WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES

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209 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 03–1293. Argued November 30, 2004—Decided January 11, 2005*
Petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to launder money in violation of
18 U. S. C. § 1956(h) after the District Court denied their request to
instruct the jury that the Government was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least one of the co-conspirators had committed
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the convictions, holding, in relevant part, that the jury in-
structions were proper because § 1956(h) does not require proof of an
overt act.
Held: Conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation
of § 1956(h), does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Pp. 212–219.
(a) Section 1956(h) provides: “Any person who conspires to commit
any offense defined in [§ 1956] or section 1957 shall be subject to the
same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.” In United States v. Shabani,
513 U. S. 10, this Court held that the nearly identical language of the
drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. § 846, does not require proof of an
overt act. The Shabani Court found instructive the distinction be-
tween § 846 and the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, which
supersedes the common law rule by expressly including an overt-act
requirement. Shabani distilled the governing rule for conspiracy stat-
utes: Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, and Singer v. United States,
323 U. S. 338, “ ‘give Congress a formulary: by choosing a text modeled
on § 371, it gets an overt-act requirement; by choosing a text modeled
on the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 [which, like 21 U. S. C. § 846, omits
any express overt-act requirement], it dispenses with such a require-
ment.’ ” 513 U. S., at 14. This rule dictates the outcome here as well:
Because § 1956(h)’s text does not expressly make the commission of an
overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the Government need
not prove an overt act to obtain a conviction. Pp. 212–214.
(b) Petitioners’ argument that Shabani is inapplicable because
§ 1956(h) does not establish a new conspiracy offense, but merely in-
*Together with No. 03–1294, Hall v. United States, also on certiorari to
the same court.

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210 WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
creases the penalty for conviction of a money laundering conspiracy
under § 371, is untenable for two reasons: Section 1956(h)’s text is suffi-
cient to establish an offense and fails to provide any cross-reference to
§ 371. Had Congress intended to create the scheme petitioners envi-
sion, it would have done so in clearer terms. Because § 1956(h)’s text
is plain and unambiguous, the Court need not consider petitioners’ argu-
ment that the provision’s legislative history supports their construction
by virtue of its failure to indicate that Congress meant to create a new
offense or to eliminate § 371’s overt-act requirement for money launder-
ing conspiracies. In any event, mere silence in the legislative history
cannot justify reading an overt-act requirement into § 1956(h). See,
e. g., United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496–497. Petitioners’ legisla-
tive history argument is particularly inapt here because Congress is
presumed to have had knowledge of Nash and Singer when it enacted
§ 1956(h). Petitioners’ arguments as to § 1956’s text and structure as a
whole—(1) that had Congress intended § 1956(h) to create a new conspir-
acy offense, it would have placed that offense with the three substantive
money laundering offenses set forth in § 1956(a); and (2) that by provid-
ing that “[a] prosecution for [a money laundering] conspiracy offense . . .
may be brought in the district where venue would lie for the completed
offense under [§ 1956(i)(1)], or in any other district where an act in fur-
therance of the . . . conspiracy took place,” § 1956(i)(2), Congress con-
firmed that proof of an overt act was required under § 1956(h)—are not
persuasive. Pp. 214–218.
349 F. 3d 1320, affirmed.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Sharon C. Samek, by appointment of the Court, post,
p. 985, argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With
her on the briefs were Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe,
Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard Ware Levitt.
Jonathan L. Marcus argued the cause for the United
States in both cases. With him on the brief were Acting
Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General
Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Kirby A.
Heller.†
†Richard A. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging
reversal in both cases.

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211 Cite as: 543 U. S. 209 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases present the question whether conviction for
conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18
U. S. C. § 1956(h), requires proof of an overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy. We hold that it does not.
I
In March 1999, a federal grand jury returned a 20-count
indictment against petitioners and five codefendants. As
relevant here, Count II of the indictment charged petitioners
with conspiracy to launder money, in violation of § 1956(h).
The indictment described, in general terms, the “manner and
means” used to accomplish the objects of the money launder-
ing conspiracy, but it did not charge the defendants with the
commission of any overt act in furtherance thereof.
At trial, the Government presented evidence that petition-
ers were members of the executive board of an entity known
as Greater Ministries International Church (GMIC). GMIC
operated a “gifting” program that took in more than $400
million between 1996 and 1999. Under that program, peti-
tioners and others induced unwary investors to give money
to GMIC with promises that investors would receive double
their money back within a year and a half. Petitioners mar-
keted the program throughout the country, claiming that
GMIC would generate returns on investors’ “gifts” through
overseas investments in gold and diamond mining, commodi-
ties, and offshore banks. Investors were told that GMIC
would use some of the profits for philanthropic purposes.
Most of these claims were false. GMIC made none of the
promised investments, had no assets, and gave virtually
nothing to charity. Many participants in GMIC’s program
received little or no return on their money, and their invest-
ments indeed largely turned out to be “gifts” to GMIC repre-
sentatives. Petitioners together allegedly received more
than $1.2 million in commissions on the money they solicited.

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At the close of the evidence, petitioners asked the District
Court to instruct the jury that the Government was required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the
co-conspirators had committed an overt act in furtherance
of the money laundering conspiracy. The court denied that
request, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the
money laundering conspiracy charge.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed petitioners’ convictions,
holding, in relevant part, that the jury instructions approved
by the District Court were proper because § 1956(h) does not
require proof of an overt act. 349 F. 3d 1320, 1324 (2003).
The Court of Appeals noted that some of its sister Circuits
had taken the opposite position. Id., at 1323 (citing United
States v. Wilson, 249 F. 3d 366, 379 (CA5 2001); United States
v. Hildebrand, 152 F. 3d 756, 762 (CA8 1998)). It concluded,
however, that those decisions were erroneously based on
case law interpreting the general conspiracy statute, 18
U. S. C. § 371, which, unlike § 1956(h), expressly includes an
overt-act requirement. 349 F. 3d, at 1323. The Eleventh
Circuit instead relied upon United States v. Shabani, 513
U. S. 10 (1994), where we held that the drug conspiracy stat-
ute, 21 U. S. C. § 846, does not require proof of an overt act.
Because the language of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(h) and 21 U. S. C.
§ 846 is “nearly identical,” the Eleventh Circuit found itself
compelled to follow the reasoning of Shabani in holding that
§ 1956(h), too, requires no proof of an overt act. 349 F. 3d,
at 1323–1324. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the Circuits on the question presented, 542 U. S. 918
(2004), and we now affirm the decision below.
II
Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. §§ 1956 and 1957 (2000 ed. and
Supp. II) as part of the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207–18. Section 1956 penal-
izes the knowing and intentional transportation or transfer
of monetary proceeds from specified unlawful activities,

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while § 1957 addresses transactions involving criminally de-
rived property exceeding $10,000 in value. As originally
enacted, neither section included a conspiracy provision.
Accordingly, the Government relied on the general conspir-
acy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, to prosecute conspiracies to
commit the offenses set forth in §§ 1956 and 1957. In 1992,
however, Congress enacted the money laundering conspiracy
provision at issue in these cases, now codified at 18 U. S. C.
§ 1956(h). See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act, Pub. L. 102–550, § 1530, 106 Stat. 4066. Section 1956(h)
provides: “Any person who conspires to commit any offense
defined in [§ 1956] or section 1957 shall be subject to the
same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the com-
mission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”
In Shabani, we addressed whether the nearly identical
language of the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. § 846,
requires proof of an overt act. See ibid. (“Any person who
attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy”). We held that it does
not, relying principally upon our earlier decisions in Nash v.
United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913), and Singer v. United
States, 323 U. S. 338 (1945). See Shabani, supra, at 13–14.
In each of those cases, the Court held that, where Congress
had omitted from the relevant conspiracy provision any lan-
guage expressly requiring an overt act, the Court would
not read such a requirement into the statute. See Singer,
supra, at 340 (Selective Training and Service Act of 1940);
Nash, supra, at 378 (Sherman Act).
As we explained in Shabani, these decisions “follow the
settled principle of statutory construction that, absent con-
trary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law
definition of statutory terms. See Molzof v. United States,
502 U. S. 301, 307–308 (1992). We have consistently held
that the common law understanding of conspiracy ‘does not

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214 WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES
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make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a
condition of liability.’ ” 513 U. S., at 13–14 (quoting Nash,
supra, at 378). In concluding that the drug conspiracy stat-
ute in Shabani did not require proof of an overt act, we found
instructive the distinction between that statute and the gen-
eral conspiracy statute, § 371, which supersedes the common
law rule by expressly including an overt-act requirement.
513 U. S., at 14. See 18 U. S. C. § 371 (“If two or more per-
sons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both” (emphasis added)).
Shabani distilled the governing rule for conspiracy stat-
utes as follows: “ ‘Nash and Singer give Congress a formu-
lary: by choosing a text modeled on § 371, it gets an overt-act
requirement; by choosing a text modeled on the Sherman
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 [which, like 21 U. S. C. § 846, omits any
express overt-act requirement], it dispenses with such a re-
quirement.’ ” 513 U. S., at 14 (quoting United States v.
Sassi, 966 F. 2d 283, 284 (CA7 1992)). This rule dictates the
outcome in the instant cases as well: Because the text of
§ 1956(h) does not expressly make the commission of an overt
act an element of the conspiracy offense, the Government
need not prove an overt act to obtain a conviction.
III
Petitioners argue that the rule that governed Shabani is
inapplicable here, because § 1956(h) does not establish a new
conspiracy offense; rather, they say, it merely increases the
penalty for conviction of a money laundering conspiracy
under § 371. In other words, as we understand their argu-
ment, petitioners contend that the Government must con-
tinue to prosecute money laundering conspiracies under
§ 371, but that § 1956(h) now provides enhanced penalties for

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conviction. Since § 371 contains an overt act requirement,
the argument goes, the Government must prove an overt
act in prosecutions ostensibly brought under § 1956(h). This
reading of § 1956(h) is untenable for two principal reasons.
First, petitioners concede—as they must—that § 1956(h)’s
text is sufficient to establish an offense. Indeed, its lan-
guage is nearly identical to the drug conspiracy statute at
issue in Shabani, which indisputably created an offense.
Second, petitioners apparently read § 1956(h) to supply an
enhanced penalty for violation of § 371 in cases where the
object of the conspiracy is to violate the substantive money
laundering offenses in §§ 1956(a) and 1957. But the text of
§ 1956(h) fails to provide any cross-reference to § 371. Mere
use of the word “conspires” surely is not enough to establish
the necessary link between these two separate statutes. In
short, if Congress had intended to create the scheme peti-
tioners envision, it would have done so in clearer terms.
Petitioners seek support for their construction of § 1956(h)
in the provision’s legislative history. They contend that this
history contains no indication that Congress meant to create
a new offense or to eliminate the pre-existing overt-act re-
quirement for money laundering conspiracy prosecutions
that hitherto had been brought under § 371. They say that
the history instead shows that § 1956(h) was intended only
to raise the penalty for money laundering conspiracy from
the 5-year maximum sentence under § 371 to the greater
maximums available for substantive money laundering of-
fenses under §§ 1956(a) and 1957. Petitioners also point out
that, when Congress enacted § 1956(h), it did so under the
title “Penalty for Money Laundering Conspiracies,” 106
Stat., at 4066 (emphasis added). Had Congress wanted to
enact an “offense” provision, they argue, it would have titled
it accordingly.
Because the meaning of § 1956(h)’s text is plain and unam-
biguous, we need not accept petitioners’ invitation to con-
sider the legislative history. But even were we to do so,

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we would reach the same conclusion. It is undisputed that
Congress intended § 1956(h) to increase the penalties for
money laundering conspiracies. The provision’s text makes
clear that Congress did so precisely by establishing a new
offense. Given the clarity of the text, mere silence in the
legislative history cannot justify reading an overt-act re-
quirement, or a cross-reference to § 371, into § 1956(h). See,
e. g., United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496–497 (1997)
(refusing to read a materiality element into the statute at
issue based on silence in the legislative history); Harrison v.
PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980) (“[I]t would
be a strange canon of statutory construction that would re-
quire Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere
in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a
statute”). Nor do we find it significant that Congress chose
to label § 1956(h) a “penalty” rather than an “offense” provi-
sion. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524
U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (“ ‘[T]he title of a statute . . . cannot
limit the plain meaning of the text’ ”); Castillo v. United
States, 530 U. S. 120, 125 (2000) (although “[t]he title of the
entirety of § 924 is ‘Penalties’ . . . at least some portion of
§ 924 . . . creates, not penalty enhancements, but entirely
new crimes”).
Petitioners’ legislative history argument is particularly
inapt here, we might add, because Congress is presumed to
have knowledge of the governing rule described in Shabani.
While Shabani was decided two years after § 1956(h) was
enacted, the rule it articulated was established decades ear-
lier in Nash and Singer. These decisions establish a “for-
mulary” that provides clear and predictable guidance to
Congress. As the Government points out, Congress has
included an express overt-act requirement in at least 22
other current conspiracy statutes, clearly demonstrating that
it knows how to impose such a requirement when it wishes
to do so. See Brief for United States 11, and n. 5 (citing
statutes). Where Congress has chosen not to do so, we will

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not override that choice based on vague and ambiguous sig-
nals from legislative history.
We conclude by addressing two arguments raised by peti-
tioners relating to the text and structure of § 1956 as a whole.
First, petitioners note that Congress placed each of the three
substantive money laundering offenses in § 1956 under sub-
section (a). Had the drafters intended § 1956(h) to create a
new offense, petitioners contend, they would have placed it
with the other offenses in subsection (a) instead of in its own
separate subsection. We fail to see why that should be so.
The three offenses placed in subsection (a) share a common
feature: All are substantive money laundering crimes. We
find nothing remarkable in Congress’ decision to place a qual-
itatively different conspiracy offense provision in a sepa-
rate subsection.
Petitioners’ second textual argument is based on § 1956(i)
(2000 ed., Supp. II), a venue provision added to the statute
in 2001. See USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107–56, § 1004,
115 Stat. 392. Section 1956(i)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. II) pro-
vides that “[a] prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy of-
fense under [§ 1956 or § 1957] may be brought in the district
where venue would lie for the completed offense under
[§ 1956(i)(1)], or in any other district where an act in further-
ance of the attempt or conspiracy took place.” Petitioners
contend that, by setting venue in the district where an overt
act took place, Congress confirmed what (petitioners say)
was the majority view of the Courts of Appeals at the time
of § 1956(i)’s enactment: that proof of an overt act was re-
quired under § 1956(h). Moreover, petitioners argue, setting
venue where an overt act took place makes little sense if
such an act is not an element of the offense.
This argument fails for several reasons. As a preliminary
matter, petitioners assume that § 1956(i) is the sole provision
setting venue in money laundering conspiracy prosecutions.
Although we need not definitively construe that provision
here, we note that its language appears permissive rather

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218 WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES
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than exclusive—§ 1956(i) says a conspiracy prosecution “may
be brought” in a district meeting the specified criteria.
(Emphasis added.) This suggests that the provision serves
to supplement, rather than supplant, the default venue rule:
“Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the gov-
ernment must prosecute an offense in a district where the
offense was committed.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 18. For a
conspiracy prosecution under the common law rule, the dis-
trict in which the unlawful agreement was reached would
satisfy this default venue rule. See Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S.
62, 76 (1905).
But even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that
§ 1956(i) is an exclusive venue provision, petitioners’ argu-
ment still fails. The provision authorizes two alternative
venues for money laundering conspiracy prosecutions: (1) the
district in which venue would lie if the completed substan-
tive money laundering offense had been accomplished, or
(2) any district in which an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy was committed. The first venue option clearly
does not require that any overt act have been committed,
and the Government therefore need not allege or prove such
an act for venue to be properly established under this por-
tion of § 1956(i). As to the second venue option, this Court
has long held that venue is proper in any district in which
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed,
even where an overt act is not a required element of the
conspiracy offense. See, e. g., United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 252 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 402–404 (1927). In
light of this longstanding rule, § 1956(i)(2)’s authorization of
venue in a district where an overt act took place cannot be
taken to indicate that Congress deemed such an act neces-
sary for conviction under § 1956(h). Instead, Congress ap-
pears merely to have confirmed the availability of this alter-
native venue option in money laundering conspiracy cases.

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* * *
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that conviction
for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of
18 U. S. C. § 1956(h), does not require proof of an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.