KONTRICK v. RYAN

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443 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
KONTRICK v. RYAN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 02–819. Argued November 3, 2003—Decided January 14, 2004
A creditor in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings has “60 days after the first
date set for the meeting of creditors” to file a complaint objecting to the
debtor’s discharge. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4004(a). The bankruptcy
court may extend that period “for cause” on motion “filed before the
time has expired.” Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4004(b). Reinforcing Rule
4004(b)’s restriction on extension of the Rule 4004(a) deadline, Rule
9006(b)(3) allows enlargement of “the time for taking action” under Rule
4004(a) “only to the extent and under the conditions stated in [that
rule],” i. e., only as permitted by Rule 4004(b).
On April 4, 1997, petitioner Kontrick filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition. After gaining three successive time extensions from the
Bankruptcy Court, respondent Ryan, Kontrick’s creditor, filed a com-
plaint on January 13, 1998, objecting to Kontrick’s discharge. Ryan al-
leged that Kontrick had transferred property, within one year of filing
his petition, with the intent to defraud creditors, and therefore did not
qualify for discharge under 11 U. S. C. §§ 727(a)(2)–(5). Ryan filed an
amended complaint on May 6, 1998, with leave of court, but without
seeking or gaining a court-approved time extension. The amended
complaint alleged with particularity that Kontrick had fraudulently
transferred money to his wife, first by removing his own name from
the family’s once-joint checking account, then by continuing regularly to
deposit his salary checks into the account, from which his wife routinely
paid family expenses (the “family-account” claim). Kontrick’s June 10,
1998, answer to the amended complaint did not raise the untimeliness
of the family-account claim; on the merits, the answer admitted the
transfers to the family account but denied that Kontrick had violated
§ 727(a)(2)(A). In response to Ryan’s summary judgment motion, which
appended a statement of material facts, Kontrick cross-moved to strike
portions of Ryan’s summary judgment filings, but did not ask the court
to strike the amended complaint’s family-account allegations. On Feb-
ruary 25, 2000, the Bankruptcy Court awarded Ryan summary judg-
ment on the family-account claim, concluding that Kontrick was not enti-
tled to discharge because his transfers to the family account were made
with intent to defraud at least creditor Ryan. Kontrick then moved for
reconsideration. For the first time, Kontrick urged that the court was

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444 KONTRICK v. RYAN
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powerless to adjudicate the family-account claim. The amended com-
plaint containing that claim, Kontrick observed, was untimely under
Rules 4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3). Those rules, Kontrick maintained,
establish a mandatory, unalterable time limit of the kind Kontrick called
“jurisdictional.” The Bankruptcy Court denied reconsideration and en-
tered final judgment, holding that Rule 4004’s complaint-filing time in-
structions are not “jurisdictional,” and that Kontrick had waived the
right to assert the untimeliness of the amended complaint by failing
squarely to raise the point before the court reached the merits of Ryan’s
objections to discharge. The District Court sustained the denial of dis-
charge, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both courts relied on deci-
sions of sister Circuits holding that the timeliness provisions at issue
are not “jurisdictional.”
Held: A debtor forfeits the right to rely on Rule 4004 if the debtor does
not raise the Rule’s time limitation before the bankruptcy court reaches
the merits of the creditor’s objection to discharge. Pp. 452–460.
(a) Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction. U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1. Congress did so, as per-
tinent here, by instructing that “objections to discharges” are “[c]ore
proceedings” within the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C.
§ 157(b)(2)(J). Congress did not build time constraints into that stat-
utory authorization. Rather, the time constraints applicable to ob-
jections to discharge are contained in Bankruptcy Rules prescribed
pursuant to § 2075. Such rules “do not create or withdraw federal ju-
risdiction.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365,
370. As Bankruptcy Rule 9030 states, the Bankruptcy Rules “shall not
be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts.” The
filing deadlines prescribed in Rules 4004 and 9006(b)(3) are claim-
processing rules that do not delineate what cases bankruptcy courts are
competent to adjudicate. Although Kontrick now concedes that those
Rules are not properly labeled “jurisdictional” in the sense of describing
a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, he maintains that the Rules have
the same import as provisions governing subject-matter jurisdiction.
A litigant generally may raise a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion at any time in the same civil action. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co.
v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382. Similarly, Kontrick urges, a debtor may
challenge a creditor’s objection to discharge as untimely under Rules
4004 and 9006(b)(3) at any time in the proceedings, even initially on
appeal or certiorari. The equation Kontrick advances overlooks the
critical difference between a rule governing subject-matter jurisdiction
and an inflexible claim-processing rule. Characteristically, a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the par-

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ties’ litigation conduct; a claim-processing rule, on the other hand, even
if unalterable on a party’s application, can nonetheless be forfeited if the
party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point. Pp. 452–456.
(b) No reasonable construction of complaint-processing rules would
allow a litigant situated as Kontrick is to defeat a claim, as filed too late,
after the party has litigated and lost the case on the merits. The rele-
vant claim-processing rules in this case, Bankruptcy Rules 4004(a) and
(b) and 9006(b)(3), include, among their primary purposes, affording the
debtor an affirmative defense to a complaint filed outside the Rules
4004(a) and (b) time limits. It is uncontested that Ryan filed his com-
plaint objecting to Kontrick’s discharge outside those limits. Kontrick
urges that nothing occurring thereafter counts, for the Rules’ time pre-
scriptions are unalterable, allowing no recourse to equitable exceptions.
This case, however, involves no issue of equitable tolling or any other
equity-based exception. Neither at the time Ryan filed the amended
complaint containing the family-account claim nor anytime thereafter
did he assert circumstances—equitable or otherwise—qualifying him
for a time extension. The sole question is whether Kontrick forfeited
his right to assert the untimeliness of Ryan’s amended complaint by
failing to raise the issue until after that complaint was adjudicated on
the merits. In other words, how long did the affirmative defense Rules
4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3) afforded Kontrick linger in the proceed-
ings? The Seventh Circuit followed the proper path on this key ques-
tion. It noted that time bars generally must be raised in an answer or
responsive pleading. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c) (made applicable to
bankruptcy court adversary proceedings by Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc.
7008(a)). An answer may be amended to include an inadvertently omit-
ted affirmative defense, and even after the time to amend “of course”
has passed, “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a) (made applicable to adversary pro-
ceedings by Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7015). Kontrick not only failed to
assert the time constraints of Rules 4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3) in a
pleading or amended pleading responsive to Ryan’s amended complaint.
In addition, Kontrick moved to delete certain items from Ryan’s sum-
mary judgment filings, but, even that far into the litigation, he did
not ask the Bankruptcy Court to strike the family-account claim.
Ordinarily, a defense is lost if it is not included in the answer or
amended answer. See Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7012(b) (Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc. 12(b)–(h) apply in adversary proceedings). Rules 12(h)(2) and
(3) prolong the life of certain defenses, but time prescriptions are not
among them. Even if a defense based on Bankruptcy Rule 4004 could
be equated to “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”
the issue could be raised, at the latest, “at the trial on the merits.”

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446 KONTRICK v. RYAN
Opinion of the Court
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(2). Only lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
is preserved post-trial. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3). Kontrick’s re-
sistance to the family-account claim is not of that order. Pp. 456–460.
295 F. 3d 724, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
E. King Poor argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Kimball R. Anderson, Michael J. Stepek,
and Laura D. Cullison.
James R. Figliulo argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were James H. Bowhay, Michael A. Pol-
lard, and G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.
Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General
McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, William
Kanter, and Michael E. Robinson.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the duration of a right to object to a
pleading on the ground that it was filed out of time. Under
the Bankruptcy Rules governing Chapter 7 liquidation pro-
ceedings, a creditor has “60 days after the first date set for
the meeting of creditors” to file a complaint objecting to the
debtor’s discharge. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4004(a). That
period may be extended “for cause” on motion “filed before
the time has expired.” Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4004(b). In
the matter before us a creditor, in an untimely pleading, ob-
jected to the debtor’s discharge. The debtor, however, did
not promptly move to dismiss the creditor’s plea as imper-
missibly late. Only after the Bankruptcy Court decided, on
the merits, that the discharge should be refused did the
debtor, in a motion for reconsideration, urge the untimeliness
of the creditor’s plea.
*Henry J. Sommer filed a brief for the National Association of Con-
sumer Bankruptcy Attorneys as amicus curiae urging reversal.

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Opinion of the Court
Bankruptcy Rule 4004’s time prescription, the debtor
maintains, is “jurisdictional,” i. e., dispositive whenever
raised in the proceedings. Rejecting the debtor’s “jurisdic-
tional” characterization, the courts below held that Rule
4004’s time prescription could not be invoked to upset an
adjudication on the merits. We agree that Rule 4004 is not
“jurisdictional.” Affirming the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, we hold that a debtor for-
feits the right to rely on Rule 4004 if the debtor does not
raise the Rule’s time limitation before the bankruptcy court
reaches the merits of the creditor’s objection to discharge.
I
A debtor in a Chapter 7 liquidation case qualifies for an
order discharging his debts if he satisfies the conditions
stated in § 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U. S. C.
§ 727(a).1 A discharge granted under § 727(a) frees the
debtor from all debts existing at the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding other than obligations § 523 of the
Code excepts from discharge. § 727(b).2
A debtor’s discharge may be opposed by the trustee, the
United States trustee, or any creditor. § 727(c)(1). Adjudi-
cation of “objections to discharg[e],” Congress provided, is a
1 Under § 727(a), the court may not grant a discharge of any debts if the
debtor, inter alia: (1) is not an individual; (2) has, with intent to defraud
a creditor, concealed, transferred, or destroyed property of the estate
(A) in the year preceding bankruptcy or (B) during the bankruptcy case;
(3) has destroyed books or records; (4) has knowingly (A) given a false
oath or account, (B) presented or used a false claim, (C) attempted to
obtain money by acting or forbearing to act, or (D) withheld documents
relating to the debtor’s property or financial affairs; or (5) has failed to
explain a loss or deficiency of assets. 11 U. S. C. §§ 727(a)(1)–(5).
2 Section 523 categorizes debts that are nondischargeable. See, e. g.,
11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(1) (certain debts “for a tax or a customs duty”);
§ 523(a)(2)(A) (certain debts for money obtained by “false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud”); § 523(a)(5) (certain debts “to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor” for “support of such spouse or
child”); § 523(a)(6) (debts for “willful and malicious injury by the debtor”).

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“[c]ore proceedin[g]” within the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts. 28 U. S. C. § 157(b)(2)(J). No statute, how-
ever, specifies a time limit for filing a complaint objecting to
the debtor’s discharge. Instead, the controlling time pre-
scriptions are contained in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, specifically, Rules 4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3).
In relevant part, Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a) states: “[A]
complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge under § 727(a)
of the Code shall be filed no later than 60 days after the
first date set for the meeting of creditors.” Rule 4004(b),
governing extensions of the Rule 4004(a) filing deadline, pro-
vides: “[T]he court may for cause extend the time [Rule
4004(a) allows] to file a complaint objecting to discharge” if
the motion is “filed before the time has expired.” Reinforc-
ing Rule 4004(b)’s restriction on extension of the Rule
4004(a) deadline, Rule 9006(b)(3) allows enlargement of “the
time for taking action” under Rule 4004(a) “only to the ex-
tent and under the conditions stated in [that rule],” i. e., only
as permitted by Rule 4004(b).3
II
On April 4, 1997, petitioner, Dr. Andrew J. Kontrick, filed
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Respondent, Dr. Robert
A. Ryan, a major creditor and Kontrick’s former associate in
3 Under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), essentially the same time prescrip-
tions apply to complaints targeting the discharge of a particular debt pur-
suant to 11 U. S. C. § 523(c). See supra, at 447, n. 2. Rule 4007(c) tracks
Rules 4004(a) and (b), and Rule 9006(b)(3) lists Rule 4007(c) as well as Rule
4004(a) among time prescriptions bankruptcy courts may enlarge “only
to the extent and under the conditions stated [in the rules themselves].”
Because of the practical identity of the time prescriptions for objections
to the discharge of any debts under § 727(a) and for objections to the dis-
charge of particular debts under § 523(c), courts have considered decisions
construing Rule 4007(c) in determining whether the time limits delineated
in Rules 4004(a) and (b) may be forfeited. See, e. g., In re Kontrick, 295
F. 3d 724, 730, n. 3 (CA7 2002) (citing In re Santos, 112 B. R. 1001, 1004,
n. 2 (BAP CA9 1990)).

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Opinion of the Court
a cosmetic and plastic surgery practice, opposed Kontrick’s
discharge. After gaining three successive time extensions
from the Bankruptcy Court, Ryan filed an original complaint
on January 13, 1998, in which he objected to the discharge
of any of Kontrick’s debts. Ryan alleged that Kontrick had
transferred property, within one year of filing the bank-
ruptcy petition, with intent to defraud creditors, and there-
fore did not qualify for a discharge under 11 U. S. C.
§§ 727(a)(2)–(5). App. to Pet. for Cert. 40.
Ryan filed an amended complaint on May 6, 1998, with
leave of court, ibid., but without seeking or gaining a
court-approved time extension. The amended complaint
particularized for the first time the debtor’s violation of
§ 727(a)(2)(A) in this regard: Debtor Kontrick, creditor Ryan
alleged, had fraudulently transferred money to Kontrick’s
wife, first by removing Kontrick’s own name from the fami-
ly’s once-joint checking account, then by continuing regularly
to deposit his salary checks into the account, from which his
wife routinely paid family expenses (the “family-account”
claim). Id., at 52–53.4
Kontrick answered Ryan’s amended complaint on June 10,
1998. His answer “did not raise the untimeliness of [the
family-account] claim,” Brief for Petitioner 4; on the merits,
he admitted the transfers to the family account but denied
violating § 727(a)(2)(A). In March 1999, after the parties en-
gaged in acrimonious discovery, Ryan moved for summary
judgment. As Local Bankruptcy Rule 402(M) (Bkrtcy. Ct.
ND Ill. 1994) instructs, Ryan appended to his motion
“a statement of material facts as to which [he] contend[ed]
there [was] no genuine issue.” Kontrick cross-moved, in Au-
4 Although Kontrick took his name off the family bank account some four
years prior to his bankruptcy petition, his salary check deposits continued
into the one-year period preceding bankruptcy specified in 11 U. S. C.
§ 727(a)(2)(A) (described supra, at 447, n. 1). See App. to Pet. for Cert.
33, 52–53.

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gust 1999, to strike portions of Ryan’s summary judgment
filings.
Kontrick’s motion to strike sought deletion of “new allega-
tions,” i. e., allegations making their first appearance in the
litigation in Ryan’s summary judgment submissions—Ryan’s
statement of facts pursuant to Local Rule 402(M), accompa-
nying exhibits, and corresponding portions of the summary
judgment motion and memorandum. Motion to Strike and
Response to [Ryan’s] Statement of Facts Under Local Rule
402 N in No. 97 B 10353 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ill.), pp. 2, 5, 26.
Although Kontrick noted that the family-account allegations
were stated only in the amended complaint and were absent
from the original complaint, id., at 3–4, he did not ask the
court to strike those allegations. His response, instead, and
in line with Local Rule 402(N), addressed the substance of
the family-account claim. He admitted taking his name off
the account, but observed that he did so “over four years
before bankruptcy.” Id., at 13. He also acknowledged that,
thereafter, he “deposited his paycheck into the account the
same way he had always done.” Ibid.
On February 25, 2000, the Bankruptcy Court ruled on the
cross-motions, granting in part Kontrick’s motion to strike,
awarding summary judgment to Ryan on the family-account
claim, and dismissing the remaining claims. The court used
the amended complaint as its baseline; it struck as untimely
“allegations not included in [that] complaint.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 47; see id., at 48–50. Homing in on Kontrick’s con-
tinuing deposits into the account from which he had removed
his name, the court concluded that Kontrick had transferred
property with intent “to hinder, delay or defraud at least
[creditor] Ryan.” Id., at 55. That course of conduct, cou-
pled with Kontrick’s testimony,5 the court concluded, sufficed
to prove a violation of § 727(a)(2) (described supra, at 447,
5 In a prebankruptcy deposition, Kontrick admitted he transferred the
once-joint bank account to his wife to prevent his creditors from attaching
the funds. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 53; 295 F. 3d, at 727–728.

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n. 1). App. to Pet. for Cert. 55, 64. Accordingly, the court
held, Kontrick was not entitled to a discharge of his debts.
Kontrick moved for reconsideration. He argued that the
Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction over the sole claim on
which the court had granted summary judgment, the family-
account claim. See id., at 71. The court was powerless to
adjudicate the claim, Kontrick insisted, because the amended
complaint containing the claim was untimely. Governing
Rules 4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3), see supra, at 448, Kon-
trick maintained, establish a mandatory, unalterable time
limit of the kind he then called “jurisdictional.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 71. It was the first time Kontrick appended a
jurisdictional label to any pleading he filed relating to the
family-account claim.
The Bankruptcy Court denied the reconsideration motion
on June 8, 2000, and entered final judgment five days later.
The court held that Rule 4004’s complaint-filing time instruc-
tions are not “jurisdictional,” and that Kontrick had waived
the right to assert the untimeliness of the amended com-
plaint by failing squarely to raise the point before the court
reached the merits of Ryan’s objections to discharge.
The District Court sustained the Bankruptcy Court’s deci-
sion denying Kontrick’s discharge. App. to Pet. for Cert.
25–38. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
turn, affirmed the judgment of the District Court. In re
Kontrick, 295 F. 3d 724 (2002). Both courts relied on deci-
sions of sister Circuits holding that “the timeliness provi-
sions at issue here are not jurisdictional.” Id., at 733 (citing
In re Benedict, 90 F. 3d 50, 54–55 (CA2 1996), and Farouki
v. Emirates Bank Int’l, Ltd., 14 F. 3d 244, 248 (CA4 1994));
accord App. to Pet. for Cert. 31–32. Both courts also agreed
with the Bankruptcy Court that Kontrick had waived the
right to challenge Ryan’s amended complaint as impermissi-
bly late.
The Seventh Circuit found in Kontrick’s papers opposing
summary judgment nothing that placed in issue the timeli-

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ness of allegations in the amended complaint. 295 F. 3d, at
735. Instead, according to the Court of Appeals, Kontrick
apparently accepted creditor Ryan’s amended complaint as
properly filed; Kontrick used that complaint, not the original
complaint, as a baseline to object to new allegations Ryan
made for the first time in his statement of facts supporting
summary judgment. Ibid. The Seventh Circuit further
commented that “[t]he policy concerns of expeditious admin-
istration of bankruptcy matters and the finality of the bank-
ruptcy court’s decision hardly are fostered by requiring the
bankruptcy court to consider the timeliness of an issue that
it already has adjudicated.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari in view of the division of opinion on
whether Rule 4004 is “jurisdictional,” 6 538 U. S. 998 (2003),
and we now affirm the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.7
III
Only Congress may determine a lower federal court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction. U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1.
6 Compare, e. g., In re Coggin, 30 F. 3d 1443, 1450–1451 (CA11 1994)
(referring to Rule 4004(b) as a “jurisdictional requirement” and a “jurisdic-
tional bar”), with, e. g., In re Benedict, 90 F. 3d 50, 54 (CA2 1996) (“time
period imposed by Rule 4007(c) is not jurisdictional”).
7 On brief and at oral argument, counsel for Kontrick suggested that, by
noting that the family-account claim was not stated in the original com-
plaint, Kontrick had implicitly invited dismissal of the claim. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 5; Brief for Petitioner 5 (“Kontrick . . . argued that in opposing
Ryan’s many other allegations as untimely, he had also sufficiently raised
the untimeliness of the family account claim.”). Kontrick’s notation that
the family-account claim was absent from the original complaint, the
courts below agreed, fell short of an argument that the claim was untimely.
295 F. 3d, at 735; App. to Pet. for Cert. 72. We have no cause to disturb
that determination. In any event, we train our attention on the ques-
tion Kontrick here presented: “[W]hether the deadline set by Rule 4004
is mandatory and jurisdictional and thus cannot be waived.” Brief for
Petitioner i. See also Pet. for Cert. i. We note, too, that the question
whether the family-account claim could properly “relate back” to the origi-
nal complaint was neither raised in the Seventh Circuit, 295 F. 3d, at 729,
n. 2, nor aired in this Court, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.

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Opinion of the Court
Congress did so with respect to bankruptcy courts in Title
28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure); in cataloging core
bankruptcy proceedings, Congress authorized bankruptcy
courts to adjudicate, inter alia, objections to discharge. See
28 U. S. C. §§ 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(I) and (J). Certain statu-
tory provisions governing bankruptcy courts contain built-in
time constraints. For example, § 157(c)(1) addresses de novo
district court review of bankruptcy court findings and con-
clusions in noncore proceedings; that provision confines re-
view to “matters to which any party has timely and specifi-
cally objected.” 8 The provision conferring jurisdiction over
objections to discharge, however, contains no timeliness con-
dition. Section 157(b)(2)(J) instructs only that “objections
to discharges” are “[c]ore proceedings” within the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy courts.
The time constraints applicable to objections to discharge
are contained in Bankruptcy Rules prescribed by this Court
for “the practice and procedure in cases under title 11.” 28
U. S. C. § 2075; cf. § 2072 (similarly providing for Court-
prescribed “rules of practice and procedure” for cases in the
federal district courts and courts of appeals). “[I]t is axio-
matic” that such rules “do not create or withdraw federal
jurisdiction.” Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U. S. 365, 370 (1978). As Bankruptcy Rule 9030 states,
the Bankruptcy Rules “shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the courts.” Rule 9030’s forerun-
ner—its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
8 Provisions of a similar order, with built-in time constraints, include 28
U. S. C. § 2401(b) (tort claim against United States “shall be forever
barred” unless presented “to the appropriate Federal agency within two
years after [the] claim accrues” or civil action “is begun within six months
after . . . notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented”); and § 2107(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section,
no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or
proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless
notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judg-
ment, order or decree.”).

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454 KONTRICK v. RYAN
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Rule 82—similarly states: “These rules shall not be con-
strued to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts . . . .” See 12 C. Wright, A. Miller, & R.
Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3141, pp. 484–485
(2d ed. 1997) (“Rule 82 states [the] important principle” that
“[t]he rules merely prescribe the method by which the juris-
diction granted the courts by Congress is to be exercised.”);
Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970) (“The proce-
dural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction
of its business are not jurisdictional . . . .”). In short, the
filing deadlines prescribed in Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and
9006(b)(3) are claim-processing rules that do not delineate
what cases bankruptcy courts are competent to adjudicate.
This much is common ground. Kontrick does not contend
in this Court that the timing rules in question affect the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 9 (acknowledging that “[t]his case does not
deal with subject matter jurisdiction”); id., at 9–10 (explain-
ing that counsel for Kontrick used the word “jurisdiction”
“as a shorthand” to indicate a nonextendable time limit).
Courts, including this Court, it is true, have been less than
meticulous in this regard; they have more than occasionally
used the term “jurisdictional” to describe emphatic time pre-
scriptions in rules of court. “Jurisdiction,” the Court has
aptly observed, “is a word of many, too many, meanings.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, we
have described Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), on time
enlargement, and correspondingly, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 45(b), on extending time, as “mandatory and juris-
dictional.” United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 228–
229 (1960). But see Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416,
419–433 (1996) (holding that, over the prosecutor’s objection,
a court may not grant a postverdict motion for a judgment
of acquittal filed one day outside the time limit allowed by
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(c); this Court did not characterize

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455 Cite as: 540 U. S. 443 (2004)
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the Rule as “jurisdictional”); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
503 U. S. 638, 642–646 (1992) (similar ruling regarding Fed.
Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 4003(b)). “[C]lassify[ing] time prescrip-
tions, even rigid ones, under the heading ‘subject matter ju-
risdiction’ ” can be confounding. Carlisle, 517 U. S., at 434
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Clarity would be facilitated if
courts and litigants used the label “jurisdictional” not for
claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating
the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the per-
sons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudica-
tory authority.
Though Kontrick concedes that Rules 4004 and 9006(b)(3)
are not properly labeled “jurisdictional” in the sense of de-
scribing a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, he maintains
that the Rules have the same import as provisions governing
subject-matter jurisdiction. A litigant generally may raise
a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time in
the same civil action, even initially at the highest appellate
instance. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S.
379, 382 (1884) (challenge to a federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction may be made at any stage of the proceedings,
and the court should raise the question sua sponte); Capron
v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126, 127 (1804) ( judgment loser
successfully raised lack of diversity jurisdiction for the first
time before the Supreme Court); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”).9 Just so, Kon-
trick urges, a debtor may challenge a creditor’s objection to
discharge as untimely under Rules 4004 and 9006(b)(3) any
time in the proceedings, even initially on appeal or certiorari.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 10–11 (a debtor may object after final judg-
ment or on appeal “so long as it’s within the same proceed-
9 Even subject-matter jurisdiction, however, may not be attacked collat-
erally. Des Moines Nav. & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552
(1887); see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1980).

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456 KONTRICK v. RYAN
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ing”); Brief for Petitioner 25, and n. 7 (same); Reply Brief 16,
and n. 7 (citing lower court decisions supporting Kontrick’s
argument on the longevity of time limits stated in Rules 4004
and 9006(b)(3), e. g., In re Poskanzer, 146 B. R. 125, 131 (NJ
1992); In re Rinde, 276 B. R. 330, 333 (Bkrtcy. Ct. RI 2002);
In re Barley, 130 B. R. 66, 69 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ind. 1991);
In re Kirsch, 65 B. R. 297, 300, 302 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ill. 1986)).
The equation Kontrick advances overlooks a critical differ-
ence between a rule governing subject-matter jurisdiction
and an inflexible claim-processing rule. Characteristically,
a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to
account for the parties’ litigation conduct; a claim-processing
rule, on the other hand, even if unalterable on a party’s appli-
cation, can nonetheless be forfeited if the party asserting the
rule waits too long to raise the point.
IV
We turn back now to the relevant claim-processing rules in
this case. Bankruptcy Rules 4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3),
governing proceedings over which bankruptcy courts have
subject-matter jurisdiction,10 serve three primary purposes.
First, they inform the pleader, i. e., the objecting creditor, of
the time he has to file a complaint. Second, they instruct
the court on the limits of its discretion to grant motions for
complaint-filing-time enlargements. Third, they afford the
debtor an affirmative defense to a complaint filed outside the
Rules 4004(a) and (b) limits. This case involves the third
office of the Rules.
It is uncontested that creditor Ryan filed his complaint ob-
jecting to debtor Kontrick’s discharge outside the Rules’
10 Like Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b) and Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 26(b), Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) is modeled on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). See Advisory Committee’s Note accompa-
nying Rule 9006 (“Subdivision (b) is patterned after Rule 6(b) F. R. Civ. P.
and Rule 26(b) F. R. App. P.” (emphasis in original)).

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time limits. Kontrick urges that nothing occurring thereaf-
ter counts, for the Rules’ time prescriptions are unalterable,
allowing no recourse to “equitable exceptions.” Brief for
Petitioner 13, n. 4; see id., at 8, 16–18. This case, however,
involves no issue of equitable tolling or any other equity-
based exception. Neither at the time creditor Ryan filed
the amended complaint containing the family-account claim
nor anytime thereafter did he assert circumstances—equi-
table or otherwise—qualifying him for a time extension.
Whether the Rules, despite their strict limitations, could be
softened on equitable grounds 11 is therefore a question we
do not reach.12 See Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 16 (“[M]uch of [Kontrick’s] argument is actually directed
to an issue that is not presented in this case,” i. e., whether
the timing rules here in question are alterable by recourse
to “ ‘equitable exceptions imported from outside the rules.’ ”
(quoting Brief for Petitioner 13)); Tr. of Oral Arg. 40
(“Whether [the bankruptcy court] would have had discretion
11 Lower courts have divided on the question whether Bankruptcy Rules
4004 and 4007(c) allow equitable exceptions. Compare, e. g., 295 F. 3d, at
733 (Rules 4004 and 4007(c) “are subject to equitable defenses”); In re
Benedict, 90 F. 3d, at 54 (same conclusion regarding Rule 4007(c)); Farouki
v. Emirates Bank Int’l, Ltd., 14 F. 3d 244, 248 (CA4 1994) (same conclusion
regarding Rule 4004), with, e. g., In re Alton, 837 F. 2d 457, 459 (CA11
1988) (per curiam) (Rule 4007(c) confers no discretion to grant an untimely
motion to extend the time to object, even if the creditor lacked notice of
the bar date); Neeley v. Murchison, 815 F. 2d 345, 346–347 (CA5 1987)
(same).
12 Nor should anything in this opinion be read to suggest that a debtor
and creditor may stipulate to the assertion of time-barred claims when
such an accommodation would operate to the detriment of other creditors.
See, e. g., In re Dollar, 257 B. R. 364, 366 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SD Ga. 2001) (“Al-
though the defendant debtor would significantly benefit by the allowance
of the amended complaint [reflecting the parties’ pretrial agreement to
substitute an untimely § 523(a)(6) cause of action for a timely § 727(a)(2)
claim,] the defendant’s other creditors would be significantly harmed.”).

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458 KONTRICK v. RYAN
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to allow a late complaint . . . isn’t before the Court, because
[Ryan has not] claimed that [in this case] there is any equita-
ble groun[d] for enlarging or extending the deadline, so that
question isn’t presented.”).
We can assume, arguendo, that had Kontrick timely as-
serted the untimeliness of Ryan’s amended complaint, Kon-
trick would have prevailed in the litigation. The question,
in that event, would have been “whether the time restric-
tions in th[e] Rules are in such ‘emphatic form’ ” as to pre-
clude equitable exceptions. Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 16 (citation omitted). See, e. g., Carlisle, 517
U. S., at 419–433 (upholding timely challenge to one-day-late
filing under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(c)); Taylor, 503 U. S.,
at 642–646 (similar ruling regarding Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc.
4003(b)); Robinson, 361 U. S., at 222–230 (similar ruling re-
garding Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45(b)). Here, however, the
sole question is whether Kontrick forfeited his right to as-
sert the untimeliness of Ryan’s amended complaint by failing
to raise the issue until after that complaint was adjudicated
on the merits.13 In other words, how long did the affirma-
tive defense Rules 4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3) afforded
Kontrick linger in the proceedings?
The Court of Appeals, we agree, followed the proper path
on this key question. See 295 F. 3d, at 734–735. Time bars,
that court noted, generally must be raised in an answer or
responsive pleading. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c) (made ap-
plicable to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy courts by
13 As the Government notes, “[t]he issue in this case is more accurately
described as one of forfeiture rather than waiver.” Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 7, n. 5. Although jurists often use the words
interchangeably, “forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of
a right[;] waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.’ United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938)).” Ibid. (some internal quota-
tion marks omitted).

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Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7008(a)).14 An answer may be
amended to include an inadvertently omitted affirmative de-
fense, and even after the time to amend “of course” has
passed, “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice
so requires.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a); see Fed. Rule
Bkrtcy. Proc. 7015 (“Rule 15 F. R. Civ. P. applies in adver-
sary proceedings.”).
Kontrick not only failed to assert the time constraints of
Rules 4004(a) and (b) and 9006(b)(3) in a pleading or amended
pleading responsive to Ryan’s amended complaint. As ear-
lier recounted, see supra, at 449–450, Kontrick moved to de-
lete certain items from Ryan’s summary judgment filings,
but, even that far into the litigation, he did not ask the Bank-
ruptcy Court to strike the family-account claim.
Ordinarily, under the Bankruptcy Rules as under the Civil
Rules, a defense is lost if it is not included in the answer
or amended answer. See Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7012(b)
(“Rule 12(b)–(h) F. R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceed-
ings.”); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 1347, p. 184 (2d ed. 1990) (“A defense or objection
that is not raised by motion or in the responsive pleading is
waived unless it is protected by Rules 12(h)(2) or 12(h)(3) or
by the successful invocation of the liberal amendment policy
of Rule 15.”). Rules 12(h)(2) and (3) prolong the life of cer-
tain defenses, but time prescriptions are not among those
provisions. Even if a defense based on Bankruptcy Rule
4004 could be equated to “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,” the issue could be raised, at the latest,
“at the trial on the merits.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(2).
Only lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is preserved post-
trial. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3). And, as we earlier ex-
plained, see supra, at 452–456, Kontrick’s resistance to the
14 In fuller detail, Bankruptcy Rule 4004(d) provides that “[a] proceeding
commenced by a complaint objecting to discharge is governed by Part VII
of these rules.” Part VII includes Bankruptcy Rule 7008(a), which states
that “Rule 8 F. R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings.”

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460 KONTRICK v. RYAN
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family-account claim is not of that order. No reasonable
construction of complaint-processing rules, in sum, would
allow a litigant situated as Kontrick is to defeat a claim, as
filed too late, after the party has litigated and lost the case
on the merits.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
Affirmed.