Bank of America v. Vaughan

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Bank of America, N.A., Respondent,

v.

Theda B. Vaughan a/k/a Theda L. Vaughan; James R.
Vaughan; LBB & HHV II, LLC; Hometrust Bank, N.A.;
Quality Business Solutions, Inc.; Creative Builders,
Incorporated; Matthew J. Bynum; Ann Bynum; Mayfield
Dairy Farms, LLC; TD Bank, N.A., as successor by
merger with Carolina First Bank; Butler Improvements,
LLC; Discover Bank; Suiza Dairy Group, LLC; FIA
Card Services, N.A., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as
successor by merger to Wachovia Bank, National
Association; L. Stewart Spinks; Dillanos Coffee
Roasters, Inc. Branch Banking and Trust Company;
Spaulding Farm Homeowners Association, Inc., TCP
Leasing, Inc., First South Bank; Brookfield South
Associates, LLC; Green Tree Servicing, LLC formerly
known as Green Tree Financial Servicing Corporation, a
Limited Liability Company under the laws of the State of
Delaware; Bank of Travelers Rest; Comprehensive Legal
Solutions, Inc.; The South Carolina Department of
Revenue, Defendants,

Of which LBB & HHVII, LLC is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002537

Appeal From Greenville County
James R. Barber, III, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-278
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Filed July 5, 2017

AFFIRMED

Donald Ryan McCabe, Jr., Jesse Ryan Oates, and John
Walter Whitmire, all of McCabe, Trotter & Beverly,
P.C., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Robert A. Muckenfuss and Trent M. Grissom, both of
McGuireWoods LLP, of Charlotte, North Carolina; and
Robert Paul Davis, of Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC,
of Columbia, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: LBB & HHV II, LLC (LBB) appeals the circuit court's order
dismissing its claims for betterments and trespass. LBB argues the circuit court
erred in dismissing its claim for (1) betterments because South Carolina law gives
a party the right to immediately assert a betterments claim in an answer and (2)
trespass because Bank of America entered the property without authorization. We
affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to issue one, we find the circuit court did not err in dismissing LBB's claim
for betterments. See Bergstrom v. Palmetto Health All., 358 S.C. 388, 395, 596
S.E.2d 42, 45 (2004) ("Under Rule 12(b)(6)[ of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure], a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint based on a failure to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In considering such a motion,
the [circuit] court must base its ruling solely on allegations set forth in the
complaint."); id. ("In deciding whether the [circuit] court properly granted the
motion to dismiss, the appellate court must consider whether the complaint, viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, states any valid claim for relief."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 27-27-10 (Supp. 2016) ("After final judgment in favor of the plaintiff
in an action to recover lands and tenements, if the defendant has purchased or
acquired the lands and tenements recovered in such action . . . supposing at the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
time of such purchase or acquisition such title to be good in fee . . . such defendant
shall be entitled to recover of the plaintiff in such action the full value of all
improvements made upon such land by such defendant or those under whom he
claims . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 27-27-70 (2007) ("In any action for the recovery
of lands and tenements, whether such action be denominated legal or equitable, the
defendant who may have made improvements or betterments on such land . . . may
set up in his answer a claim against the plaintiff for . . . the improvements . . . .");
Strother v. Lexington Cty. Recreation Comm'n, 332 S.C. 54, 62, 504 S.E.2d 117,
121-22 (1998) ("If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a
clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory
interpretation and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.");
Howard v. Kirton, 144 S.C. 89, 94, 142 S.E. 39, 41 (1928) ("The right to recover
for betterments being statutory, the remedy or method prescribed by statute for its
enforcement must be followed."); Lessly v. Bowie, 27 S.C. 193, 197, 3 S.E. 199,
200 (1887) ("[A] claim for improvements cannot be made in an action for
foreclosure of a mortgage."); Frederick v. Chapman, 144 S.C. 137, 144, 142 S.E.
247, 249 (1928) (listing an action for foreclosure of a mortgage as an example of a
claim that is not an "action[] 'for recovery of real property'"); Citizens & S. Nat.
Bank, Atlanta, Ga. v. Homes Constr. Co., 248 S.C. 130, 134, 149 S.E.2d 326, 328
(1966) (finding "the betterment[s] statute afford[ed] no remedy" when it did "not
appear . . . that any action for possession of the land has been brought by the
owner").

2. As to issue two, we find the circuit court properly dismissed LBB's claim for
trespass. See Bergstrom, 358 S.C. at 395, 596 S.E.2d at 45 ("Under Rule
12(b)(6)[ of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure], a defendant may move
to dismiss a complaint based on a failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. In considering such a motion, the [circuit] court must base its
ruling solely on allegations set forth in the complaint."); id. ("In deciding whether
the [circuit] court properly granted the motion to dismiss, the appellate court must
consider whether the complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
states any valid claim for relief."); Ravan v. Greenville Cty., 315 S.C. 447, 463,
434 S.E.2d 296, 306 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[A] trespass is any interference with one's
right to the exclusive, peaceable possession of his property."); id. at 464, 434
S.E.2d at 306 ("The essence of trespass is the unauthorized entry onto the land of
another." (emphasis added)); Mulherin-Howell v. Cobb, 362 S.C. 588, 601, 608
S.E.2d 587, 594 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A quitclaim deed does not guarantee the quality
of title, but only conveys that which the grantor may lawfully convey."); S.C. Code
Ann. § 30-9-30(A) (2007) (explaining the recording of an instrument "is notice to
all persons, sufficient to put them upon inquiry of the purport of the filed
instrument and the property affected by the instrument"); BB & T of S.C. v.
Kidwell, 350 S.C. 382, 389, 565 S.E.2d 316, 319 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A mortgage
duly recorded is notice not only of the existence of the mortgage, but of all its
contents . . . . It is notice not only to purchasers but to the subsequent creditors as
well . . . ." (quoting Nat'l Bank of Newberry v. Livingston, 155 S.C. 264, 284, 152
S.E. 410, 417-18 (1930))).

AFFIRMED.

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.