JINKS v. RICHLAND COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA, et al.

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456 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
JINKS v. RICHLAND COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA,
et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of south carolina
No. 02–258. Argued March 5, 2003—Decided April 22, 2003
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1367 determines whether a federal district court with
jurisdiction over a civil action may exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over other claims forming part of the same Article III “case or contro-
versy.” If the court declines to exercise such jurisdiction, the claims
will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the
limitations period on those claims from expiring while they are pending
in federal court, § 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while
a supplemental claim is pending in federal court and for 30 days after
its dismissal unless state law provides for a longer tolling period. Peti-
tioner filed a federal-court action claiming that Richland County (herein-
after respondent) and others violated 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in connection
with her husband’s death. She also asserted supplemental claims for
wrongful death and survival under South Carolina law. The District
Court granted defendants summary judgment on the § 1983 claim and
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Petitioner
then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won a wrongful-
death verdict against respondent. The State Supreme Court reversed,
finding the state-law claims time barred. Although they would not
have been barred under § 1367(d)’s tolling rule, the court held § 1367(d)
unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a
State’s political subdivisions.
Held: Section 1367(d)’s application to claims brought against a State’s po-
litical subdivisions is constitutional. Pp. 461–467.
(a) The Court rejects respondent’s contention that § 1367(d) is facially
invalid because it exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers. Rather, it
is necessary and proper for executing Congress’s power “[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and assuring
that those tribunals may fairly and efficiently exercise “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States,” Art. III, § 1. As to “necessity”: It suffices
that § 1367(d) is conducive to the administration of justice in federal
court and is plainly adapted to that end. See McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 421. And as to propriety: Contrary to respondent’s claim,
§ 1367(d) does not violate state-sovereignty principles by regulating
state-court procedures. Pp. 461–465.

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Syllabus
(b) Also without merit is respondent’s contention that § 1367(d) should
not be interpreted to apply to claims brought against a State’s political
subdivisions. Congress lacks Article I authority to override a State’s
immunity from suit in its own courts, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706,
but it may subject a municipality to suit in state court if that is done
pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers, see id., at 756.
This is merely the consequence of those cases, which respondent does
not ask the Court to overrule, holding that municipalities do not enjoy
a constitutionally protected immunity from suit. And any suggestion
that an “unmistakably clear” statement is required before an Act of
Congress may expose a local government to liability cannot possibly be
reconciled with Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436
U. S. 658. Pp. 465–467.
349 S. C. 298, 563 S. E. 2d 104, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Souter, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 467.
Robert S. Peck argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were James Mixon Griffin and Bradford P.
Simpson.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States
as intervenor. On the briefs were Solicitor General Olson,
Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor
General Clement, Malcolm L. Stewart, Mark B. Stern, and
Alisa B. Klein.
Andrew F. Lindemann argued the cause for respondent
Richland County. With him on the brief were William H.
Davidson II and David L. Morrison.*
*Barbara Arnwine and Thomas J. Henderson filed a brief for the Law-
yers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as amicus curiae urging
reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Alabama et al. by William H. Pryor, Jr., Attorney General of Alabama,
Nathan A. Forrester, Solicitor General, Carter G. Phillips, and Gene C.
Schaerr, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol-
lows: Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E.
Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Steve Carter of Indiana,
Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Mike Moore of

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458 JINKS v. RICHLAND COUNTY
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina dismissed petition-
er’s lawsuit against Richland County (hereinafter respond-
ent) as time barred. In doing so it held that 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367(d), which required the state statute of limitations to
be tolled for the period during which petitioner’s cause of
action had previously been pending in federal court, is uncon-
stitutional as applied to lawsuits brought against a State’s
political subdivisions. The issue before us is the validity of
that constitutional determination.
I
A
When a federal district court has original jurisdiction over
a civil cause of action, § 1367 determines whether it may ex-
ercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims that do
not independently come within its jurisdiction, but that form
part of the same Article III “case or controversy.” Section
1367(a) provides:
“Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as ex-
pressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any
civil action of which the district courts have original ju-
risdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental ju-
risdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, David Samson of New
Jersey, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson of
Oklahoma, Charlie Condon of South Carolina, Paul G. Summers of Ten-
nessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Jerry W.
Kilgore of Virginia; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by
Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley.

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Opinion of the Court
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that in-
volve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”
As the introductory clause suggests, not every claim within
the same “case or controversy” as the claim within the fed-
eral courts’ original jurisdiction will be decided by the fed-
eral court; §§ 1367(b) and (c) describe situations in which a
federal court may or must decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. Section 1367(c), for example, states:
“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—
“(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State
law,
“(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim
or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction,
“(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction, or
“(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other com-
pelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”
Thus, some claims asserted under § 1367(a) will be dismissed
because the district court declines to exercise jurisdiction
over them and, if they are to be pursued, must be refiled
in state court. To prevent the limitations period on such
supplemental claims from expiring while the plaintiff was
fruitlessly pursuing them in federal court, § 1367(d) provides
a tolling rule that must be applied by state courts:
“The period of limitations for any claim asserted under
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action
that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after
the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be
tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for
a longer tolling period.”

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460 JINKS v. RICHLAND COUNTY
Opinion of the Court
B
On October 14, 1994, Carl H. Jinks was arrested and jailed
for failure to pay child support. Four days later, while con-
fined at respondent’s detention center, he died of complica-
tions associated with alcohol withdrawal. In 1996, within
the applicable statute of limitations, petitioner Susan Jinks,
Carl Jinks’s widow, brought an action in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina against re-
spondent, its detention center director, and its detention cen-
ter physician. She asserted a cause of action under Rev.
Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and also supplemental claims
for wrongful death and survival under the South Carolina
Tort Claims Act. See S. C. Code Ann. § 15–78–10 et seq.
(West Supp. 2002). On November 20, 1997, the District
Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment on the § 1983 claim, and two weeks later issued an order
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-
law claims, dismissing them without prejudice pursuant to
28 U. S. C. § 1367(c)(3).
On December 18, 1997, petitioner filed her wrongful-death
and survival claims in state court. After the jury returned
a verdict of $80,000 against respondent on the wrongful-
death claim, respondent appealed to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, which reversed on the ground that petitioner’s
state-law claims were time barred. Although they would
not have been time barred under § 1367(d)’s tolling rule, the
State Supreme Court held that § 1367(d) was unconstitu-
tional as applied to claims brought in state court against a
State’s political subdivisions, because it “interferes with the
State’s sovereign authority to establish the extent to which
its political subdivisions are subject to suit.” 349 S. C. 298,
304, 563 S. E. 2d 104, 107 (2002).
We granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 972 (2002).

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Opinion of the Court
II
A
Respondent and its amici first contend that § 1367(d) is
facially invalid because it exceeds the enumerated powers
of Congress. We disagree. Although the Constitution does
not expressly empower Congress to toll limitations periods
for state-law claims brought in state court, it does give Con-
gress the authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution [Congress’s Ar-
ticle I, § 8,] Powers and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States . . . .”
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The enactment of § 1367(d) was not the
first time Congress prescribed the alteration of a state-law
limitations period; 1 nor is this the first case in which we have
ruled on its authority to do so. In Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall.
1 See, e. g., Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App.
§ 525 (“The period of military service shall not be included in computing
any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law, regulation, or order
for the bringing of any action or proceeding in any court . . . by or against
any person in military service”); 42 U. S. C. § 9658(a)(1) (“In the case of
any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property dam-
ages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous
substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment
from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as speci-
fied in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a
commencement date which is earlier than the federally required com-
mencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required
commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute”);
11 U. S. C. § 108(c) (“Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law . . . fixes a period for commencing or continuing
a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against
the debtor . . . and such period has not expired before the date of the filing
of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of—(1) the
end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on
or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the
termination or expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, 1201, or 1301
of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim”).

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Opinion of the Court
493 (1871), we upheld as constitutional a federal statute that
tolled limitations periods for state-law civil and criminal
cases for the time during which actions could not be prose-
cuted because of the Civil War. We reasoned that this law
was both necessary and proper to carrying into effect the
Federal Government’s war powers, because it “remed[ied]
the evils” that had arisen from the war. “It would be a
strange result if those in rebellion, by protracting the con-
flict, could thus rid themselves of their debts, and Congress,
which had the power to wage war and suppress the insurrec-
tion, had no power to remedy such an evil, which is one of
its consequences.” Id., at 507.
Of course § 1367(d) has nothing to do with the war power.
We agree with petitioner and intervenor United States, how-
ever, that § 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into
execution Congress’s power “[t]o constitute Tribunals infe-
rior to the supreme Court,” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 9,
and to assure that those tribunals may fairly and efficiently
exercise “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,” Art. III,
§ 1. As to “necessity”: The federal courts can assuredly
exist and function in the absence of § 1367(d), but we long
ago rejected the view that the Necessary and Proper Clause
demands that an Act of Congress be “ ‘absolutely neces-
sary’ ” to the exercise of an enumerated power. See McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 414–415 (1819). Rather, it
suffices that § 1367(d) is “conducive to the due administration
of justice” in federal court,2 and is “plainly adapted” to that
end, id., at 417, 421. Section 1367(d) is conducive to the ad-
ministration of justice because it provides an alternative to
the unsatisfactory options that federal judges faced when
they decided whether to retain jurisdiction over supplemen-
tal state-law claims that might be time barred in state court.
In the pre-§ 1367(d) world, they had three basic choices:
2 This was Chief Justice Marshall’s description in McCulloch of why—
by way of example—legislation punishing perjury in the federal courts is
valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See 4 Wheat., at 417.

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Opinion of the Court
First, they could condition dismissal of the state-law claim
on the defendant’s waiver of any statute-of-limitations de-
fense in state court. See, e. g., Duckworth v. Franzen, 780
F. 2d 645, 657 (CA7 1985); Financial General Bankshares,
Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F. 2d 768, 778 (CADC 1982). That
waiver could be refused, however, in which case one of the
remaining two choices would have to be pursued. Second,
they could retain jurisdiction over the state-law claim even
though it would more appropriately be heard in state court.
See Newman v. Burgin, 930 F. 2d 955, 963–964 (CA1 1991)
(collecting cases). That would produce an obvious frustra-
tion of statutory policy. And third, they could dismiss the
state-law claim but allow the plaintiff to reopen the federal
case if the state court later held the claim to be time barred.
See, e. g., Rheaume v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 666 F. 2d
925, 932 (CA5 1982). That was obviously inefficient. By
providing a straightforward tolling rule in place of this re-
gime, § 1367(d) unquestionably promotes fair and efficient op-
eration of the federal courts and is therefore conducive to
the administration of justice.
And it is conducive to the administration of justice for an-
other reason: It eliminates a serious impediment to access to
the federal courts on the part of plaintiffs pursuing federal-
and state-law claims that “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact,” Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725
(1966). Prior to enactment of § 1367(d), they had the follow-
ing unattractive options: (1) They could file a single federal-
court action, which would run the risk that the federal court
would dismiss the state-law claims after the limitations pe-
riod had expired; (2) they could file a single state-law action,
which would abandon their right to a federal forum; (3) they
could file separate, timely actions in federal and state court
and ask that the state-court litigation be stayed pending res-
olution of the federal case, which would increase litigation
costs with no guarantee that the state court would oblige.
Section 1367(d) replaces this selection of inadequate choices

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464 JINKS v. RICHLAND COUNTY
Opinion of the Court
with the assurance that state-law claims asserted under
§ 1367(a) will not become time barred while pending in fed-
eral court.
We are also persuaded, and respondent does not deny, that
§ 1367(d) is “plainly adapted” to the power of Congress to
establish the lower federal courts and provide for the fair
and efficient exercise of their Article III powers. There is
no suggestion by either of the parties that Congress enacted
§ 1367(d) as a “pretext” for “the accomplishment of objects
not entrusted to the [federal] government,” McCulloch,
supra, at 423, nor is the connection between § 1367(d) and
Congress’s authority over the federal courts so attenuated
as to undermine the enumeration of powers set forth in Arti-
cle I, § 8, cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 567–568
(1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 615 (2000).
Respondent and its amici further contend, however, that
§ 1367(d) is not a “proper” exercise of Congress’s Article I
powers because it violates principles of state sovereignty.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 923–924 (1997).
Respondent views § 1367(d)’s tolling rule as a regulation of
state-court “procedure,” and contends that Congress may
not, consistent with the Constitution, prescribe procedural
rules for state courts’ adjudication of purely state-law claims.
See, e. g., Bellia, Federal Regulation of State Court Proce-
dures, 110 Yale L. J. 947 (2001); Congressional Authority to
Require State Courts to Use Certain Procedures in Products
Liability Cases, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 372, 373–374
(1989) (stating that “potential constitutional questions” arise
when Congress “attempts to prescribe directly the state
court procedures to be followed in products liability cases”).
Assuming for the sake of argument that a principled dichot-
omy can be drawn, for purposes of determining whether an
Act of Congress is “proper,” between federal laws that regu-
late state-court “procedure” and laws that change the “sub-
stance” of state-law rights of action, we do not think that

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Opinion of the Court
state-law limitations periods fall into the category of “proce-
dure” immune from congressional regulation. Respondent’s
reliance on Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717 (1988),
which held a state statute of limitations to be “procedural”
for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is mis-
placed. As we noted in that very case, the meaning of
“ ‘substance’ ” and “ ‘procedure’ ” in a particular context is
“largely determined by the purposes for which the dichot-
omy is drawn.” Id., at 726. For purposes of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), for example, statutes of limita-
tions are treated as substantive. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945). Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall., at 506–
507, provides ample support for the proposition that—if the
substance-procedure dichotomy posited by respondent is
valid—the tolling of limitations periods falls on the “substan-
tive” side of the line. To sustain § 1367(d) in this case, we
need not (and do not) hold that Congress has unlimited
power to regulate practice and procedure in state courts.
We therefore reject respondent’s contention that § 1367(d)
is facially unconstitutional.
B
Respondent next maintains that § 1367(d) should not be
interpreted to apply to claims brought against a State’s polit-
ical subdivisions. We find this contention also to be with-
out merit.
The South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S. C. Code Ann. § 15–
78–10 et seq. (West Supp. 2002), confers upon respondent an
immunity from tort liability for any claim brought more than
two years after the injury was or should have been discov-
ered. In respondent’s view, § 1367(d)’s extension of the time
period in which a State’s political subdivisions may be sued
constitutes an impermissible abrogation of “sovereign immu-
nity.” That is not so. Although we have held that Con-
gress lacks authority under Article I to override a State’s
immunity from suit in its own courts, see Alden v. Maine,

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Opinion of the Court
527 U. S. 706 (1999), it may subject a municipality to suit in
state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its
enumerated powers, see id., at 756. Section 1367(d) tolls the
limitations period with respect to state-law causes of action
brought against municipalities, but we see no reason why
that represents a greater intrusion on “state sovereignty”
than the undisputed power of Congress to override state-law
immunity when subjecting a municipality to suit under a fed-
eral cause of action. In either case, a State’s authority to
set the conditions upon which its political subdivisions are
subject to suit in its own courts must yield to the enactments
of Congress. This is not an encroachment on “state sover-
eignty,” but merely the consequence of those cases (which
respondent does not ask us to overrule) which hold that mu-
nicipalities, unlike States, do not enjoy a constitutionally pro-
tected immunity from suit.
Nor do we see any reason to construe § 1367(d) not to apply
to claims brought against a State’s political subdivisions ab-
sent an “unmistakably clear” statement of the statute’s appli-
cability to such claims. Although we held in Raygor v. Re-
gents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533 (2002), that § 1367(d)
does not apply to claims filed in federal court against States
but subsequently dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds,
we did so to avoid interpreting the statute in a manner that
would raise “serious constitutional doubt” in light of our
decisions protecting a State’s sovereign immunity from
congressional abrogation, id., at 543. As we have just
explained, however, no such constitutional doubt arises from
holding that petitioner’s claim against respondent—which is
not a State, but a political subdivision of a State—falls under
the definition of “any claim asserted under subsection (a).”
§ 1367(d) (emphasis added). In any event, the idea that an
“unmistakably clear” statement is required before an Act of
Congress may expose a local government to liability cannot
possibly be reconciled with our holding in Monell v. New

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Souter, J., concurring
York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978), that
municipalities are subject to suit as “persons” under § 1983.
* * *
The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, concurring.
In joining the Court today, I do not signal any change of
opinion from my dissent in Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706,
760 (1999).