UNITED STATES v. PATANE

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630 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. PATANE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 02–1183. Argued December 9, 2003—Decided June 28, 2004
After Officer Fox began to investigate respondent’s apparent violation of
a temporary restraining order, a federal agent told Fox’s colleague, De-
tective Benner, that respondent, a convicted felon, illegally possessed a
pistol. Officer Fox and Detective Benner proceeded to respondent’s
home, where Fox arrested him for violating the restraining order. Ben-
ner attempted to advise respondent of his rights under Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U. S. 436, but respondent interrupted, asserting that he knew
his rights. Benner then asked about the pistol and retrieved and seized
it. Respondent was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court granted his motion to
suppress the pistol, reasoning that the officers lacked probable cause to
arrest him, and declining to rule on his alternative argument that the
gun should be suppressed as the fruit of an unwarned statement. The
Tenth Circuit reversed the probable-cause ruling, but affirmed the sup-
pression order on respondent’s alternative theory. Rejecting the Gov-
ernment’s argument that Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, and Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, foreclosed application of the fruit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 488, to
the present context, the appeals court reasoned that Elstad and Tucker,
which were based on the view that Miranda announced a prophylactic
rule, were incompatible with Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428,
444, in which this Court held that Miranda announced a constitutional
rule. The appeals court thus equated Dickerson’s ruling with the prop-
osition that a failure to warn pursuant to Miranda is itself a violation
of the suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
304 F. 3d 1013, reversed and remanded.
Justice Thomas, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia,
concluded that a failure to give a suspect Miranda warnings does not
require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but
voluntary statements. Pp. 637–644.
(a) The Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against
violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. That
Clause’s core protection is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defend-
ant to testify against himself at trial. See, e. g., Chavez v. Martinez,

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538 U. S. 760, 764–768. It cannot be violated by the introduction of
nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements.
See, e. g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27, 34. The Court has
recognized and applied several prophylactic rules designed to protect
the core privilege against self-incrimination. For example, the Mi-
randa rule creates a presumption of coercion in custodial interrogations,
in the absence of specific warnings, that is generally irrebuttable for
purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief. E. g., 384 U. S., at 467. But
because such prophylactic rules necessarily sweep beyond the Self-
Incrimination Clause’s actual protections, see, e. g., Withrow v. Wil-
liams, 507 U. S. 680, 690–691, any further extension of one of them must
be justified by its necessity for the protection of the actual right against
compelled self-incrimination, e. g., Chavez, supra, at 778. Thus, uncom-
pelled statements taken without Miranda warnings can be used to im-
peach a defendant’s testimony at trial, see Elstad, supra, at 307–308,
though the fruits of actually compelled testimony cannot, see New Jer-
sey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 458–459. A blanket rule requiring sup-
pression of statements noncompliant with the Miranda rule could not
be justified by reference to the “Fifth Amendment goal of assuring
trustworthy evidence” or by any deterrence rationale, e. g., Elstad, 470
U. S., at 308, and would therefore fail the Court’s requirement that the
closest possible fit be maintained between the Self-Incrimination Clause
and any rule designed to protect it. Furthermore, the Clause contains
its own exclusionary rule that automatically protects those subjected to
coercive police interrogations from the use of their involuntary state-
ments (or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent
criminal trial. E. g., id., at 307–308. This explicit textual protection
supports a strong presumption against expanding the Miranda rule any
further. Cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386. Finally, nothing in
Dickerson calls into question the Court’s continued insistence on its
close-fit requirement. Pp. 637–641.
(b) That a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself,
violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule was
evident in many of the Court’s pre-Dickerson cases, see, e. g., Elstad,
supra, at 308, and the Court has adhered to that view since Dickerson,
see Chavez, supra, at 772–773. This follows from the nature of the
“fundamental trial right” protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause,
e. g., Withrow, supra, at 691, which the Miranda rule, in turn, protects.
Thus, the police do not violate a suspect’s constitutional rights (or the
Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide full
Miranda warnings. Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the
admission of unwarned statements into evidence. And, at that point,
the exclusion of such statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for
any perceived Miranda violation. Chavez, supra, at 790. Unlike ac-

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632 UNITED STATES v. PATANE
Syllabus
tual violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to
mere failures to warn, nothing to deter and therefore no reason to apply
Wong Sun’s “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. It is not for this
Court to impose its preferred police practices on either federal or state
officials. Pp. 641–642.
(c) The Tenth Circuit erred in ruling that the taking of unwarned
statements violates a suspect’s constitutional rights. Dickerson’s char-
acterization of Miranda as a constitutional rule does not lessen the need
to maintain the close-fit requirement. There is no such fit here. Intro-
duction of the nontestimonial fruit of a voluntary statement, such as
respondent’s pistol, does not implicate the Clause. It presents no risk
that a defendant’s coerced statements (however defined) will be used
against him at a criminal trial. In any case, the exclusion of unwarned
statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived
Miranda violation. E. g., Chavez, supra, at 790. Similarly, because po-
lice cannot violate the Clause by taking unwarned though voluntary
statements, an exclusionary rule cannot be justified by reference to a
deterrence effect on law enforcement, as the court below believed. The
word “witness” in the constitutional text limits the Self-Incrimination
Clause’s scope to testimonial evidence. Hubbell, supra, at 34–35. And
although the Court requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actu-
ally coerced statements, statements taken without sufficient Miranda
warnings are presumed to have been coerced only for certain purposes
and then only when necessary to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination. This Court declines to extend that presumption fur-
ther. Pp. 642–644.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concluded that it is
unnecessary to decide whether the detective’s failure to give Patane full
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, warnings should be characterized as
a violation of the Miranda rule itself, or whether there is anything to
deter so long as the unwarned statements are not later introduced at
trial. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S.
649, and Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, evidence obtained following
unwarned interrogations was held admissible based in large part on the
Court’s recognition that the concerns underlying the Miranda rule must
be accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice system.
Here, it is sufficient to note that the Government presents an even
stronger case for admitting the evidence obtained as the result of
Patane’s unwarned statement than was presented in Elstad and Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433. Admission of nontestimonial physical
fruits (the pistol here) does not run the risk of admitting into trial an
accused’s coerced incriminating statements against himself. In light of
reliable physical evidence’s important probative value, it is doubtful that
exclusion can be justified by a deterrence rationale sensitive to both

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Opinion of Thomas, J.
law enforcement interests and a suspect’s rights during an in-custody
interrogation. Pp. 644–645.
Thomas, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opin-
ion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined. Kennedy, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which O’Connor, J., joined,
post, p. 644. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 645. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p. 647.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Wray, James A.
Feldman, and Joseph C. Wyderko.
Jill M. Wichlens argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Michael G. Katz and Virginia L.
Grady.*
Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice and
Justice Scalia join.
In this case we must decide whether a failure to give
a suspect the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona,
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ala-
bama et al. by William H. Pryor, Jr., Attorney General of Alabama, Na-
than A. Forrester, Solicitor General, Michael B. Billingsley, Deputy Solici-
tor General, Marc A. Starrett, Assistant Attorney General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: M. Jane Brady
of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii,
Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Mike McGrath of Mon-
tana, Jim Petro of Ohio, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E.
Long of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of
Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Jerry
W. Kilgore of Virginia, Peggy A. Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Patrick
J. Crank of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by
Kent S. Scheidegger.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Brennan
Center for Justice by Stephen J. Schulhofer, Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr.,
Tom Gerety, and E. Joshua Rosenkranz; and for the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by James J. Tomkovicz, David M.
Porter, and Steven R. Shapiro.

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384 U. S. 436 (1966), requires suppression of the physical
fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements.
The Court has previously addressed this question but has
not reached a definitive conclusion. See Massachusetts v.
White, 439 U. S. 280 (1978) (per curiam) (dividing evenly on
the question); see also Patterson v. United States, 485 U. S.
922 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Although we believe that the Court’s decisions in Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U. S. 433 (1974), are instructive, the Courts of Appeals have
split on the question after our decision in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000). See, e. g., United States
v. Villalba-Alvarado, 345 F. 3d 1007 (CA8 2003) (holding ad-
missible the physical fruits of a Miranda violation); United
States v. Sterling, 283 F. 3d 216 (CA4 2002) (same); United
States v. DeSumma, 272 F. 3d 176 (CA3 2001) (same); United
States v. Faulkingham, 295 F. 3d 85 (CA1 2002) (holding ad-
missible the physical fruits of a negligent Miranda violation).
Because the Miranda rule protects against violations of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is not implicated
by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting
from voluntary statements, we answer the question pre-
sented in the negative.
I
In June 2001, respondent, Samuel Francis Patane, was ar-
rested for harassing his ex-girlfriend, Linda O’Donnell. He
was released on bond, subject to a temporary restraining
order that prohibited him from contacting O’Donnell. Re-
spondent apparently violated the restraining order by at-
tempting to telephone O’Donnell. On June 6, 2001, Officer
Tracy Fox of the Colorado Springs Police Department began
to investigate the matter. On the same day, a county proba-
tion officer informed an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms (ATF), that respondent, a convicted
felon, illegally possessed a .40 Glock pistol. The ATF re-
layed this information to Detective Josh Benner, who worked

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closely with the ATF. Together, Detective Benner and Of-
ficer Fox proceeded to respondent’s residence.
After reaching the residence and inquiring into respond-
ent’s attempts to contact O’Donnell, Officer Fox arrested
respondent for violating the restraining order. Detective
Benner attempted to advise respondent of his Miranda
rights but got no further than the right to remain silent. At
that point, respondent interrupted, asserting that he knew
his rights, and neither officer attempted to complete the
warning.1 App. 40.
Detective Benner then asked respondent about the Glock.
Respondent was initially reluctant to discuss the matter,
stating: “I am not sure I should tell you anything about the
Glock because I don’t want you to take it away from me.”
Id., at 41. Detective Benner persisted, and respondent told
him that the pistol was in his bedroom. Respondent then
gave Detective Benner permission to retrieve the pistol.
Detective Benner found the pistol and seized it.
A grand jury indicted respondent for possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(1). The District Court granted respondent’s motion
to suppress the firearm, reasoning that the officers lacked
probable cause to arrest respondent for violating the re-
straining order. It therefore declined to rule on respond-
ent’s alternative argument that the gun should be sup-
pressed as the fruit of an unwarned statement.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling
with respect to probable cause but affirmed the suppression
order on respondent’s alternative theory. The court re-
jected the Government’s argument that this Court’s deci-
sions in Elstad, supra, and Tucker, supra, foreclosed applica-
tion of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine of Wong Sun
1 The Government concedes that respondent’s answers to subsequent
on-the-scene questioning are inadmissible at trial under Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), despite the partial warning and respondent’s
assertions that he knew his rights.

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v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), to the present context.
304 F. 3d 1013, 1019 (CA10 2002). These holdings were, the
Court of Appeals reasoned, based on the view that Miranda
announced a prophylactic rule, a position that it found to be
incompatible with this Court’s decision in Dickerson, supra,
at 444 (“Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Con-
gress may not supersede legislatively”).2 The Court of Ap-
peals thus equated Dickerson’s announcement that Miranda
is a constitutional rule with the proposition that a failure to
warn pursuant to Miranda is itself a violation of the Consti-
tution (and, more particularly, of the suspect’s Fifth Amend-
ment rights). Based on its understanding of Dickerson, the
Court of Appeals rejected the post-Dickerson views of the
Third and Fourth Circuits that the fruits doctrine does not
apply to Miranda violations. 304 F. 3d, at 1023–1027 (dis-
cussing United States v. Sterling, 283 F. 3d 216 (CA4 2002),
and United States v. DeSumma, 272 F. 3d 176 (CA3 2001)).
It also disagreed with the First Circuit’s conclusion that sup-
pression is not generally required in the case of negligent
failures to warn, 304 F. 3d, at 1027–1029 (discussing United
States v. Faulkingham, 295 F. 3d 85 (CA1 2002)), explaining
that “[d]eterrence is necessary not merely to deter inten-
tional wrongdoing, but also to ensure that officers diligently
(non-negligently) protect—and properly are trained to
protect—the constitutional rights of citizens,” 304 F. 3d,
at 1028–1029. We granted certiorari. 538 U. S. 976 (2003).
As we explain below, the Miranda rule is a prophylac-
tic employed to protect against violations of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. The Self-Incrimination Clause, how-
ever, is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the
physical fruit of a voluntary statement. Accordingly, there
is no justification for extending the Miranda rule to this con-
2 The Court of Appeals also distinguished Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S.
298 (1985), on the ground that the second (and warned) confession at issue
there was the product of the defendant’s volition. 304 F. 3d, at 1019, 1021.
For the reasons discussed below, we do not find this distinction relevant.

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text. And just as the Self-Incrimination Clause primarily
focuses on the criminal trial, so too does the Miranda rule.
The Miranda rule is not a code of police conduct, and police
do not violate the Constitution (or even the Miranda rule,
for that matter) by mere failures to warn. For this reason,
the exclusionary rule articulated in cases such as Wong Sun
does not apply. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings.
II
The Self-Incrimination Clause provides: “No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. We need not de-
cide here the precise boundaries of the Clause’s protection.
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the core protec-
tion afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause is a prohibi-
tion on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against
himself at trial. See, e. g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. 760,
764–768 (2003) (plurality opinion); id., at 777–779 (Souter,
J., concurring in judgment); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2263,
p. 378 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (explaining that the
Clause “was directed at the employment of legal process to
extract from the person’s own lips an admission of guilt,
which would thus take the place of other evidence”); see also
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27, 49–56 (2000) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (explaining that the privilege might extend to
bar the compelled production of any incriminating evidence,
testimonial or otherwise). The Clause cannot be violated
by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a
result of voluntary statements. See, e. g., id., at 34 (noting
that the word “ ‘witness’ ” in the Self-Incrimination Clause
“limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating
communications to those that are ‘testimonial’ in character”);
id., at 35 (discussing why compelled blood samples do not
violate the Clause; cataloging other examples and citing
cases); Elstad, 470 U. S., at 304 (“The Fifth Amendment, of

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course, is not concerned with nontestimonial evidence”); id.,
at 306–307 (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the
prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony”);
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 705 (1993) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing
“true Fifth Amendment claims [as] the extraction and use of
compelled testimony”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649,
665–672, and n. 4 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the
physical fruit of a Miranda violation need not be suppressed
for these reasons).
To be sure, the Court has recognized and applied several
prophylactic rules designed to protect the core privilege
against self-incrimination. See, e. g., Chavez, supra, at 770–
772 (plurality opinion). For example, although the text of
the Self-Incrimination Clause at least suggests that “its cov-
erage [is limited to] compelled testimony that is used against
the defendant in the trial itself,” Hubbell, supra, at 37, po-
tential suspects may, at times, assert the privilege in pro-
ceedings in which answers might be used to incriminate
them in a subsequent criminal case. See, e. g., United States
v. Balsys, 524 U. S. 666, 671–672 (1998); Minnesota v. Mur-
phy, 465 U. S. 420, 426 (1984); cf. Kastigar v. United States,
406 U. S. 441 (1972) (holding that the Government may com-
pel grand jury testimony from witnesses over Fifth Amend-
ment objections if the witnesses receive “use and derivative
use immunity”); Uniformed Sanitation Men Assn., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Sanitation of City of New York, 392 U. S.
280, 284 (1968) (allowing the Government to use economic
compulsion to secure statements but only if the Government
grants appropriate immunity). We have explained that
“[t]he natural concern which underlies [these] decisions is
that an inability to protect the right at one stage of a pro-
ceeding may make its invocation useless at a later stage.”
Tucker, 417 U. S., at 440–441.

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Similarly, in Miranda, the Court concluded that the possi-
bility of coercion inherent in custodial interrogations unac-
ceptably raises the risk that a suspect’s privilege against
self-incrimination might be violated. See Dickerson, 530
U. S., at 434–435; Miranda, 384 U. S., at 467. To protect
against this danger, the Miranda rule creates a presumption
of coercion, in the absence of specific warnings, that is gener-
ally irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in
chief.
But because these prophylactic rules (including the Mi-
randa rule) necessarily sweep beyond the actual protections
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, see, e. g., Withrow, supra,
at 690–691; Elstad, supra, at 306, any further extension of
these rules must be justified by its necessity for the protec-
tion of the actual right against compelled self-incrimination,
Chavez, supra, at 778 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)
(requiring a “ ‘powerful showing’ ” before “expand[ing] . . .
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination”). In-
deed, at times the Court has declined to extend Miranda
even where it has perceived a need to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination. See, e. g., Quarles, supra, at 657
(concluding “that the need for answers to questions in a situ-
ation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need
for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination”).
It is for these reasons that statements taken without Mi-
randa warnings (though not actually compelled) can be used
to impeach a defendant’s testimony at trial, see Elstad,
supra, at 307–308; Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971),
though the fruits of actually compelled testimony cannot, see
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 458–459 (1979). More
generally, the Miranda rule “does not require that the
statements [taken without complying with the rule] and their
fruits be discarded as inherently tainted,” Elstad, 470 U. S.,
at 307. Such a blanket suppression rule could not be justi-

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fied by reference to the “Fifth Amendment goal of assuring
trustworthy evidence” or by any deterrence rationale, id.,
at 308; see Tucker, supra, at 446–449; Harris, supra, at
225–226, and n. 2, and would therefore fail our close-fit
requirement.
Furthermore, the Self-Incrimination Clause contains its
own exclusionary rule. It provides that “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.” Amdt. 5. Unlike the Fourth Amend-
ment’s bar on unreasonable searches, the Self-Incrimination
Clause is self-executing. We have repeatedly explained
“that those subjected to coercive police interrogations have
an automatic protection from the use of their involuntary
statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in
any subsequent criminal trial.” Chavez, 538 U. S., at 769
(plurality opinion) (citing, for example, Elstad, supra, at 307–
308). This explicit textual protection supports a strong pre-
sumption against expanding the Miranda rule any further.
Cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989).
Finally, nothing in Dickerson, including its characteriza-
tion of Miranda as announcing a constitutional rule, 530
U. S., at 444, changes any of these observations. Indeed, in
Dickerson, the Court specifically noted that the Court’s
“subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda
rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming [Mi-
randa]’s core ruling that unwarned statements may not be
used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.” Id., at
443–444. This description of Miranda, especially the em-
phasis on the use of “unwarned statements . . . in the prose-
cution’s case in chief,” makes clear our continued focus on the
protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause. The Court’s
reliance on our Miranda precedents, including both Tucker
and Elstad, see, e. g., Dickerson, supra, at 438, 441, further
demonstrates the continuing validity of those decisions. In
short, nothing in Dickerson calls into question our continued

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insistence that the closest possible fit be maintained between
the Self-Incrimination Clause and any rule designed to pro-
tect it.
III
Our cases also make clear the related point that a mere
failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate
a suspect’s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule.
So much was evident in many of our pre-Dickerson cases,
and we have adhered to this view since Dickerson. See
Chavez, 538 U. S., at 772–773 (plurality opinion) (holding that
a failure to read Miranda warnings did not violate the re-
spondent’s constitutional rights); 538 U. S., at 789 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing “that
failure to give a Miranda warning does not, without more,
establish a completed violation when the unwarned interro-
gation ensues”); Elstad, supra, at 308; Quarles, 467 U. S., at
654; cf. Chavez, supra, at 777–779 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment). This, of course, follows from the nature of the
right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause, which the
Miranda rule, in turn, protects. It is “ ‘a fundamental trial
right.’ ” Withrow, 507 U. S., at 691 (quoting United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 264 (1990)). See also
Chavez, 538 U. S., at 766–768 (plurality opinion); id., at 790
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The identification of a Miranda violation and its conse-
quences, then, ought to be determined at trial”).
It follows that police do not violate a suspect’s constitu-
tional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even de-
liberate failures to provide the suspect with the full panoply
of warnings prescribed by Miranda. Potential violations
occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned state-
ments into evidence at trial. And, at that point, “[t]he exclu-
sion of unwarned statements . . . is a complete and sufficient

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remedy” for any perceived Miranda violation. Chavez,
supra, at 790.3
Thus, unlike unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment or actual violations of the Due Process Clause
or the Self-Incrimination Clause, there is, with respect to
mere failures to warn, nothing to deter. There is therefore
no reason to apply the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine
of Wong Sun, 371 U. S., at 488.4 See also Nix v. Williams,
467 U. S. 431, 441 (1984) (discussing the exclusionary rule in
the Sixth Amendment context and noting that it applies to
“illegally obtained evidence [and] other incriminating evi-
dence derived from [it]” (emphasis added)). It is not for this
Court to impose its preferred police practices on either fed-
eral law enforcement officials or their state counterparts.
IV
In the present case, the Court of Appeals, relying on Dick-
erson, wholly adopted the position that the taking of un-
warned statements violates a suspect’s constitutional rights.
304 F. 3d, at 1028–1029.5 And, of course, if this were so, a
3 We acknowledge that there is language in some of the Court’s post-
Miranda decisions that might suggest that the Miranda rule operates as
a direct constraint on police. See, e. g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S.
318, 322 (1994) (per curiam); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 420 (1986)
(stating that “Miranda imposed on the police an obligation to follow cer-
tain procedures”); cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 485 (1981). But
Miranda itself made clear that its focus was the admissibility of state-
ments, see, e. g., 384 U. S., at 439, 467, a view the Court reaffirmed in
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443–444 (2000) (equating the
Miranda rule with the proposition that “unwarned statements may not be
used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief ” (emphasis added)).
4 We reject respondent’s invitation to apply the balancing test of Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939). Brief for Respondent 15–33.
At issue in Nardone was the violation of a federal wiretap statute, and
the Court employed an exclusionary rule to deter those violations. But,
once again, there are no violations (statutory or constitutional) to deter
here.
5 It is worth mentioning that the Court of Appeals did not have the
benefit of our decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. 760 (2003).

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Opinion of Thomas, J.
strong deterrence-based argument could be made for sup-
pression of the fruits. See, e. g., Nix, supra, at 441–444;
Wong Sun, supra, at 484–486; cf. Nardone v. United States,
308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939).
But Dickerson’s characterization of Miranda as a constitu-
tional rule does not lessen the need to maintain the closest
possible fit between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any
judge-made rule designed to protect it. And there is no
such fit here. Introduction of the nontestimonial fruit of a
voluntary statement, such as respondent’s Glock, does not
implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause. The admission of
such fruit presents no risk that a defendant’s coerced state-
ments (however defined) will be used against him at a crimi-
nal trial. In any case, “[t]he exclusion of unwarned state-
ments . . . is a complete and sufficient remedy” for any
perceived Miranda violation. Chavez, supra, at 790 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also H. Friendly, Benchmarks 280–281 (1967). There is sim-
ply no need to extend (and therefore no justification for ex-
tending) the prophylactic rule of Miranda to this context.
Similarly, because police cannot violate the Self-
Incrimination Clause by taking unwarned though voluntary
statements, an exclusionary rule cannot be justified by refer-
ence to a deterrence effect on law enforcement, as the Court
of Appeals believed, 304 F. 3d, at 1028–1029. Our decision
not to apply Wong Sun to mere failures to give Miranda
warnings was sound at the time Tucker and Elstad were
decided, and we decline to apply Wong Sun to such fail-
ures now.
The Court of Appeals ascribed significance to the fact that,
in this case, there might be “little [practical] difference be-
tween [respondent’s] confessional statement” and the actual
physical evidence. 304 F. 3d, at 1027. The distinction, the
court said, “appears to make little sense as a matter of pol-
icy.” Ibid. But, putting policy aside, we have held that
“[t]he word ‘witness’ in the constitutional text limits the”

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644 UNITED STATES v. PATANE
Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause to testimonial evi-
dence. Hubbell, 530 U. S., at 34–35. The Constitution itself
makes the distinction.6 And although it is true that the
Court requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually
coerced statements, it must be remembered that statements
taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed
to have been coerced only for certain purposes and then
only when necessary to protect the privilege against
self-incrimination. See Part II, supra. For the reasons
discussed above, we decline to extend that presumption
further.7
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals and remand the case for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O’Connor joins,
concurring in the judgment.
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985), New York v.
Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 (1984), and Harris v. New York, 401
U. S. 222 (1971), evidence obtained following an unwarned
interrogation was held admissible. This result was based in
large part on our recognition that the concerns underlying
the Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), rule must be
accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice sys-
6 While Fourth Amendment protections extend to “persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects,” the Self-Incrimination Clause prohibits only compelling
a defendant to be “a witness against himself,” Amdt. 5.
7 It is not clear whether the Government could have used legal processes
actually to compel respondent to produce the Glock, though there is a
reasonable argument that it could have. See, e. g., United States v. Hub-
bell, 530 U. S. 27, 42–45 (2000); Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v.
Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549, 554–556 (1990); Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S.
391 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 302–303
(1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 761 (1966). But see Com-
monwealth v. Hughes, 380 Mass. 583, 404 N. E. 2d 1239 (1980); Goldsmith
v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 76, 199 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1984). In light
of this, it would be especially odd to exclude the Glock here.

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Souter, J., dissenting
tem. I agree with the plurality that Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000), did not undermine these prece-
dents and, in fact, cited them in support. Here, it is suffi-
cient to note that the Government presents an even stronger
case for admitting the evidence obtained as the result of Pa-
tane’s unwarned statement. Admission of nontestimonial
physical fruits (the Glock in this case), even more so than the
postwarning statements to the police in Elstad and Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), does not run the risk of
admitting into trial an accused’s coerced incriminating state-
ments against himself. In light of the important probative
value of reliable physical evidence, it is doubtful that exclu-
sion can be justified by a deterrence rationale sensitive to
both law enforcement interests and a suspect’s rights during
an in-custody interrogation. Unlike the plurality, however,
I find it unnecessary to decide whether the detective’s failure
to give Patane the full Miranda warnings should be charac-
terized as a violation of the Miranda rule itself, or whether
there is “[any]thing to deter” so long as the unwarned state-
ments are not later introduced at trial. Ante, at 641–642.
With these observations, I concur in the judgment of the
Court.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Jus-
tice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
The plurality repeatedly says that the Fifth Amendment
does not address the admissibility of nontestimonial evi-
dence, an overstatement that is beside the point. The issue
actually presented today is whether courts should apply the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incen-
tive for the police to omit Miranda warnings, see Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), before custodial interrogation.1
1 In so saying, we are taking the legal issue as it comes to us, even
though the facts give off the scent of a made-up case. If there was a
Miranda failure, the most immediate reason was that Patane told the po-

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646 UNITED STATES v. PATANE
Souter, J., dissenting
In closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an eviden-
tiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda, the plurality
adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore
the rule in that case.
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive
character of custodial interrogation and the inherently diffi-
cult exercise of assessing the voluntariness of any confession
resulting from it. Unless the police give the prescribed
warnings meant to counter the coercive atmosphere, a custo-
dial confession is inadmissible, there being no need for the
previous time-consuming and difficult enquiry into volun-
tariness. That inducement to forestall involuntary state-
ments and troublesome issues of fact can only atrophy if we
turn around and recognize an evidentiary benefit when an
unwarned statement leads investigators to tangible evi-
dence. There is, of course, a price for excluding evidence,
but the Fifth Amendment is worth a price, and in the ab-
sence of a very good reason, the logic of Miranda should be
followed: a Miranda violation raises a presumption of coer-
cion, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 306–307, and n. 1 (1985),
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evi-
dence, see United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27, 37–38 (2000)
(recognizing “the Fifth Amendment’s protection against the
prosecutor’s use of incriminating information derived di-
rectly or indirectly from . . . [actually] compelled testimony”);
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 453 (1972). That
should be the end of this case.
The fact that the books contain some exceptions to the
Miranda exclusionary rule carries no weight here. In Har-
ris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), it was respect for the
integrity of the judicial process that justified the admission
lice to stop giving the warnings because he already knew his rights.
There could easily be an analogy in this case to the bumbling mistake the
police committed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985). See Missouri
v. Seibert, ante, at 614–615 (plurality opinion).

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Breyer, J., dissenting
of unwarned statements as impeachment evidence. But Pa-
tane’s suppression motion can hardly be described as seeking
to “perver[t]” Miranda “into a license to use perjury” or oth-
erwise handicap the “traditional truth-testing devices of the
adversary process.” 401 U. S., at 225–226. Nor is there
any suggestion that the officers’ failure to warn Patane was
justified or mitigated by a public emergency or other exigent
circumstance, as in New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 (1984).
And of course the premise of Oregon v. Elstad, supra, is not
on point; although a failure to give Miranda warnings before
one individual statement does not necessarily bar the admis-
sion of a subsequent statement given after adequate warn-
ings, 470 U. S. 298; cf. Missouri v. Seibert, ante, at 614–615
(plurality opinion), that rule obviously does not apply to
physical evidence seized once and for all.2
There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable
invitation to law enforcement officers to flout Miranda when
there may be physical evidence to be gained. The incentive
is an odd one, coming from the Court on the same day it
decides Missouri v. Seibert, ante, p. 600. I respectfully
dissent.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
For reasons similar to those set forth in Justice Souter’s
dissent and in my concurring opinion in Missouri v. Seibert,
ante, at 617, I would extend to this context the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” approach, which I believe the Court has
come close to adopting in Seibert. Under that approach,
2 To the extent that Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974) (admitting
the testimony of a witness who was discovered because of an unwarned
custodial interrogation), created another exception to Miranda, it is off
the point here. In Tucker, we explicitly declined to lay down a broad
rule about the fruits of unwarned statements. Instead, we “place[d] our
holding on a narrower ground,” relying principally on the fact that the
interrogation occurred before Miranda was decided and was conducted in
good faith according to constitutional standards governing at that time.
417 U. S., at 447–448 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964)).

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Breyer, J., dissenting
courts would exclude physical evidence derived from un-
warned questioning unless the failure to provide Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), warnings was in good faith.
See Seibert, ante, at 617–618 (Breyer, J., concurring);
cf. ante, at 645–646, n. 1 (Souter, J., dissenting). Because
the courts below made no explicit finding as to good or bad
faith, I would remand for such a determination.