’s scope to only consumers.
{23} 	However, although the CILA does not only protect consumers, it does not allow
recovery by Sivad in this case. In addition to the CILA’s stated purpose to protect
people from unscrupulous contractors, it also states that, to effect its purpose, the
Legislature intends that “contractors be required to furnish and maintain evidence of
responsibility.” Section 60-13-1.1(C); see Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 413, 806 P.2d
at 62 (interpreting the purpose of the CILA as remedying the wrong of “exploitation
of the public by incompetent and unscrupulous contractors who are unable or
unwilling to obtain a license”). We construe the sections of the CILA together to give
effect to the Legislature’s intent. 	See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of
Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (explaining that,
when “several sections of a statute are involved, they must be read together so that all

17
parts are given effect”). “In determining legislative intent, we look not only to the
language used in the statute, but also to the object sought to be accomplished and the
wrong to be remedied.” Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 413, 806 P.2d at 62.
{24} 	Sivad cites Mascarenas for the contention that Romero should not be permitted
to retain compensation received for licensed work for which he had no license. See
id. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63. However, the facts in Mascarenas are different from the
present case. 	In Mascarenas, a landowner hired an unlicensed contractor to do
licensed work and then sought reimbursement of compensation already paid. Id. at
411-12, 806 P.2d at 60-61. 	Mascarenas held, “[a]s a matter of public policy, an
unlicensed contractor may not retain payments made pursuant to a contract which
requires him to perform in violation of the [CILA]” and granted the landowner a full
refund. Id. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63. However, in the present case, a licensed general
contractor is seeking recovery of payments made to an unlicensed subcontractor that
the general contractor hired. There is no indication that Romero withheld information
from Sivad or that Sivad, prior to hiring, would not have obtained information
concerning Romero’s licensure upon reasonable inquiry. 	From the Legislature’s
requirement that contractors “furnish and maintain evidence of responsibility,” we
infer that contractors must behave responsibly. See § 60-13-1.1(C). The Legislature’s
purpose of protecting the people of New Mexico from unscrupulous contractors would

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be thwarted if, after mandating that contractors behave responsibly and requiring that
contractors possess applicable licenses, general contractors were then allowed
recovery of compensation paid to unlicensed subcontractors that they irresponsibly
hired and assigned to do work requiring a license. Therefore, we reverse the district
court’s order that Sivad be permitted to recover payments already made to Romero.
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF AGENTS
{25} 	Romero finally argues that he believed that he was working for Parker rather
than Sivad and that he did not know that Sivad was even involved. Romero therefore
contends that Parker is personally liable to him as an agent for an undisclosed
principal. Parker argues, however, that he has no personal liability to Romero because
there was substantial evidence to support the district court’s decision against Romero
on this issue and because Romero’s claim that Parker is liable to Romero as an
“undisclosed agent” of Sivad is flawed as a matter of law. We agree with Parker.
{26} 	In reviewing a substantial evidence claim, “[t]he question is not whether
substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such
evidence supports the result reached.” Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters v. City of Las
Cruces, 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177. “Additionally we will
not reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder.” Id.
The district court found that Parker was the agent of Sivad, that Romero knew about

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Sivad, and that Romero’s contract was with Sivad. In our review of the record, we
conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings: Sivad’s signs
and permits were posted at the construction sites, Romero received checks with
Sivad’s name on them, and other employees informed Romero that they worked for
Sivad. 	The district court did not err in finding that Sivad was not an undisclosed
principal, and, thus, Parker is not individually liable to Romero.
CONCLUSION
{27} 	We conclude that the CILA bars both an unlicensed subcontractor from
recovering compensation from a general contractor and a general contractor who did
not 	act 	responsibly 	in 	hiring 	an 	unlicensed 	subcontractor 	from 	recovering
compensation already paid to the unlicensed subcontractor. We also conclude that
equitable principles are not applicable to actions addressed under the CILA. 	We
therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.
{28} 	IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
WE CONCUR:
_______________________________
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge

RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
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