CITY OF SHERRILL, NEW YORK v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK et al.

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Syllabus
CITY OF SHERRILL, NEW YORK v. ONEIDA INDIAN
NATION OF NEW YORK et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 03–855. Argued January 11, 2005—Decided March 29, 2005
Respondent Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN or Tribe) is a direct
descendant of the Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida Nation), whose aborigi-
nal homeland, at the Nation’s birth, comprised some six million acres in
what is now central New York State. See, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation
of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 664 (Oneida I). In 1788,
the State and the Oneida Nation entered into a treaty whereby the
Oneidas ceded all their lands to the State, but retained a reservation of
about 300,000 acres for their own use. See County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 231 (Oneida II). The Federal
Government initially pursued a policy protective of the New York Indi-
ans. In 1790, Congress passed the first Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act (Nonintercourse Act), barring sales of tribal land without the Gov-
ernment’s acquiescence. And in the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua, the
United States “acknowledge[d]” the Oneidas’ 300,000-acre reservation
and guaranteed their “free use and enjoyment” of the reserved territory.
Act of Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44, 45, Art. III. Nevertheless, New York
continued to purchase reservation land from the Oneidas. Although the
Washington administration objected, later administrations made not
even a pretense of interfering with New York’s purchases, and ulti-
mately pursued a policy designed to open reservation lands to white
settlers and to remove tribes westward. Pressured by the removal pol-
icy, many Oneidas left the State. Those who stayed continued to dimin-
ish in number and, during the 1840’s, sold most of their remaining lands
to New York. By 1920, the New York Oneidas retained only 32 acres
in the State.
Although early litigation over Oneida land claims trained on monetary
recompense from the United States for past deprivations, the Oneidas
ultimately shifted to suits against local governments. In 1970, they
filed a federal “test case” against two New York counties, alleging that
the cession of 100,000 acres to the State in 1795 violated the Noninter-
course Act and thus did not terminate the Oneidas’ right to possession.
They sought damages measured by the fair rental value, for the years
1968 and 1969, of 872 acres of their ancestral land owned and occupied
by the two counties. The District Court, affirmed by the Court of Ap-

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198 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
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peals, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim. This
Court reversed in Oneida I, 414 U. S., at 675, 682, holding that federal
jurisdiction was properly invoked. After the Oneidas prevailed in the
lower courts, this Court held, inter alia, that the Oneidas could maintain
their claim to be compensated “for violation of their possessory rights
based on federal common law,” Oneida II, 470 U. S., at 236, but reserved
“[t]he question whether equitable considerations should limit the relief
available to the present day Oneida Indians,” id., at 253, n. 27.
In 1997 and 1998, OIN purchased separate parcels of land in petitioner
city of Sherrill, New York. These properties, once contained within the
historic Oneida Reservation, were last possessed by the Oneidas as a
tribal entity in 1805. In that year, the Oneida Nation transferred the
parcels to one of its members, who sold the land to a non-Indian in 1807.
The properties thereafter remained in non-Indian hands until OIN reac-
quired them in open-market transactions. For two centuries, gover-
nance of the area in which the properties are located has been provided
by the State and its county and municipal units. According to the 2000
census, over 99% of the area’s present-day population is non-Indian.
Nevertheless, because the parcels lie within the boundaries of the reser-
vation originally occupied by the Oneidas, OIN maintained that the
properties are tax exempt and accordingly refused to pay property
taxes assessed by Sherrill. Sherrill initiated state-court eviction pro-
ceedings, and OIN brought this federal-court suit. In contrast to
Oneida I and II, which involved demands for monetary compensation,
OIN sought equitable relief prohibiting, currently and in the future, the
imposition of property taxes. The District Court concluded that the
parcels are not taxable, and the Second Circuit affirmed. In this Court,
OIN resists the payment of the property taxes on the ground that OIN’s
acquisition of fee title to discrete parcels of historic reservation land
revived the Oneidas’ ancient sovereignty piecemeal over each parcel, so
that regulatory authority over the newly purchased properties no longer
resides in Sherrill.
Held: Given the longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of central
New York and its inhabitants, the regulatory authority over the area
constantly exercised by the State and its counties and towns for 200
years, and the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking judicial relief against par-
ties other than the United States, standards of federal Indian law and
federal equity practice preclude the Tribe from unilaterally reviving its
ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue. The
Oneidas long ago relinquished governmental reins and cannot re-
gain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders.
Pp. 213–221.

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(a) The Court rejects the theory of OIN and the United States that,
because Oneida II recognized the Oneidas’ aboriginal title to their an-
cient reservation land and because the Tribe has now acquired the spe-
cific parcels at issue in the open market, it has unified fee and aboriginal
title and may now assert sovereign dominion over the parcels. The
Oneidas sought only money damages in Oneida II, see 470 U. S., at 229,
and the Court reserved the question whether “equitable considerations”
should limit the relief available to the present-day Oneidas, id., at 253,
n. 27. Substantive questions of rights and duties are very different
from remedial questions. Here, OIN seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief recognizing its present and future sovereign immunity from local
taxation on parcels the Tribe purchased in the open market, properties
that had been subject to state and local taxation for generations. The
appropriateness of such relief must be evaluated in light of the long
history of state sovereign control over the territory. From the early
1800’s into the 1970’s, the United States largely accepted, or was indif-
ferent to, New York’s governance of the land in question and the validity
vel non of the Oneidas’ sales to the State. Moreover, the properties
here involved have greatly increased in value since the Oneidas sold
them 200 years ago. The longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by
the State over an area that is predominantly non-Indian in population
and land use creates “justifiable expectations.” E. g., Rosebud Sioux
Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 604–605. Similar justifiable expectations,
grounded in two centuries of New York’s exercise of regulatory jurisdic-
tion, until recently uncontested by OIN, merit heavy weight here. The
wrongs of which OIN complains occurred during the early years of the
Republic, whereas, for the past two centuries, New York and its local
units have continuously governed the territory. The Oneidas did not
seek to regain possession of their aboriginal lands by court decree until
the 1970’s. And not until the 1990’s did OIN acquire the properties
in question and assert its unification theory to ground its demand for
exemption of the parcels from local taxation. This long lapse of time,
during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their sovereign control
through equitable relief in court, and the attendant dramatic changes in
the character of the properties, preclude OIN from gaining the disrup-
tive remedy it now seeks. Pp. 213–217.
(b) The distance from 1805 to the present day, the Oneidas’ long delay
in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and devel-
opments in Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines
of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the
piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.
This Court has long recognized that the passage of time can preclude
relief. For example, the doctrine of laches focuses on one side’s inaction

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200 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
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and the other’s legitimate reliance to bar long-dormant claims for equi-
table relief. See, e. g., Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 94. Moreover,
long acquiescence may have controlling effect on the exercise of States’
dominion and sovereignty over territory. E. g., Ohio v. Kentucky, 410
U. S. 641, 651. This Court’s original-jurisdiction state-sovereignty
cases do not dictate a result here, but they provide a helpful point of
reference: When a party belatedly asserts a right to present and future
sovereign control over territory, longstanding observances and settled
expectations are prime considerations. It has been two centuries since
the Oneidas last exercised regulatory control over the properties here
or held them free from local taxation. Parcel-by-parcel revival of their
sovereign status, given the extraordinary passage of time, would dis-
honor “the historic wisdom in the value of repose.” Oneida II, 470
U. S., at 262. Finally, this Court has recognized the impracticability of
returning to Indian control land that generations earlier passed into
numerous private hands. See, e. g., Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United
States, 272 U. S. 351, 357. The unilateral reestablishment of present
and future Indian sovereign control, even over land purchased at the
market price, would have disruptive practical consequences similar to
those that led the Yankton Sioux Court to initiate the impossibility
doctrine: Sherrill and the surrounding area are today overwhelmingly
populated by non-Indians, and a checkerboard of state and tribal juris-
diction—created unilaterally at OIN’s behest—would “seriously bur-
de[n] the administration of state and local governments” and would ad-
versely affect landowners neighboring the tribal patches. Hagen v.
Utah, 510 U. S. 399, 421. If OIN may unilaterally reassert sovereign
control and remove these parcels from the local tax rolls, little would
prevent it from initiating a new generation of litigation to free the par-
cels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that protect all land-
owners in the area. See Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 335. Recogniz-
ing these practical concerns, Congress has provided, in 25 U. S. C. § 465,
a mechanism for the acquisition of lands for tribal communities that
takes account of the interests of others with stakes in the area’s gover-
nance and well-being. Section 465 provides the proper avenue for OIN
to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the Onei-
das 200 years ago. Pp. 217–221.
(c) The question of damages for the Tribe’s ancient dispossession, re-
solved in Oneida II, is not at issue here, and the Court leaves undis-
turbed its Oneida II holding. P. 221.
337 F. 3d 139, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer,

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JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 222. Stevens,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 222.
Ira S. Sacks argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs was Esther S. Trakinski.
Caitlin J. Halligan, Solicitor General of New York, argued
the cause for the State of New York as amicus curiae urging
reversal. With her on the brief were Eliot Spitzer, Attor-
ney General, Daniel Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General,
Peter H. Schiff, Andrew D. Bing, Assistant Solicitor General,
and Dwight A. Healy.
Michael R. Smith argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were William W. Taylor III, David
A. Reiser, Thomas B. Mason, Richard G. Taranto, and Peter
D. Carmen.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on
the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clark, Wil-
liam Lazarus, David C. Shilton, and Ethan G. Shenkman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Cayuga and Sen-
eca Counties, New York, et al. by Gus P. Coldebella, William L. Dorr,
Daniel J. Moore, and Brian Laudadio; for the Town of Lenox, New York,
et al. by Charles G. Curtis, Jr., and E. Joshua Rosenkranz; for the Coun-
ties of Madison and Oneida, New York, by G. Robert Witmer, Jr., David
M. Schraver, John J. Field III, and Randal B. Caldwell; and for the Citi-
zens Equal Rights Foundation by Woodruff Lee Carroll.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Cayuga Na-
tion of New York et al. by Arlinda F. Locklear, Martin R. Gold, James
T. Meggesto, Robert T. Coulter, Curtis G. Berkey, Marsha K. Schmidt,
Carey R. Ramos, and Jeanne S. Whiteing; for the Puyallup Tribe of Indi-
ans et al. by Harry R. Sachse, Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Richard A. Guest,
Thomas H. Shipps, John Howard Bell, and Peter C. Chestnut; for the
National Congress of American Indians by Carter G. Phillips, Virginia
A. Seitz, Mark E. Haddad, and Riyaz A. Kanji; and for United South
and Eastern Tribes, Inc., by Ian Heath Gershengorn and Donald B.
Verrilli, Jr.

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202 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns properties in the city of Sherrill, New
York, purchased by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York
(OIN or Tribe) in 1997 and 1998. The separate parcels of
land in question, once contained within the Oneidas’ 300,000-
acre reservation, were last possessed by the Oneidas as a
tribal entity in 1805. For two centuries, governance of the
area in which the properties are located has been provided
by the State of New York and its county and municipal units.
In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470
U. S. 226 (1985) (Oneida II), this Court held that the Oneidas
stated a triable claim for damages against the County of
Oneida for wrongful possession of lands they conveyed to
New York State in 1795 in violation of federal law. In the
instant action, OIN resists the payment of property taxes to
Sherrill on the ground that OIN’s acquisition of fee title to
discrete parcels of historic reservation land revived the Onei-
das’ ancient sovereignty piecemeal over each parcel. Conse-
quently, the Tribe maintains, regulatory authority over
OIN’s newly purchased properties no longer resides in
Sherrill.
Our 1985 decision recognized that the Oneidas could main-
tain a federal common-law claim for damages for ancient
wrongdoing in which both national and state governments
were complicit. Today, we decline to project redress for the
Tribe into the present and future, thereby disrupting the
governance of central New York’s counties and towns. Gen-
erations have passed during which non-Indians have owned
and developed the area that once composed the Tribe’s his-
toric reservation. And at least since the middle years of the
19th century, most of the Oneidas have resided elsewhere.
Given the longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of
the area and its inhabitants, the regulatory authority con-
stantly exercised by New York State and its counties and
towns, and the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking judicial relief
against parties other than the United States, we hold that

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the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty,
in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue. The Oneidas
long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot
regain them through open-market purchases from current
titleholders.
I
A
OIN is a federally recognized Indian Tribe and a direct
descendant of the Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida Nation),
“one of the six nations of the Iroquois, the most powerful
Indian Tribe in the Northeast at the time of the American
Revolution.” Id., at 230. At the birth of the United States,
the Oneida Nation’s aboriginal homeland comprised some six
million acres in what is now central New York. Ibid.;
Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414
U. S. 661, 664 (1974) (Oneida I).
In the years after the Revolutionary War, “the State of
New York came under increasingly heavy pressure to open
the Oneidas’ land for settlement.” Oneida II, 470 U. S., at
231. Reflective of that pressure, in 1788, New York State
and the Oneida Nation entered into the Treaty of Fort
Schuyler. For payments in money and kind, the Oneidas
ceded to New York “all their lands.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
A136. Of the vast area conveyed, “[t]he Oneidas retained a
reservation of about 300,000 acres,” Oneida II, 470 U. S., at
231, “for their own use and cultivation,” App. to Pet. for
Cert. A137 (internal quotation marks omitted).1 OIN does
1 Under the “doctrine of discovery,” Oneida II, 470 U. S. 226, 234 (1985),
“fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived be-
came vested in the sovereign—first the discovering European nation and
later the original States and the United States,” Oneida I, 414 U. S. 661,
667 (1974). In the original 13 States, “fee title to Indian lands,” or “the
pre-emptive right to purchase from the Indians, was in the State.” Id.,
at 670; see Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. New York, 860 F. 2d 1145,
1159–1167 (CA2 1988). Both before and after the adoption of the Consti-
tution, New York State acquired vast tracts of land from Indian tribes

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Opinion of the Court
not here contest the legitimacy of the Fort Schuyler convey-
ance or the boundaries of the reserved area.
The Federal Government initially pursued a policy protec-
tive of the New York Indians, undertaking to secure the
Tribes’ rights to reserved lands. See Oneida II, 470 U. S.,
at 231–232; Oneida I, 414 U. S., at 667; F. Cohen, Handbook
of Federal Indian Law 418–419 (1942 ed.); F. Cohen, Hand-
book of Federal Indian Law 73–74 (1982 ed.) (hereinafter
Handbook). In 1790, Congress passed the first Indian Trade
and Intercourse Act, commonly known as the Nonintercourse
Act. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. Periodically
renewed, see Oneida I, 414 U. S., at 667–668, and n. 4, and
remaining substantially in force today, see Rev. Stat. § 2116,
25 U. S. C. § 177, the Act bars sales of tribal land without
the acquiescence of the Federal Government.2 In 1794, in
further pursuit of its protective policy, the United States en-
tered into the Treaty of Canandaigua with the Six (Iroquois)
Nations. Act of Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44. That treaty both
“acknowledge[d]” the Oneida Reservation as established by
through treaties it independently negotiated, without National Govern-
ment participation. See Gunther, Governmental Power and New York
Indian Lands—A Reassessment of a Persistent Problem of Federal-State
Relations, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1958–1959) (hereinafter Gunther).
2 By its terms, the 1790 Nonintercourse Act governed Indian lands
within the boundaries of the original 13 States. The Act provided “[t]hat
no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians
within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to
any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not,
unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty,
held under the authority of the United States.” Act of July 22, 1790,
ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 138 (emphasis added). Our prior decisions state in this
regard that, “[w]ith the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations be-
came the exclusive province of federal law.” Oneida II, 470 U. S., at 234
(citing Oneida I, 414 U. S., at 670). See generally Clinton & Hotopp, Judi-
cial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land:
The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 Me. L. Rev. 17, 23–38 (1979)
(discussing Indian relations under the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution).

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the Treaty of Fort Schuyler and guaranteed the Oneidas’
“free use and enjoyment” of the reserved territory. Id., at
45, Art. II. The Oneidas in turn agreed they would “never
claim any other lands within the boundaries of the United
States.” Id., at 45, Art. IV.
New York State nonetheless continued to purchase reser-
vation land from the Oneidas. The Washington administra-
tion objected to New York’s 1795 negotiations to buy 100,000
acres of the Oneidas’ Reservation without federal supervi-
sion. Oneida II, 470 U. S., at 229, 232. Later administra-
tions, however, “[made not] even a pretense of interfer[ing]
with [the] State’s attempts to negotiate treaties [with the
Oneidas] for land cessions.” Oneida Nation of N. Y. v.
United States, 43 Ind. Cl. Comm’n 373, 385 (1978); see also
id., at 390; Campisi, The Oneida Treaty Period, 1783–1838, in
The Oneida Indian Experience: Two Perspectives 48, 59 (J.
Campisi & L. Hauptman eds. 1988) (hereinafter Campisi).
See generally Gunther 6 (“New York acquired much land
from Indians through treaties—perhaps as many as 200—not
participated in, though apparently known and not objected
to, by the national government.” (footnote omitted)).
The Federal Government’s policy soon veered away from
protection of New York and other east coast reservations.
In lieu of the commitment made in the Treaty of Canandai-
gua, the United States pursued a policy designed to open
reservation lands to white settlers and to remove tribes
westward. D. Getches, C. Wilkinson, & R. Williams, Cases
and Materials on Federal Indian Law 94 (4th ed. 1998) (After
the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, federal policymakers “began
to debate the tactics of inducing [eastern Indians] to ex-
change their remaining ancestral lands for a permanent ter-
ritory in the West.”). As recounted by the Indian Claims
Commission in 1978, early 19th-century federal Indian
agents in New York State did not simply fail to check New
York’s land purchases, they “took an active role . . . in en-
couraging the removal of the Oneidas . . . to the west.”

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206 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Opinion of the Court
Oneida Nation of N. Y., 43 Ind. Cl. Comm’n, at 390; see id.,
at 391 (noting that some federal agents were “deeply in-
volved” in “plans . . . to bring about the removal of the [Onei-
das]” and in the State’s acquisition of Oneida land). Begin-
ning in 1817, the Federal Government accelerated its efforts
to remove Indian tribes from their east coast homelands.
Handbook 78–79, and n. 142.
Pressured by the removal policy to leave their ancestral
lands in New York, some 150 Oneidas, by 1825, had moved
to Wisconsin. Horsman, The Wisconsin Oneidas in the Pre-
allotment Years, in The Oneida Indian Experience, supra, at
65, 67. In 1838, the Oneidas and the United States entered
into the Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which envisioned removal
of all remaining New York Indians, including the Oneidas, to
Kansas. Act of Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550. By this time, the
Oneidas had sold all but 5,000 acres of their original reserva-
tion. 337 F. 3d 139, 149 (CA2 2003). Six hundred of their
members resided in Wisconsin, while 620 remained in New
York State. 7 Stat. 556 (Sched. A).
In Article 13 of the Buffalo Creek Treaty, the Oneidas
agreed to remove to the Kansas lands the United States had
set aside for them “as soon as they c[ould] make satisfactory
arrangements” for New York State’s “purchase of their lands
at Oneida.” Id., at 554. As a condition of the treaty’s rati-
fication, the Senate directed that a federal commissioner
“fully and fairly explai[n]” the terms to each signatory tribe
and band. New York Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 1,
21–22 (1898). Commissioner Ransom H. Gillet, who had
originally negotiated the treaty terms with the Oneidas, met
with them again and assured them they would not be forced
to move but could remain on “their lands where they reside,”
i. e., they could “if they ch[ose] to do so remain where they
are forever.” App. 146 (emphases added).
The Oneidas who stayed on in New York after the procla-
mation of the Buffalo Creek Treaty continued to diminish in
number and, during the 1840’s, sold most of their remaining

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lands to the State. New York Indians v. United States, 40
Ct. Cl. 448, 458, 469–471 (1905). A few hundred Oneidas
moved to Canada in 1842, id., at 458, and “by the mid-1840s,
only about 200 Oneidas remained in New York State,” Intro-
duction to Part I, The Oneida Indian Journey: From New
York to Wisconsin, 1784–1860, pp. 9, 13 (L. Hauptman & L.
McLester eds. 1999). By 1843, the New York Oneidas re-
tained less than 1,000 acres in the State. Campisi 61. That
acreage dwindled to 350 in 1890; ultimately, by 1920, only 32
acres continued to be held by the Oneidas. Ibid.
The United States eventually abandoned its efforts to re-
move the New York Indians to Kansas. In 1860, the Federal
Government restored the Kansas lands to the public domain,
and sold them thereafter. New York Indians, 170 U. S., at
24, 28–29, 31.
B
Early litigation concerning the Oneidas’ land claims
trained on monetary recompense from the United States for
past deprivations. In 1893, the United States agreed to be
sued for disposing of the Kansas lands to settlers, and the
Oneidas in New York shared in the resulting award of dam-
ages. See New York Indians, 170 U. S. 1; New York Indi-
ans, 40 Ct. Cl. 448 (identifying the Tribes qualified to share
in the distribution of the sum recovered).
Seeking further compensation from the United States a
half century later, the New York and Wisconsin Oneidas ini-
tiated proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission in
1951. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida,
622 F. 2d 624, 626 (CA2 1980). They sought redress for
lands New York had acquired through 25 treaties of cession
concluded between 1795 and 1846. The Oneidas alleged, and
the Claims Commission agreed, that under the Noninter-
course Act of 1790 and successor statutes, the Federal Gov-
ernment had a fiduciary duty to ensure that the Oneidas re-
ceived from New York “conscionable consideration” for the
lands in question. Oneida Nation of N. Y. v. United States,

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208 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
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26 Ind. Cl. Comm’n 138, 145 (1971). The Court of Claims
affirmed the Commission’s core determination, but held that
the United States’ duty extended only to land transactions
of which the Government had knowledge. United States v.
Oneida Nation of N. Y., 201 Ct. Cl. 546, 554, 477 F. 2d 939,
944 (1973). Accordingly, the Court of Claims directed the
Commission to determine whether the Government actually
or constructively knew of the land transactions at issue. Id.,
at 555, 477 F. 2d, at 945.
On remand, the Commission found that the Federal Gov-
ernment had actual or constructive knowledge of all of the
treaties and would be liable if the Oneidas had not received
conscionable consideration. Oneida Nation of N. Y., 43 Ind.
Cl. Comm’n, at 375, 406–407. The Commission anticipated
further proceedings to determine the Federal Government’s
ultimate liability, but the Oneidas had by then decided to
pursue a different course. On the Oneidas’ request, the
Court of Claims dismissed the proceedings. See Oneida
Nation of N. Y. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 990, 991 (1982)
(per curiam).
In lieu of concentrating on recovery from the United
States, the Oneidas pursued suits against local governments.
In 1970, the Oneidas of New York and Wisconsin, asserting
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 or
§ 1362, instituted a “test case” against the New York Coun-
ties of Oneida and Madison. They alleged that the cession
of 100,000 acres to New York State in 1795, see supra, at
205, violated the Nonintercourse Act and thus did not termi-
nate the Oneidas’ right to possession under the applicable
federal treaties and statutes. In this initial endeavor to
gain compensation from governmental units other than the
United States, the Oneidas confined their demand for relief.
They sought only damages measured by the fair rental value,
for the years 1968 and 1969, of 872 acres of their ancestral
land owned and occupied by the two counties. The District
Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dismissed the Onei-

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das’ complaint for failure to state a claim arising under fed-
eral law. We reversed that determination, holding that fed-
eral jurisdiction was properly invoked. Oneida I, 414 U. S.,
at 675, 682.
In the next round, the Oneidas prevailed in the lower
courts. On review in Oneida II, we rejected various de-
fenses the counties presented that might have barred the
action for damages, 470 U. S., at 240–250, and held that the
Oneidas could maintain their claim to be compensated “for
violation of their possessory rights based on federal common
law,” id., at 236. While upholding the judgment of the
Court of Appeals regarding the counties’ liability under fed-
eral common law, we noted that “[t]he question whether equi-
table considerations should limit the relief available to the
present day Oneida Indians was not addressed by the Court
of Appeals or presented to this Court.” Id., at 253, n. 27.
Accordingly, “we express[ed] no opinion as to whether other
considerations m[ight] be relevant to the final disposition of
this case.” Ibid. On remand, the District Court entered a
final judgment which fixed the amount of damages payable
by the counties. Allowing setoffs for the counties’ good-
faith improvements to the land, the court ordered recoveries
of $15,994 from Oneida County and $18,970 from Madison
County, plus prejudgment interest. Oneida Indian Nation
of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 217 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310
(NDNY 2002).
In 2000, litigation resumed in an action held in abeyance
during the pendency of the test case. In that revitalized
action, the Oneidas sought damages from Oneida and Madi-
son Counties for a period spanning over 200 years. The
amended complaint alleged that, through a series of agree-
ments concluded during the years 1795 to 1846, approxi-
mately 250,000 acres of the Oneidas’ ancestral land had been
unlawfully conveyed to New York. Oneida Indian Nation
of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 199 F. R. D. 61, 66–68 (NDNY
2000).

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210 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
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The Oneidas further sought to enlarge the action by de-
manding recovery of land they had not occupied since the
1795–1846 conveyances.3 They attempted to join as defend-
ants, inter alia, approximately 20,000 private landowners,
and to obtain declaratory relief that would allow the Oneidas
to eject these landowners. Id., at 67–68.4 The District
Court refused permission to join the landowners so late in
the day, resting in part on the Oneidas’ bad faith and undue
delay. Id., at 79–85. Further, the court found the proposed
amendment “futile.” Id., at 94. In this regard, the court
emphasized the “sharp distinction between the existence of
a federal common law right to Indian homelands,” a right
this Court recognized in Oneida II, “and how to vindicate
that right.” 199 F. R. D., at 90. That distinction “must be
drawn,” the court stated, ibid., for in the two centuries since
the alleged wrong, “development of every type imaginable
3 In contrast, United States v. Boylan, 265 F. 165 (CA2 1920), involved
land the Oneidas never left. Boylan concerned the 1885 conveyances by
individual Oneida Indians of a 32-acre tract of reservation land to non-
Indians. Despite the conveyances, a band of Oneidas continued to live
on the land. After a non-Indian gained a state-court order ejecting the
remaining Oneidas, the United States brought suit on behalf of the Onei-
das to reclaim the land. The Second Circuit observed that the Oneidas
were “actually in possession” of the 32 acres in question, id., at 167, and
had occupied the land continuously for over a century, id., at 171. Given
that occupation and the absence of Federal Government approval for the
individual Oneidas’ conveyances, the Second Circuit upheld the District
Court’s “decree restoring the ejected Indians to possession.” Id., at
173–174.
4 In another lawsuit, commenced in 1978, the Oneidas sought from the
State of New York and others both damages and recovery of land New
York had purchased from the Oneidas in 1785 and 1788. Oneida Indian
Nation of N. Y., 860 F. 2d, at 1148. The Second Circuit affirmed the Dis-
trict Court’s dismissal of that action, holding that treaties between New
York and the Oneidas during the years in which the Articles of Confedera-
tion were operative did not require the assent of Congress. Id., at 1167;
see supra, at 203–204, n. 1.

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has been ongoing,” id., at 92. Referring to the “practical
concerns” that blocked restoration of Indians to their former
lands, the court found it high time “to transcend the theo-
retical.” Ibid. Cases of this genre, the court observed,
“cr[ied] out for a pragmatic approach.” Ibid. The District
Court therefore excluded the imposition of any liability
against private landowners. Id., at 93–95.
This brings us to the present case, which concerns parcels
of land in the city of Sherrill, located in Oneida County, New
York. According to the 2000 census, over 99% of the popula-
tion in the area is non-Indian: American Indians represent
less than 1% of the city of Sherrill’s population and less than
0.5% of Oneida County’s population. U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Hous-
ing, Summary Population and Housing Characteristics: New
York, 2000 PHC–1–34, Table 3, p. 124 (July 2002), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/phc-1-34.pdf (as vis-
ited Mar. 24, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
OIN owns approximately 17,000 acres of land scattered
throughout the Counties of Oneida and Madison, represent-
ing less than 1.5% of the counties’ total area. OIN’s prede-
cessor, the Oneida Nation, had transferred the parcels at
issue to one of its members in 1805, who sold the land to a
non-Indian in 1807. The properties thereafter remained in
non-Indian hands until OIN’s acquisitions in 1997 and 1998
in open-market transactions. See 337 F. 3d, at 144, n. 3.
OIN now operates commercial enterprises on these parcels:
a gasoline station, a convenience store, and a textile facility.
Id., at 144.
Because the parcels lie within the boundaries of the reser-
vation originally occupied by the Oneidas, OIN maintained
that the properties are exempt from taxation, and accord-
ingly refused to pay the assessed property taxes. The city
of Sherrill initiated eviction proceedings in state court, and
OIN sued Sherrill in federal court. In contrast to Oneida I

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212 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Opinion of the Court
and II, which involved demands for monetary compensation,
OIN sought equitable relief prohibiting, currently and in the
future, the imposition of property taxes. OIN also sued
Madison County, seeking a declaration that the Tribe’s prop-
erties in Madison are tax exempt. The litigation involved
a welter of claims and counterclaims. Relevant here, the
District Court concluded that parcels of land owned by the
Tribe in Sherrill and Madison are not taxable. See 145
F. Supp. 2d 226, 254–259 (NDNY 2001).
A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed. 337 F. 3d
139. Writing for the majority, Judge Parker ruled that the
parcels qualify as “Indian country,” as that term is defined
in 18 U. S. C. § 1151, 5 because they fall within the boundaries
of a reservation set aside by the 1794 Canandaigua Treaty
for Indian use under federal supervision. 337 F. 3d, at 155–
156; see supra, at 204–205. The court further held that the
Buffalo Creek Treaty did not demonstrate a clear congres-
sional purpose to disestablish or diminish the Oneida Reser-
vation. 337 F. 3d, at 161, 165; see supra, at 206. Finally,
the court found no legal requirement “that a federally recog-
nized tribe demonstrate its continuous existence in order to
assert a claim to its reservation land.” 337 F. 3d, at 165.
In any case, the court held, the record demonstrated OIN’s
continuous tribal existence. Id., at 166–167. Judge Van
Graafeiland dissented as to the majority’s primary holding.
In his view, the record raised a substantial question whether
OIN had “forfeited” its aboriginal rights to the land because
it abandoned “its tribal existence . . . for a discernable period
of time.” Id., at 171.
We granted the city of Sherrill’s petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari, 542 U. S. 936 (2004), and now reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
5 Titled “Indian country defined,” 18 U. S. C. § 1151 provides, in relevant
part, that “the term ‘Indian country’ . . . means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government.”

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II
OIN and the United States argue that because the Court
in Oneida II recognized the Oneidas’ aboriginal title to their
ancient reservation land and because the Tribe has now ac-
quired the specific parcels involved in this suit in the open
market, it has unified fee and aboriginal title and may now
assert sovereign dominion over the parcels. Brief for Re-
spondents 1, 12–19; Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 9–10. When the Oneidas came before this Court 20
years ago in Oneida II, they sought money damages only.
470 U. S., at 229; see also id., at 244, n. 16 (recognizing that
the suit was an “action at law”). The Court reserved for
another day the question whether “equitable considerations”
should limit the relief available to the present-day Oneidas.
Id., at 253, n. 27; supra, at 209.6
“The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has any
right or the defendant has any duty, and if so what it is,
are very different questions from the remedial questions
whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what the
measure of the remedy is.” D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§ 1.2, p. 3 (1973); see also Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New
Mexico, 809 F. 2d 1455, 1467 (CA10 1987) (“The distinction
between a claim or substantive right and a remedy is funda-
mental.”). “[S]tandards of federal Indian law and federal
equity practice” led the District Court, in the litigation re-
vived after Oneida II, see supra, at 210–211, to reject OIN’s
plea for ejectment of 20,000 private landowners. Oneida
Indian Nation of N. Y., 199 F. R. D., at 90 (internal quotation
marks omitted); ibid. (“[T]here is a sharp distinction between
the existence of a federal common law right to Indian home-
lands and how to vindicate that right . . . .”). In this action,
6 The United States acknowledged in its brief to the Court in Oneida II
that equitable considerations unaddressed by the Court of Appeals in that
suit might limit the relief available to the present-day Oneidas. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation of N. Y., O. T. 1984, No. 83–1065 etc., pp. 33–40.

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214 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Opinion of the Court
OIN seeks declaratory and injunctive relief recognizing its
present and future sovereign immunity from local taxation
on parcels of land the Tribe purchased in the open market,
properties that had been subject to state and local taxation
for generations.7 We now reject the unification theory of
OIN and the United States and hold that “standards of fed-
eral Indian law and federal equity practice” preclude the
Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago
grew cold.8
The appropriateness of the relief OIN here seeks must be
evaluated in light of the long history of state sovereign con-
trol over the territory. From the early 1800’s into the
1970’s, the United States largely accepted, or was indifferent
to, New York’s governance of the land in question and the
validity vel non of the Oneidas’ sales to the State. See gen-
erally Gunther 23–25 (attributing much of the confusion and
conflict in the history of New York Indian affairs to “Federal
inattention and ambivalence”). In fact, the United States’
policy and practice through much of the early 19th century
was designed to dislodge east coast lands from Indian pos-
7 The dissent suggests that, compatibly with today’s decision, the Tribe
may assert tax immunity defensively in the eviction proceeding initiated
by Sherrill. Post, at 225. We disagree. The equitable cast of the relief
sought remains the same whether asserted affirmatively or defensively.
8 We resolve this case on considerations not discretely identified in the
parties’ briefs. But the question of equitable considerations limiting the
relief available to OIN, which we reserved in Oneida II, is inextricably
linked to, and is thus “fairly included” within, the questions presented.
See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (“The statement of any question presented
is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein.”);
Ballard v. Commissioner, ante, at 47, n. 2; R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S.
377, 381, n. 3 (1992). See generally R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, &
K. Geller, Supreme Court Practice 414 (8th ed. 2002) (“Questions not ex-
plicitly mentioned but essential to analysis of the decisions below or to the
correct disposition of the other issues have been treated as subsidiary
issues fairly comprised by the question presented.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

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session. See supra, at 205–207. Moreover, the properties
here involved have greatly increased in value since the Onei-
das sold them 200 years ago. Notably, it was not until lately
that the Oneidas sought to regain ancient sovereignty over
land converted from wilderness to become part of cities like
Sherrill. See supra, at 210–212; Oneida II, 470 U. S., at
264–265 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
This Court has observed in the different, but related, con-
text of the diminishment of an Indian reservation that “[t]he
longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an
area that is over 90% non-Indian, both in population and in
land use,” may create “justifiable expectations.” Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 604–605 (1977); accord
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U. S. 399, 421 (1994) (“jurisdictional his-
tory” and “the current population situation . . . demonstrat[e]
a practical acknowledgment” of reservation diminishment;
“a contrary conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable
expectations of the people living in the area” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).9 Similar justifiable expectations,
grounded in two centuries of New York’s exercise of regula-
9 The Court has recognized that “only Congress can divest a reservation
of its land and diminish its boundaries.” Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463,
470 (1984); see also 18 U. S. C. § 1151 (defining Indian country); South Da-
kota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S. 329, 343 (1998) (“[O]nly Congress
can alter the terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation.”).
The Court need not decide today whether, contrary to the Second Circuit’s
determination, the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek disestablished the Onei-
das’ Reservation, as Sherrill argues. See Brief for Petitioner 31–39;
Oneida II, 470 U. S., at 269, n. 24 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (“There
is . . . a serious question whether the Oneida did not abandon their claim
to the aboriginal lands in New York when they accepted the Treaty of
Buffalo Creek of 1838 . . . .”). The relief OIN seeks—recognition of pres-
ent and future sovereign authority to remove the land from local taxa-
tion—is unavailable because of the long lapse of time, during which New
York’s governance remained undisturbed, and the present-day and future
disruption such relief would engender.

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216 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Opinion of the Court
tory jurisdiction, until recently uncontested by OIN, merit
heavy weight here.10
The wrongs of which OIN complains in this action oc-
curred during the early years of the Republic. For the past
two centuries, New York and its county and municipal units
have continuously governed the territory. The Oneidas did
not seek to regain possession of their aboriginal lands by
court decree until the 1970’s. See supra, at 210, n. 4. And
not until the 1990’s did OIN acquire the properties in ques-
tion and assert its unification theory to ground its demand
for exemption of the parcels from local taxation. 337 F. 3d,
at 144. 11 This long lapse of time, during which the Oneidas
did not seek to revive their sovereign control through equita-
ble relief in court, and the attendant dramatic changes in the
10 Citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759 (1985), The Kansas
Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867), and The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867),
the dissent notes that only Congress may revoke the tax-exempt status of
Indian reservation land. Post, at 224, and n. 3. Those cases, however,
concerned land the Indians had continuously occupied. See Brief for Re-
spondents in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, O. T. 1984, No. 83–2161, p. 3, and
n. 1 (noting Indians’ occupation of reservation); Kansas Indians, 5 Wall.,
at 738–742 (concerning Indians removed to and residing on Kansas lands
before statehood); New York Indians, 5 Wall., at 768 (taxation by State
would “interfer[e] with the possession, and occupation, and exercise of
authority” by the Indians residing on the reservation). The Oneidas last
occupied the parcels here at issue in 1805. See supra, at 211. The dis-
sent additionally refers to Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians, 524 U. S. 103 (1998). Post, at 224, n. 3. But in that case, the
Court held that an Indian tribe could not revive the tax-exempt status of
its former reservation lands—which Congress had expressly removed
from federal protection—by reacquiring the lands in the open market.
524 U. S., at 113–114.
11 The fact that OIN brought this action promptly after acquiring the
properties does not overcome the Oneidas’ failure to reclaim ancient pre-
rogatives earlier or lessen the problems associated with upsetting New
York’s long-exercised sovereignty over the area. OIN’s claim concerns
grave, but ancient, wrongs, and the relief available must be commensurate
with that historical reality.

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character of the properties, preclude OIN from gaining the
disruptive remedy it now seeks.
The principle that the passage of time can preclude relief
has deep roots in our law, and this Court has recognized this
prescription in various guises. It is well established that
laches, a doctrine focused on one side’s inaction and the oth-
er’s legitimate reliance, may bar long-dormant claims for eq-
uitable relief. See, e. g., Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 87, 94
(1865) (“[C]ourts of equity act upon their own inherent doc-
trine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated de-
mands, refuse to interfere where there has been gross laches
in prosecuting the claim, or long acquiescence in the asser-
tion of adverse rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Wagner v. Baird, 7 How. 234, 258 (1849) (same); Bowman v.
Wathen, 1 How. 189, 194 (1843) (“[The] doctrine of an equita-
ble bar by lapse of time, so distinctly announced by the chan-
cellors of England and Ireland, . . . should now be regarded
as settled law in this court.”).
This Court applied the doctrine of laches in Felix v. Pat-
rick, 145 U. S. 317 (1892), to bar the heirs of an Indian from
establishing a constructive trust over land their Indian an-
cestor had conveyed in violation of a statutory restriction.
In the nearly three decades between the conveyance and the
lawsuit, “[a] large part of the tract ha[d] been platted and
recorded as an addition to the city of Omaha, and . . . sold to
purchasers.” Id., at 326. “[A]s the case stands at present,”
the Court observed, “justice requires only what the law . . .
would demand—the repayment of the value of the [illegally
conveyed] scrip.” Id., at 334. The Court also recognized
the disproportion between the value of the scrip issued to
the Indian ($150) and the value of the property the heirs
sought to acquire (over $1 million). Id., at 333. The sort of
changes to the value and character of the land noted by the
Felix Court are present in even greater magnitude in this
suit. Cf. Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368, 373 (1892)
(“[L]aches is not . . . a mere matter of time; but principally

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218 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Opinion of the Court
a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be en-
forced—an inequity founded upon some change in the condi-
tion or relations of the property or the parties.”).
As between States, long acquiescence may have control-
ling effect on the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over
territory. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U. S. 641, 651 (1973) (“The
rule, long-settled and never doubted by this court, is that
long acquiescence by one state in the possession of territory
by another and in the exercise of sovereignty and dominion
over it is conclusive of the latter’s title and rightful author-
ity.” (quoting Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 295, 308
(1926))); Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U. S. 65, 95 (1926)
(“Long acquiescence in the possession of territory and the
exercise of dominion and sovereignty over it may have a con-
trolling effect in the determination of a disputed boundary.”).
The acquiescence doctrine does not depend on the original
validity of a boundary line; rather, it attaches legal conse-
quences to acquiescence in the observance of the boundary.
California v. Nevada, 447 U. S. 125, 131 (1980) (No relation-
ship need exist “between the origins of a boundary and the
legal consequences of acquiescence in that boundary. . . .
Longstanding acquiescence by California and Nevada can
give [the boundary lines] the force of law whether or not
federal authorities had the power to draw them.”).
This Court’s original-jurisdiction state-sovereignty cases
do not dictate a result here, but they provide a helpful point
of reference: When a party belatedly asserts a right to pres-
ent and future sovereign control over territory,12 longstand-
ing observances and settled expectations are prime consider-
ations. There is no dispute that it has been two centuries
since the Oneidas last exercised regulatory control over the
properties here or held them free from local taxation.
12 It bears repetition that for generations, the Oneidas dominantly com-
plained, not against New York or its local units, but about “[mis]treatment
at the hands of the United States Government.” Oneida II, 470 U. S., at
269 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see supra, at 207–208.

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Parcel-by-parcel revival of their sovereign status, given the
extraordinary passage of time, would dishonor “the historic
wisdom in the value of repose.” Oneida II, 470 U. S., at 262
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
Finally, this Court has recognized the impracticability of
returning to Indian control land that generations earlier
passed into numerous private hands. See Yankton Sioux
Tribe v. United States, 272 U. S. 351, 357 (1926) (“It is impos-
sible . . . to rescind the cession and restore the Indians to
their former rights because the lands have been opened to
settlement and large portions of them are now in the posses-
sion of innumerable innocent purchasers . . . .”); Felix, 145
U. S., at 334 (observing, in declining to award equitable re-
lief, “[t]hat which was wild land thirty years ago is now inter-
sected by streets, subdivided into blocks and lots, and largely
occupied by persons who have bought upon the strength of
Patrick’s title, and have erected buildings of a permanent
character”). The District Court, in the litigation dormant
during the pendency of Oneida II, see supra, at 209–211,
rightly found these pragmatic concerns about restoring In-
dian sovereign control over land “magnified exponentially
here, where development of every type imaginable has been
ongoing for more than two centuries.” Oneida Indian Na-
tion of N. Y., 199 F. R. D., at 92.
In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the “im-
possibility” doctrine had no application because OIN ac-
quired the land in the open market and does not seek to
uproot current property owners. 337 F. 3d, at 157. But the
unilateral reestablishment of present and future Indian sov-
ereign control, even over land purchased at the market price,
would have disruptive practical consequences similar to
those that led this Court in Yankton Sioux to initiate the
impossibility doctrine. The city of Sherrill and Oneida
County are today overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians.
See supra, at 211. A checkerboard of alternating state and
tribal jurisdiction in New York State—created unilaterally

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220 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Opinion of the Court
at OIN’s behest—would “seriously burde[n] the administra-
tion of state and local governments” and would adversely
affect landowners neighboring the tribal patches. Hagen,
510 U. S., at 421 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463,
471–472, n. 12 (1984)). If OIN may unilaterally reassert sov-
ereign control and remove these parcels from the local tax
rolls, little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new
generation of litigation to free the parcels from local zoning
or other regulatory controls that protect all landowners in
the area. See Felix, 145 U. S., at 335 (“decree prayed for in
this case, if granted, would offer a distinct encouragement to
. . . similar claims”); cf. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408, 433–437 (1989) (opin-
ion of Stevens, J.) (discussing tribal land-use controls); post,
at 226, n. 6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “the balance
of interests” supports continued state zoning jurisdiction).13
Recognizing these practical concerns, Congress has pro-
vided a mechanism for the acquisition of lands for tribal com-
munities that takes account of the interests of others with
stakes in the area’s governance and well-being. Title 25
U. S. C. § 465 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to ac-
quire land in trust for Indians and provides that the land
“shall be exempt from State and local taxation.” See Cass
County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U. S.
103, 114–115 (1998). The regulations implementing § 465 are
sensitive to the complex interjurisdictional concerns that
arise when a tribe seeks to regain sovereign control over
13 Other tribal entities have already sought to free historic reserva-
tion lands purchased in the open market from local regulatory controls.
See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Aurelius, New York, No. 5:03–
CV–00690 (NPM), 2004 WL 1945359, *1–*3 (NDNY, Sept. 1, 2004) (tribe
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to avoid application of municipal
zoning and land-use laws to 229 acres); Cayuga Indian Nation of N. Y. v.
Union Springs, 317 F. Supp. 2d 128, 131–134, 147–148 (NDNY 2004)
(granting declaratory and injunctive relief to tribe, to block application of
zoning regulations to property—“located within 300 yards” of a school—
under renovation by the tribe for use as a gaming facility).

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territory. Before approving an acquisition, the Secretary
must consider, among other things, the tribe’s need for addi-
tional land; “[t]he purposes for which the land will be used”;
“the impact on the State and its political subdivisions result-
ing from the removal of the land from the tax rolls”; and
“[j]urisdictional problems and potential conflicts of land use
which may arise.” 25 CFR § 151.10(f) (2004). Section 465
provides the proper avenue for OIN to reestablish sover-
eign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200
years ago.
In sum, the question of damages for the Tribe’s ancient
dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do
not disturb our holding in Oneida II. However, the distance
from 1805 to the present day, the Oneidas’ long delay in seek-
ing equitable relief against New York or its local units, and
developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several gen-
erations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and
impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in
governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.14
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
14 Justice Stevens, after vigorously urging the application of laches to
block further proceedings in Oneida II, 470 U. S., at 255, now faults the
Court for rejecting the claim presented here, post, at 223–224. The ma-
jority indicated in Oneida II that application of a nonstatutory time limita-
tion in an action for damages would be “novel.” 470 U. S., at 244, n. 16;
cf. id., at 261–262 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (acknowledging “the
application of a traditional equitable defense in an action at law is some-
thing of a novelty”). No similar novelty exists when the specific relief
OIN now seeks would project redress for the Tribe into the present and
future. The claim to a sovereign’s prerogative asserted by OIN, we hold,
does “not survive eternally,” id., at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part);
rather, it is a claim “best left in repose,” id., at 273 (same).

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222 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Stevens, J., dissenting
Justice Souter, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court with one qualification that
goes to the appropriateness of considering the long dor-
mancy of any claim to tribal authority over the parcels in
question, as a basis to hold that the Oneida Indian Nation is
not now immune from the taxing authority of local govern-
ment. The Tribe’s claim, whether affirmative or defensive,
see ante, at 214, n. 7, is one of territorial sovereign status
entitled to recognition by the territorial state sovereign and
its subdivisions. The claim of present sovereign status
turns not only on background law and the provisions of trea-
ties, but also on the Tribe’s behavior over a long period of
time: the absence of the Tribe and tribal members from the
particular lots of land, and the Tribe’s failure to assert sover-
eignty over them. The Tribe’s inaction cannot, therefore,
be ignored here as affecting only a remedy to be considered
later; it is, rather, central to the very claims of right made
by the contending parties. Since the subject of inaction was
not expressly raised as a separate question presented for re-
view, see ante, at 214, n. 8, there is some question whether
we should order reargument before dealing with it. I think
that is unnecessary; the issue was addressed by each side in
the argument prior to submission of the case, notwithstand-
ing the terms of the questions on which review was granted.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
This case involves an Indian tribe’s claim to tax immunity
on its own property located within its reservation. It does
not implicate the tribe’s immunity from other forms of state
jurisdiction, nor does it concern the tribe’s regulatory au-
thority over property owned by non-Indians within the
reservation.
For the purposes of its decision the Court assumes that
the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly re-
solved the major issues of fact and law that the parties de-
bated in those courts and that the city of Sherrill (City) pre-

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223 Cite as: 544 U. S. 197 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
sented to us in its petition for certiorari. Thus, we accept
those courts’ conclusions that the Oneida Indian Nation of
New York (Tribe) is a federally recognized Indian Tribe; that
it is the successor-in-interest to the original Oneida Nation;
that in 1788 the Treaty of Fort Schuyler created a 300,000-
acre reservation for the Oneida; that in 1794 the Treaty of
Canandaigua established that tract as a federally protected
reservation; and that the reservation was not disestablished
or diminished by the Treaty of Buffalo Creek in 1838. It is
undisputed that the City seeks to collect property taxes on
parcels of land that are owned by the Tribe and located
within the historic boundaries of its reservation.
Since the outset of this litigation it has been common
ground that if the Tribe’s properties are “Indian Country,”
the City has no jurisdiction to tax them without express con-
gressional consent.1 For the reasons set forth at length in
the opinions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals,
it is abundantly clear that all of the land owned by the Tribe
within the boundaries of its reservation qualifies as Indian
country. Without questioning the accuracy of that conclu-
sion, the Court today nevertheless decides that the fact that
most of the reservation has been occupied and governed by
non-Indians for a long period of time precludes the Tribe
“from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew
cold.” Ante, at 214. This is a novel holding, and in my
judgment even more unwise than the Court’s holding in
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470
U. S. 226 (1985), that the Tribe may recover damages for the
alleged illegal conveyance of its lands that occurred in 1795.
In that case, I argued that the “remedy for the ancient wrong
established at trial should be provided by Congress, not by
judges seeking to rewrite history at this late date,” id., at
270 (opinion dissenting in part). In the present case, the
1 The District Court noted that “[n]o argument is made that should a
finding be made that the properties in question are Indian Country, they
are nonetheless taxable.” 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 241, n. 7 (NDNY 2001).

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224 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Stevens, J., dissenting
Tribe is not attempting to collect damages or eject landown-
ers as a remedy for a wrong that occurred centuries ago;
rather, it is invoking an ancient immunity against a city’s
present-day attempts to tax its reservation lands.
Without the benefit of relevant briefing from the parties,
the Court has ventured into legal territory that belongs to
Congress. Its decision today is at war with at least two
bedrock principles of Indian law. First, only Congress has
the power to diminish or disestablish a tribe’s reservation.2
Second, as a core incident of tribal sovereignty, a tribe en-
joys immunity from state and local taxation of its reservation
lands, until that immunity is explicitly revoked by Congress.3
Far from revoking this immunity, Congress has specifically
reconfirmed it with respect to the reservation lands of the
New York Indians.4 Ignoring these principles, the Court
2 See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S. 329, 343 (1998)
(“Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, including the
power to modify or eliminate tribal rights. Accordingly, only Congress
can alter the terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation, and
its intent to do so must be ‘clear and plain’ ” (citations omitted)); Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 470 (1984) (“Once a block of land is set aside for an
Indian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual
plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until
Congress explicitly indicates otherwise”).
3 See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 764–765 (1985) (noting
that the Court has “never wavered” from the view that a State’s attempt
to tax Indian reservation land is illegal and inconsistent with Indian title
(citing The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867), and The New York Indians,
5 Wall. 761 (1867))); Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans, 524 U. S. 103, 110 (1998) (“We have consistently declined to find that
Congress has authorized such taxation unless it has ‘ “made its intention
to do so unmistakably clear” ’ ”).
4 In providing New York state courts with jurisdiction over civil actions
between Indians, Congress emphasized that the statute was not to be
“construed as subjecting the lands within any Indian reservation in the
State of New York to taxation for State or local purposes.” 25 U. S. C.
§ 233. See Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S.
661, 680–681, n. 15 (1974) (“ ‘The text and history of the new legislation
are replete with indications that congressional consent is necessary to vali-

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225 Cite as: 544 U. S. 197 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
has done what only Congress may do—it has effectively pro-
claimed a diminishment of the Tribe’s reservation and an ab-
rogation of its elemental right to tax immunity. Under our
precedents, whether it is wise policy to honor the Tribe’s tax
immunity is a question for Congress, not this Court, to
decide.
As a justification for its lawmaking decision, the Court re-
lies heavily on the fact that the Tribe is seeking equitable
relief in the form of an injunction. The distinction between
law and equity is unpersuasive because the outcome of the
case turns on a narrow legal issue that could just as easily,
if not most naturally, be raised by a tribe as a defense against
a state collection proceeding. In fact, that scenario actually
occurred in this case: The City brought an eviction proceed-
ing against the Tribe based on its refusal to pay property
taxes; that proceeding was removed to federal court and con-
solidated with the present action; the District Court granted
summary judgment for the Tribe; and the Court of Appeals
affirmed on the basis of tribal tax immunity.5 Either this
date the exercise of state power over tribal Indians and, most significantly,
that New York cannot unilaterally deprive Indians of their tribal lands or
authorize such deprivations. The civil jurisdiction law, to make assurance
doubly sure, contains a proviso that explicitly exempts reservations from
state and local taxation . . . . Moreover, both federal and state officials
agreed that the bills would retain ultimate federal power over the Indians
and that federal guardianship, particularly with respect to property
rights, would continue’ ” (quoting Gunther, Governmental Power and New
York Indian Lands—A Reassessment of a Persistent Problem of Federal-
State Relations, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 16 (1958–1959))).
5 See 337 F. 3d 139, 167 (CA2 2003). Additionally, to the extent that we
are dealing with genuine equitable defenses, these defenses are subject to
waiver. Here, the City sought to add the defense of laches to its answer;
the District Court refused on the ground of futility, 145 F. Supp. 2d, at
259; the Court of Appeals upheld this determination, 337 F. 3d, at 168–169;
and the City failed to preserve this point in its petition for certiorari or
brief on the merits. The City similarly failed to preserve its impossibility
defense in its submissions to this Court, and there is no indication that
the City ever raised an acquiescence defense in the proceedings below.

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226 CITY OF SHERRILL v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Stevens, J., dissenting
defensive use of tax immunity should still be available to the
Tribe on remand, but see ante, at 214, n. 7, or the Court’s
reliance on the distinctions between law and equity and be-
tween substantive rights and remedies, see ante, at 213–214,
is indefensible.
In any event, as a matter of equity I believe that the “prin-
ciple that the passage of time can preclude relief,” ante, at
217, should be applied sensibly and with an even hand. It
seems perverse to hold that the reliance interests of non-
Indian New Yorkers that are predicated on almost two cen-
turies of inaction by the Tribe do not foreclose the Tribe’s
enforcement of judicially created damages remedies for an-
cient wrongs, but do somehow mandate a forfeiture of a
tribal immunity that has been consistently and uniformly
protected throughout our history. In this case, the Tribe
reacquired reservation land in a peaceful and lawful manner
that fully respected the interests of innocent landowners—it
purchased the land on the open market. To now deny the
Tribe its right to tax immunity—at once the most fundamen-
tal of tribal rights and the least disruptive to other sover-
eigns—is not only inequitable, but also irreconcilable with
the principle that only Congress may abrogate or extinguish
tribal sovereignty. I would not decide this case on the basis
of speculation about what may happen in future litigation
over other regulatory issues.6 For the answer to the ques-
6 It is not necessary to engage in any speculation to recognize that the
majority’s fear of opening a Pandora’s box of tribal powers is greatly exag-
gerated. Given the State’s strong interest in zoning its land without ex-
ception for a small number of Indian-held properties arranged in checker-
board fashion, the balance of interests obviously supports the retention of
state jurisdiction in this sphere. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians, 480 U. S. 202, 215 (1987) (“ ‘[I]n exceptional circumstances a
State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal
members’ ”). Nor, as the Tribe acknowledges, Brief for Respondents 19,
n. 4, could it credibly assert the right to tax or exercise other regulatory
authority over reservation land owned by non-Indians. See Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U. S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A–1 Contractors, 520

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227 Cite as: 544 U. S. 197 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
tion whether the City may require the Tribe to pay taxes on
its own property within its own reservation is pellucidly
clear. Under settled law, it may not.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
U. S. 438, 456 (1997) (denying tribal jurisdiction in part because the Tribe
could not “assert a landowner’s right to occupy and exclude” over the land
in question); see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yak-
ima Nation, 492 U. S. 408, 444–445 (1989) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“Be-
cause the Tribe no longer has the power to exclude nonmembers from a
large portion of this area, it also lacks the power to define the essential
character of the territory [through zoning]”).