Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 235–263
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
May 21, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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OCTOBER TERM, 2025 235
Syllabus
HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 24–983. Argued February 23, 2026—Decided May 21, 2026
In 1928, the United States-based Havana Docks Corporation acquired from
the Cuban Government a property interest in the development and op-
eration of docks at the Port of Havana. That property interest, a usu-
fructuary concession, was time-limited and set to expire in 2004. The
Cuban Government agreed that, if it expropriated the docks before 2004,
it would compensate Havana Docks for the value of the works it had
constructed. After Fidel Castro seized power in 1959, the new Cuban
Government decreed that it would forcibly take American-owned prop-
erties and enterprises in Cuba and specifcally identifed Havana Docks.
As relevant here, the Cuban Government seized, without compensation,
the docks that Havana Docks had constructed and its property interest
in those docks. Havana Docks fled a claim with the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, which certifed about $9 million in losses, plus
six percent annual interest. Despite these certifed losses, Havana
Docks lacked any means to obtain compensation. That began to change
in 1996, when Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity Act, 22 U. S. C. § 6021 et seq., which creates a private right of
action for United States nationals who own claims to “property which
was confscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959,”
§ 6082(a)(1)(A). Title III of the Act imposes liability on those who
knowingly and intentionally traffc in such confscated property.
§§ 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii). The Act authorizes the President to “suspend”
the Title III right of action, §§ 6085(c)(1), (2), and Presidents Clinton,
Bush, and Obama continuously suspended the right of action from its
effective date onward. President Trump allowed the suspension of the
Title III right of action to expire in May 2019.
From 2016 to 2019, four commercial cruise lines—Royal Caribbean
Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and
MSC Cruises—transported nearly a million paid passengers to Cuba,
using the docks that Havana Docks built to embark and disembark their
passengers. In 2019, Havana Docks invoked Title III and sued the
cruise lines in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. The cruise lines argued they were not liable because Ha-
vana Docks' property interest would have expired in 2004 even absent

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236 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Syllabus
confscation. The District Court rejected that argument and entered
summary judgment against all four cruise lines, awarding Havana Docks
more than $100 million from each. A divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit reversed. In its view, a defendant is liable for traffcking in
confscated property only if its actions would have interfered with the
plaintiff's property interest had there been no confscation. On that
view, because Havana Docks' concession would have expired before
2016, the cruise lines' challenged conduct from 2016 to 2019 did not con-
stitute traffcking.
Held: The cruise lines' use of the docks is suffcient to establish that they
used “property which was confscated by the Cuban Government”; Ha-
vana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines traffcked
in Havana Docks' property interest. Pp. 245–253.
(a) Title III generally makes any person who “traffcs in property
which was confscated by the Cuban Government . . . liable to any United
States national who owns the claim to such property.” § 6082(a)(1)(A).
This dispute turns on whether the relevant “property which was confs-
cated” must be Havana Docks' property interest in the docks (the con-
cession), or whether it could instead be the docks themselves.
Under the plain text of Title III, “property which was confscated”
can refer to the physical property in which the plaintiff had an interest,
and not just the interest itself. Title III makes entities liable for traf-
fcking in “any property . . . and any . . . interest therein” that the Cuban
Government confscated, §§ 6023(12)(A), 6082(a)(1)(A), and the Act's
defnition of “property” makes clear that the Act imposes liability for
traffcking in both physical property and property interests. The term
“any property” includes physical things, as the Court recognized when
it previously considered Fidel Castro's expropriations and noted that
the Cuban Government “nationalize[d] by forced expropriation property
. . . in which American nationals had an interest.” Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 401 (emphasis added).
The relevant “property which was confscated” is therefore not limited
to the plaintiff 's interest in that property; it can refer to the physical
property in which the plaintiff had an interest when the Cuban Govern-
ment “seiz[ed] . . . control of ” it after January 1, 1959. § 6023(4)(A).
Confscated property is, as it were, tainted—off limits—such that any-
one who uses the property can be liable to those who had any interest
in the tainted property. Pp. 245–248.
(b) On that understanding of “property,” Havana Docks has shown
that the cruise lines used confscated property in which Havana Docks
had a property interest and to which it owns a claim. The docks are
“property which was confscated” because Havana Docks established

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Cite as: 608 U. S. 235 (2026) 237
Syllabus
that the Cuban Government confscated those docks without compensa-
tion when Castro's forces physically took possession of the docks and
expelled Havana Docks' agents in 1960. The cruise lines “use[d]” or
“engage[d] in commercial activity using” the docks, §§ 6023(13)(A)(i),
(ii), when they transported nearly a million paying passengers to Cuba
“without the authorization of ” Havana Docks, § 6023(13)(A). Finally,
Havana Docks is a “United States national who owns the claim” to the
confscated docks, § 6082(a)(1)(A), as its Commission-certifed claim is
“conclusive proof ” that it has satisfed this element, § 6083(a)(1).
Pp. 248–250.
(c) The Court of Appeals' analysis and the cruise lines' arguments
confict with Title III's text. Pp. 250–253.
(1) The Court of Appeals interpreted the Act to require a counter-
factual analysis, assuming that there had been no confscation of the
owner's property interest: “[T]he way to give effect to the statutory
language (`traffcs in property which was confscated'),” the court said,
“is to view the property interest at issue in a Title III action as if there
had been no expropriation and then determine whether the alleged con-
duct constituted traffcking in that interest.” 119 F. 4th, at 1287. That
counterfactual approach rested on the premise that “property” could
refer only to present property interests, but this approach is diffcult to
understand and apply, and would foreclose liability in cases where the
text demands it. If the approach requires courts to assume that the
original rightsholder retained his legal rights, it would read out of the
Act cases of traffcking that should be in the heartland of Title III, such
as when companies sell and purchase confscated property interests.
Title III is instead simply an antitraffcking right of action that recog-
nizes that the effect of the Cuban Government's expropriation was the
destruction of the plaintiff 's interest in the property. It then provides
a right to compensation based on the plaintiff 's former property interest
from those who later traffc in the property and thereby help to support
the Communist Cuban Government. Pp. 250–252.
(2) The cruise lines' argument that the Cuban Government did not
confscate the docks, but only the concession, fails. The Act defnes
“confiscat[ion] ” to include the seizure of “control of property, ”
§ 6023(4)(A), and when armed agents physically occupied the dock facili-
ties, they seized control of the docks. Before the seizure, Havana Docks
was in possession of the works; after the seizure, the Cuban Government
stopped Havana Docks from operating, using, enjoying, possessing, or
otherwise controlling the docks. The Cuban Government thereby ex-
tinguished Havana Docks' concession and physically occupied the docks,
and those actions constitute confscation of the docks under Title III.
Pp. 252–253.

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238 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Opinion of the Court
(d) Because the Court of Appeals wrongfully concluded that the
cruise lines did not use confscated property to which Havana Docks
owns the claim, it did not reach the cruise lines' remaining arguments
against liability; those arguments are not before the Court, and the
Court does not address them. P. 253.
119 F. 4th 1276, vacated and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson,
JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Kava-
naugh, J., joined, post, p. 253. Kagan, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post,
p. 257.
Richard Klingler argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Vincent H. Li.
Aimee W. Brown argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney General
Shumate, Deputy Solicitor General Gannon, Sharon
Swingle, Lewis S. Yelin, and Reed D. Rubinstein.
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Matthew D. Rowen, Niccolo A. Bel-
tramo, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Robert M. Loeb, J. Douglas
Baldridge, Andrew T. Hernacki, Kannon K. Shanmugam,
William T. Marks, Abigail Frisch Vice, Derek L. Shaffer,
Christopher G. Michel, and Nicholas J. Caluda.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity Act. The Act seeks to deter traffcking
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Rep. Mario Díaz-
Balart et al. by Bryan S. Gowdy and Dimitrios A. Peteves; and for Daniel
W. Fisk by Marcos Daniel Jiménez.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Cruise Lines
International Association by Shay Dvoretzky, Parker Rider-Longmaid,
Steven Marcus; and for the U. S. Travel Association et al. by Bradley J.
Bondi and Ronald K. Anguas, Jr.
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Opinion of the Court
in property that the Cuban Government confscated from
Americans after the Communist Revolution of 1959. 22
U. S. C. §§ 6081(3)(B), (11). To that end, the Act generally
imposes liability on those who use confscated property to
which an American entity owns a claim. §§ 6082(a)(1)(A),
6023(13)(A)(i), (ii).
This case concerns whether the Act imposes liability on
four cruise lines that used docks that the Cuban Government
took from an American company in 1960. Before the Com-
munist Revolution, petitioner Havana Docks Corporation
built, operated, and held a time-limited property interest in
docks at the Port of Havana. After the Communist Revolu-
tion, the Cuban Government seized control of those docks.
Then, between 2016 and 2019, four commercial cruise lines
used those same docks to embark and disembark nearly a
million passengers. Havana Docks sued the cruise lines
under the Act and won judgments against each of them in
the District Court.
The Court of Appeals reversed. In its view, a defendant
is liable for traffcking in confscated property only if its ac-
tions would have interfered with the plaintiff 's property in-
terest had there been no confscation. The court held that
the cruise lines were not liable because Havana Docks' prop-
erty interest in the docks would have expired before 2016
had the Cuban Government not confscated the docks.
We disagree. The Act generally makes those who use
property tainted by a past confscation liable to any United
States national who owns a claim to that property. Havana
Docks did not have to prove that the cruise lines interfered
with a property interest that would have existed in the coun-
terfactual scenario in which the Cuban Government did not
confscate it. Instead, Havana Docks had to prove only that
the cruise lines used confscated property—such as the
docks—to which Havana Docks owns a claim. We therefore
vacate the Court of Appeals' decision.
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240 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Opinion of the Court
I
A
In 1928, the United States-based Havana Docks Corpora-
tion acquired a property interest, specifcally a “usufructuary
concession,” that allowed it to develop and operate dock facil-
ities at the state-owned Port of Havana. A usufruct is a
right to use, enjoy, or proft from another's property, 2 G.
Cabanellas de las Cuevas & E. Hoague, Butterworths Span-
ish/English Legal Dictionary 659 (1991); F. Moore, The Cy-
clopedic Law Dictionary 1141 (3d ed. 1940), and a concession
is a privilege granted by the government, Black's Law Dic-
tionary 361 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Relying on this usufructuary
concession from the Cuban Government, Havana Docks com-
pleted a large terminal building and three piers—which we
collectively refer to as the “docks”—at the Port of Havana.
Havana Docks acquired this property interest with certain
conditions and guarantees. It enjoyed the right to operate
and proft from the docks that it completed. Its property
interest was time-limited and set to expire in 2004. Havana
Docks therefore expected to control, operate, and proft from
the docks for 76 years. At the end of the concession's term,
the Cuban Government would “replace the concessionaire in
possession of the works,” and Havana Docks' “enjoyment of
it and its proceeds” would come to an end. 1 App. 454–455.
The Cuban Government agreed that, if it “expropriated” the
docks before 2004, it “w[ould] compensate [Havana Docks]
for the value of all works constructed by it.” Id., at 449.
The Communist Revolution cut Havana Docks' concession
short without that compensation. After Fidel Castro seized
power in 1959, he declared that “it is fundamental for the
liberation and economic development of our country to liqui-
date the [American] commercial or industrial enterprises”
operating in Cuba. Id., at 483. To that end, the new Cuban
Government decreed that it would forcibly take American
“properties and enterprises located” in Cuba, targeting Ha-
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Opinion of the Court
vana Docks by name. Id., at 483, 487. Under the decree,
government forces seized the docks in 1960 and confscated
“all” of Havana Docks' “assets.” Id., at 497–498; see also id.,
at 257. These assets included, as relevant here, the docks
that Havana Docks had constructed and its property interest
in those docks. All agree that this action prematurely de-
stroyed Havana Docks' concession in 1960 and, by extension,
its ability to beneft from the docks that it built. Brief for
Respondents 21; 119 F. 4th 1276, 1286 (CA11 2024) (opinion
below). The Cuban Government has never compensated
Havana Docks for “the taking of its property,” and it contin-
ues to operate parts of the docks to this day. Id., at 1283.
Havana Docks fled a claim with the Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission. Congress had authorized the Commis-
sion to determine “the amount and validity of claims . . .
for losses resulting from the nationalization, expropriation,
intervention, or other taking of ” “any property, right, or in-
terest” by the Cuban Government. 22 U. S. C. §§ 1643a(3),
1643b(a). The Commission concluded that Havana Docks
had “a concession for the construction and operation of ” the
docks and “real property with all improvements and appur-
tenances located” at the Port. 1 App. 256–257. It also con-
frmed that “the facilities of the company were physically
occupied by agents of the Cuban Government” and that the
Cuban Government had expropriated Havana Docks' assets.
Id., at 257. It therefore certifed about $9 million in losses,
plus six percent annual interest. But, despite its certifed
losses, Havana Docks lacked any means to obtain
compensation.
B
That began to change in 1996. On February 24 of that
year, Cuban fghter jets shot down two unarmed American
civilian airplanes over international waters. 61 Fed. Reg.
8843 (1996). In response, Congress promptly enacted the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
of 1996, 22 U. S. C. § 6021 et seq. Among other things, the
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242 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Opinion of the Court
Act codifed the longstanding embargo against Cuba and set
conditions for the normalization of relations between the two
countries. §§ 6032(h), 6061, 6064, 6067(d).
As relevant here, the Act also sought to “deter traffcking
in wrongfully confscated property.” § 6081(11). Congress
found that the Cuban Government had allowed foreign inves-
tors to use confscated property to secure “badly needed
fnancial beneft” for the regime, contrary to the Ameri-
can foreign policy goals of undermining the Castro regime
and compensating United States nationals. §§ 6081(5), (6).
Congress further found that the “international judicial sys-
tem” failed to provide “fully effective remedies . . . for unjust
enrichment from the use of wrongfully confscated property
by . . . private entities.” § 6081(8). So, in Title III of the
Act, Congress “endowed” American victims of confscation
“with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States.”
§ 6081(11).
Under Title III, any entity that “traffcs in property which
was confscated by the Cuban Government on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who
owns the claim to such property.” §§ 6023(11), 6082(a)(1)(A).
Subject to certain exceptions, someone “ `traffcs' in confs-
cated property if ” he “knowingly and intentionally” “sells,”
“purchases,” or “uses” the confscated property or “engages
in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefting from
confscated property” without authorization from the claim-
holder. §§ 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii). “Property” includes “any
property,” including “real, personal, or mixed, and any pres-
ent, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest
therein, including any leasehold interest.” § 6023(12)(A).
And, “confscated” refers to the “nationalization, expropria-
tion, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of owner-
ship or control of property” without compensation, settle-
ment, or return of the property. § 6023(4)(A). To prevail,
then, a plaintiff must show that (1) the Cuban Government
confscated property on or after January 1, 1959; (2) the de-
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Opinion of the Court
fendant traffcked in the property, such as by knowingly and
intentionally using it without authorization; and (3) the plain-
tiff is a United States national who owns a claim to the
property.1
An entity that traffcs in confscated property is liable
for “money damages.” § 6082(a)(1)(A). Those damages are
presumptively equal to the amount certifed by the Commis-
sion if the plaintiff has a certifed claim. §§ 6082(a)(1)
(A)(i)(I), (2). Title III trebles those damages “if a United
States national owns a claim with respect to that property
which was certifed by the” Commission. § 6082(a)(3).
This right of action lay dormant for more than two dec-
ades. The Act authorizes the President to “suspend” the
Title III right of action based on a determination that the
suspension is in the national interest and will “expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba.” §§ 6085(c)(1), (2). Presi-
dents Clinton, Bush, and Obama continuously suspended the
right of action from its effective date onward. But, in May
of 2019, President Trump allowed the suspension to expire,
permitting the right of action to go into effect for the frst
time. That policy change exposed traffckers in confscated
property of United States nationals to Title III liability.
C
From 2016 to 2019, respondents—Royal Caribbean
Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corpo-
ration, and MSC Cruises—transported nearly a million paid
passengers to Cuba. These cruise lines paid entities affli-
ated with the Cuban Government tens of millions of dollars
to do business in Cuba. They collectively earned hundreds
of millions of dollars in revenue from voyages that included
1 The defnition of “traffcs” in Title III includes several exceptions, in-
cluding one for “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel
to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are
necessary to the conduct of such travel.” § 6023(13)(B)(iii). These excep-
tions are not at issue before this Court. See n. 4, infra.
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244 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Opinion of the Court
a stop in Havana. As part of this enterprise, their cruise
ships arrived at the docks that Havana Docks built, where
they embarked and disembarked their passengers. They
continued to do so even after receiving notice of Havana
Docks' certifed claim to the docks.
D
Shortly after President Trump allowed the suspension of
the right of action to expire in May 2019, Havana Docks fled
lawsuits against these four cruise lines in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Havana
Docks alleged that, between 2016 and 2019, the cruise lines
had traffcked in confscated property to which Havana
Docks owned a claim.2 The cruise lines did not dispute that
they used the docks in question “without the authorization
of ” Havana Docks. § 6023(13)(A). Instead, the cruise lines
argued they are not liable because Havana Docks' property
interest in those docks would have expired in 2004 even if
there had been no confscation, and the cruise lines “could
not have traffcked in a time-limited concession that expired
in 2004.” Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., 592
F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1194 (SD Fla. 2022).
The District Court rejected that argument, and, after re-
jecting other defenses not at issue here, entered summary
judgment against all four cruise lines. Id., at 1202–1203.
Because the cruise lines had independently traffcked in the
confscated property, they were independently liable under
Title III, and the District Court awarded Havana Docks
more than $100 million from each of the cruise lines.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that the cruise lines
2 Havana Docks also alleged that Carnival had traffcked in its confs-
cated property from 1996 to 2001, but these allegations are not at issue
here because the Court of Appeals did not address them and instead left
them for the District Court to consider on remand. 119 F. 4th 1276, 1290
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Opinion of the Court
had not traffcked in confscated property to which Havana
Docks owned a claim. In its view, courts must “view the
property interest at issue in a Title III action as if there
had been no expropriation and then determine whether the
alleged conduct constituted traffcking in that interest.”
119 F. 4th, at 1287. Applying that test, it concluded that,
because “any property interest that Havana Docks had by
virtue of th[e] concession ended” in 2004, “the cruise lines'
conduct from 2016 to 2019” would not have constituted traf-
fcking if there had been no confscation. Id., at 1288. Its
analysis assumed that Havana Docks had to establish traf-
fcking in the time-limited property interest that had permit-
ted it to build and operate the docks.
Judge Brasher dissented. In his view, Havana Docks
could establish liability based on the cruise lines' traffcking
in the underlying physical property, “the docks—which still
exist, are still in use, and have not expired, ended, or fallen
into the sea.” Id., at 1294. And, he explained, the “majori-
ty's counterfactual analysis—asking what would have hap-
pened to Havana Docks' docks if they had not been confs-
cated in 1960—is incompatible with the text of the Act.”
Id., at 1291. Instead, the analysis Title III requires here is
“very simple”: “The Cuban Government stole Havana Docks'
property—its docks, piers, and other things that it had the
right to operate under its concession.” Id., at 1292. “And
the cruise lines have—all agree—commercially benefted by
depositing paying customers on those docks and piers.”
Ibid. So, “the cruise lines traffcked in confscated property
to which Havana Docks owns a claim.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari. 606 U. S. 1065 (2025).
II
Title III generally makes any person who “traffcs in prop-
erty which was confscated by the Cuban Government . . .
liable to any United States national who owns the claim to
such property.” § 6082(a)(1)(A). The cruise lines argue
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246 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Opinion of the Court
that “[t]he Act demands a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the property interest confscated and the property in-
terest traffcked.” Brief for Respondents 20 (emphasis
added). Havana Docks, meanwhile, argues that the Act im
poses liability for traffcking in underlying physical property,
not just interests in property. Reply Brief 1, 3–5. The dis-
pute before us thus turns on whether the relevant “property
which was confscated” must be Havana Docks' property in-
terest in the docks, or whether it could instead be the docks
themselves. We hold that the cruise lines' use of the docks
is suffcient to establish that they used “property which was
confiscated by the Cuban Government.” § 6082(a)(1)(A).
Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise
lines used its property interest.
A
Under the plain text of Title III, “property which was con-
fscated” can be the physical property in which the plaintiff
had an interest, and not just the interest itself. Title III
makes entities liable for traffcking in “any property . . . and
any . . . interest therein” that the Cuban Government confs-
cated. §§ 6023(12)(A), 6082(a)(1)(A). The Act's defnition of
“property” thus makes clear that the Act imposes liability
for traffcking in both the physical property and the property
interests. Accord, post, at 260 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Ordinary meaning reinforces that conclusion. The term
“any property,” of course, includes physical things. “Any
external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and
enjoyment are exercised” can be “property.” Black's Law
Dictionary 1232 (7th ed. 1999) (Black's). Title III itself
provides examples, including “real” property, § 6023(12)(A),
which includes “[l]and and anything . . . attached to” it, id., at
1234, and “personal” property, § 6023(12)(A), which includes
movable things, id., at 1233.
This Court has recognized that “property” ordinarily can
refer to physical things in which people can have property
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Opinion of the Court
interests. When this Court previously considered Castro's
expropriations, it recognized that “property” can refer to
both physical things and interests in them, noting that the
Cuban Government “nationalize[d] by forced expropriation
property . . . in which American nationals had an interest.”
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 401
(1964) (emphasis added). For that reason, the Cuban Gov-
ernment could, for example, expropriate “sugar itself ” in ad-
dition to, or “rather than,” “merely contractual rights” re-
lated to the sugar. Id., at 413.
Construing “property which was confscated” to refer only
to the plaintiff's interest in the property would read out of
the Act obvious ways in which people can traffc in confs-
cated property. One traffcs, for example, by “us[ing]” con-
fscated property. §§ 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii). This form of “traf-
fcking” ordinarily concerns things, not property interests:
One uses land or other physical property, but one does not
ordinarily use someone else's property interests. If, for ex-
ample, your car is stolen and the thief lets another drive it,
the other uses your car, but he does not use your property
interest in your car. So, requiring “a one-to-one correspond-
ence between the property interest confscated and the prop-
erty interest traffcked,” Brief for Respondents 20 (emphasis
added), would lead to the surprising result that entities could
freely “us[e]” many kinds of confscated property without ex-
posure under Title III, contra, §§ 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii).
This case illustrates the point. The Court of Appeals
agreed that, if the cruise lines had used the docks before
Havana Docks' property interest was set to expire, they
could have been liable under the Act. 119 F. 4th, at 1288,
1290. The dissent seems to agree. Post, at 259 (opinion of
Kagan, J.). Yet no matter when Havana Docks' property
interest was set to expire, the cruise lines would not have
“used” (or otherwise traffcked in) Havana Docks' conces-
sion. The cruise lines would have “used”—and traffcked
in—“the docks” themselves. Ibid. But, the use of the docks

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248 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Opinion of the Court
would not be enough for liability on the Court of Appeals'
and the dissent's view. See post, at 260 (“where the only
`property' confscated from the plaintiff is an intangible prop-
erty interest, the defendant is liable only if he has traffcked
in that interest”).
We thus conclude that the relevant “property which was
confiscated” is not limited to the plaintiff 's interest in
that property. “[P]roperty which was confiscated, ”
§ 6082(a)(1)(A), can refer to the physical property in which
the plaintiff had an interest when the Cuban Government
“seiz[ed] . . . control of ” it after January 1, 1959, § 6023(4)(A).
Knowingly and intentionally “traffc[king]” in that physical
property by, for example, using it, can lead to liability under
the Act. §§ 6023(13)(A)(i), 6082(a)(1)(A). In that way, con-
fscated property is, as it were, tainted—off limits—such that
anyone who uses the property can be liable to those who had
an interest in the tainted property.3
B
On that understanding of “property,” Havana Docks has
shown that the cruise lines used confscated property in
which Havana Docks had a property interest and to which it
owns a claim.
The docks are “property which was confiscated. ”
§ 6082(a)(1)(A); 119 F. 4th, at 1294 (Brasher, J., dissenting).
Havana Docks has established that the Cuban Government
confscated those docks without compensation. In 1960, the
Castro regime expropriated American property, specifcally
targeting Havana Docks. 1 App. 483, 487. Then, Castro's
forces physically took possession of the docks and expelled
Havana Docks' agents. Id., at 257. The Cuban Gov-
ernment therefore “seiz[ed] . . . control of ” the docks,
3 This is not to say that property interests are irrelevant for Title III.
A plaintiff can argue that the defendant traffcked in a confscated prop-
erty interest by, for example, purchasing, selling, or transferring the inter-
est. See § 6023(13)(A)(i).
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Opinion of the Court
§ 6023(4)(A)—the physical property in which Havana Docks
had an interest. It follows that the docks are “property
which was confscated by the Cuban Government” after Jan-
uary 1, 1959. § 6082(a)(1)(A). See also infra, at 250–253.
The cruise lines “use[d]” or “engage[d] in commercial ac-
tivity using” the docks. §§ 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii). It is undis-
puted that when they transported nearly a million paying
passengers to Cuba, the cruise lines “used the docks.” Brief
for Respondents 23; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 72 (“We have
used the docks”). It is likewise undisputed that they
did so “without the authorization of ” Havana Docks.
§ 6023(13)(A). So, if the cruise lines did so knowingly and
intentionally, the cruise lines “traffc[ked] in property”—the
docks—“which was confscated by the Cuban Government.”
§§ 6023(13)(A)(i), (ii), 6082(a)(1)(A).4
Finally, Havana Docks is a “United States national who
owns the claim” to the confscated docks.5 § 6082(a)(1)(A).
Although a plaintiff need not have a Commission-certifed
claim, § 6083(a)(2); Brief for Respondents 24, Havana Docks
has such a certifed claim, which is “conclusive proof ” that
Havana Docks has satisfed this element, § 6083(a)(1). The
Commission found that Havana Docks had acquired “a con-
cession for the construction and operation of ” the docks and
“the real property with all improvements and appurtenances
located” at the Port. 1 App. 256–257. And, the Commission
found “that the facilities of [Havana Docks] were physically
4 The cruise lines have argued that their use of the docks fell within the
exception to Title III's defnition of “traffcs” for “uses of property incident
to lawful travel,” § 6023(13)(B)(iii), an argument that the District Court
rejected based on the general ban against travel to Cuba for tourist activi-
ties, see 22 U. S. C. § 7209(b)(1). Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp.,
592 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1173–1174 (SD Fla. 2022). The Court of Appeals
did not reach this issue because of its primary holding, and we do not
address it here. 119 F. 4th, at 1279, n. 1.
5 The Court of Appeals rejected the cruise lines' argument that Havana
Docks is not a United States national within the meaning of the Act, see
id., at 1281, a holding that is not before us here.
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250 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Opinion of the Court
occupied by agents of the Cuban Government” after the
Cuban Government had nationalized Havana Docks' assets
in 1960. Id., at 257.
* * *
In sum, the Cuban Government seized control of “prop-
erty”—the docks that Havana Docks built—in 1960. At that
point, the docks were tainted as confscated property, the
“the use of ” which the United States sought to “deter.”
§§ 6081(8), (11). The cruise lines later used the confscated
docks—property to which Havana Docks owns a certifed
claim—when they transported nearly a million passengers to
Cuba between 2016 and 2019. The Court of Appeals there-
fore erred in concluding that Havana Docks failed to estab-
lish these requirements for Title III liability.
III
The Court of Appeals' analysis below, as well as the cruise
lines' and dissent's arguments here, confict with Title III's
text.
A
The Court of Appeals interpreted the Act to demand a
counterfactual analysis. “[T]he way to give effect to the
statutory language (`traffcs in property which was confs-
cated'),” the court said, “is to view the property interest at
issue in a Title III action as if there had been no expropria-
tion and then determine whether the alleged conduct consti-
tuted traffcking in that interest.” 119 F. 4th, at 1287.
This approach rested on the premise that “property” could
refer only to present property interests. But, no “Title III
plaintiff” owns a present property interest “because that
property now belongs to the Cuban Government.” Id., at
1286. After all, the Cuban Government expropriated those
property interests in 1960. See 1 App. 483. In order to
resolve this tension and “give effect” to its understanding of
the statute, the Court of Appeals had to eliminate the “dis-
torting effect of the confscation” by assuming that there had
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Opinion of the Court
been no confscation and then asking whether the defendant's
use of the property would have interfered with the owner's
property interest absent the confscation. 119 F. 4th, at
1287–1288. In this case, the court posited a counterfactual
scenario in which the Cuban Government “had never expro-
priated” Havana Docks' concession and then analyzed the de-
fendants' conduct in that scenario. Id., at 1288. Because
the “concession expired in 2004” in this counterfactual sce-
nario, and Havana Docks would have had to hand the docks
over at that point anyway, the court reasoned that the cruise
lines' conduct from 2016 to 2019 did not violate Havana
Docks' rights and therefore cannot constitute traffcking
under Title III. Ibid.
This counterfactual approach is diffcult to understand and
apply. If the approach requires courts to assume that the
original rightsholder retained his legal rights, it would fore-
close liability in cases where the text demands it. Suppose
that an American owned land; the Cuban Government expro-
priated his property interest in the land; the Cuban Govern-
ment transferred the property interest to a company; and
the company sold it to another company. There should be
no doubt that both companies are liable under Title III for
“traffck[ing] in property which was confscated” from an
American, § 6082(a)(1)(A): the frst, by “sell[ing]” the prop-
erty interest, and the second, by “purchas[ing] ” it,
§ 6023(13)(A)(i). But if, as the Court of Appeals suggested,
we “treat” the property interest “as if the Cuban Govern-
ment had never expropriated it,” id., at 1288, then the Amer-
ican would still own it, in which case the other companies
could not have sold or purchased it. It makes little sense to
“determine whether the alleged conduct constituted traf-
fcking in that interest” because the alleged conduct—selling
and purchasing—cannot occur in the counterfactual scenario.
Id., at 1287. We decline to adopt an approach that appears
to read out of the Act cases of traffcking that should be in
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252 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
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Opinion of the Court
On the other hand, if all that the Court of Appeals meant
is that the Act requires that the defendant traffc in the same
property interest that the plaintiff held, then it still misun-
derstood the Act. In that case, the Court of Appeals' analy-
sis simply rested on the assumption that the relevant confs-
cated and traffcked-in “property” must be the plaintiff's
original property interest—here, the usufructuary conces-
sion. Id., at 1287–1288. But, as Judge Brasher explained,
“Havana Docks' theory is that the cruise lines are using the
docks”—the physical property—not that they are using the
property interest. Id., at 1294. And, as we have explained,
the Act allows Havana Docks to proceed on that theory. See
supra, at 246–250. This understanding explains why a
cruise line could have been liable under Title III for using
the docks in 1997, 2001, or 2021, even though the cruise line
would not have used Havana Docks' interest in the docks at
any of those times.
Title III is simply an antitraffcking right of action. It
recognizes that the effect of the Cuban Government's expro-
priation was the destruction of the plaintiff's interest in the
property. See Black's 602 (“expropriation” is a “governmen-
tal taking or modifcation of an individual's property rights”);
accord, 119 F. 4th, at 1286. It then provides a right to com-
pensation based on the plaintiff's former property interest
from those who later traffc in the property and thereby help
to support the Communist Cuban Government.
B
The cruise lines make an additional argument for affrm-
ance. Havana Docks' suit fails, the cruise lines contend, be-
cause “the Cuban government did not confscate the docks”;
it confscated only the concession. Brief for Respondents 31.
The dissent agrees. Post, at 261 (opinion of Kagan, J.).
This assertion would have surprised anyone present in
1960 Havana. As explained, the Act defnes “confscat[ion]”
to include the seizure of “ownership or control of property.”
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Sotomayor, J., concurring
§ 6023(4)(A) (emphasis added). When armed agents physi-
cally occupied the docks facilities, they seized control of the
docks even if “Cuba owned the docks.” Post, at 261 (opinion
of Kagan, J.). Before that seizure, the “concessionaire”—
Havana Docks—was “in possession of the works.” 1 App.
454; Brief for Respondents 32. After the seizure, the Cuban
Government stopped Havana Docks from operating, using,
enjoying, possessing, or otherwise “control[ling] the [docks].”
Id., at 23. The Cuban Government thereby extinguished
Havana Docks' concession and “physically occupied” the
docks, as the Commission found. 1 App. 257. Those actions
constitute confscation of the docks under Title III.6
IV
We conclude that the cruise lines used confscated prop-
erty to which Havana Docks owns the claim. Because the
Court of Appeals concluded otherwise, it did not reach the
cruise lines' remaining arguments against liability. Those
arguments are not before us and we do not address them. Ac-
cordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kavanaugh
joins, concurring.
I agree with the Court's resolution of the narrow question
before it and join the majority opinion in full. I write to
6 The dissent seemingly does not dispute that the Cuban Government
seized control of the docks. See, post, at 261. After all, Havana Docks
controlled the docks, then “armed offcers” took them over. Ibid. Con-
gress defned “confscat[ion]” in the statute to include “seizure by the
Cuban Government of . . . control of property.” § 6023(4)(A). “When a
statute includes an explicit defnition, we must follow that defnition.”
Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U. S. 43, 47 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the statutory defnition, the dissent's theory has the surprising conse-
quence that it is not “possible” for a landlord to prematurely seize control of
“property it always owned” from a “renter with a lease.” Post, at 258, 261.
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254 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Sotomayor, J., concurring
highlight two issues that the Court does not reach but that
raise signifcant concerns for remand or in other future Title
III cases.
First, petitioner's reading of Title III, if adopted, could
allow it to recover a potentially unlimited amount of money
from an unlimited number of people who use the confscated
docks at issue. Here, the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission (Commission) certifed that, in 1960, petitioner lost
around $9 million from the confscation of the docks. Ante,
at 241. The District Court determined that, under Title III,
each of the four cruise lines in this case was liable to peti-
tioner for $110 million (after trebling the certifed loss plus
more than a half-century's worth of interest, and awarding
additional legal fees and costs).
On petitioner's interpretation of Title III, however, those
awards could be just the beginning. Title III specifes that
“any person that . . . traffcs in property which was confs-
cated by the Cuban Government . . . shall be liable” for no
less than the value of the claim certifed by the Commission,
plus interest. 22 U. S. C. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i). Below, peti-
tioner defended the District Court's awards by arguing, in
essence, that “any person” really means “each person,” so
that each cruise line is liable for the full amount.
If petitioner is correct, then petitioner potentially could
recover $110 million from every person who uses the docks
in any way. Here, petitioner sued four cruise lines who used
the docks, but on its theory, nothing would prevent it from
recovering even more if other cruise lines had used the docks
in the past or if any cruise line uses them again in the future.
Nor would petitioner necessarily be limited to one recovery
against each cruise line. It could possibly seek to recover
the full $110 million against respondents for each individual
cruise; each docking, after all, was potentially an independ-
ent instance of traffcking. See 28 U. S. C. § 1603(d) (defning
“commercial activity” to mean “either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction
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Sotomayor, J., concurring
or act”); 22 U. S. C. § 6023(3) (incorporating that defnition);
see also § 6023(13)(A)(ii); but see § 6082(f)(1)(A) (appearing
to limit plaintiffs to one suit per “subject matter”). Liabil-
ity could even theoretically extend to third-party retailers
aboard respondents' ships, maintenance contractors at re-
spondents' dockyards, and even the nearly one million pas-
sengers who paid respondents to sail to Cuba, all of whom
arguably “engage[d] in a commercial activity using or other-
wise benefting from” the confscated docks or “participate[d]
in” respondents' commercial activities. §§ 6023(13)(A)(ii)–
(iii). In short, this limitless reading of the statute could per-
mit petitioner to recover millions, if not billions, of dollars
over and over again, so long as anyone continues to make
any commercial use of the docks.
It is unlikely that Congress intended for someone who suf-
fered a fnite loss to reap infnite recoveries. Congress de-
fned “confscated” property to mean property that was
seized by the Cuban Government “without the property hav-
ing been returned or adequate and effective compensation
provided.” § 6023(4)(A)(i). Congress also created the
Commission and tasked it with assessing the value of claims
stemming from the Cuban Government's confscations and
made the Commission-certifed value a presumptive mea-
sure of a Title III plaintiff's recovery. Ante, at 241, 243;
see § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i). That statutory scheme suggests that
Congress intended for the Commission's certifcation to sup-
ply a benchmark for adequate compensation; it does not ex-
pressly authorize repeatedly recovering the Commission-
certifed amount. Furthermore, if the statute is read the
way petitioner suggests, then Title III's remedies could po-
tentially violate the Due Process Clause to the extent that
the statute imposes penalties against individual defendants
that are “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly dispro-
portioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63, 66–
67 (1919).
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256 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Sotomayor, J., concurring
Second, there is a signifcant question as to whether re-
spondents' conduct fell within a statutory exception to Title
III liability for “transactions and uses of property incident
to lawful travel to Cuba.” § 6023(13)(B)(iii); see ante, at 243,
n. 1, 249, n. 4 (declining to address this exception). Indeed,
the Federal Government appears to have previously taken
the position that these cruises were lawful and benefcial to
both Cuba and the United States.
For example, in 2016, President Obama announced at a
joint press conference with Cuban President Raúl Castro
that the United States Government had “removed the last
major hurdle to resuming cruises and ferry service,” which
would “mean even more Americans visiting Cuba in the
years ahead and appreciating the incredible history and cul-
ture of the Cuban people.” * The Offce of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC), which administers and enforces sanctions
by the United States against Cuba, also granted one re-
spondent a license that specifcally authorized “carrier serv-
ices by vessel to, from, or within Cuba in connection with
travel or transportation between the United States and
Cuba.” App. 570. OFAC later amended its regulations “to
authorize persons subject to U. S. jurisdiction to provide car-
rier services by vessel, without the need for specifc li-
censes.” 80 Fed. Reg. 56916 (2015). Further, the State De-
partment previously informed petitioner that it would not
bring enforcement actions against respondents because of
“the clear exclusion” from the defnition of “ `traffcs' ” that
shields “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful
travel to Cuba.” App. 834.
To be sure, as petitioner argued below, at the same time
the Government made these statements, it also warned re-
*Remarks by President Obama and President Raúl Castro of Cuba in a
Joint Press Conference, The Obama White House (Mar. 21, 2016), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/remarks-
president-obama-and-president-raul-castro-cuba-joint-press (archived at
perma.cc/2JA3-NTP7).
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Kagan, J., dissenting
spondents that their activities had to comply with any appli-
cable regulations and could not exceed the scope of the li-
censes provided to them. See, e. g., id., at 570– 572
(emphasizing additional restrictions on cruises); id., at 869–
875 (cautionary letter issued by OFAC). Even so, as the
United States explained at argument, “[t]o the extent that
Respondents received assurances from appropriate govern-
ment offcials that what they were doing was lawful and au-
thorized,” holding them liable for that conduct could “raise
due process concerns.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 57–58.
As neither the infnite-recovery issue nor the lawful-travel
issue was fairly included within the question presented, the
Court appropriately does not address either one here. See
this Court's Rule 14.1(a). The Court also correctly ex-
presses no view as to other issues unaddressed by the Elev-
enth Circuit, such as respondents' argument that petitioner's
concession was nonexclusive and limited to cargo services,
Brief for Respondents 34, and respondents' argument that
the Commission's certifcation violates due process or the
Seventh Amendment, id., at 40–42. To the extent any of
these or other issues remain and are properly preserved, the
Eleventh Circuit should address them in the frst instance
on remand.
Justice Kagan, dissenting.
Today the Court misconstrues the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act to allow plaintiffs to recover for
traffcking in property that was not theirs. Title III of
that Act provides that “any person” that “traffcs in prop-
erty which was confscated by the Cuban Government on or
after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States
national who owns the claim to such property.” 22 U. S. C.
§ 6082(a)(1)(A). The majority holds that because four com-
mercial cruise lines used docks in the Port of Havana be-
tween 2016 and 2019, they can be held liable to Havana Docks
Corporation, a U. S. company that built, operated, and once
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258 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Kagan, J., dissenting
held a property interest in those docks. That may seem
sensible at frst blush. But there is a problem: The docks
are not “property which was confscated by the Cuban Gov-
ernment” within the meaning of Title III. Why? Because
the docks belonged to the Cuban Government—not Havana
Docks—all along. What Havana Docks owned was only a
property interest allowing it to use those docks for a speci-
fed time. And that time-limited interest expired in 2004—
more than a decade before the cruise lines ever used the
docks.
The key to getting this case right is understanding the
nature of the property interest that Havana Docks once held
in the docks. In 1905, the Cuban Government granted Com-
pañia del Puerto a 50-year “usufructuary concession” so that
it could build and then operate docks at the Port of Havana.
See 119 F. 4th 1276, 1278, 1281 (CA11 2024). As the major-
ity explains, a “usufruct” is a “right to use, enjoy, or proft
from another's property” (here, Cuba's property in the Port),
and a “concession” is a “privilege granted by the govern-
ment” (here, the Cuban Government). Ante, at 240. So the
deal struck was this: Compañia del Puerto would build docks
for Cuba at the Port and, in exchange, Cuba would let the
company operate those docks for a limited time. Later, that
usufructuary concession was assigned to Havana Docks and
extended to 99 years, meaning that it would expire in 2004.
So Havana Docks' property interest in the docks, like its
predecessor's, was a time-limited one. Before 2004, Havana
Docks had a right to make use of the docks, even though
they belonged to Cuba; after 2004, the company had no right
to anything. You might think of Havana Docks as a renter
with a lease set to expire in 2004.
Everyone agrees that Havana Docks did not get all it was
promised. That is because in 1960, 44 years before the con-
cession was to expire, Cuba issued a decree nationalizing Ha-
vana Docks' assets and sent armed agents to physically
occupy the docks. Those actions “prematurely destroyed
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Kagan, J., dissenting
Havana Docks' concession” and, “by extension, its ability to
beneft from the docks.” Ante, at 241. The Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission confrmed as much, fnding that
Cuba had seized from Havana Docks a concession for the
“operation of wharves and warehouses in the harbor of Ha-
vana,” which was “to expire in the year 2004,” as well as
associated “equipment, furniture and fxtures.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 138a, 141a. The Commission thus certifed about
$9 million in losses, plus six percent annual interest. Cuba
has never compensated Havana Docks for that harm.
But the question in this case is not whether Cuba should
pay Havana Docks for depriving it of 44 years of its conces-
sion; the question is instead whether cruise lines using the
docks twelve years after the concession's expiration date are
liable to Havana Docks under Title III. And the answer to
that question is no. Recall what the statute says: “[A]ny
person” that “traffcs in property which was confscated by
the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall
be liable to any United States national who owns the claim
to such property.” § 6082(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The
“property which was confscated” from Havana Docks is a
time-limited concession. We know that is the “property
which was confscated” because that is the only property Ha-
vana Docks ever owned—and thus the only property Cuba
could have confscated from it. So to hold the cruise lines
liable, Havana Docks must show that they “traffc[ked] in”
its time-limited concession. Had the cruise lines used the
docks before 2004, Havana Docks would have a good argu-
ment that they did so. But the cruise lines did not use the
docks until 2016—years after Havana Docks' concession was
scheduled to expire. Given that fact, the cruise lines did not
“traffc in” the “property which was confscated” from Ha-
vana Docks and so are not liable to it under Title III.
The Court reaches the opposite conclusion because it be-
lieves that the “property which was confscated” in this case
includes the physical docks themselves. See ante, at 11.
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Kagan, J., dissenting
The majority believes that not because it thinks the physical
docks ever belonged to Havana Docks. On the contrary, the
majority acknowledges that Havana Docks' sole “property
interest was time-limited and set to expire in 2004.” Ante,
at 240. But as the majority sees it, when Title III says
“property which was confscated,” it means not just the prop-
erty interest that was actually confscated from the plaintiff
(here, the time-limited concession), but also “the physical
property in which the plaintiff had an interest” (here, the
physical docks). Ante, at 246, 247–248. There are three re-
lated problems with that theory of the case.
First, it misreads the statute Congress wrote. Congress
could have imposed liability on “any person” that “traffcs in
property in which a United States national held an interest
which was confscated.” If so, the majority's result would
follow. But that is not what Title III says. Instead, the
statute imposes liability on “any person” that “traffcs in
property which was confscated,” period. § 6082(a)(1)(A).
So, where the only “property” confscated from the plaintiff
is an intangible property interest, the defendant is liable only
if he has traffcked in that interest. Traffcking in the un-
derlying physical thing is not enough, because doing so is
not traffcking in the “property which was confscated.” Of
course, the majority is right that, by defning “property” to
include both physical things and intangible interests, the Act
“makes clear” that liability can be imposed for traffcking in
either. Ante, at 246; see § 6023(12)(A) (“The term `property'
means any property . . . , whether real, personal, or mixed,
and any present, future, or contingent right, security, or
other interest therein, including any leasehold interest”).
But that fact does not help the majority's cause. It means
that where the “property” confscated from the plaintiff is a
physical thing, liability can attach for traffcking in that
thing. It does not mean (as the majority seems to think)
that where the “property” confscated from the plaintiff is
an intangible interest, liability can attach for traffcking in
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Kagan, J., dissenting
something other than that interest—that is, in the underly-
ing physical thing. Always, according to the statute, traf-
fcking can give rise to liability only when it is in the actual
“property which was confscated.”
Second, the docks are not “property which was confscated
by the Cuban Government” because they were not, in fact,
confscated by the Cuban Government; rather, Cuba owned
the docks all along. True enough that in 1960, the Cuban
Government issued a decree expropriating Havana Docks'
assets and sent armed offcers to physically occupy the docks.
That is how Cuba confscated Havana Docks' usufructuary
concession. But in taking those measures, Cuba did not
somehow confscate the docks, because the docks already be-
longed to Cuba. The majority emphasizes that the Act de-
fnes “confscat[ion]” to include seizing “control of property”
and argues that Cuba's actions ft that description because
Cuba seized “control” of the docks. See ante, at 252–253.
But nothing in the Act's defnition—more fully stated, “the
nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban
Government of ownership or control of property, on or after
January 1, 1959,” § 6023(4)(A)—makes it possible for Cuba to
confscate property it always owned (and Havana Docks
never did). The defnition's inclusion of seizure of “control”
just means that Cuba can “confscate[ ]” property belonging
to someone else by seizing “control” of it, even if ownership
does not change hands. So, for example, if Havana Docks
had owned the docks and Cuba had taken “control” of them
without obtaining title, that would still have counted as “con-
fscat[ion].” But that is not what happened here—because,
again, Havana Docks owned not the docks themselves, but
only a time-limited interest in using them.*
*The majority is wrong to say that this view “has the surprising conse-
quence that it is not `possible' for a landlord to prematurely seize control
of `property it always owned' from a `renter with a lease.' ” Ante, at 253,
n. 6. A landlord could of course prematurely take control of physical
property (say, a house) that he owns but is leasing to a renter. It is just
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262 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN
CRUISES, LTD.
Kagan, J., dissenting
Finally, the majority's approach ignores basic principles of
property law. As every frst-year law student learns, “prop-
erty” is defned by reference not just to spatial boundaries,
but also to temporal ones. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S.
302, 331–332 (2002) (“An interest in real property is defned
by the metes and bounds that describe its geographic dimen-
sions and the term of years that describes the temporal as-
pect of the owner's interest. . . . Both dimensions must be
considered if the interest is to be viewed in its entirety”).
Yet the majority inexplicably privileges the spatial. It is
obvious that a plaintiff cannot recover under Title III for
traffcking in property that falls outside its own property's
spatial boundaries. Suppose Havana Docks had a conces-
sion of unlimited duration, but only in the red dock—not in
the blue dock next to it. Havana Docks could then recover
from a defendant who uses the red dock, but not from a de-
fendant who uses the blue dock because that dock lies outside
its property interest. And if that is so, why should it be
different when the boundary is temporal, rather than spatial?
Havana Docks had a concession in the docks until 2004, so it
could get compensation from a defendant who used the docks
before that date. But just as Havana Docks could not re-
cover from the user of the blue dock, so too it should not
recover from someone who used the docks after 2004, when
its concession was due to expire. In either case, the traf-
fcking would be in a thing falling outside Havana Docks'
property interest—and whether it falls outside the interest's
spatial boundaries, or instead its temporal ones, should make
no difference to the outcome.
At the end of the day, the Court's interpretation of Title
III treats all property interests as if they were perpetual
ones. Like the Eleventh Circuit, I “do not believe that Con-
that, when the landlord does so, what he confscates is not the house—
which he already owns—but the lease alone, with its scheduled expira-
tion date.

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Kagan, J., dissenting
gress, in enacting Title III, meant to convert property inter-
ests which were temporally limited at the time of their con-
fscation into fee simple interests in perpetuity such that the
holders of such limited interests could assert traffcking
claims through what Buzz Lightyear called `infnity and be-
yond.' ” 119 F. 4th, at 1287 (quoting Toy Story (Pixar Ani-
mation Studios/Walt Disney Pictures 1995)). Instead, I
would hold that a plaintiff can recover under Title III only
when the defendant traffcs in the actual property that was
confscated from the plaintiff. Here, that means Havana
Docks' claim should fail, because the cruise lines did not traf-
fc in Havana Docks' time-limited—and long-ago expired—
concession. I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None

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