YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. MICHIGAN et al.

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36 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. MICHIGAN
et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of michigan
No. 01–270. Argued October 7, 2002—Decided November 5, 2002
Prior to 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowed States
to charge interstate motor carriers operating within their borders an-
nual registration fees of up to $10 per vehicle. As proof of registration,
participating States issued stamps that were affixed to a card carried in
each vehicle. Under this so-called “bingo card” system, some States
entered into “reciprocity agreements” whereby, in exchange for recipro-
cal treatment, they discounted or waived registration fees for carriers
from other States. In the Intermodal Surface Transportation Effi-
ciency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), Congress directed the ICC to replace the
“bingo card” regime with a new system, the “Single State Registration
System,” under which a carrier’s annual registration with one State that
had participated in the “bingo card” system would be deemed to satisfy
the registration requirements of all other such States. ISTEA also
capped state registration fees by directing the ICC to “establish a
fee system . . . that . . . will result in a fee for each participating
State that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that
such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.” 49
U. S. C. § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) (1994 ed.), amended and recodified in
§ 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). In its final implementing regulations, the ICC
ruled that, under the new system, States could not terminate the reci-
procity agreements that were in place under the “bingo card” regime.
To allow them to do so, the ICC decided, would be inconsistent with
ISTEA’s fee-cap provision and with the Act’s intent that the flow of
revenue for the States be maintained while the burden of the registra-
tion system for carriers be reduced.
Michigan participated in the “bingo card” regime. For the 1990 and
1991 registration years, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not
levy a fee for petitioner’s trucks that were licensed in Illinois pursuant
to its policy not to charge a fee for vehicles registered in other States
that did not charge Michigan-based carriers a fee. In 1991, however,
the commission announced a change in its policy, effective February 1,
1992, whereby the commission granted reciprocity treatment based on
the policies of the State in which a carrier maintained its principal place
of business rather than the State in which individual vehicles were li-
censed. Because Michigan had no reciprocal arrangement with Kansas,

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37 Cite as: 537 U. S. 36 (2002)
Syllabus
where petitioner was headquartered, the Michigan commission levied a
fee of $10 per vehicle for the 1992 registration year on petitioner’s entire
fleet, with payment due on January 1, 1992. After paying the fees in
October 1991 under protest, petitioner brought suit in the Michigan
Court of Claims seeking a refund of the fees it paid for its Illinois-
licensed vehicles after the Single State Registration System came into
effect. It alleged that, because Michigan had not “collected or charged”
a 1991 registration fee for those trucks, ISTEA’s fee-cap provision pro-
hibits Michigan from levying a fee for them. The court granted peti-
tioner summary judgment, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, concluding that reciprocity
agreements are not relevant in determining what fee a State “charged
or collected” as of November 15, 1991. Applying Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, the court
determined that the statute unambiguously forbids the ICC’s interpre-
tation. Reasoning that the new fee system is based not on the fees
collected from one individual company, but on the fee system that the
State had in place on November 15, 1991, the court concluded that it
must look not at the fees petitioner paid in any given year, but at the
generic fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of November
15, 1991.
Held: The Michigan Supreme Court erred in holding that, under
§ 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), only a State’s “generic” fee is relevant to deter-
mining the fee that was “collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.”
States may not renounce or modify a reciprocity agreement so as to
alter any fee charged or collected as of that date. Because the ICC’s
interpretation of ISTEA’s fee-cap provision is a permissible reading of
the statutory language and reasonably resolves ambiguity therein, the
ICC’s interpretation must receive deference under Chevron, supra, at
843, and the Michigan Supreme Court erred in declining to enforce it.
The fee-cap provision does not foreclose the ICC’s determination that
fees charged under States’ pre-existing reciprocity agreements were, in
effect, frozen by the new Single State Registration System. The statu-
tory language “collected or charged” can quite naturally be read to mean
fees that a State actually collected or charged. The statute can easily
be read as the ICC chose, making it unlawful for a State to renounce or
modify a reciprocity agreement so as to alter any fee charged or col-
lected as of November 15, 1991. While the Michigan Supreme Court’s
reading of the statute might be reasonable, nothing in the statute com-
pels that particular result. The fee-cap provision refers not to a “fee
system,” but to the “fee . . . collected or charged.” Under the ICC’s
rule, where a State waives its registration fee, its “fee . . . collected or

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38 YELLOW TRANSP., INC. v. MICHIGAN
Opinion of the Court
charged” is zero and must remain zero. To allow States to disavow
their reciprocity agreements so as to alter any fee charged or collected
as of November 15, 1991, would potentially permit States to increase
their revenues substantially under the new system, a result that the
ICC quite reasonably believed Congress did not intend. The Court
rejects respondents’ arguments that Congress intended for each State
to set a single, uniform fee; that the ICC could not add a constraint
not within the statute’s express language; and that the ICC’s rule con-
travenes the fee-cap provision by limiting what a State can charge
based on what was collected from or charged to a particular carrier.
Pp. 45–48.
464 Mich. 21, 627 N. W. 2d 236, reversed and remanded.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post,
p. 48.
Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Evan M. Tager, Robert L. Bron-
ston, John W. Bryant, and R. Ian Hunter.
Austin C. Schlick argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Michael
Jay Singer, Bruce G. Forrest, Kirk K. Van Tine, Paul M.
Geier, Dale C. Andrews, and Laura C. Fentonmiller.
Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued
the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Jen-
nifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Susan I. Leffler, As-
sistant Solicitor General, and David A. Voges and Henry J.
Boynton, Assistant Attorneys General.*
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case, 534 U. S. 1112 (2002), to
determine whether the Michigan Supreme Court erred in
*Roy T. Englert, Jr., Sherri Lynn Wolson, Beth L. Law, and Robert
Digges, Jr., filed a brief for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al.
as amici curiae urging reversal.

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39 Cite as: 537 U. S. 36 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
holding that, under 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), only a
State’s “generic” fee is relevant to determining the fee that
was “collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.”
I
A
Beginning in 1965, Congress authorized States to require
interstate motor carriers operating within their borders to
register with the State proof of their Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) interstate operating permits. Pub. L.
89–170, 79 Stat. 648, 49 U. S. C. § 302(b)(2) (1970 ed.). Con-
gress provided that state registration requirements would
not constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce so
long as they were consistent with regulations promulgated
by the ICC. Ibid.
Prior to 1994, the ICC allowed States to charge interstate
motor carriers annual registration fees of up to $10 per vehi-
cle. See 49 CFR § 1023.33 (1992). As proof of registration,
participating States would issue a stamp for each of the car-
rier’s vehicles. § 1023.32. The stamp was affixed on a “uni-
form identification cab car[d]” carried in each vehicle, within
the square bearing the name of the issuing State.
§§ 1023.32(d)–(e). This system came to be known as the
“bingo card” system. Single State Insurance Registration,
9 I. C. C. 2d 610 (1993).
The “bingo card” regime proved unsatisfactory to many
who felt that the administrative burdens it placed on carriers
and participating States outweighed the benefits to those
States and to the public. H. R. Rep. No. 102–171, pt. I, p. 49
(1991); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 102–404, pp. 437–438 (1991). In
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991 (ISTEA), Congress therefore directed the ICC to im-
plement a new system to replace the “bingo card” regime.*
*Congress abolished the ICC in 1995 and assigned responsibility for
administering the new Single State Registration System to the Secretary
of Transportation. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–88,

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40 YELLOW TRANSP., INC. v. MICHIGAN
Opinion of the Court
See Pub. L. 102–240, § 4005, 105 Stat. 1914, 49 U. S. C.
§ 11506(c) (1994 ed.). Under the new system, called the
Single State Registration System, “a motor carrier [would
be] required to register annually with only one State,”
and “such single State registration [would] be deemed to
satisfy the registration requirements of all other States.”
§§ 11506(c)(1)(A) and (C). Thus, one State would—on behalf
of all other participating States—register a carrier’s vehi-
cles, file and maintain paperwork, and collect and distribute
registration fees. § 11506(c)(2)(A). Participation in the
Single State Registration System was limited to those States
that had elected to participate in the “bingo card” system.
§ 11506(c)(2)(D).
ISTEA also capped the per-vehicle registration fee that
participating States could charge interstate motor carriers.
Congress directed the ICC to
“establish a fee system . . . that (I) will be based on the
number of commercial motor vehicles the carrier op-
erates in a State and on the number of States in
which the carrier operates, (II) will minimize the costs
of complying with the registration system, and (III)
will result in a fee for each participating State that is
equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such
State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.”
§ 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).
Congress provided that the charging or collection of any
fee not in accordance with the ICC’s fee system would
“be deemed to be a burden on interstate commerce.”
§ 11506(c)(2)(C).
§ 101, 109 Stat. 803. The provisions of ISTEA governing the system were
amended and recodified. See 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c). The Federal High-
way Administration, under the Secretary of Transportation, adopted the
ICC regulations that implemented the Single State Registration System,
61 Fed. Reg. 54706, 54707 (1996), and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration now has authority to administer the system, 49 U. S. C.
§ 113(f)(1).

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Opinion of the Court
The ICC issued its final implementing regulations in May
1993 after notice-and-comment proceedings. Single-State
Insurance Registration, supra. The rulemaking gave rise
to the central question in this case: whether, under the Sin-
gle State Registration System, States were free to terminate
“reciprocity agreements” that were in place under the “bingo
card” regime. Id., at 617–619. Under these agreements, in
exchange for reciprocal treatment, some States discounted
or waived registration fees for carriers from other States.
Id., at 617.
In issuing a set of proposed rules and soliciting further
comments, the ICC questioned whether it had the power to
require States to preserve pre-existing reciprocity agree-
ments. Single State Insurance Registration, No. MC–100
(Sub-No. 6), 1993 WL 17833, *12 (Jan. 22, 1993); see Single
State Insurance Registration—1993 Rules, 9 I. C. C. 2d 1, 11
(1992). It noted that these agreements were voluntary and
mutually beneficial and commented that “as long as no car-
rier is charged more than [a State’s] standard November 15,
1991, fee for all carriers (subject to the $10 limit), the re-
quirements of [ISTEA] are satisfied.” 1993 WL 17833, *12.
In its final implementing regulations, however, the ICC
concluded, in light of further comments, that its prelimi-
nary view on reciprocity agreements was inconsistent with
ISTEA’s fee-cap provision and with “the intent of the law
that the flow of revenue for the States be maintained while
the burden of the registration system for carriers be re-
duced.” Single State Insurance Registration, 9 I. C. C. 2d,
at 618. The agency therefore determined that States partic-
ipating in the Single State Registration System “must con-
sider fees charged or collected under reciprocity agreements
when determining the fees charged or collected as of No-
vember 15, 1991, as required by § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).” Id., at
618–619; see also American Trucking Associations—Peti-
tion for Declaratory Order—Single State Insurance Reg-
istration, 9 I. C. C. 2d 1184, 1192, 1194–1195 (1993). The

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42 YELLOW TRANSP., INC. v. MICHIGAN
Opinion of the Court
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) and 18 state regulatory commissions sought re-
view of the ICC’s determination and certain provisions of
the Single State Registration System regulations. NARUC
v. ICC, 41 F. 3d 721 (1994). The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia concluded that the plain
language of the statute supported the ICC’s determination
that States participating in the new system must consider
reciprocity agreements under 49 U. S. C. § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).
41 F. 3d, at 729.
B
Prior to the implementation of the Single State Registra-
tion System, Michigan had participated in the “bingo card”
regime. See App. 5 (Affidavit of Thomas R. Lonergan, Di-
rector, Motor Carrier Regulation Division of the Michigan
Public Service Commission ¶ 3e) (hereinafter Lonergan Af-
fidavit). The Michigan Legislature had directed the Michi-
gan Public Service Commission to levy an annual regis-
tration fee of $10 per vehicle on interstate motor carrier
vehicles and simultaneously endowed the commission with
authority to “enter into a reciprocal agreement with a state.”
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 478.7(4) (West 1988). Pursuant to
such reciprocal agreements, the commission was empowered
to “waive the fee [otherwise] required.” Ibid.
Petitioner in this case is an interstate trucking company
headquartered in Kansas. For calendar years 1990 and
1991, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not levy a
fee for petitioner’s trucks that were licensed in Illinois pur-
suant to its policy “not to charge a fee to carriers with vehi-
cles registered in states . . . which did not charge Michigan-
based carriers a fee.” App. 6 (Lonergan Affidavit ¶ 3i). In
1991, however, the Michigan Public Service Commission an-
nounced a change in its reciprocity policy to take effect on
February 1, 1992. Under the new policy, the commission
granted reciprocity treatment based on the policies of the
State in which a carrier maintained its principal place of

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43 Cite as: 537 U. S. 36 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
business rather than the State in which individual vehicles
were licensed. Because Michigan had no reciprocal arrange-
ment with Kansas, the Michigan Public Service Commission
sent petitioner a bill in September 1991, levying a fee of $10
per vehicle for the 1992 registration year on petitioner’s en-
tire fleet, with payment due on January 1, 1992.
Petitioner paid the fees in October 1991 under protest and
later brought suit in the Michigan Court of Claims seeking a
refund of the fees it paid for its Illinois-licensed vehicles
after the Single State Registration System came into effect.
See 49 U. S. C. § 11506(c)(3) (1994 ed.) (setting effective date
of January 1, 1994). Petitioner alleged that, because Michi-
gan had not “collected or charged” a fee for the 1991 registra-
tion year for trucks licensed in Illinois, ISTEA’s fee-cap
provision prohibits Michigan from levying a fee on Illinois-
licensed trucks.
On cross motions for summary disposition, the Michigan
Court of Claims ruled in favor of petitioner. Yellow Freight
System, Inc. v. Michigan, No. 95–15706–CM (Mar. 13, 1996)
(Yellow Freight System I). The Court of Claims’ holding
relied on an ICC declaratory order in which the agency held
that ISTEA’s fee-cap provision caps fees at the level “col-
lected or charged” for registration year 1991, not those fees
levied for registration year 1992 in advance of the statutory
cutoff date. Id., at 3–4; see American Trucking Associa-
tions, supra, at 1192, 1195.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed on similar
grounds. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Michigan, 231
Mich. App. 194, 585 N. W. 2d 762 (1998) (Yellow Freight Sys-
tem II). The Court of Appeals also rejected Michigan’s ar-
gument that States need not consider reciprocity agreements
in determining the level of fees “charged or collected as of
November 15, 1991,” noting that the ICC had determined
reciprocity agreements must be considered, and that the
agency’s decision had been upheld in NARUC v. ICC, supra.

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44 YELLOW TRANSP., INC. v. MICHIGAN
Opinion of the Court
Yellow Freight System II, supra, at 202–203, 585 N. W. 2d,
at 766.
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. Yellow Freight
System, Inc. v. Michigan, 464 Mich. 21, 627 N. W. 2d 236
(2001) (Yellow Freight System III). The court concluded
that “reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining
what fee [a State] ‘charged or collected’ as of November 15,
1991.” Id., at 33, 627 N. W. 2d, at 242. The court expressly
rejected the District of Columbia Circuit’s contrary conclu-
sion. Id., at 29, 627 N. W. 2d, at 240 (citing NARUC v. ICC,
supra). The Court applied Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), but
determined that the statute unambiguously forbids the ICC’s
interpretation. Yellow Freight System III, 464 Mich., at
29–31, 627 N. W. 2d, at 240–241. Reasoning that “[t]he new
‘fee system’ is based not on the fees collected from one indi-
vidual company, but on the fee system that the state had in
place on November 15, 1991,” the court concluded that “[w]e
must look not at the fees paid by [petitioner] in any given
year, but at the generic fee Michigan charged or collected
from carriers as of November 15, 1991.” Id., at 31, 627 N. W.
2d, at 241 (emphasis added). Two justices dissented, finding
ISTEA’s fee-cap provision ambiguous, the ICC’s construction
reasonable, and deference therefore due. Id., at 33–43, 627
N. W. 2d, at 242–247 (opinions of Kelly and Cavanagh, JJ.).
The Michigan Supreme Court did not consider respond-
ents’ argument that the fees petitioner paid Michigan for the
1992 registration year were “collected or charged as of No-
vember 15, 1991.” 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). Nor
did that court reach the question whether Michigan had “can-
celed its reciprocity agreements with other States in 1989.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. The only
issue before this Court, therefore, is whether States may
charge motor carrier registration fees in excess of those
charged or collected under reciprocity agreements as of
November 15, 1991.

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Opinion of the Court
II
Neither party disputes that Chevron, supra, governs the
interpretive task at hand. In ISTEA, Congress made an
express delegation of authority to the ICC to promulgate
standards for implementing the new Single State Registra-
tion System. 49 U. S. C. § 11506(c)(1) (1994 ed.). The ICC
did so, interpreting ISTEA’s fee-cap provision subsequent to
a notice-and-comment rulemaking. See United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229 (2001) (“[A] very good indica-
tor of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is an] express
congressional authorizatio[n] to engage in the process of rule-
making or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings
for which deference is claimed”). The Federal Highway Ad-
ministration adopted the ICC’s regulations, see supra, at 39,
n., and the Single State Registration System is now adminis-
tered by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
49 U. S. C. § 113.
Accordingly, the question before us is whether the text of
the statute resolves the issue, or, if not, whether the ICC’s
interpretation is permissible in light of the deference to be
accorded the agency under the statutory scheme. If the
statute speaks clearly “to the precise question at issue,” we
“must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842–843. If the statute
is instead “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue,” we must sustain the agency’s interpretation if it is
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at
843; see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 217–218 (2002).
ISTEA’s fee-cap provision does not foreclose the ICC’s de-
termination that fees charged under States’ pre-existing rec-
iprocity agreements were, in effect, frozen by the new Single
State Registration System. The provision requires that the
new system “result in a fee for each participating State that
is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such
State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.” 49
U. S. C. § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). The language “collected or

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46 YELLOW TRANSP., INC. v. MICHIGAN
Opinion of the Court
charged” can quite naturally be read to mean fees that a
State actually collected or charged. The statute thus can
easily be read as the ICC chose, making it unlawful “for a
State to renounce or modify a reciprocity agreement so as to
alter any fee charged or collected as of November 15, 1991,
under the predecessor registration system.” American
Trucking Associations, 9 I. C. C. 2d, at 1194; see Single State
Insurance Registration, 9 I. C. C. 2d, at 618–619.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the language of
ISTEA’s fee-cap provision compels a different result. Al-
though it acknowledged that ISTEA is silent with respect to
reciprocity agreements, the court nonetheless concluded that
the fee-cap provision mandates that those agreements have
no bearing in the determination of what fee a State “col-
lected or charged” as of November 15, 1991. Yellow Freight
System III, 464 Mich., at 31, 627 N. W. 2d, at 241. The court
reasoned that the Single State Registration System was
“based not on the fees collected from one individual company,
but on the fee system that the state had in place.” Ibid.
(emphasis added). While such a reading might be reason-
able, nothing in the statute compels that particular result.
The fee-cap provision refers not to a “fee system,” but
to the “fee . . . collected or charged. ” 49 U. S. C.
§ 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). Under the ICC’s rule, where a
State waives its registration fee, its “fee . . . collected or
charged” is zero and must remain zero. The ICC’s interpre-
tation is a permissible reading of the language of the statute.
And, because there is statutory ambiguity and the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable, its interpretation must receive
deference. See Chevron, supra, at 843.
As commenters to the ICC during the rulemaking pointed
out, to allow States to disavow their reciprocity agreements
so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of November
15, 1991, would potentially permit States to increase their
revenues substantially under the new system, a result that
the ICC quite reasonably believed Congress did not intend.

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Opinion of the Court
See Single State Insurance Registration, 9 I. C. C. 2d, at
618. The ICC concluded that its rule best served the “in-
tent of the law that the flow of revenue for the States be
maintained while the burden of the registration system for
carriers be reduced.” Ibid. The agency considered that
allowing States to disavow reciprocity agreements and
charge a single, uniform fee might reduce administrative
burdens, but expressed concern that carriers’ registration
costs, and state revenues, would balloon. Ibid. (noting that
some carriers’ fees “assertedly could increase as much as
900%,” and that one commenter presented a “worst case
scenario” in which “State revenues could increase from $50
million to $200 million”).
Respondents argue that Congress intended for each State
to set a single, uniform fee. While such a mandate would,
indeed, have simplified the new system, it is not compelled
by the language of the statute, which instructs the ICC to
implement a system under which States charge a fee, not to
exceed $10 per vehicle, that is equal to the fee such States
“collected or charged as of November 15, 1991.”
Respondents also contend that, by freezing the fees
charged under reciprocity agreements as part of the fee cap,
the ICC added a constraint not within the express language
of the statute. The Michigan Supreme Court expressed a
similar concern, stating that “[i]t is not for the ICC . . . to
insert words into the statute.” 464 Mich., at 32, 627 N. W.
2d, at 241–242. It was precisely Congress’ command, how-
ever, that the ICC promulgate standards to govern the Sin-
gle State Registration System, 49 U. S. C. § 11506(c) (1994
ed.), and it was thus for that agency to resolve any ambigu-
ities and fill in any holes in the statutory scheme. See Mead
Corp., supra, at 229; Chevron, supra, at 843–844. To hold
States to the fees they actually collected or charged seems
to us a reasonable interpretation of the statute’s command
that state fees be “equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per

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48 YELLOW TRANSP., INC. v. MICHIGAN
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
vehicle, that such State collected or charged as of November
15, 1991.” 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III).
Respondents argue that the ICC’s rule contravenes
ISTEA’s fee-cap provision by limiting what a State can
charge based on what was collected from or charged to a
particular carrier. Respondents point out that the focus of
the provision is on the actions of the State, not the actions
of any particular carrier. While we agree that the statute
focuses on what States “collected or charged” rather than
what particular carriers paid, we do not agree that the ICC’s
rule focuses the inquiry on the latter. Under the “bingo
card” regime, States entered into reciprocity agreements
that waived or reduced fees charged to particular categories
of vehicles. The ICC’s rule does not necessarily cap the ag-
gregate fee paid by any particular carrier; rather, it simply
requires States to preserve fees at the levels they actually
collected or charged pursuant to reciprocity agreements in
place as of November 15, 1991.
Because the ICC’s interpretation of ISTEA’s fee-cap provi-
sion is consistent with the language of the statute and rea-
sonably resolves any ambiguity therein, see Chevron, 467
U. S., at 843, the Michigan Supreme Court erred in declining
to enforce it.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is re-
manded to the Michigan Supreme Court for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
In my opinion there is no ambiguity in the relevant provi-
sions of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 (ISTEA). In that Act, Congress delegated to
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the power to
prescribe “standards” and “amendments to standards” that
would create a “Single State Registration System.” 49
U. S. C. § 11506 (1994 ed.). As a part of that delegation, the

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49 Cite as: 537 U. S. 36 (2002)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
ISTEA gave the ICC broad authority to establish a “fee sys-
tem” that would comply with three conditions, the third of
which contained two requirements.1 The fee for each par-
ticipating State (1) may not exceed $10 per vehicle and
(2) must be equal to the fee that the State “collected or
charged as of November 15, 1991.” § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III).
Because Michigan had both collected and charged a $10 fee
in 1991—and continued to do so thereafter—the Michigan
Public Service Commission did not violate either of those
statutory requirements when it changed its method of deter-
mining reciprocity with respect to individual carriers.2 In-
deed, the essential features of Michigan’s fee system for 1992
were the same as they were in 1991: The amount of the fee
that the “State collected or charged” was $10 per vehicle
both before and after November 15, 1991; that fee was as-
sessed on exactly the same kinds of vehicles both before and
after that date; the State had reciprocal arrangements, pro-
viding for either a discount or a waiver of the fee with the
same States in 1992 that it did in 1991.
Michigan did, however, violate an additional requirement
imposed by the ICC when the State modified its method of
determining the home State of out-of-state vehicles. That
1 “(B) Receipts; Fee System.—Such amended standards—
. . . . .
“(iv) shall establish a fee system for the filing of proof of insurance as
provided under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph that (I) will be
based on the number of commercial motor vehicles the carrier operates in
a State and on the number of States in which the carrier operates, (II)
will minimize the costs of complying with the registration system, and
(III) will result in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the
fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State collected or charged as
of November 15, 1991 . . . .” 49 U. S. C. § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv) (1994 ed.).
2 As explained by the majority, ante, at 42–43, Michigan changed its
policy from determining reciprocity with respect to an individual vehicle
based on where that vehicle was registered and had obtained a license
plate to determining reciprocity based on where the trucking company
that owned the individual vehicle maintained its principal place of
business.

537US1 Unit: $$U6 [04-14-04 19:21:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN
50 YELLOW TRANSP., INC. v. MICHIGAN
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
agency-imposed requirement effectively precluded a State
from making a systemic change that would significantly in-
crease its revenues. I think it clear that the statutory dele-
gation of power to the ICC to “establish a fee system” was
broad enough to include the power to impose additional
requirements to ensure that a State would not impose a
“burden on interstate commerce.” See §§ 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv),
(c)(2)(C). The rulemaking proceeding confirmed the ICC’s
power to require the States to preserve pre-existing reci-
procity agreements to avoid a scenario in which “some States
would realize windfalls.” Single State Insurance Registra-
tion, 9 I. C. C. 2d 610, 618 (1993) (responding to comment
alleging, among other things, that if reciprocity agreements
were discontinued, “State revenues could increase from $50
million to $200 million”); see ante, at 41. Although Michigan
did not abandon any reciprocity agreement, I think it equally
clear that the ICC could prohibit a change in the method
of implementing those agreements that would significantly
increase a State’s revenues, and therefore threaten to bur-
den commerce.3
Thus, I concur in the Court’s judgment because the statute
authorized the ICC to decide that the States’ pre-existing
reciprocity agreements should, in effect, be “frozen.” I do
not, however, believe that the statute mandated that result.
Nor do I believe that the additional constraint imposed by
the ICC should be upheld as a permissible construction of
subsection (c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). Rather, in my opinion, it was a
permissible exercise of the broad authority vested in the ICC
to “establish a fee system” that would not create “a burden
on interstate commerce.” See §§ 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv), (c)(2)(C).
It is on this basis that I concur in the judgment of the Court.
3 Not every change in how reciprocity is determined would lead to an
increase in a State’s revenues. Indeed, it may be that a State’s revenues
would decrease after making such a change. I am satisfied, however, that
the potential for an increase in these circumstances is a sufficient threat
to burden commerce within the meaning of the statute.