Joe Hand Promotions v. Christopher M. Ruegsegger

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Christopher Michael Ruegsegger a/k/a Chris Ruegsegger,
Founders Federal Credit Union, and Springleaf Financial
Services, Defendants,

Of which Founders Federal Credit Union is the
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2019-002071

Appeal From Spartanburg County
Gordon G. Cooper, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-056
Heard December 7, 2022 – Filed February 8, 2023

AFFIRMED

Leonard R. Jordan, Jr., of Jordan Law Firm, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Suzanne G. Grigg, of Nexsen Pruet, LLC, of Columbia,
for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from a foreclosure action regarding
Christopher M. Ruegseggar's home located at 721 Jordan Creek Road, Inman,
South Carolina. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. (Joe Hand) was a third-in-line
judgment creditor of Ruegseggar, who owned an undivided one-half interest in the
property. Joe Hand appeals the master-in-equity's denial of its request to have its
lien elevated to first priority under the doctrine of superior diligence. We affirm.

1. As to Joe Hand's arguments it met the criteria for the master to apply the
doctrine of superior diligence, we conclude the master did not err in finding the
application of the doctrine was not appropriate under the particular circumstances
of this case.1 See FCX, Inc. v. Long Meadow Farms, Inc., 269 S.C. 202, 208-09,
237 S.E.2d 50, 52-53 (1977) (denying a request for elevation under the doctrine of
superior diligence and noting "[t]he case at bar d[id] not involve the uncovering of
an unknown asset"); id. at 208-09, 237 S.E.2d at 53 ("While recognizing the
equitable principle [of superior due diligence] stated in Ex Parte Roddey, [171 S.C.
489, 172 S.E. 866 (1934),] we are of the opinion that it should be sparingly
applied."); id. at 209, 237 S.E.2d at 53 (noting the party seeking the application of
superior diligence had been paid its expenses and attorney's fees).

2. As to Joe Hand's argument the liens in this case were not inalterably fixed by
their date of filing, we conclude the master correctly determined the priority of the
liens was so fixed.2 See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-35-810 (2005) (providing "[f]inal
judgments and decrees entered in any court of record in this State . . . shall
constitute a lien upon the real estate of the judgment debtor . . . the lien to begin
from the time of such entry on the book of abstracts and indices"); FCX, Inc., 269
S.C. at 206-07, 237 S.E.2d at 52 (referencing section 15-35-810 and stating "[i]f
Long Meadow Farms had held legal title to the real estate, then, under established
law, the judgments would constitute a lien upon the real estate in the order of their
filing and there would be no question of priority"); Sherlock Holmes Pub, Inc. v.
City of Columbia, 389 S.C. 77, 82, 697 S.E.2d 619, 621 (Ct. App. 2010)
(expressing reluctance to disregard rulings that were dicta when the rulings were
directly on point); Yaeger v. Murphy, 291 S.C. 485, 490 n.2, 354 S.E.2d 393, 396
n.2 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]hose who disregard dictum, either in law or in life, do so
at their peril."), overruled on other grounds by Paradis v. Charleston Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 433 S.C. 562, 861 S.E.2d 774 (2021).

1
This section addresses Joe Hand's Issues on Appeal I, IV, V, and VII.
2
This section addresses Joe Hand's Issues on Appeal II and III.
3. As to Joe Hand's argument liens against Ruegseggar's half-interest previously
owned by his wife attached simultaneously, we find this issue is not preserved.
See Hickman v. Hickman, 301 S.C. 455, 456, 392 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ct. App. 1990)
("A party cannot use Rule 59(e) [,SCRCP,] to present to the court an issue the
party could have raised prior to judgment but did not."); id. at 456-57, 392 S.E.2d
at 482 ("I do not conceive of [the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 59(e) as serving
the office of providing a disappointed suitor with a post-judgment opportunity to
argue that which could have been argued pre-judgment." (quoting Johnson v. City
of Richmond, 102 F.R.D. 623, 623 (E.D. Va. 1984))).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.