TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION v. HOOD

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
440 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE
CORPORATION v. HOOD
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 02–1606. Argued March 1, 2004—Decided May 17, 2004
Respondent Hood had an outstanding balance on student loans guaranteed
by petitioner Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC), a
state entity, at the time she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.
Hood’s general discharge did not cover her student loans, as she did not
list them and they are only dischargeable if a bankruptcy court deter-
mines that excepting the debt from the order would be an “undue hard-
ship” on the debtor, 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(8). Hood subsequently reopened
the petition, seeking an “undue hardship” determination. As pre-
scribed by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(6), 7003, and
7004, she filed a complaint and, later, an amended complaint, and served
them with a summons on TSAC and others. The Bankruptcy Court
denied TSAC’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that 11 U. S. C. § 106(a) abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel affirmed, as did the Sixth Circuit, which held that the Bankruptcy
Clause gave Congress the authority to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity in § 106(a). This Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress such authority.
Held: Because the Bankruptcy Court’s discharge of a student loan debt
does not implicate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, this
Court does not reach the question on which certiorari was granted.
Pp. 446–455.
(a) States may be bound by some judicial actions without their con-
sent. For example, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal ju-
risdiction over in rem admiralty actions when the State does not possess
the res. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U. S. 491, 507–508.
A debt’s discharge by a bankruptcy court is similarly an in rem proceed-
ing. The court has exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor’s property,
wherever located, and over the estate. Once debts are discharged, a
creditor who did not submit a proof of claim will be unable to collect on
his unsecured loans. A bankruptcy court is able to provide the debtor
a fresh start, even if all of his creditors do not participate, because the
court’s jurisdiction is premised on the debtor and his estate, not on the
creditors. Because the court’s jurisdiction is premised on the res, how-
ever, a nonparticipating creditor cannot be personally liable. States,

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
441 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Syllabus
whether or not they choose to participate in the proceeding, are bound
by a bankruptcy court’s discharge order no less than other creditors,
see, e. g., New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S. 329, 333. And when
the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the res is unquestioned, the
exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge the debt does not infringe
a State’s sovereignty. TSAC argues, however, that the individualized
process by which student loan debts are discharged unconstitutionally
infringes its sovereignty. If a debtor does not affirmatively secure
§ 523(a)(8)’s “undue hardship” determination, States choosing not to sub-
mit themselves to the court’s jurisdiction might receive some benefit:
The debtor’s personal liability on the loan may survive the discharge.
TSAC misunderstands the proceeding’s fundamental nature when it
claims that Congress, by making a student loan debt presumptively non-
dischargeable and singling it out for an individualized determination,
has authorized a suit against a State. The bankruptcy court’s jurisdic-
tion is premised on the res, not the persona; that States were granted
the presumptive benefit of nondischargeability does not alter the court’s
underlying authority. A debtor does not seek damages or affirmative
relief from a State or subject an unwilling State to a coercive judicial
process by seeking to discharge his debts. Indeed, this Court has en-
dorsed individual determinations of States’ interests within the federal
courts’ in rem jurisdiction, e. g., Deep Sea Research, supra. Although
bankruptcy and admiralty are specialized areas of the law, there is no
reason why the exercise of federal courts’ in rem bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion is more threatening to state sovereignty than the exercise of their
in rem admiralty jurisdiction. Pp. 446–451.
(b) With regard to the procedure used in this case, the Bankruptcy
Rules require a debtor to file an adversary proceeding against the State
to discharge student loan debts. While this is part of the original bank-
ruptcy case and within the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction, it
requires the service of a summons and a complaint, see Rules 7001(6),
7003, and 7004. The issuance of process is normally an indignity to a
State’s sovereignty, because its purpose is to establish personal jurisdic-
tion; but the court’s in rem jurisdiction allows it to adjudicate the debt-
ors’ discharge claim without in personam jurisdiction over the State.
Section 523(a)(8) does not require a summons, and absent Rule 7001(6)
a debtor could proceed by motion, which would raise no constitutional
concern. There is no reason why service of a summons, which in this
case is indistinguishable in practical effect from a motion, should be
given dispositive weight. Dismissal of the complaint is not appropriate
here where the court has in rem jurisdiction and has not attempted to
adjudicate any claims outside of that jurisdiction. This case is unlike
an adversary proceeding by a bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
442 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Syllabus
property in the State’s hands on the grounds that the transfer was a
voidable preference. Even if this Court were to hold that Congress
lacked the ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bank-
ruptcy Clause, the Bankruptcy Court would still have authority to make
the undue hardship determination Hood seeks. Thus, this Court de-
clines to decide whether a bankruptcy court’s exercise of personal juris-
diction over a State would be valid under the Eleventh Amendment.
If the Bankruptcy Court on remand exceeds its in rem jurisdiction,
TSAC would be free to challenge the court’s authority. Pp. 451–455.
319 F. 3d 755, affirmed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post,
p. 455. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined,
post, p. 455.
Daryl J. Brand, Associate Solicitor General of Tennessee,
argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs
were Paul G. Summers, Attorney General, Michael E.
Moore, Solicitor General, Cynthia E. Kinser, Deputy Attor-
ney General, and Marvin E. Clements, Jr.
Leonard H. Gerson argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio
et al. by Jim Petro, Attorney General of Ohio, Douglas R. Cole, State
Solicitor, and Elise Porter, Assistant Solicitor, by Anabelle Rodrı´guez,
Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Gregg
Renkes of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas,
Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal
of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Flor-
ida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence
G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana,
Tom Miller of Iowa, Phill Kline of Kansas, Albert B. Chandler III of
Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J.
Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mi-
chael A. Cox of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska,
Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Peter Heed of New Hampshire, Peter C. Har-
vey of New Jersey, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
443 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Article I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution provides that Con-
gress shall have the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.” We granted certiorari to determine whether this
Clause grants Congress the authority to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity from private suits. Because we conclude
that a proceeding initiated by a debtor to determine the dis-
chargeability of a student loan debt is not a suit against the
State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, we affirm
the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and we do not reach the
question on which certiorari was granted.
I
Petitioner, Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation
(TSAC), is a governmental corporation created by the Ten-
nessee Legislature to administer student assistance pro-
New York, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North
Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon,
D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Henry Dargan McMaster of South
Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark
L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Jerry W. Kilgore of
Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of
West Virginia, Peggy A. Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Patrick J.
Crank of Wyoming; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by
Richard Ruda and D. Bruce La Pierre.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Commercial
Law League of America by Robert D. Piliero; for the National Association
of Bankruptcy Trustees et al. by Martin P. Sheehan, Robert C. Furr, and
Neil C. Gordon; for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy
Attorneys by Henry J. Sommer; for Susan Block-Lieb et al. by Susan M.
Freeman and Richard Lieb; for G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., by Mr. Brunstad,
pro se, Rheba Rutkowski, and Susan Kim; for Bernard Katz by P. An-
thony Sammons and Allen E. Grimes III; for Bruce H. Mann by Brady
C. Williamson; and for Donald J. Spring by C. Hall Swaim, Mitchel Appel-
baum, and George W. Shuster, Jr.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
444 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Opinion of the Court
grams. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49–4–201 (2002). TSAC guaran-
tees student loans made to residents of Tennessee and to
nonresidents who are either enrolled in an eligible school in
Tennessee or make loans through an approved Tennessee
lender. § 49–4–203.
Between July 1988 and February 1990, respondent, Pamela
Hood, a resident of Tennessee, signed promissory notes for
educational loans guaranteed by TSAC. In February 1999,
Hood filed a “no asset” Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Tennessee; at the time of the filing, her student loans had an
outstanding balance of $4,169.31. TSAC did not participate
in the proceeding, but Sallie Mae Service, Inc. (Sallie Mae),
submitted a proof of claim to the Bankruptcy Court, which
it subsequently assigned to TSAC.1 The Bankruptcy Court
granted Hood a general discharge in June 1999. See 11
U. S. C. § 727(a).
Hood did not list her student loans in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, and the general discharge did not cover them. See
§ 727(b) (providing that a discharge under § 727(a) discharges
the debtor from all prepetition debts except as listed in
§ 523(a)); § 523(a)(8) (providing that student loans guaranteed
by governmental units are not included in a general dis-
charge order unless the bankruptcy court determines that
excepting the debt from the order would impose an “undue
hardship” on the debtor). In September 1999, Hood re-
opened her bankruptcy petition for the limited purpose of
seeking a determination by the Bankruptcy Court that her
student loans were dischargeable as an “undue hardship”
pursuant to § 523(a)(8). As prescribed by the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, Hood filed a complaint against the
1 Sallie Mae was the original holder of Hood’s student loan debt. On
November 15, 1999, Sallie Mae signed an assignment of proof of claim,
transferring the debt to TSAC. The actual proof of claim was filed by
Sallie Mae in the Bankruptcy Court on November 29, and one month later,
on December 29, the assignment of the proof of claim was filed.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
445 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
United States of America, the Department of Education, and
Sallie Mae, see Fed. Rules Bkrtcy. Proc. 7001(6) and 7003,
and later filed an amended complaint in which she included
TSAC and University Account Services as additional de-
fendants and deleted Sallie Mae. The complaint and the
amended complaint were served along with a summons on
each of the named parties. See Rule 7004.
In response, TSAC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, asserting Eleventh Amendment sov-
ereign immunity.2 The Bankruptcy Court denied the mo-
tion, holding that 11 U. S. C. § 106(a) was a valid abrogation
of TSAC’s sovereign immunity. App. to Pet. for Cert. A–62.
TSAC took an interlocutory appeal, see Puerto Rico Aque-
duct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S.
139, 147 (1993), and a unanimous Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
of the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 262 B. R. 412 (2001). TSAC
appealed the panel’s decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That court affirmed, holding
that the States ceded their immunity from private suits in
bankruptcy in the Constitutional Convention, and therefore,
the Bankruptcy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, pro-
vided Congress with the necessary authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in 11 U. S. C. § 106(a). 319 F. 3d
755, 767 (2003). One judge concurred in the judgment, con-
cluding that TSAC waived its sovereign immunity when it
accepted Sallie Mae’s proof of claim.3 Id., at 768. We
granted certiorari, 539 U. S. 986 (2003), and now affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Because we hold that a
bankruptcy court’s discharge of a student loan debt does not
implicate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, we do
not reach the broader question addressed by the Court of
Appeals.
2 Hood does not dispute that TSAC is considered a “State” for purposes
of the Eleventh Amendment.
3 Hood does not argue in this Court that TSAC waived its sovereign
immunity, and we pass no judgment on the question.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
446 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Opinion of the Court
II
By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits “in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” For over a century, how-
ever, we have recognized that the States’ sovereign immu-
nity is not limited to the literal terms of the Eleventh
Amendment. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
Although the text of the Amendment refers only to suits
against a State by citizens of another State, we have repeat-
edly held that an unconsenting State also is immune from
suits by its own citizens. See, e. g., id., at 15; Duhne v. New
Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 313 (1920); Great Northern Life Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944); Employees of Dept. of
Public Health and Welfare of Mo. v. Department of Public
Health and Welfare of Mo., 411 U. S. 279, 280 (1973); Edel-
man v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662–663 (1974); Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 55 (1996).
States, nonetheless, may still be bound by some judicial
actions without their consent. In California v. Deep Sea
Research, Inc., 523 U. S. 491 (1998), we held that the Elev-
enth Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over in
rem admiralty actions when the State is not in possession of
the property. In that case, a private corporation located a
historic shipwreck, the S. S. Brother Jonathan, in Califor-
nia’s territorial waters. The corporation filed an in rem ac-
tion in federal court seeking rights to the wreck and its
cargo. The State of California intervened, arguing that it
possessed title to the wreck and that its sovereign immunity
precluded the court from adjudicating its rights. While ac-
knowledging that the Eleventh Amendment might constrain
federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction in some instances, id.,
at 503 (citing Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490 (1921) (New
York I); Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 503 (1921) (New York
II); Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458
U. S. 670 (1982)), we held that the States’ sovereign immu-

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
447 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
nity did not prohibit in rem admiralty actions in which the
State did not possess the res, 523 U. S., at 507–508 (citing
e. g., The Davis, 10 Wall. 15 (1870); The Pesaro, 255 U. S.
216 (1921)).
The discharge of a debt by a bankruptcy court is similarly
an in rem proceeding. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U. S.
565, 574 (1947); Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 318, 320–321 (1931);
Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 192 (1902); New
Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S.
656, 662 (1876). Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over a debtor’s property, wherever located, and over
the estate. See 28 U. S. C. § 1334(e). In a typical voluntary
bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 7, the debtor files a
petition for bankruptcy in which he lists his debts or his
creditors, Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 1007(a)(1); the petition
constitutes an order for relief, 11 U. S. C. § 301. The court
clerk notifies the debtor’s creditors of the order for relief,
see Rule 2002(l), and if a creditor wishes to participate in
the debtor’s assets, he files a proof of claim, Rule 3002(a); see
11 U. S. C. § 726. If a creditor chooses not to submit a proof
of claim, once the debts are discharged, the creditor will be
unable to collect on his unsecured loans. Rule 3002(a); see
11 U. S. C. § 726. The discharge order releases a debtor
from personal liability with respect to any discharged debt
by voiding any past or future judgments on the debt and by
operating as an injunction to prohibit creditors from at-
tempting to collect or to recover the debt. §§ 524(a)(1), (2);
3 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d § 48:1, p. 48–3
(1998) (hereinafter Norton).
A bankruptcy court is able to provide the debtor a fresh
start in this manner, despite the lack of participation of all
of his creditors, because the court’s jurisdiction is premised
on the debtor and his estate, and not on the creditors. In re
Collins, 173 F. 3d 924, 929 (CA4 1999) (“A federal court’s
jurisdiction over the dischargeability of debt . . . derives not
from jurisdiction over the state or other creditors, but rather

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
448 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Opinion of the Court
from jurisdiction over debtors and their estates” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Gardner, supra, at 572;
In re Ellett, 254 F. 3d 1135, 1141 (CA9 2001); Texas v. Walker,
142 F. 3d 813, 822 (CA5 1998). A bankruptcy court’s in rem
jurisdiction permits it to “determin[e] all claims that any-
one, whether named in the action or not, has to the prop-
erty or thing in question. The proceeding is ‘one against
the world.’ ” 16 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 108.70[1], p. 108–106 (3d ed. 2004). Because the court’s ju-
risdiction is premised on the res, however, a nonparticipating
creditor cannot be subjected to personal liability. See Free-
man v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 188–189 (1886) (citing Cooper
v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 (1870)).
Under our longstanding precedent, States, whether or not
they choose to participate in the proceeding, are bound by a
bankruptcy court’s discharge order no less than other credi-
tors. In New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S. 329 (1933),
we sustained an order of the Bankruptcy Court which barred
the State of New York’s tax claim because it was not filed
within the time fixed for the filing of claims. We held that
“[i]f a state desires to participate in the assets of a bankrupt,
she must submit to the appropriate requirements.” Id., at
333; see also Gardner, supra, at 574 (holding that a State
waives its sovereign immunity by filing a proof of claim).
And in Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U. S. 225, 228–229
(1931), we held that the Bankruptcy Court had the authority
to sell a debtor’s property “free and clear” of a State’s tax
lien. At least when the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over
the res is unquestioned, cf. United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U. S. 30 (1992), our cases indicate that the exercise
of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt does not infringe
state sovereignty. 4 Cf. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dept. of In-
4 Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18 (1933), is not to the contrary. In that
case, private individuals sought to enjoin the State of Missouri from prose-
cuting probate proceedings in state court, contending that the Federal
District Court had made a final determination of the ownership of the

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
449 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
come Maintenance, 492 U. S. 96, 102 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (applying Eleventh Amendment analysis where a Bank-
ruptcy Court sought to issue a money judgment against a
nonconsenting State).
TSAC concedes that States are generally bound by a bank-
ruptcy court’s discharge order, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, but
argues that the particular process by which student loan
debts are discharged unconstitutionally infringes its sover-
eignty. Student loans used to be presumptively discharged
in a general discharge. But in 1976, Congress provided a
significant benefit to the States by making it more difficult
for debtors to discharge student loan debts guaranteed by
States. Education Amendments of 1976, § 439A(a), 90 Stat.
2141 (codified at 20 U. S. C. § 1087–3 (1976 ed.), repealed by
Pub. L. 95–598, § 317, 92 Stat. 2678). That benefit is cur-
rently governed by 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(8), which provides
that student loan debts guaranteed by governmental units
are not included in a general discharge order unless except-
ing the debt from the order would impose an “undue hard-
ship” on the debtor. See also § 727(b) (providing that a
discharge under § 727(a) discharges the debtor from all pre-
petition debts except as listed in § 523(a)).
contested stock. We held the Eleventh Amendment prevented federal
courts from entertaining such a suit because a “[federal] court has no
authority to issue process against the State to compel it to subject itself
to the court’s judgment.” Id., at 28. Although a discharge order under
the Bankruptcy Code “operates as an injunction” against creditors who
commence or continue an action against a debtor in personam to recover
or to collect a discharged debt, 11 U. S. C. § 524(a)(2), the enforcement of
such an injunction against the State by a federal court is not before us.
To the extent that Fiske is relevant in the present context, it supports our
conclusion that a discharge order is binding on the State. There, we
noted the State might still be bound by the federal court’s adjudication
even if an injunction could not issue. 290 U. S., at 29. It is unlikely that
the Court sub silentio overruled the holdings in Irving Trust and Van
Huffel in Fiske as Justice Thomas implies, see post, at 463 (dissenting
opinion), as Fiske was decided the same year as Irving Trust.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
450 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Opinion of the Court
Section 523(a)(8) is “self-executing.” Norton § 47:52, at
47–137 to 47–138; see also S. Rep. No. 95–989, p. 79 (1978).
Unless the debtor affirmatively secures a hardship determi-
nation, the discharge order will not include a student loan
debt. Norton § 47:52, at 47–137 to 47–138. Thus, the major
difference between the discharge of a student loan debt and
the discharge of most other debts is that governmental credi-
tors, including States, that choose not to submit themselves
to the court’s jurisdiction might still receive some benefit:
The debtor’s personal liability on the loan may survive the
discharge.
It is this change that TSAC contends infringes state sover-
eignty. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15–16. By making a student loan
debt presumptively nondischargeable and singling it out for
an “individualized adjudication,” id., at 17, TSAC argues that
Congress has authorized a suit against a State. But TSAC
misunderstands the fundamental nature of the proceeding.
No matter how difficult Congress has decided to make the
discharge of student loan debt, the bankruptcy court’s juris-
diction is premised on the res, not on the persona; that States
were granted the presumptive benefit of nondischargeability
does not alter the court’s underlying authority. A debtor
does not seek monetary damages or any affirmative relief
from a State by seeking to discharge a debt; nor does he
subject an unwilling State to a coercive judicial process. He
seeks only a discharge of his debts.
Indeed, we have previously endorsed individualized deter-
minations of States’ interests within the federal courts’ in
rem jurisdiction. In Van Huffel, we affirmed the bank-
ruptcy courts’ power to sell property free from encum-
brances, including States’ liens, and approvingly noted that
some courts had chosen specifically to discharge States’ liens
for taxes. 284 U. S., at 228; cf. Gardner, 329 U. S., at 572–
574 (noting “that the reorganization court had jurisdiction
over the proof and allowance of the tax claims and that the
exercise of that power was not a suit against the State”).

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
451 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
Our decision in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523
U. S. 491 (1998), also involved an individualized in rem adju-
dication in which a State claimed an interest, as have other
in rem admiralty cases involving sovereigns, e. g., The Davis,
10 Wall., at 19; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 159 (1869); The Pesaro,
255 U. S., at 219. Although both bankruptcy and admiralty
are specialized areas of the law, we see no reason why the
exercise of the federal courts’ in rem bankruptcy jurisdiction
is more threatening to state sovereignty than the exercise of
their in rem admiralty jurisdiction.
We find no authority, in fine, that suggests a bankruptcy
court’s exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a stu-
dent loan debt would infringe state sovereignty in the man-
ner suggested by TSAC. We thus hold that the undue hard-
ship determination sought by Hood in this case is not a suit
against a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.5
III
Lastly, we deal with the procedure that was used in this
case. Creditors generally are not entitled to personal serv-
ice before a bankruptcy court may discharge a debt. Han-
over Nat. Bank, 186 U. S., at 192. Because student loan
debts are not automatically dischargeable, however, the Fed-
eral Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide creditors
greater procedural protection. See Fed. Rules Bkrtcy. Proc.
7001(6), 7003, and 7004. The current Bankruptcy Rules re-
quire the debtor to file an “adversary proceeding” against
the State in order to discharge his student loan debt. The
5 This is not to say, “a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction overrides
sovereign immunity,” United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30,
38 (1992), as Justice Thomas characterizes our opinion, post, at 462, but
rather that the court’s exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a
student loan debt is not an affront to the sovereignty of the State. Nor
do we hold that every exercise of a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction
will not offend the sovereignty of the State. No such concerns are pres-
ent here, and we do not address them.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
452 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Opinion of the Court
proceeding is considered part of the original bankruptcy
case, see 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 7003.02 (rev. 15th ed.
2003), and still within the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdic-
tion as discussed above. But, as prescribed by the Rules,
an “adversary proceeding” requires the service of a sum-
mons and a complaint. Rules 7001(6), 7003, and 7004.
Because this “adversary proceeding” has some similarities
to a traditional civil trial, Justice Thomas contends that the
Bankruptcy Court cannot make an undue hardship determi-
nation without infringing TSAC’s sovereignty under Federal
Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535
U. S. 743 (2002). See post, at 457–460. In Federal Mari-
time Comm’n, we held that the Eleventh Amendment pre-
cluded a private party from haling an unconsenting State
into a proceeding before the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC). We noted that we have applied a presumption since
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), “that the Constitution
was not intended to ‘rais[e] up’ any proceedings against the
States that were ‘anomalous and unheard of when the Con-
stitution was adopted.’ ” 535 U. S., at 755. Because agency
adjudications were unheard of at the time of the founding,
we had to determine whether the FMC proceeding was “the
type of proceedin[g] from which the Framers would have
thought the States possessed immunity when they agreed
to enter the Union.” Id., at 756. Noting the substantial
similarities between a proceeding before the FMC and one
before an Article III court, we concluded that the Hans pre-
sumption applied, see 535 U. S., at 756–763, and that the
Eleventh Amendment therefore precluded private suits in
such a forum, id., at 769.
In this case, however, there is no need to engage in a com-
parative analysis to determine whether the adjudication
would be an affront to States’ sovereignty. As noted above,
we have long held that the bankruptcy courts’ exercise of in
rem jurisdiction is not such an offense. Supra, at 448–451.
Nor is there any dispute that, if the Bankruptcy Court had

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
453 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over TSAC, such an adju-
dication would implicate the Eleventh Amendment. Our
precedent has drawn a distinction between in rem and in
personam jurisdiction, even when the underlying proceed-
ings are, for the most part, identical. Thus, whether an in
rem adjudication in a bankruptcy court is similar to civil liti-
gation in a district court is irrelevant. If Justice Thomas’
interpretation of Federal Maritime Comm’n were adopted,
Deep Sea Research, Van Huffle, and Irving Trust, all of
which involved proceedings resembling traditional civil adju-
dications, would likely have to be overruled. We are not
willing to take such a step.
The issuance of process, nonetheless, is normally an indig-
nity to the sovereignty of a State because its purpose is to
establish personal jurisdiction over the State. We noted in
Seminole Tribe: “The Eleventh Amendment does not exist
solely in order to prevent federal-court judgments that must
be paid out of a State’s treasury; it also serves to avoid the
indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judi-
cial tribunals at the instance of private parties.” 517 U. S.,
at 58 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, however, the Bankruptcy Court’s in rem jurisdiction
allows it to adjudicate the debtor’s discharge claim with-
out in personam jurisdiction over the State. See 4A C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1070,
pp. 280–281 (3d ed. 2002) (noting jurisdiction over the person
is irrelevant if the court has jurisdiction over the property).
Hood does not argue that the court should exercise personal
jurisdiction; all she wants is a determination of the dis-
chargeability of her debt. The text of § 523(a)(8) does not
require a summons, and absent Rule 7001(6) a debtor could
proceed by motion, see Rule 9014 (“[I]n a contested matter
. . . not otherwise governed by these rules, relief shall be
requested by motion”), which would raise no constitutional
concern. Hood concedes that even if TSAC ignores the sum-
mons and chooses not to participate in the proceeding the

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
454 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Opinion of the Court
Bankruptcy Court cannot discharge her debt without making
an undue hardship determination. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33–34.
We see no reason why the service of a summons, which in
this case is indistinguishable in practical effect from a mo-
tion, should be given dispositive weight. As we said in
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. 261, 270
(1997), “[t]he real interests served by the Eleventh Amend-
ment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of cap-
tions and pleading.” See New York I, 256 U. S., at 500 (a
suit against a State “is to be determined not by the mere
names of the titular parties but by the essential nature and
effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the entire rec-
ord”). To conclude that the issuance of a summons, which is
required only by the Rules, precludes Hood from exercising
her statutory right to an undue hardship determination
would give the Rules an impermissible effect. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2075 (“[The Bankruptcy Rules] shall not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right”). And there is no reason
to take such a step. TSAC sought only to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Court. Mo-
tion to Dismiss Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction in
No. 99–0847 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Tenn.), pp. 1–2. Clearly dis-
missal of the complaint is not appropriate as the court has
in rem jurisdiction over the matter, and the court here has
not attempted to adjudicate any claims outside of that juris-
diction. The case before us is thus unlike an adversary pro-
ceeding by the bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover prop-
erty in the hands of the State on the grounds that the
transfer was a voidable preference. Even if we were to hold
that Congress lacked the ability to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause, as TSAC urges us
to do, the Bankruptcy Court would still have the authority
to make the undue hardship determination sought by Hood.
We therefore decline to decide whether a bankruptcy
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a State would
be valid under the Eleventh Amendment. See Liverpool,

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
455 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Thomas, J., dissenting
New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Em-
igration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885) (“[We are bound] never to
anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it”). If the Bankruptcy Court on re-
mand exceeds its in rem jurisdiction, TSAC, of course, will
be free to challenge the court’s authority. At this point,
however, any such constitutional concern is merely hypothet-
ical. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring.
I join in the Court’s opinion, save for any implicit approval
of the holding in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S.
44 (1996).
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
dissenting.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether Con-
gress has the authority to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity under the Bankruptcy Clause. 539 U. S. 986 (2003).
Instead of answering this question, the Court addresses a
more difficult one regarding the extent to which a bank-
ruptcy court’s exercise of its in rem jurisdiction could offend
the sovereignty of a creditor-State. I recognize that, as the
Court concludes today, the in rem nature of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings might affect the ability of a debtor to obtain, by
motion, a bankruptcy court determination that affects a
creditor-State’s rights, but I would not reach this difficult
question here. Even if the Bankruptcy Court could have
exercised its in rem jurisdiction to make an undue hardship
determination by motion, I cannot ignore the fact that the
determination in this case was sought pursuant to an ad-
versary proceeding. Under Federal Maritime Comm’n v.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
456 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Thomas, J., dissenting
South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743 (2002), the
adversary proceeding here clearly constitutes a suit against
the State for sovereign immunity purposes. I would thus
reach the easier question presented and conclude that Con-
gress lacks authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Bankruptcy Clause.
I
The Court avoids addressing respondent’s principal argu-
ment—which was the basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision
and which this Court granted certiorari in order to ad-
dress—namely, that Congress possesses the power under the
Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity
from suit. Instead, the Court affirms the judgment of the
Court of Appeals based on respondent’s alternative argu-
ment, ante, at 445, that the Bankruptcy Court’s decision was
“an appropriate exercise of [its] in rem jurisdiction,” Brief
for Respondent 35. Although respondent advanced this ar-
gument in the proceedings before the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel of the Sixth Circuit, Brief for Appellee in No. 00–8062,
p. 8, she declined to do so in the Court of Appeals. Indeed,
before that court, respondent relied entirely on Congress’
ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
Bankruptcy Clause rather than on any in rem theory be-
cause, under her reading of Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18
(1933), “there is no in rem exception to a state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity” in bankruptcy. Brief for Appellee
in No. 01–5769 (CA6), p. 24. Furthermore, respondent did
not raise the in rem argument in her brief in opposition be-
fore this Court. Under this Court’s Rule 15.2, we may deem
this argument waived. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S.
61, 75, n. 13 (1996). And, we should do so here both because
the argument is irrelevant to this case, and because the in
rem question is both complex and uncertain, see Baldwin v.
Reese, ante, p. 27.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
457 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Thomas, J., dissenting
A
In Federal Maritime Comm’n, South Carolina Maritime
Services, Inc. (SCMS), filed a complaint with the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC), an independent agency, alleg-
ing that a state-run port had violated the Shipping Act of
1984, 46 U. S. C. App. § 1701 et seq. We assumed without
deciding that the FMC does not exercise “judicial power,”
535 U. S., at 754, and nonetheless held that state sovereign
immunity barred the adjudication of SCMS’ complaint. Id.,
at 769.
Federal Maritime Comm’n turned on the “overwhelming”
similarities between FMC proceedings and civil litigation in
federal courts. Id., at 759. For example, FMC’s rules gov-
erning pleadings and discovery are very similar to the analo-
gous Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., at 757–758.
Moreover, we noted that “the role of the [administrative law
judge], the impartial officer designated to hear a case, is simi-
lar to that of an Article III judge.” Id., at 758 (footnote and
citation omitted). Based on these similarities, we held that,
for purposes of state sovereign immunity, the adjudication
before the FMC was indistinguishable from an adjudication
in an Article III tribunal. See id., at 760–761. Thus, Fed-
eral Maritime Comm’n recognized that if the Framers
would have found it an “impermissible affront to a State’s
dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private
parties in federal courts,” the Framers would have found it
equally impermissible to compel States to do so simply be-
cause the adjudication takes place in an Article I rather than
an Article III court. Ibid.
Although the Court ignores Federal Maritime Comm’n al-
together, its reasoning applies to this case. The similarities
between adversary proceedings in bankruptcy and federal
civil litigation are striking. Indeed, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure govern adversary proceedings in substantial
part. The proceedings are commenced by the filing of a
complaint, Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7003; process is served,

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
458 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Thomas, J., dissenting
Rule 7005; the opposing party is required to file an answer,
Rule 7007; and the opposing party can file counterclaims
against the movant, Rule 7013. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 8 applies to the parties’ pleadings. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy.
Proc. 7008. Even the form of the parties’ pleadings must
comply with the federal rules for civil litigation. Rule 7010.
“Likewise, discovery in [adversary proceedings] largely mir-
rors discovery in federal civil litigation.” Federal Maritime
Comm’n, supra, at 758. See Fed. Rules Bkrtcy. Proc. 7026–
7037 (applying Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 26–37 to adversary pro-
ceedings). And, when a party fails to answer or appear in
an adversary proceeding, the Federal Rule governing default
judgments applies. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7055 (adopting
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 55).
In spite of these similarities, the Court concludes that, be-
cause the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is premised on the
res, the issuance of process in this case, as opposed to all
others, does not subject an unwilling State to a coercive judi-
cial process. Ante, at 452. The Court also views the adver-
sary proceeding in this case differently than a typical adver-
sary proceeding because, absent Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7001(6), the Court concludes that a debtor could
obtain an undue hardship determination by motion consist-
ent with a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction and consist-
ent with the Constitution. See ante, at 453.
Critically, however, the Court fails to explain why, simply
because it asserts that this determination could have been
made by motion, the adversary proceeding utilized in this
case is somehow less offensive to state sovereignty. After
all, “[t]he very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment
[is] to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coer-
cive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties.” In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 505 (1887); Federal
Maritime Comm’n, supra, at 760; Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S.
706, 748 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S.
44, 58 (1996). The fact that an alternative proceeding exists,

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
459 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Thomas, J., dissenting
the use of which might not be offensive to state sovereignty,
is irrelevant to whether the particular proceeding actually
used subjects a particular State to the indignities of coercive
process. Indeed, the dissent in Federal Maritime Comm’n,
much like the Court today, focused on the fact that the FMC
was not required by statute to evaluate complaints through
agency adjudication, 535 U. S., at 774–776 (opinion of
Breyer, J.), and could have opted to evaluate complaints in
some other manner. But this fact had no bearing on our
decision in that case, nor should it control here. I simply
cannot ignore the fact that respondent filed a complaint in
the Bankruptcy Court “pray[ing] that proper process issue
and that upon a hearing upon the merits that [the court] issue
a judgment for [respondent] and against [petitioner] allowing
[respondent’s] debt to be discharged.” Complaint for Hard-
ship Discharge in No. 99–22606–K, Adversary No. 99–0847
(Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Tenn.), p. 1.
More importantly, although the adversary proceeding in
this case does not require the State to “defend itself ” against
petitioner in the ordinary sense, the effect is the same,
whether done by adversary proceeding or by motion, and
whether the proceeding is in personam or in rem. In order
to preserve its rights, the State is compelled either to subject
itself to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction or to forfeit
its rights. And, whatever the nature of the Bankruptcy
Court’s jurisdiction, it maintains at least as much control
over nonconsenting States as the FMC, which lacks the
power to enforce its own orders. Federal Mar i time
Comm’n rejected the view that the FMC’s lack of enforce-
ment power means that parties are not coerced to participate
in its proceedings because the effect is the same—a State
must submit to the adjudication or compromise its ability
to defend itself in later proceedings. 535 U. S., at 761–764.
Here, if the State does not oppose the debtor’s claim of undue
hardship, the Bankruptcy Court is authorized to enter a de-
fault judgment without making an undue hardship determi-

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
460 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Thomas, J., dissenting
nation. See Fed. Rules Bkrtcy. Proc. 7055, 9014 (adopting
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 55 in both adversary proceedings and in
contested matters governed by motion). The Court appar-
ently concludes otherwise, but, tellingly, its only support for
that questionable proposition is a statement made at oral
argument. See ante, at 453–454.
As I explain in Part I–B, infra, I do not contest the asser-
tion that in bankruptcy, like admiralty, there might be a lim-
ited in rem exception to state sovereign immunity from suit.
Nor do I necessarily reject the argument that this proceed-
ing could have been resolved by motion without offending
the dignity of the State. However, because this case did not
proceed by motion, I cannot resolve the merits based solely
upon what might have, but did not, occur. I would therefore
hold that the adversary proceeding in this case constituted a
suit against the State for sovereign immunity purposes.
B
The difficulty and complexity of the question of the scope
of the Bankruptcy Court’s in rem jurisdiction as it relates to
a State’s interests is a further reason that the Court should
not address the question here without complete briefing and
full consideration by the Court of Appeals.
Relying on this Court’s recent recognition of a limited in
rem exception to state sovereign immunity in certain admi-
ralty actions, see California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523
U. S. 491 (1998), the Court recognizes that “States . . . may
still be bound by some judicial actions without their con-
sent,” ante, at 446. The Court then acknowledges the undis-
puted fact that bankruptcy discharge proceedings are in rem
proceedings. Ante, at 447. These facts, however, standing
alone, do not compel the conclusion that the in rem exception
should extend to this case.
Deep Sea Research, supra, does not make clear the extent
of the in rem exception in admiralty, much less its potential
application in bankruptcy. The Court’s recognition of an in

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
461 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Thomas, J., dissenting
rem exception to state sovereign immunity in admiralty ac-
tions was informed, in part, by Justice Story’s understanding
of the difference between admiralty actions and regular civil
litigation. Justice Story doubted whether the Eleventh
Amendment extended to admiralty and maritime suits at all
because, in admiralty, “the jurisdiction of the [federal] court
is founded upon the possession of the thing; and if the State
should interpose a claim for the property, it does not act
merely in the character of a defendant, but as an actor.”
2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§ 1689, p. 491 (5th ed. 1891). Justice Story supported this
view by contrasting suits in law or equity with suits in admi-
ralty, which received a separate grant of jurisdiction under
Article III. Id., at 491–492. The Court, however, has since
adopted a more narrow understanding of the in rem mari-
time exception. See Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497
(1921) (“Nor is the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ex-
empt from the operation of the rule [that a State may not be
sued without its consent]”). Thus, our holding in Deep Sea
Research was limited to actions where the res is not within
the State’s possession. 523 U. S., at 507–508.
Whatever the scope of the in rem exception in admiralty,
the Court’s cases reveal no clear principle to govern which,
if any, bankruptcy suits are exempt from the Eleventh
Amendment’s bar. In Fiske, 290 U. S., at 28, the Court
stated in no uncertain terms that “[t]he fact that a suit in a
federal court is in rem, or quasi in rem, furnishes no ground
for the issue of process against a non-consenting State.”
The Court contends that Fiske supports its argument be-
cause there the Court “noted the State might still be bound
by the federal court’s adjudication even if an injunction could
not issue.” Ante, at 449, n. 4. But the Court in Fiske also
suggested that the State might not be bound by the federal
court’s adjudication—a more weighty proposition given the
circumstances of the case. Fiske, in part, involved the valid-
ity of a federal-court decree entered in 1927, which deter-

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
462 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Thomas, J., dissenting
mined that Sophie Franz had only a life interest in certain
shares of stock previously held by her deceased husband.
When Franz died in 1930, Franz’s executor did not inventory
the shares because the federal-court decree declared Franz
to have only a life interest in them. The dispute arose be-
cause the State sought to inventory those shares as assets of
Franz’s estate so that it could collect inheritance taxes on
those shares. Although Fiske did not decide whether the
1927 federal decree was binding on the State, 290 U. S., at
29, the mere suggestion that the State might not be bound
by the decree because it was not a party to an in rem pro-
ceeding in which it had no interest, see ibid., at least leaves
in doubt the extent of any in rem exception in bankruptcy.
Our more recent decision in United States v. Nordic Vil-
lage, Inc., 503 U. S. 30 (1992), casts some doubt upon the
Court’s characterization of any in rem exception in bank-
ruptcy. Nordic Village explicitly recognized that “we have
never applied an in rem exception to the sovereign-immunity
bar against monetary recovery, and have suggested that no
such exception exists.” Id., at 38. Although Nordic Vil-
lage involved the sovereign immunity of the Federal Govern-
ment, it also supports the argument that no in rem exception
exists for other types of relief against a State. Nordic Vil-
lage interpreted 11 U. S. C. § 106(c) to waive claims for de-
claratory and injunctive, though not monetary, relief against
the Government. 503 U. S., at 34–37. We noted that this
interpretation did not render § 106(c) irrelevant because a
waiver of immunity with respect to claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief would “perform a significant function”
by “permit[ing] a bankruptcy court to determine the amount
and dischargeability of an estate’s liability to the Govern-
ment . . . whether or not the Government filed a proof of
claim.” Id., at 36. Our interpretation of § 106(c) to waive
liability only for declaratory and injunctive relief strongly
suggests that such a waiver is necessary—i. e., that without
the waiver, despite the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdic-

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
463 Cite as: 541 U. S. 440 (2004)
Thomas, J., dissenting
tion, the bankruptcy court could not order declaratory or in-
junctive relief against a State without the State’s consent.
Cf. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533, 553,
n. 11 (2002).
To be sure, the Court has previously held that a State can
be bound by a bankruptcy court adjudication that affects a
State’s interest. See New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U. S.
329 (1933); Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U. S. 225 (1931).
But, in neither of those cases did the Court attempt to under-
take a sovereign immunity analysis. Irving Trust, for in-
stance, rested on Congress’ “power to establish uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies,” 288 U. S., at 331, and the
need for “orderly and expeditious proceedings,” id., at 333.
And in Van Huffel, the Court appeared to rest its decision
more on “the requirements of bankruptcy administration,”
284 U. S., at 228, than the effect of the in rem nature of the
proceedings on state sovereign immunity.* Perhaps recog-
nizing that these precedents cannot support the weight of its
reasoning, the Court attempts to limit its holding by explic-
itly declining to find an in rem exception to every exercise
of a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction that might offend
state sovereignty, ante, at 451, n. 5. But, I can find no prin-
ciple in the Court’s opinion to distinguish this case from any
other. For this reason, I would not undertake this compli-
cated inquiry.
II
Congress has made its intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause clear. See 11
U. S. C. § 106(a). The only question, then, is whether the
Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress the power to do so.
*Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U. S. 565 (1947), also does not aid the
Court’s argument. Although Gardner held that the reorganization court
could entertain objections to the State’s asserted claim, the Court also
held that the State waived its immunity by filing a proof of claim, thus
obviating any need to consider the sovereign immunity question in the
context of the in rem proceedings. Id., at 573–574.

541US2 Unit: $U46 [05-20-06 18:28:23] PAGES PGT: OPIN
464 TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
v. HOOD
Thomas, J., dissenting
This Court has repeatedly stated that “Congress may not
. . . base its abrogation of the States’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.” Board
of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 364
(2001). See also, e. g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U. S. 62, 80 (2000) (“Congress’ powers under Article I of the
Constitution do not include the power to subject States to
suit at the hands of private individuals”); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank,
527 U. S. 627, 636 (1999) (“Seminole Tribe makes clear that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursu-
ant to its Article I powers”).
Despite the clarity of these statements, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the Bankruptcy Clause operates differently
from Congress’ other Article I powers because of its “uni-
formity requirement,” 319 F. 3d 755, 764 (CA6 2003). Our
discussions of Congress’ inability to abrogate state sovereign
immunity through the use of its Article I powers reveal no
such limitation. I would therefore reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.