MIDDLETON, WARDEN v. McNEIL

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433 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
MIDDLETON, WARDEN v. McNEIL
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 03–1028. Decided May 3, 2004
Respondent was charged with murdering her husband after an argument.
Under California law, the malice element needed for a murder conviction
is negated if one kills out of fear of imminent peril. If that fear is
unreasonable but genuine, California’s “imperfect self-defense” doctrine
reduces the crime to voluntary manslaughter. The voluntary man-
slaughter jury instruction in this case erroneously defined imminent
peril, but the prosecutor’s closing statement correctly stated the law.
Respondent was convicted of second-degree murder. In affirming, the
California Court of Appeal acknowledged the erroneous instruction, but
found that the instructions as a whole and the prosecutor’s argument
made the correct standard clear. The Federal District Court later de-
nied respondent federal habeas relief, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Held: The Ninth Circuit erred in finding that the erroneous instruction
eliminated respondent’s imperfect self-defense claim and that the state
appellate court unreasonably applied federal law by ignoring the unchal-
lenged and uncorrected instruction. A state prisoner is entitled to fed-
eral habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of his constitutional
claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). When a jury
instruction fails to give effect to the requirement that a State prove
every element of a criminal offense, the question is whether the instruc-
tion so infected the entire trial that the conviction violates due process.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 72. Here, the question is whether
there is a “ ‘reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the . . . [am-
biguous] instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Ibid.
Given that there were three correct instructions and one contrary one,
the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law when it found no
reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled by the erroneous instruc-
tion. Though the Ninth Circuit also faulted the state court for relying
on the prosecutor’s argument, nothing in Boyde v. California, 494 U. S.
370, precludes a state court from assuming that counsel’s arguments
clarified an ambiguous jury charge, particularly when they resolve the
ambiguity in the defendant’s favor.
Certiorari granted; 344 F. 3d 988, reversed and remanded.

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434 MIDDLETON v. McNEIL
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
I
Respondent Sally Marie McNeil killed her husband after
an argument over his infidelity and spending habits. The
State of California charged her with murder. Respondent’s
theory at trial was that her husband had tried to strangle
her during the argument, but that she had escaped, fetched
a shotgun from the bedroom, and killed him out of fear for
her life. Fingernail marks were indeed found on her neck
after the shooting. She testified that her husband had been
abusive, and a defense expert opined that she suffered from
Battered Women’s Syndrome. The State countered with fo-
rensic evidence showing that the fingernail marks were not
her husband’s and may have been self-inflicted, and with the
testimony of a 911 operator who overheard respondent tell
her husband she had shot him because she would no longer
tolerate his behavior.
Under California law, “[m]urder is the unlawful killing of
a human being . . . with malice aforethought.” Cal. Penal
Code Ann. § 187(a) (West 1999). The element of malice is
negated if one kills out of fear of imminent peril. In re
Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 773, 872 P. 2d 574, 576 (1994).
Where that fear is unreasonable (but nevertheless genuine),
it reduces the crime from murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter—a doctrine known as “imperfect self-defense.” Ibid.
At respondent’s trial, the judge instructed the jury on these
concepts as follows:
“ ‘The specific intent for voluntary manslaughter, as
opposed to murder, must arise upon one of [the] follow-
ing circumstances:
. . . . .
“ ‘[A]n honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity
to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great
bodily injury. That would be imperfect self-defense.
. . . . .

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435 Cite as: 541 U. S. 433 (2004)
Per Curiam
“ ‘To establish that a killing is murder [and] not man-
slaughter, the burden is on the People to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt each of the elements of murder and
that the act which caused the death was not done . . .
in the honest, even though unreasonable, belief in the
necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or to
great bodily injury.
. . . . .
“ ‘A person, who kills another person in the actual but
unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against
imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlaw-
fully, but is not guilty of murder. This would be so even
though a reasonable person in the same situation, seeing
and knowing the same facts, would not have had the
same belief. Such an actual but unreasonable belief is
not a defense to the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
“ ‘An “imminent” peril is one that is apparent, present,
immediate and must be instantly dealt with, or must so
appear at the time to the slayer as a reasonable per-
son.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31–33.
The last four words of this instruction—“ ‘as a reasonable
person’ ”—are not part of the relevant form instruction,
1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.17 (6th ed.
1996), and were apparently included in error. The prosecu-
tor’s closing argument, however, correctly stated the law.
Respondent was convicted of second-degree murder and
appealed on the basis of the erroneous jury instruction. The
California Court of Appeal acknowledged the error but up-
held her conviction, reasoning:
“[R]eversal is not required because ‘[e]rror cannot be
predicated upon an isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt
from the instructions since the correctness of an instruc-
tion is to be determined in its relation to the other in-
structions and in light of the instructions as a whole.’

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436 MIDDLETON v. McNEIL
Per Curiam
Here, when all of the jury instructions on voluntary
manslaughter and imperfect self-defense, are considered
in their entirety, it is not reasonably likely that the jury
would have misunderstood the requirements of the im-
perfect self-defense component of voluntary manslaugh-
ter. On the contrary, these instructions repeatedly in-
formed the jury that if the defendant had an honest (or
actual) but unreasonable belief in the need to act in
self-defense, then the offense would be manslaughter
and the defendant could not be convicted of murder.
Furthermore, in arguing to the jury, the prosecutor set
forth the appropriate standard, stating ‘[i]f you believe
it is an imperfect self-defense, that she actually believed
but that a reasonable person would not believe in the
necessity for self-defense, that lessens the crime to what
is called, “voluntary manslaughter.” ’ ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 33–34 (citations omitted).
Respondent then sought federal habeas relief. The Dis-
trict Court denied her petition, but the Ninth Circuit re-
versed. 344 F. 3d 988 (2003). We now grant the State’s pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse.
II
A federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner
if a state court’s adjudication of his constitutional claim was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).
“Where, as here, the state court’s application of governing
federal law is challenged, it must be shown to be not only
erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U. S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam); see Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 409 (2000).

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437 Cite as: 541 U. S. 433 (2004)
Per Curiam
In a criminal trial, the State must prove every element of
the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it
fails to give effect to that requirement. See Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 520–521 (1979). Nonetheless, not
every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury in-
struction rises to the level of a due process violation. The
question is “ ‘whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected
the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due
process.’ ” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 72 (1991) (quot-
ing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973)). “ ‘[A] sin-
gle instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial iso-
lation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall
charge.’ ” Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 378 (1990)
(quoting Cupp, supra, at 146–147). If the charge as a whole
is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a “ ‘reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruc-
tion in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle,
supra, at 72 (quoting Boyde, supra, at 380).
The Ninth Circuit held that the erroneous imminent-peril
instruction “eliminated” respondent’s imperfect self-defense
claim, and that the state court unreasonably applied federal
law by “completely ignor[ing] unchallenged and uncorrected
instructions to the jury.” 344 F. 3d, at 999. It acknowl-
edged that it was bound to consider the jury charge as a
whole, but held that the other instructions were irrelevant
because “[t]he only time that the trial judge actually defined
imminent peril for the jury was in the erroneous instruction
on imperfect self-defense.” Id., at 997.
This conclusion failed to give appropriate deference to the
state court’s decision. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s de-
scription, the state court did not “ignor[e]” the faulty in-
struction. It merely held that the instruction was not rea-
sonably likely to have misled the jury given the multiple
other instances (at least three, see supra, at 434–435) where
the charge correctly stated that respondent’s belief could be

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438 MIDDLETON v. McNEIL
Per Curiam
unreasonable. App. to Pet. for Cert. 34. Given three cor-
rect instructions and one contrary one, the state court did
not unreasonably apply federal law when it found that there
was no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled.
The Ninth Circuit thought that the other references to un-
reasonableness were irrelevant because they were not part
of the definition of “imminent peril.” That alone does not
make them irrelevant; whether one defines imminent peril in
terms of an unreasonable belief or instead describes imper-
fect self-defense as allowing an unreasonable belief in immi-
nent peril, the import of the instruction is the same. Per-
haps the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the erroneous definition
of “imminent peril” caused the jury to believe that the ear-
lier, correct instructions (“actual but unreasonable belief in
the necessity to defend against imminent peril”) meant that,
although the belief in the necessity to defend may be unrea-
sonable, the belief in the existence of the “imminent peril”
may not. This interpretation would require such a rare
combination of extremely refined lawyerly parsing of an in-
struction, and extremely gullible acceptance of a result that
makes no conceivable sense, that the state court’s implicit
rejection of the possibility was surely not an unreasonable
application of federal law.
The Ninth Circuit also faulted the state court for relying
on the prosecutor’s argument, noting that instructions from
a judge are presumed to have more influence than arguments
of counsel. 344 F. 3d, at 999 (citing Boyde, supra, at 384).
But this is not a case where the jury charge clearly says one
thing and the prosecutor says the opposite; the instructions
were at worst ambiguous because they were internally in-
consistent. Nothing in Boyde precludes a state court from
assuming that counsel’s arguments clarified an ambiguous
jury charge. This assumption is particularly apt when it is
the prosecutor’s argument that resolves an ambiguity in
favor of the defendant.

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439 Cite as: 541 U. S. 433 (2004)
Per Curiam
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.