Estate of G.B. v. Hamilton Cty. Job & Family Servs.

[Cite as Estate of G.B. v. Hamilton Cty. Job & Family Servs., 2026-Ohio-4188.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
ESTATE OF G.B., by and through
Administrator Blake Maislin,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAMILTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants,
and
SHAMARA STEPHENS,
KASSI SETTY,
and
LUMADI LAVUSA,
Defendants-Appellees.
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APPEAL NO. C-250376
TRIAL NO. A-1701739
JUDGMENT ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.

OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 10/23/2026.
Pursuant to App.R. 30, the clerk is directed to serve upon all parties, or their
counsel if represented, a copy of the court’s judgment and note such action
on the docket.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge

[Cite as Estate of G.B. v. Hamilton Cty. Job & Family Servs., 2026-Ohio-4188.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
ESTATE OF G.B., by and through
Administrator Blake Maislin,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAMILTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants,
and
SHAMARA STEPHENS,
KASSI SETTY,
and
LUMADI LAVUSA,
Defendants-Appellees.
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APPEAL NO. C-250376
TRIAL NO. A-1701739
O P I N I O N
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 23, 2026

OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
FG+G, Jacqueline Greene and Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Laufman Napolitano, LLC, and Paul M. Laufman, and Michael L. Tranter, for
Defendant-Appellee Shamara Stephens,
Stephen J. Wenke, for Defendant-Appellee Kassi Setty,
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, Pamela J. Sears and Bennet
S. Weaver, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Defendant-Appellee Lumadi Lavusa.

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5
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} This appeal involves the tragic death of two-year-old G.B., who was
murdered by her parents, Andrea Bradley and Glen Bates.1 Plaintiff maternal
grandmother, in her individual capacity and as the then-administrator2 of the estate
of G.B. (“the Estate”), brought wrongful-death and survivorship claims against
defendants-appellees Lumadi Lavusa, Shamara Stephens, and Kassie Setty
(collectively, “the caseworkers”), who were employed as caseworkers by the Hamilton
County Department of Job and Family Services (“JFS”).3 The trial court granted the
caseworkers’ motions for summary judgment because it determined that they were
immune from liability. The Estate appealed.
{¶2} We hold that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the
caseworkers’ acts or omissions constitute a conscious indifference to, or disregard of,
a known or obvious risk of harm to G.B. that was unreasonable under the
circumstances—conduct which, if proven, could constitute recklessness under R.C.
2744.03(A)(6)(b) and defeat immunity. We sustain the Estate’s assignments of error,
reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand the cause to the trial court.
1 The coroner identified two causes that equally contributed to G.B.’s death: starvation and blunt-
force trauma. Because the evidence involving G.B.’s prolonged malnutrition and starvation is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the caseworkers acted
recklessly for purposes of R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), we confine our analysis to that aspect of the
record. Accordingly, we do not address whether the caseworkers’ actions or omissions with respect
to investigating Bates, including whether he was residing in the home with Bradley and G.B.,
whether he had a propensity for violence, or whether he was a suitable caregiver, independently
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding recklessness.
2 On June 15, 2018, Blake Maislin replaced maternal grandmother as the administrator of the Estate
of G.B., a deceased minor, by order of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Probate
Division. Thus, the plaintiff-appellant in this appeal is the Estate of G.B., by and through
administrator Blake Maislin.
3 Maternal grandmother sued other defendants, but this appeal involves only the three caseworkers.

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I. Factual and Procedural History
A. Caseworkers’ deficient briefs
{¶3} As a preliminary matter, Stephens’s and Setty’s appellate briefs are
deficient. The briefs do not comply with App.R. 16 because, rather than providing their
own statements of fact, they simply direct this court to the statements of fact contained
in their summary‑judgment motions. But the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not
permit parties to incorporate arguments or factual recitations by reference to filings
in the trial court. See Erie Cty. Dept. of Jobs & Family Servs. v. Ray, 2025‑Ohio‑2327,
¶ 19 (6th Dist.) (collecting cases). App.R. 16 requires parties’ briefs to set forth a
statement of facts with citations to the record. And although App.R. 16(B) allows an
appellee to omit a statement of facts if satisfied with the appellant’s version, appellees
wishing to rely on a different factual account must provide their own statements with
proper record citations.
{¶4} Because Stephens’s and Setty’s briefs contain no independent statement
of facts, we were required to sift through the summary-judgment record to determine
the facts upon which they relied to support their arguments that they were immune
from liability. Identifying the portions of the record that support a party’s position is
the party’s responsibility, not the court’s. These deficiencies improperly shifted to the
court the burden of locating and assembling the evidence necessary to evaluate the
parties’ arguments and hindered the efficient resolution of this appeal.
{¶5} Setty’s summary‑judgment motion further impedes our review because
it contains no citations to evidence in the record, making it impossible to locate
supporting material by reference to that motion. Again, courts are not required to
search the record to find evidence supporting a party’s position.

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7
B. Procedural history
{¶6} The Estate sued various entities and individuals, including the
caseworkers, asserting claims for wrongful death and survivorship.
{¶7} The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to all defendants.
This court affirmed that judgment. Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of
Job & Family Servs., 2020-Ohio-1580 (1st Dist.) (“Maternal Grandmother I”). The
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment in favor of the caseworkers and
remanded the cause to the trial court. Maternal Grandmother, Admr. v. Hamilton
Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2021-Ohio-4096 (“Maternal Grandmother II”).
{¶8} On remand, the caseworkers moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted their motions and entered judgment in their favor, finding that the
caseworkers were entitled to statutory immunity because the Estate’s evidence failed
to establish that the caseworkers’ acts or omissions were reckless.
{¶9} The Estate appealed.
C. Facts
1. The juvenile court placed G.B. in JFS’s custody immediately
after her birth
{¶10} In January 2013, G.B. was born to her parents, Bradley and Bates. G.B.
was born full term and weighed eight pounds, eight ounces, placing her in the 84th
percentile for weight.
{¶11} Before G.B.’s birth, JFS had obtained temporary custody of Bradley’s
four other children based on allegations that Bradley had left her children in the care
of her five-year-old child, who sustained “multiple marks and bruises as a result of
physical discipline at the hands” of Bradley. Bradley signed a voluntary agreement
stating that she was unwilling to care for G.B. JFS placed G.B. with her siblings in

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foster care.
2. Lumadi Lavusa
a. August 26, 2013 to December 31, 2013
{¶12} In late August 2013, JFS assigned G.B.’s case to ongoing caseworker
Lavusa. That same day, JFS moved for the juvenile court to terminate JFS’s temporary
custody and return the children to Bradley. JFS’s motion indicated that Bradley had
completed substance-abuse treatment and parenting classes, tested negative on
random drug screens, and was treating her mental-health issues with medication and
therapy. The children’s GAL supported terminating temporary custody, but he noted
in his report that “[a] few issues do present.” One of these issues was that the children
were receiving only “one meal per day during visits” with Bradley.
{¶13} Two days later, Lavusa and Bradley visited the children at the foster
parents’ home. During the visit, the foster mother told Lavusa she was concerned
about the children returning to Bradley’s custody. She explained that she often gave
Bradley food for the children when Bradley had unsupervised weekend visits with the
children because Bradley lacked food in her home. Lavusa told the foster mother that
Bradley would receive a food voucher.
{¶14} The juvenile court granted JFS’s motion and the children returned to
Bradley’s custody on September 9, 2013. A protective-supervision order required
Bradley to provide JFS reasonable access to her home, maintain sobriety, cooperate
with mental-health services, and complete intensive-family-restoration services
(“IFRS”). When she returned to Bradley’s custody, G.B. weighed 18 pounds and four
ounces, placing her in the 82nd percentile for weight for an eight-month-old girl.
{¶15} Four days later, after one of G.B.’s siblings alleged that Bradley was
locking the children in a closet as punishment, Lavusa made an unannounced visit to

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9
Bradley’s home. (Later, this allegation was deemed unsubstantiated.) While there,
Lavusa inspected Bradley’s refrigerator, documenting that “there was enough food.”
Bradley told Lavusa that maternal grandmother had provided Bradley with food and
that she had reapplied for food assistance. Bradley told Lavusa that she had been
unable to pay her rent for two months because she had stopped receiving benefits.
{¶16} A few days later, Lavusa spoke with a prosecutor about a child-
endangerment case that had been filed against Bradley due to the child’s allegation.
The prosecutor advised Lavusa to visit weekly to ensure the children’s safety and to
obtain supplemental food vouchers for Bradley.
{¶17} A little more than one week after the children had returned to Bradley’s
care, Lavusa made a planned visit to Bradley’s home. Bradley told Lavusa that her food
assistance had not “kicked in yet” despite “them showing that they have been posted.”
Lavusa said she would follow up with the food-assistance worker and directed Bradley
to food pantries. Bradley assured Lavusa that G.B. “had plenty of food.” But Bradley
was lying: Lavusa inspected Bradley’s refrigerator to find that there was no food inside
it. Bradley signed a release of information for G.B. to participate in a program called
“Help Me Grow.” Lavusa instructed Bradley to keep her updated about the status of
Bradley’s food assistance.
{¶18} Three days later, Lavusa returned for an unannounced home visit.
Bradley’s food assistance had still not “rolled over on her card.” Lavusa documented
that Bradley had enough food for the night “as evidence[d] by canned foods in the
cabinet.” Bradley told Lavusa she was in the process of enrolling the children at Walnut
Hills Medical Center for their health-care needs. Lavusa documented her intention to
follow up with the medical center to confirm the children were enrolled.
{¶19} During an October 2013 visit, Lavusa observed Bradley giving G.B. a

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bottle. Bradley told Lavusa that she had a WIC4 appointment the next day and the
children were scheduled for doctors’ appointments in November. At a visit later in
October, Lavusa documented (1) she told Bradley that an IFRS worker had praised
Bradley as very compliant, (2) Bradley represented that she was continuing to take her
medication, “which really helps stabilize her,” (3) the children appeared “healthy and
happy,” (4) G.B. “is fairing along well too,” and (5) Bradley told Lavusa that despite
G.B. sometimes pushing the bottle away, “for the most part she is feeding well.”
{¶20} At a November 2013 visit, Bradley told Lavusa that G.B. had begun to
crawl and that Help Me Grow was visiting at the end of the month to evaluate G.B. and
another child.
{¶21} In December 2013, Lavusa learned that Bradley was seven months
pregnant and had not disclosed this to JFS. Lavusa visited later that month, and
Bradley confirmed that she was pregnant and Bates was the father. Further, Bradley
told Lavusa that Help Me Grow planned to work with G.B. to help her develop motor
and verbal skills.
{¶22} After Bradley regained custody of her children, G.B. began losing
weight. In September 2013, when G.B. was placed in Bradley’s custody, G.B. weighed
18 pounds, four ounces, which placed her in the 82nd percentile for weight for her age.
But just months later, in December 2013, G.B. had lost a significant amount of weight.
G.B. weighed 16 pounds and 12 ounces, placing her in only the fifth percentile for
weight for her age. Lavusa was the family’s J.F.S. caseworker during that entire period.
According to the coroner who conducted G.B.’s autopsy, it was during this time that
G.B. began to experience starvation.
4 WIC is the United States Department of Agriculture’s “Special Supplemental Nutrition Program
for Women, Infants, and Children.”

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11
b. January 2014 through May 2014
{¶23} At an early January 2014 visit, Bradley told Lavusa that she continued
to take her mental-health medication and had an upcoming therapy session. Further,
Bradley said that the children were up to date on their doctors’ appointments and Help
Me Grow was visiting twice a month to work with G.B.
{¶24} At a February 2014 home visit, Lavusa observed no food in Bradley’s
refrigerator other than a gallon of milk, which one of Bradley’s other children reported
was for G.B. Bradley told Lavusa that she ran out of food assistance, so she and the
children were eating at restaurants. Lavusa suggested that Bradley make use “of the
free store” when her food assistance ran out. Bradley reported to Lavusa that a Help
Me Grow worker told her that G.B. had “very low muscle tone” and was concerned that
G.B. was more than a year old but could not walk.
{¶25} Later that month, Bradley took G.B. to the emergency department at
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center (“Children’s”). Bradley reported to
medical personnel that G.B. had been “standing on a learning table and fell off
backward,” hitting her head on a toy. A nurse noted a “large boggy spot” and a “boggy
bruise” on G.B.’s forehead. Further, the nurse observed that G.B. “appears very small
for her age and is very somnolent in exam room” and believed the doctors should rule
out abuse. But a resident physician’s note described G.B. as appearing “well-developed
and well-nourished.” At the hospital, G.B. weighed 16 pounds and 12 ounces, which
placed her in the zero percentile for weight for her age. Children’s discharged G.B.
without documenting any abuse inquiries or concerns.
{¶26} The next day, Lavusa visited Bradley and documented that G.B. was “not
looking well” and “appears to have lost some weight.” Bradley told Lavusa that G.B.
“has been sick with a virus” and that she had taken G.B. to the emergency department.

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Bradley told Lavusa that G.B. weighed “about 17 pounds,” was “eating well,” and G.B.’s
doctor had told Bradley that G.B. was “in the right weight range for her age.” Bradley
also claimed that G.B. had attended her one-year pediatrician appointment and was
up to date on her vaccinations. (The coroner could find no record of a one-year medical
appointment.) Lavusa’s notes said G.B. “presents as being small in stature and
underweight” and Bradley “presents as not understanding the child’s development in
relation to the child’s age.” Lavusa did not document G.B.’s forehead bruise or injury.
{¶27} In her deposition, Lavusa could not recall following up with G.B.’s
medical providers to confirm whether G.B. attended a one-year appointment or if
G.B.’s doctors believed G.B.’s weight was on track. Lavusa agreed that had she
contacted G.B.’s medical providers, she would have documented doing so. But G.B.’s
JFS file contained no documentation that Lavusa attempted to contact the providers.
{¶28} In mid-March 2014, maternal grandmother took G.B. to the emergency
department at Children’s because G.B. was having difficulty breathing. Children’s staff
noted that G.B. appeared “very quiet. Not interactive during exam,” but otherwise was
“well-developed and well-nourished.” Children’s, however, noted that G.B. had low
muscle tone and referred her to neurology. At this point, G.B. weighed 16 pounds, 7.7
ounces, which again placed her in the zero percentile for weight. Lavusa did not know
about this hospital visit.
{¶29} At a late-March 2014 visit, Lavusa documented that G.B. had “gained
some weight as evidenced by [Lavusa] lift[ing] her in her arms.”
{¶30} In April 2014, a Help Me Grow worker called Lavusa and reported that
Bradley had missed G.B.’s February 2014 appointment without notification and had
cancelled the next-scheduled appointment. The same day that she received the call,
Lavusa visited Bradley and documented that G.B. was pulling herself up to stand on a

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couch. Bradley claimed to have forgotten about the Help Me Grow appointments she
missed. Bradley told Lavusa she would be restarting therapy in six weeks and had
resumed taking her medications after her youngest child was born. Later in April,
Bradley reported that G.B. had another Help Me Grow appointment and she was
taking her medication.
{¶31} In May 2014, Lavusa and her supervisor, Mary Ayoki, closed Bradley’s
case. As a result, no one from JFS observed Bradley’s home, G.B., or the other children
between May and December 2014.
3. Children’s admits G.B., prompting a neglect report
{¶32} On December 4, 2014, Bradley took G.B. to Children’s, which admitted
G.B. for an 11-day stay. The medical team diagnosed G.B. with failure to thrive.
{¶33} Stacey Litman-Padnos, a social worker employed by Children’s,
documented that Bradley had reported limiting G.B.’s food because she believed G.B.
was overweight. Bradley also told Litman-Padnos that she was not taking her
medication or attending therapy. G.B. weighed 17 pounds and 4.8 ounces, placing her
in the zero percentile.
{¶34} Litman-Padnos reported Bradley to 241-KIDS on December 9, 2014.
She told the JFS intake worker that Bradley admitted to restricting G.B.’s food because
she believed G.B. was overweight and that G.B. had not received “any medical care
since she left foster care.”
{¶35} Litman-Padnos contacted WIC, which informed her that at a July 2014
WIC appointment, WIC employees were concerned about G.B.’s weight and wanted
G.B. to return in September. Bradley did not bring G.B. back to the WIC office.
{¶36} Litman-Padnos explained that Children’s doctors had not found a
medical explanation for G.B.’s failure to thrive, leading her to suspect that G.B.’s

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condition was caused by “malnutrition and restriction of food.” Litman-Padnos
believed Bradley had a “warped view on what the baby should look like” and “seemed
shocked” when Litman-Padnos told her that a baby’s legs should have fat on them.
4. Shamara Stephens
{¶37} JFS assigned Stephens to investigate Bradley’s neglect. JFS provided
Stephens with an “Intake Narrative,” which included Litman-Padnos’s report and
JFS’s history with Bradley, detailing past allegations. After being assigned the case,
Stephens called her supervisor, Nancy White, to discuss failure to thrive.
{¶38} On December 10, 2014, Stephens spoke with Litman-Padnos, who was
“very concerned about [G.B.] as well as her size and development,” noting that G.B.
was “significantly underweight” and unable to walk. Litman-Padnos told Stephens she
suspected that Bradley was “intentionally mistreating [G.B.] and she is fearful of
allowing the child to return to the home.” Stephens documented that Litman-Padnos
had been unable to provide a “concrete” reason for her fear. But Litman-Padnos
explained that there was no “medical reason for the failure to thrive so the only other
conclusion is neglect.” And Litman-Padnos stressed to Stephens the importance of
having a “good/safe discharge plan in place before [G.B.] can go home.”
{¶39} With G.B. still in the hospital, Stephens visited Bradley at her home.
Bradley told Stephens that she had believed G.B. was overweight and admitted “that
maybe she was not giving the child the nutrients she needed but denies it was
intentional.” Stephens’s visit notes suggest that Bradley confirmed she was not
engaged in any mental-health services. Finally, her notes do not indicate that she
spoke with any of Bradley’s other children during her visit and a JFS “Post-Death
Summary” states that Stephens left “without any determination about the children’s
safety nor any information to rule out the present danger threats identified in the

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15
hotline. No action was taken.”
{¶40} Before G.B.’s discharge, Stephens told Litman-Padnos that JFS lacked
“enough information to prevent [Bradley] from taking her child home once she is
ready for discharge.” Stephens asked Litman-Padnos if G.B. had gained any weight
while in the hospital. Litman-Padnos explained that G.B. had gained one pound during
her admission, which was “no where [sic] near what they were expecting.” According
to the JFS Post-Death Summary, there was “no documentation to support the decision
to allow [G.B.] to be discharged [to] her mother.”
{¶41} Children’s discharged G.B. on December 15, 2014. JFS provided G.B.’s
discharge summary to Stephens, which indicated that Bradley had been feeding nearly
two-year-old G.B. “approximately 8 oz of Similac + 2-3 small bowls of cereal. No solids
given due to choking on food.”
{¶42} Stephens dropped by the house a week later to deliver Christmas gifts
and could not remember if she saw any of the children but explained this was not a
“home visit.”
{¶43} Two weeks later, Stephens returned to Bradley’s home and documented
that Bradley told her G.B. had gained three pounds since her hospital admission. G.B.
was napping and was not in the room at the time. Later, however, Stephens observed
Bradley dressing G.B. and was “shocked at her appearance. The child is significantly
underweight and has very glossy eyes. She was not observed moving or making any
sounds.” Bradley attributed G.B.’s “despondent behavior . . . to the fact that she had
just been woke up from a nap” and told Stephens that G.B. had a WIC appointment
the next week and would receive a prescription for PediaSure. Bradley also told
Stephens that G.B. had been seen at a medical clinic after her discharge from
Children’s and was scheduled to return to the clinic once she had begun drinking

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PediaSure. Stephens spoke with Bradley’s other children, who reported that they were
not denied food.
{¶44} The next day, January 6, Stephens made referrals for Bradley for a
diagnostic assessment and for “Intensive Family Intervention Services.” Stephens also
initiated transferring Bradley’s case to an ongoing caseworker “to ensure that the
medical health needs of [G.B.] are properly met and that [Bradley] re-engages in the
appropriate mental health treatment.”
{¶45} Two days later, Stephens completed a “Safety and Family Assessment”
for Bradley’s case. She wrote that there “are no active safety threats at this time but
there is a concern that [Bradley] is no longer under a mental health doctor’s care and
it may have an effect on her parenting.” Stephens noted that she was “concern[ed]”
that Bradley thought G.B. was overweight when she returned from foster care and
questioned whether Bradley was “intentionally withholding food from the child.”
Stephens determined that none of Bradley’s children could protect themselves and the
“final level of risk for this family is high.” She also found the neglect allegation related
to G.B. to be “indicated.”5 Although Stephens believed that G.B. had “not received any
serious inflicted physical harm at this time,” she noted that G.B. was “significantly
underweight for age [and] at this time there is no medical reason.” Despite concerns
with G.B.’s weight, Stephens reported that Bradley had the ability to protect her
children and she was “more than capable” of meeting the children’s basic needs.
{¶46} Stephens also denied that Bradley was symptomatic for a mental illness
5 The record shows that a report is “indicated” if there is “circumstantial or other isolated indicators
of child abuse or neglect lacking confirmation; or a determination by the caseworker that the child
has been abused or neglected based upon completion of an assessment/investigation.” A report is
“substantiated” if “there is an admission of child abuse or neglect by the person(s) responsible; an
adjudication of child abuse or neglect; or other forms of confirmation deemed valid by” JFS, which
includes a nonaccidental injury confirmed by a medical provider with expertise in diagnosing
maltreatment or written reports/records from service providers.

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that might place a child in immediate danger but documented that Bradley had
stopped seeing a mental-health provider. Under a space asking whether a caretaker
had “an unconvincing or insufficient explanation for the child’s serious injury or
physical condition,” Stephens indicated, “No,” but then documented that Bradley
restricted G.B.’s consumption of solid foods due to concerns about choking and G.B.’s
hospital visit resulting in the failure-to-thrive diagnosis. Stephens’s supervisor, Nancy
White, signed off on Stephens’s assessments.
5. Kassi Setty
{¶47} On January 14, 2015, Stephens and Setty participated in a conference to
transfer Bradley’s case to Setty, the assigned ongoing caseworker. Setty testified in her
deposition that this meeting lasted five minutes, but she was aware that G.B. had been
diagnosed with failure to thrive. Stephens gave Setty Bradley’s physical file during the
meeting. That file included all prior “Activity Log Reports” (“ALRs”) about Bradley’s
case.6 Setty could not recall if she had read Bradley’s file beyond “briefly” reviewing
the last few ALRs. And during her deposition, Setty stated that she had been unaware
that G.B. had been hospitalized.
{¶48} Six days later, Stephens conducted an unannounced home visit. She did
not document seeing any of the children but provided Bradley with a Kmart voucher
and confirmed Bradley’s availability for a joint home visit with Setty the following day.
{¶49} A week after Stephens transferred the case to Setty, the caseworkers
visited Bradley’s home together. Setty did not document anything about the visit.
{¶50} Setty’s next home visit was scheduled for four weeks later, on February
18, 2015. But Setty called Bradley to cancel that visit due to snow and rescheduled for
6 Activity Log Reports are notes created by caseworkers that are stored within the Statewide
Automated Child Welfare Information System (“SACWIS”).

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February 26. But Setty did not visit that day. Setty had pushed that visit to later in the
day and could not find Bradley’s house because it was too dark outside. Setty and
Bradley agreed to reschedule the appointment for the next week.
{¶51} In early March, Setty attempted an unannounced home visit, but
Bradley was not home.
{¶52} Finally, on March 4, 2015, Setty succeeded in visiting Bradley. Setty
referred Bradley, who had stopped taking mental-health medication, to mental-health
services. Bradley told Setty that G.B.’s Help Me Grow services were “‘closed out’ stating
that ‘everything was fine.’” Setty documented her intention to verify this information.
Bradley told Setty she had taken G.B. to the WIC office, where personnel said G.B. was
“‘doing great.’” Further, Bradley told Setty that G.B.’s pediatrician said G.B. “‘will catch
up,’” and G.B.’s next pediatrician appointment was in May. Setty documented that
G.B. appeared sleepy during the visit “and was falling in and out of sleep.”
{¶53} Although Setty testified that she had attempted to verify Bradley’s
representations about Help Me Grow and WIC, she conceded that if she had sent a
request for information, she likely would have documented the request, which would
be in the file. Setty did not attempt to contact G.B.’s doctor because she did not know
who it was. Setty never reviewed any of G.B.’s medical records or contacted G.B.’s
medical providers. She never asked anyone about G.B.’s weight, whether G.B. was
being weighed, or how or when G.B. was fed. Moreover, Setty made “[v]ery little”
attempts to observe G.B.’s weight during her visit, and she never asked about or
attempted to observe any part of G.B.’s body.
{¶54} Three weeks later, on March 26, 2015, Setty attempted to visit Bradley.
Bradley was not home, so Setty left a visitation receipt on the door requesting Bradley
to call to schedule a visit.

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6. G.B.’s death and autopsy
{¶55} On March 29, 2015, Bradley brought G.B. to the emergency department
at Children’s. G.B. was dead when she arrived and was covered in numerous visible
injuries, including a head injury.
{¶56} Hamilton County Deputy Coroner Dr. Schott conducted an autopsy on
G.B. the following day. She ruled G.B.’s death a homicide and attributed it to two equal
causes: (1) battered-child syndrome with acute and chronic intracranial hemorrhages,
and (2) starvation. Dr. Schott explained that “the effects of the starvation and the blunt
impacts were both equally important in the cause of death.” She reported, “the blunt
force injuries could have stood alone as a cause of death, and that the starvation could
have stood alone as a cause of death, but they are both two components of child abuse.”
{¶57} The autopsy showed that G.B., who was approximately 26 months old
when she died, weighed only 13 pounds and 14.2 ounces and was 28 inches tall, placing
her in the zero percentile for both height and weight for her age. Dr. Schott stated that
G.B. “definitely” was experiencing starvation in December 2013. She explained that
this starvation caused G.B.’s failure-to-thrive diagnosis. Dr. Schott’s autopsy report
showed that G.B. had abdominal distension, thinned hair, generalized muscle wasting,
loss of subcutaneous fat, puffy feet, loose skin, and general malnutrition, all of which
were present during G.B.’s December 2014 hospital admission.
7. Investigation and conviction of Bradley and Bates
{¶58} The State charged Bates and Bradley with G.B.’s murder. Bradley
pleaded guilty to murder and is serving a 15-year-to-life sentence in prison. Bates was
convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, but his conviction was
reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court. See State v. Bates, 2020-Ohio-634. Bates later
pleaded guilty to amended charges.

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20
{¶59} After G.B.’s death, JFS performed a safety assessment for Bradley’s
other children. JFS learned that Bradley never took G.B. to any weekly weight checks
after December 17, 2014.
II. Analysis
{¶60} On appeal, the Estate raises three assignments of error, which assert
that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Lavusa, Stephens, and
Setty. Under each assignment of error, the Estate presents two issues for review: (1)
whether the trial court improperly defined recklessness under R.C. 2744.03(A)(b)(6);
and (2) whether genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.
{¶61} In entering summary judgment in favor of the caseworkers on the issue
of immunity, the trial court concluded that the caseworkers’ conduct did not rise to
the level of recklessness. The trial court determined that Lavusa and Stephens followed
up with Bradley through visits, assisted her with resources, and “made attempts” to
confirm her compliance with JFS directives. It is unclear from the record upon what
facts the court relied to find that Lavusa and Stephens “made attempts” to confirm
Bradley’s compliance, other than documenting Bradley’s representations that she was
complying.
{¶62} The trial court appeared to be more critical of Setty’s conduct. It
observed, “[w]hether due to inexperience or lack of training, it appears Setty was
unprepared for the role as a social worker” and that her notes “leave much to be
desired and make it difficult to determine what actions she took.” Nevertheless, the
court found no evidence that Setty observed abuse or neglect or possessed knowledge
that her conduct would “in all probability result in injury.”
{¶63} We first address and set forth the proper definition of “reckless” in the
context of statutory immunity. Then we address whether the caseworkers were

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entitled to summary judgment.
A. De novo review
{¶64} This court reviews a trial court’s decision granting summary judgment
de novo. Branson v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 2025-Ohio-4396, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.).
{¶65} Trial courts shall grant summary judgment if “(1) there are no genuine
issues of material fact, (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
(3) when viewing the evidence most strongly in the nonmovant’s favor, reasonable
minds can come to one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmovant.”
Id. at ¶ 29, citing Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶66} The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden to explain
the basis for summary judgment by pointing to admissible evidence in the record
demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists on the essential elements
of the nonmoving party’s claims. Weckel v. Cole + Russell Architects, Inc., 2024-Ohio-
5111, ¶ 34 (1st Dist.), quoting Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). Once the
movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶67} “‘Summary judgment is admittedly a drastic device’ because it ‘cuts off
a party’s right to present [her] case to the jury.’” Johnson v. Munther, 2005-Ohio-
3641, ¶ 56 (5th Dist.), quoting Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 120
(1980). Courts reviewing summary-judgment motions may not weigh the evidence;
rather, they must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Smathers v. Glass, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 32. “When factual
ambiguities exist, inferences must . . . be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Id.

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22
B. Political subdivision immunity and the “recklessness” exception
{¶68} Ohio law generally grants political subdivisions and their employees
immunity from lawsuits and liability. Maternal Grandmother II, 2021-Ohio-4096, at
¶ 7, citing R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and 2744.03(A)(6). “That immunity is not absolute,
however.” Id. Employees may be liable for acts or omissions within the scope of their
employment when their conduct is reckless. Id., citing R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Liability
cannot be imposed for mere negligence. Anderson v. City of Massillon, 2012-Ohio-
5711, ¶ 23.
C. “Recklessness” includes the conscious disregard of a known or
obvious risk
{¶69} In its entry granting summary judgment to the caseworkers, the trial
court, citing O’Toole v. Denihan, 2008-Ohio-2574, defined recklessness as “a perverse
disregard of a known risk.” It concluded that the caseworkers neither knew of nor
perversely disregarded the risk that G.B. would be harmed by her parents. The Estate
contends that this formulation improperly required proof of actual, subjective
knowledge and failed to account for an obvious risk that a reasonable person in the
caseworkers’ position would have recognized. We agree that, to the extent the trial
court confined its analysis to risks about which the caseworkers had actual knowledge,
it applied an unduly narrow standard.
{¶70} In Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102 (1990),7 the Ohio Supreme
Court adopted the Restatement definition of reckless conduct. Id. at 104; see 2
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, § 500, at 587 (1965). Under that definition, a person
is reckless when the person performs an act, or intentionally fails to perform a required
7 While not overruling Thompson, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected dicta in Thompson
indicating that “willfulness,” “wantonness,” and “recklessness” were interchangeable terms.
Anderson at ¶ 31.

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23
act, while “knowing or having reason to know” of facts that would lead a reasonable
person to recognize both an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another and a risk
that is substantially greater than that necessary to establish negligence. (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 105, quoting 2 Restatement, § 500; see Anderson at ¶ 34 (Thompson
adopted the Restatement’s definition of reckless).
{¶71} The Court later described recklessness in O’Toole as a “perverse
disregard of a known risk.” O’Toole at ¶ 73. But O’Toole did not displace the broader
definition adopted in Thompson. Indeed, immediately before offering that shorthand
formulation, the Court quoted Thompson’s knowing-or-having-reason-to-know
standard. Read in context, “perverse disregard of a known risk” distills the governing
rule; it does not restrict recklessness to risks proven through the actor’s actual,
subjective awareness.
{¶72} This conclusion is confirmed by Anderson. There, the Court clarified
that willful, wanton, and reckless conduct describe distinct degrees of culpability and
are not interchangeable. Anderson, 2012-Ohio-5711, at ¶ 3. The Court defined reckless
conduct as the “conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of
harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially
greater than negligent conduct.” Id. at ¶ 34. The inclusion of an “obvious” risk
preserves the objective component of the Thompson standard: the relevant risk need
not have been expressly acknowledged by the actor if the circumstances made that risk
apparent to a reasonable person in the actor’s position.
{¶73} The Ohio Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions consistently read these
formulations of recklessness together. In A.J.R. v. Lute, 2020-Ohio-5168, the Court
cited both O’Toole’s perverse-disregard-of-a-known-risk formulation and Anderson’s
definition involving a “known or obvious risk.” Lute at ¶ 17. In Smathers v. Glass,

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2022-Ohio-4595, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered R.C. 2744.03’s recklessness
exception in a lawsuit filed against social workers after a child’s death and again
defined reckless conduct as the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or
obvious, unreasonable risk substantially greater than negligence, while also
recognizing O’Toole’s shorthand description. Id. at ¶ 33. And in the Supreme Court’s
opinion reversing this Court’s judgment in Maternal Grandmother I, 2020-Ohio-
1580 (1st Dist.), the Supreme Court applied Anderson’s known-or-obvious-risk
formulation. See Maternal Grandmother II, 2021-Ohio-4096, at ¶ 7. These decisions
show that Thompson, O’Toole, and Anderson are complementary, not inconsistent.
{¶74} Accordingly, we hold that a person’s conduct may be “reckless” in the
context of R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) when the person acts, or fails to act despite having a
duty to do so, with “conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk
of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially
greater than negligent conduct.” See Smathers at ¶ 33, quoting Anderson at ¶ 34;
Maternal Grandmother II at ¶ 8. In other words, for a government employee’s
conduct to constitute “recklessness,” thus constituting an exception to statutory
immunity, the employee need not have had actual knowledge of a risk; rather, as to
whether the employee had sufficient knowledge of the risk, it is enough that a
reasonable person would have known and appreciated the risk. See 2 Restatement, §
500, Comment c; see also Baab v. Medina City Schools Bd. of Edn., 2019-Ohio-510, ¶
14 (9th Dist.); Al-Jahmi v. Ohio Athletic Comm., 2022-Ohio-2296, ¶ 100 (10th Dist.);
Mercer v. Athens Cty., 72 F.4th 152, 165 (6th Cir. 2023) (observing that “‘Ohio law
does not require a showing or finding that a person had actual, subjective knowledge
of a known or obvious risk of harm to conclude that he acted recklessly.’”).

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25
D. The evidence presents questions of fact involving whether the
caseworkers acted recklessly
{¶75} “[C]aseworkers tasked with ensuring the safety and well-being of Ohio’s
children face some of the biggest challenges in our communities: addiction, mental-
health disorders, poverty, and trauma.” Smathers at ¶ 1. R.C. 2744.03 “recognizes that
a court should not use hindsight to judge the difficult decisions made by children’s-
services workers” and shield them from accusations of negligence in their work. Id. at
¶ 1-2. R.C. 2744.03 strikes a balance between “the need to protect children’s-services
workers so that they may do their job without fear of being sued [and] the need to
ensure that children are not harmed because of a children’s-services worker’s wanton
or reckless conduct.” Id.; see R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).
{¶76} Whether a political subdivision employee is entitled to statutory
immunity “is an issue that appropriately may be decided on a motion for summary
judgment.” Smathers, 2022-Ohio-4595, at ¶ 3. Courts, however, should grant
summary judgment based on statutory immunity only where the government
employee’s evidence is “so one-sided that the party claiming immunity should prevail
as a matter of law.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Courts are cautioned that because “this
determination requires an application of the immunity statute to undisputed facts, the
court must be careful not to step into the role of fact-finder.” Id.
1. Ohio courts have found recklessness to present a jury question
in some cases and resolved the issue as a matter of law in others
{¶77} The parties rely on cases addressing whether children’s-services
caseworkers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on statutory immunity,
including whether an exception to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) applies. These
cases demonstrate that whether an agency employee acted recklessly is necessarily
fact-specific and depends on the circumstances that the employee knew or should have

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26
known and the employee’s response to those circumstances.
{¶78} In Smathers, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed a summary judgment
in favor of children-services employees responsible for overseeing a two-year-old girl
who later died from abuse or neglect. Smathers at ¶ 4. There, the grandmother had
repeatedly reported concerns about the child’s mother, and the child was later
hospitalized because medical providers suspected abuse after the child collapsed while
in the grandmother’s care. Id. at ¶ 7, 12. Despite the hospital’s concerns of abuse, the
agency cleared the child for discharge to her parents. Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶79} The Court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find the
employees had acted recklessly based on, among other things, assuming that the
grandmother could protect the child despite later observations that the child was with
her mother again; clearing the child for discharge based on an arguably inconsistent
notation in the medical records, despite documented evidence of abuse; delaying in
obtaining and following up on the child’s medical records; failing to verify the child’s
whereabouts; and failing to address or document dangerous conditions in the home.
Smathers, 2022-Ohio-4595, at ¶ 36-45. Construing the evidence in the grandmother’s
favor, the Court held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the employees
acted recklessly or wantonly in failing to protect the child from the risk of abuse or
neglect.
{¶80} In O’Toole, the Supreme Court upheld a summary judgment in favor of
a children-services supervisor who oversaw a caseworker assigned to a family in which
a child died from abuse. O’Toole, 2008-Ohio-2574, at ¶ 1. After the child’s daycare
reported injuries, the caseworker interviewed the daycare staff, the child, and the
mother, and the caseworker and supervisor implemented a safety plan. Id. at 15-26.
The supervisor reviewed the evidence and, considering the mother’s cooperation, the

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27
clean and safe home, her favorable background check, and the safety plan, the
supervisor determined that removal was not warranted. Id. at ¶ 29. The Court held
that these circumstances did not amount to reckless conduct. Id. at ¶ 76.
{¶81} In Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 76 Ohio App.3d 448
(12th Dist. 1991), the Twelfth District affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a
children-services caseworker after a child died from abuse by her father following
reunification. Id. at 450-451. The caseworker had visited the father’s home, spoken
with the father’s partner several times, followed up regarding the child’s medical
condition, and attempted to schedule another home visit six weeks after her initial
visit. Id. at 451. Although an evaluation report did not portray the father as “the ideal
parent,” it contained no indication that he posed a risk of physical violence. Id. at 455.
The court concluded that the caseworker’s conduct, including her single home visit,
repeated conversations, and encouragement to seek medical care, did not constitute
recklessness. Id. at 456.
{¶82} Unlike in O’Toole and Jackson, where the employees had taken
affirmative steps to address the concerns presented to them, the evidence here,
construed in the Estate’s favor, would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
the caseworkers failed to respond to significant and reasonably identifiable risks to
G.B, similar to the caseworkers in Smathers. The caseworkers failed to demonstrate
that the evidence “is so one-sided that the [caseworkers] should prevail as a matter of
law.” See Smathers, 2022-Ohio-4595, at ¶ 3. Accordingly, we hold that none of the
caseworkers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Lavusa
{¶83} The Estate argues that a jury could find Lavusa reckless for failing to
ensure that Bradley had adequate food for G.B. and for failing to contact G.B.’s medical

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28
providers regarding her weight.
{¶84} When Lavusa took over the case in August 2013, JFS and the juvenile
court were in the process of returning Bradley’s children to her under protective
supervision. G.B. had been born full-term, had no medical conditions affecting weight
gain, and in August 2013 weighed 18 pounds and four ounces, placing her in the 82nd
percentile in weight for a seven-month-old baby.
{¶85} During her first month as Bradley’s caseworker, Lavusa had multiple
signs that should have warned her that Bradley did not keep enough food in her home
to feed her children. The children’s foster mother told Lavusa that Bradley lacked food
for the children and the foster mother supplied the food for unsupervised weekend
visits. The children’s GAL documented that Bradley fed the children only one meal per
day. Days after Bradley regained custody of the children, Lavusa inspected Bradley’s
refrigerator and noted there was “enough food,” but she did not document whether
Bradley had formula to feed G.B. During visits on September 20 and 23, Bradley
claimed her food-assistance benefits had not yet begun, despite the records showing
that the benefits had been issued. Lavusa said she would follow up with the food-
assistance worker and directed Bradley to food pantries, but the record contains no
documentation that she did so. During one visit, Bradley lied to Lavusa, saying she had
plenty of food for the children, but there was no food in the refrigerator. Days later,
Lavusa noted only canned goods in the home, again without confirming whether
Bradley had formula to feed G.B.
{¶86} From October through December 2013, Lavusa made multiple visits to
Bradley’s home, but she never documented whether she had food or formula available
for the children. Meanwhile, WIC records show that by December 11, 2013, only three
months after Bradley regained custody of her children, G.B. had dropped from the

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82nd percentile to the fifth percentile in weight, weighing only 16 pounds, 12 ounces.
The coroner testified that G.B. had begun starving by that time. Lavusa’s January 2014
visits likewise contained no documentation regarding food.
{¶87} In February 2014, Lavusa again observed an empty refrigerator, except
for a gallon of milk that another child said was for G.B. Bradley reported her food-
assistance benefits had run out and relayed concerns from a Help Me Grow worker
about G.B.’s low muscle tone and inability to walk.
{¶88} On February 17, 2014, Bradley took G.B. to the emergency department
at Children’s after G.B. sustained an injury to her head. A nurse noted that G.B.
appeared “very small for her age,” was somnolent, and suggested ruling out abuse.
Although a resident described G.B. as “well-developed and well-nourished,” G.B.
weighed only 16 pounds, 12 ounces.
{¶89} The next day, Lavusa visited Bradley and documented that G.B. was “not
looking well,” appeared to have lost weight, and looked “small in stature and
underweight.” Bradley claimed that the doctor was unconcerned and that G.B. had
attended her one-year appointment. The coroner found no record of such an
appointment. Lavusa neither contacted medical providers to confirm Bradley’s
assertions about G.B.’s condition nor attempted to obtain G.B.’s hospital records.
{¶90} Lavusa continued visiting Bradley in March and April 2014, but she did
not document food availability. Despite medical records showing G.B.’s continued
weight loss, Lavusa wrote on March 31 that G.B. had “gained some weight,” based
solely on Lavusa lifting G.B. In April, Help Me Grow informed Lavusa that Bradley had
not appeared with G.B. at her February and March appointments.
{¶91} In May 2014, Lavusa closed the case, concluding that Bradley was
meeting her children’s basic needs. As a result of Lavusa’s closing Bradley’s case, no

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30
one from JFS observed G.B. between May 2014 and December 2014, when G.B. was
admitted to Children’s for 11 days with a failure-to-thrive diagnosis.
{¶92} Taken together, the evidence shows that despite Lavusa helping Bradley
obtain food assistance, Lavusa knew when she was assigned to the case that Bradley
struggled with food insecurity and Lavusa repeatedly encountered an empty or
inadequately stocked refrigerator. Yet, from September 2013 through January 2014,
when G.B. still required formula, Lavusa never documented whether Bradley had
formula available. After G.B. turned one, Lavusa documented the availability of food
only once, despite repeatedly visiting a home where food was scarce. By December
2013, G.B. had lost a significant amount of weight—she dropped from the 82nd
percentile to the fifth percentile in weight. The coroner confirmed that by December
2013, G.B. had begun experiencing starvation.
{¶93} A reasonable jury could find that Lavusa’s failure to adequately
investigate or address G.B.’s nutritional needs, despite these circumstances,
demonstrated a conscious disregard of an obvious risk to G.B.’s health.
{¶94} Moreover, the evidence raises a question of fact as to whether Lavusa
acted recklessly by failing to contact G.B.’s medical providers, WIC, Help Me Grow, or
other service providers to confirm Bradley’s assertions about G.B.’s health. In her
deposition, Lavusa acknowledged that caseworkers must make collateral contacts. Yet,
after observing that G.B. appeared unwell and underweight on February 18, 2014,
Lavusa relied solely on Bradley’s statements that G.B. had a virus, had been seen in
the emergency department, and was at a healthy weight for her age. Lavusa made no
collateral contact with Children’s or the pediatrician Bradley identified. Such contacts
could have revealed G.B.’s weight at the zero percentile, medical staff’s concerns about
her size, and the absence of a one-year well-child visit.

OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
31
{¶95} The Estate contends that Lavusa’s failure to obtain medical records is
analogous to the caseworkers’ conduct in Smathers. See Smathers, 2022-Ohio-4595,
at ¶ 41. There, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the caseworkers’ failure to
promptly obtain medical records after learning of circumstances suggesting possible
abuse or neglect could support a finding of recklessness. The Court reasoned that their
failure to obtain the records demonstrated a “persistent opposition to a generally
accepted course to follow to protect children.” Id.
{¶96} Similarly, a jury could find that Lavusa knew, or should have known,
that G.B. was significantly underweight, which, coupled with Lavusa’s awareness of
Bradley’s ongoing food insecurity, required further investigation. Her failure to
contact Children’s or G.B.’s pediatrician, despite observing that G.B. appeared
underweight and unwell, could demonstrate a persistent opposition to a generally
accepted course of conduct to protect children and support a finding of recklessness.
See id.
{¶97} Ultimately, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Lavusa
consciously disregarded a known or obvious risk to G.B. Accordingly, whether Lavusa
acted recklessly presents a question for the jury, and summary judgment based on
statutory immunity was improper. We sustain the first assignment of error.
3. Stephens
{¶98} The Estate argues that Stephens acted recklessly because despite
Stephens knowing G.B. had been diagnosed with failure to thrive and Bradley had
admitted to restricting G.B.’s food, she approved G.B.’s discharge from Children’s
without a safety plan in place.
{¶99} The Estate first argues that Stephens was informed by Children’s staff
that G.B. was severely underweight, had been diagnosed with failure to thrive, that

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there was no medical reason for G.B.’s failure to thrive, and that Bradley admitted she
was restricting G.B.’s food based on an unreasonable belief that G.B. was overweight.
It argues that despite this knowledge, Stephens failed to take any meaningful action to
address G.B.’s failure to thrive.
{¶100} In December 2014, G.B. was severely underweight. Children’s admitted
G.B. for an 11-day stay and diagnosed her with failure to thrive. Social worker Litman-
Padnos reported to a JFS intake worker through her call to 241-KIDS that Bradley
admitted restricting G.B.’s food based on her belief that G.B. was overweight. She also
explained that Children’s staff could find no medical explanation for G.B.’s failure-to-
thrive condition and suspected it “is related to malnutrition and restriction of food.”
{¶101} Litman-Padnos’s report led to JFS assigning Stephens to investigate
Bradley’s neglect. JFS provided Stephens with an “Intake Narrative” summarizing
Litman-Padnos’s report and Bradley’s prior involvement with JFS. After speaking with
her supervisor, Stephens called Litman-Padnos, who reiterated that G.B. was
“significantly underweight” and unable to walk, and that Litman-Padnos was fearful
about returning G.B. to her home because she suspected Bradley was “intentionally
mistreating [G.B.].” Stephens concluded that Litman-Padnos provided no “concrete
answer” about why she was afraid for G.B. to return home, despite Litman-Padnos
explaining that there was no “medical reason for the failure to thrive so the only other
conclusion is neglect.” Litman-Padnos stressed to Stephens that G.B. could not be
safely discharged without a solid safety plan.
{¶102} Stephens then visited Bradley, who admitted she believed G.B. was
overweight and “maybe” had not provided proper nutrition. Children’s records show
staff were awaiting JFS’s approval before discharge, noting they would not send G.B.
home without follow up and “a good/safe plan in place.” Yet Litman-Padnos

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documented that Stephens felt comfortable returning G.B. home and planned only to
arrange in-home services and assist Bradley in getting a psychological evaluation.
{¶103} JFS’s own “Post-Death Summary” states that Stephens made no
“determination about the children’s safety nor any information to rule out the present
danger threats identified in the hotline [241-Kids]. No action was taken.” Further, the
Post-Death Summary stated that there was “no documentation to support the decision
to allow [G.B.] to be discharged [to] her mother.”
{¶104} Here, like the defendant in Smathers, Stephens had actual knowledge
from hospital staff that Bradley was suspected of abuse or neglect. See Smathers,
2022-Ohio-4595, at ¶ 40-41. Stephens knew that G.B.’s diagnosis lacked a medical
explanation and knew Bradley herself admitted that she restricted G.B.’s food.
Stephens discounted hospital concerns because Litman-Padnos could not identify
“anything concrete,” but Stephens made no effort to speak with any Children’s
physicians “to better understand the basis for their conclusions regarding abuse and
neglect.” See id. at ¶ 42. Further, it was only after she had approved G.B.’s discharge
to Bradley that Stephens observed G.B. and was “shocked” by her appearance.
{¶105} And like in Smathers, medical staff were unwilling to discharge G.B.
back to her mother without approval from child services, which Stephens provided.
See id. at ¶ 40. Under these facts, a reasonable jury could find that Stephens recklessly
disregarded warnings of nonorganic failure to thrive and medical concerns about
neglect when she allowed G.B. to be discharged from the hospital to Bradley’s care.
{¶106} We sustain the Estate’s second assignment of error.
4. Setty
{¶107} The Estate argues that Setty acted recklessly by failing to assess G.B.’s
safety despite knowing of her failure-to-thrive diagnosis, failing to contact medical

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34
providers, failing to review G.B.’s case file, and failing to act on Bradley’s admission
that she was not taking mental-health medication.
{¶108} Setty became Bradley’s ongoing caseworker in mid-January 2014 after
a five-minute transfer meeting with Stephens. During that meeting, Setty learned of
G.B.’s failure-to-thrive diagnosis and received Bradley’s case file, which included all
prior ALRs. On January 21, Stephens and Setty conducted a joint home visit, but
Stephens documented nothing substantive and Setty documented nothing at all.
{¶109} Setty did not see G.B. at any point in February. She canceled one visit
because of the weather and failed to locate Bradley’s home on a second attempt. Setty
finally saw G.B. on March 4, six weeks after she had last visited. Setty noted only that
G.B. appeared sleepy and was “falling in and out of sleep.” Setty admitted she did not
ask about G.B.’s weight, feeding, or medical care, and she did not attempt to observe
G.B.’s physical condition. She did not see G.B. again before her death. Setty
unsuccessfully attempted to visit Bradley on March 26, and G.B. died three days later.
{¶110} A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Setty consciously
disregarded a known risk by failing to observe G.B. for more than 40 days, document
her condition, or confirm that Bradley had adequate food for her, despite knowing of
G.B.’s failure-to-thrive diagnosis. See Smathers, 2022-Ohio-4595, at ¶ 44 (concluding
that evidence of caseworkers failing to identify or address unsafe conditions in a child’s
room, despite having inspected it and knowing of concerns about its safety, could
support a finding of recklessness).
{¶111} The evidence also raises a question of fact regarding Setty’s failure to
contact G.B.’s medical providers. During her March 4 visit, Bradley signed a release of
information and told Setty that Help Me Grow had “closed out” its services because
“everything was fine,” WIC had said G.B. was “doing great,” and G.B.’s pediatrician

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35
expected her to “catch up.” Setty documented her intention to follow up with these
providers. She later testified that she believed she had sent requests to Help Me Grow
and WIC but could not recall to whom. She acknowledged that any such requests
should have been documented under JFS policy, yet the activity reports contain no
such documentation. A disciplinary letter also stated that Setty had failed to follow up
with Help Me Grow. Despite her stated intention to contact the providers, it appears
Setty made no documented collateral contacts before G.B.’s death, several weeks later.
{¶112} A reasonable factfinder could conclude that Setty acted recklessly by
failing to follow up with G.B.’s service providers despite knowing of G.B.’s failure-to-
thrive diagnosis and recognizing the need for further information about her condition.
See Smathers at ¶ 43 (concluding that a caseworker’s failure to act for at least a week
after being directed to offer ongoing services to a mother could support a finding of
recklessness).
{¶113} The Estate further argues that Setty acted recklessly by failing to review
G.B.’s medical records. Setty received Bradley’s physical case file during the transfer
meeting with Stephens. The file included ALRs documenting G.B.’s physical condition.
Although Setty testified she may have skimmed some of the ALRs, she admitted that
she did not review the medical records, including records from Children’s. Given her
knowledge of G.B.’s failure-to-thrive diagnosis, a reasonable factfinder could conclude
that Setty’s failure to review the available medical records, which contained
information about G.B.’s medical condition and concerns regarding Bradley’s
suspected abuse or neglect, demonstrated a reckless disregard of a substantial risk of
harm to G.B. See Smathers, 2022-Ohio-4595, at ¶ 42 (concluding that caseworkers’
failure to promptly obtain medical records could demonstrate a “persistent opposition
to a generally accepted course to follow to protect children”).

OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
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{¶114} Viewed together and in the light most favorable to the Estate, the
evidence of Setty’s conduct is sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that she acted recklessly in the performance of her duties. We sustain the Estate’s third
assignment of error.
III. Conclusion
{¶115} We hold that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Estate, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the caseworkers’ acts
or omissions demonstrated a conscious disregard of known or obvious risks of harm
to G.B. Thus, whether the caseworkers’ conduct constituted recklessness is a question
of fact for the jury and the trial court erroneously granted the caseworkers’ motions
for summary judgment.
{¶116} We sustain the Estate’s assignments of error, reverse the trial court’s
judgment, and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion
and the law.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
KINSLEY, P.J., concurs.
ZAYAS, J., concurs in judgment only.