SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P., et al. v. CITY and COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, et al.

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Syllabus
SAN REMO HOTEL, L. P., et al. v. CITY and COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 04–340. Argued March 28, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005
Petitioners, hoteliers in respondent city, initiated this litigation over the
application of an ordinance requiring them to pay a $567,000 fee for
converting residential rooms to tourist rooms. They initially sought
mandamus in California state court, but that action was stayed when
they filed suit in Federal District Court asserting, inter alia, facial and
as-applied challenges to the ordinance under the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause. Although the District Court granted the city sum
mary judgment, the Ninth Circuit abstained from ruling on the facial
challenge under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S.
496, because the pending state mandamus action could moot the federal
question. The court did, however, affirm the District Court’s ruling
that the as-applied claim was unripe. Back in state court, petitioners
attempted to reserve the right to return to federal court for adjudication
of their federal takings claims. Ultimately, the California courts re
jected petitioners’ various state-law takings claims, and they returned
to the Federal District Court, advancing a series of federal takings
claims that depended on issues identical to those previously resolved in
the state courts. In order to avoid being barred from suit by the gen
eral rule of issue preclusion, petitioners asked the District Court to
exempt their federal takings claims from the reach of the full faith and
credit statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738. Relying on the Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U. S. 172, 195, holding that takings claims are not ripe until a State fails
“to provide adequate compensation for the taking,” petitioners argued
that, unless courts disregard § 1738 in takings cases, plaintiffs will be
forced to litigate their claims in state court without any realistic possi
bility of ever obtaining federal review. Holding, inter alia, that peti
tioners’ facial attack was barred by issue preclusion, the District Court
reasoned that § 1738 requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to
any state-court judgment that would have such effect under the State’s
laws. The court added that because California courts had interpreted
the relevant substantive state takings law coextensively with federal
law, petitioners’ federal claims constituted the same claims the state
courts had already resolved. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit rejected

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petitioners’ contention that general preclusion principles should be cast
aside whenever plaintiffs must litigate in state court under Pullman
and/or Williamson County.
Held: This Court will not create an exception to the full faith and credit
statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to ad
vance federal takings claims. Pp. 336–348.
(a) The Court rejects petitioners’ contention that whenever plaintiffs
reserve their federal takings claims in state court under England v.
Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, federal courts
should review the reserved federal claims de novo, regardless of what
issues the state court may have decided or how it may have decided
them. The England Court’s discussion of the “typical case” in which
reservations of federal issues are appropriate makes clear that the deci
sion was aimed at cases fundamentally distinct from petitioners’. Eng
land cases generally involve federal constitutional challenges to a state
statute that can be avoided if a state court construes the statute in a
particular manner. Id., at 420. In such cases, the purpose of absten
tion is not to afford state courts an opportunity to adjudicate an issue
that is functionally identical to the federal question, but to avoid resolv
ing the federal question by encouraging a state-law determination that
may moot the federal controversy. See id., at 416–417, and n. 7. Addi
tionally, the Court made clear that the effective reservation of a federal
claim was dependent on the condition that plaintiffs take no action to
broaden the scope of the state court’s review beyond deciding the ante
cedent state-law issue. Id., at 419. Because the Ninth Circuit invoked
Pullman abstention after determining that a ripe federal question ex
isted as to petitioners’ facial takings challenge, they were entitled to
insulate from preclusive effect that one federal issue while they re
turned to state court to resolve their mandamus petition. Petitioners,
however, chose to advance broader issues than the limited ones in the
mandamus petition, putting forth facial and as-applied takings chal
lenges to the city ordinance in their state action. By doing so, they
effectively asked the state court to resolve the same federal issue they
had previously asked it to reserve. England does not support the exer
cise of any such right. Petitioners’ as-applied takings claims fare no
better. The Ninth Circuit found those claims unripe under Williamson
County, and therefore affirmed their dismissal. They were never prop
erly before the District Court, and there was no reason to expect that
they could be relitigated in full if advanced in the state proceedings.
Pp. 336–341.
(b) Federal courts are not free to disregard § 1738 simply to guaran
tee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court. Peti

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tioners misplace their reliance on the Second Circuit’s Santini decision,
which held that parties who are forced to litigate their state-law takings
claims in state court pursuant to Williamson County cannot be pre
cluded from having those very claims resolved by a federal court. The
Santini court’s reasoning is unpersuasive for several reasons. First,
both petitioners and Santini ultimately depend on an assumption that
plaintiffs have a right to vindicate their federal claims in a federal
forum. This Court has repeatedly held to the contrary. See, e. g.,
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 103–104. Second, petitioners’ argument
assumes that courts may simply create exceptions to § 1738 wherever
they deem them appropriate. However, this Court has held that no
such exception will be recognized unless a later statute contains an ex
press or implied partial repeal. E. g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 468. Congress has not expressed any intent to
exempt federal takings claims from § 1738. Third, petitioners have
overstated Williamson County’s reach throughout this litigation. Be
cause they were never required to ripen in state court their claim that
the city ordinance was facially invalid for failure to substantially ad
vance a legitimate state interest, see Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519,
534, they could have raised the heart of their facial takings challenges
directly in federal court. With respect to those federal claims that did
require ripening, petitioners are incorrect that Williamson County pre
cludes state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff ’s request for
compensation under state law together with a claim that, in the alterna
tive, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. Pp. 341–348.
364 F. 3d 1088, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Sou
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opin
ion concurring in the judgment, in which O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 348.
Paul F. Utrecht argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs was Andrew M. Zacks.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Andrew W. Schwartz, Fran M. Layton,
Ellison Folk, Edward C. DuMont, and Therese M. Stewart.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Defenders of
Property Rights et al. by Robert P. Parker, Nancie G. Marzulla, Roger J.
Marzulla, and Michael E. Malamut; for Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc.,

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether federal courts
may craft an exception to the full faith and credit statute, 28
U. S. C. § 1738, for claims brought under the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioners, who own and operate a hotel in San Francisco,
California (hereinafter City), initiated this litigation in re
sponse to the application of a city ordinance that required
them to pay a $567,000 “conversion fee” in 1996. After the
California courts rejected petitioners’ various state-law tak
ings claims, they advanced in the Federal District Court a
series of federal takings claims that depended on issues iden
tical to those that had previously been resolved in the state
et al. by Elliot L. Bien, Edith R. Matthai, and Steven S. Fleischman; for
the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard
A. Samp; and for Elizabeth J. Neumont et al. by Eric Grant.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New
Jersey et al. by Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, Patrick
DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, and Brian Weeks, Deputy Attor
ney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Mark
J. Bennett of Hawaii, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Jeremiah W.
(Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, W. A. Drew Edmond
son of Oklahoma, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the
State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York,
Caitlin J. Halligan, Solicitor General, Peter H. Lehner, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Gregory Klass, Assistant Solicitor General, and John J.
Sipos and Susan L. Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General, Richard Blu
menthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and William H. Sorrell, At
torney General of Vermont; for the Community Rights Counsel et al. by
Timothy J. Dowling; for the Conference of Chief Justices by John D.
Echeverria; and for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard
Ruda and James I. Crowley.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Association of Home
Builders by Kenneth B. Bley, Mary V. DiCrescenzo, Duane J. Desiderio,
and Thomas J. Ward; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Meriem
L. Hubbard and R. S. Radford; for the Honorable Steve Chabot by Timo
thy S. Hollister; for Franklin P. Kottschade by Michael M. Berger; and for
Evandro S. Santini et al. by Everett E. Newton.

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court action. In order to avoid the bar of issue preclusion,
petitioners asked the District Court to exempt from § 1738’s
reach claims brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
Petitioners’ argument is predicated on Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), which held that takings
claims are not ripe until a State fails “to provide adequate
compensation for the taking.” Id., at 195. Unless courts
disregard § 1738 in takings cases, petitioners argue, plaintiffs
will be forced to litigate their claims in state court without
any realistic possibility of ever obtaining review in a federal
forum. The Ninth Circuit’s rejection of this argument con
flicted with the Second Circuit’s decision in Santini v. Con
necticut Hazardous Waste Management Serv., 342 F. 3d 118
(2003). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 543
U. S. 1032 (2004),1 and now affirm the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit.
I
The San Remo Hotel is a three-story, 62-unit hotel in the
Fisherman’s Wharf neighborhood in San Francisco. In De
cember 1906, shortly after the great earthquake and fire de
stroyed most of the City, the hotel—then called the “New
California Hotel”—opened its doors to house dislocated in
dividuals, immigrants, artists, and laborers. The City offi
cially licensed the facility to operate as a hotel and restau
rant in 1916, and in 1922 the hotel was given its current
1 Although petitioners asked this Court to review two separate ques
tions, our grant of certiorari was limited exclusively to the question
whether “a Fifth Amendment Takings claim [is] barred by issue preclusion
based on a judgment denying compensation solely under state law, which
was rendered in a state court proceeding that was required to ripen the
federal Takings claim?” Pet. for Cert. i. Thus, we have no occasion to
reach petitioners’ claim that, under California law, the substantive state
takings law decision of the California Supreme Court was not entitled to
preclusive effect in federal court. See Brief for Petitioners 19–21.

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name. When the hotel fell into financial difficulties and
a “dilapidated condition” in the early 1970’s, Robert and
Thomas Field purchased the facility, restored it, and began
to operate it as a bed and breakfast inn. See San Remo
Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. App. 2000) (officially depublished).
In 1979, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors responded
to “a severe shortage” of affordable rental housing for el
derly, disabled, and low-income persons by instituting a mor
atorium on the conversion of residential hotel units into tour
ist units. San Francisco Residential Hotel Unit Conversion
and Demolition Ordinance (hereinafter Hotel Conversion Or
dinance or HCO) §§ 41.3(a)–(g), App. to Pet. for Cert. 195a–
197a. Two years later, the City enacted the first version of
the Hotel Conversion Ordinance to regulate all future con
versions. San Francisco Ordinance No. 330–81, codified in
§ 41.1 et seq. Under the 1981 version of the HCO, a hotel
owner could convert residential units into tourist units only
by obtaining a conversion permit. And those permits could
be obtained only by constructing new residential units,
rehabilitating old ones, or paying an “in lieu” fee into the
City’s Residential Hotel Preservation Fund Account. See
§§ 41.12–41.13, App. to Pet. for Cert. 224a–231a. The City
substantially strengthened the HCO in 1990 by eliminating
several exceptions that had existed in the 1981 version and
increasing the size of the “in lieu” fee hotel owners must pay
when converting residential units. See 145 F. 3d 1095, 1099
(CA9 1998).
The genesis of this protracted dispute lies in the 1981
HCO’s requirement that each hotel “file an initial unit usage
report containing” the “number of residential and tourist
units in the hotel[s] as of September 23, 1979.” § 41.6(b)(1),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 206a. Jean Iribarren was operating
the San Remo Hotel, pursuant to a lease from petitioners,
when this requirement came into effect. Iribarren filed the
initial usage report for the hotel, which erroneously reported

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that all of the rooms in the hotel were “residential” units.2
The consequence of that initial classification was that the
City zoned the San Remo Hotel as “residential hotel”—in
other words, a hotel that consisted entirely of residential
units. And that zoning determination ultimately meant
that, despite the fact that the San Remo Hotel had operated
in practice as a tourist hotel for many years, 145 F. 3d, at
1100, petitioners were required to apply for a conditional use
permit to do business officially as a “tourist hotel,” San
Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 27
Cal. 4th 643, 654, 41 P. 3d 87, 94 (2002).
After the HCO was revised in 1990, petitioners applied to
convert all of the rooms in the San Remo Hotel into tourist
use rooms under the relevant HCO provisions and requested
a conditional use permit under the applicable zoning laws.
In 1993, the City Planning Commission granted petitioners’
requested conversion and conditional use permit, but only
after imposing several conditions, one of which included the
requirement that petitioners pay a $567,000 “in lieu” fee.3
Petitioners appealed, arguing that the HCO requirement
was unconstitutional and otherwise improperly applied to
their hotel. See id., at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95. The City Board
of Supervisors rejected petitioners’ appeal on April 19, 1993.
2 It seems that despite this initial classification, the San Remo Hotel has
operated as a mixed hotel for tourists and long-term residents since long
before the HCO was enacted. According to the California Supreme
Court, in “a 1992 declaration by [petitioners], Iribarren filed the ‘incorrect’
initial unit usage report without their knowledge. They first discovered
the report in 1983 when they resumed operation of the hotel. They pro
tested the residential use classification in 1987, but were told it could not
be changed because the appeal period had passed.” San Remo Hotel,
L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 654, 41 P. 3d
87, 94 (2002).
3 The application specifically required petitioners (1) to pay for 40 per
cent of the cost of replacement housing for the 62 lost residential units;
(2) to offer lifetime leases to any then-current residential users; and (3) to
“obtain variances from floor-area ratio and parking requirements.” Id.,
at 656, 41 P. 3d, at 95.

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In March 1993, petitioners filed for a writ of administrative
mandamus in California Superior Court. That action lay
dormant for several years, and the parties ultimately agreed
to stay that action after petitioners filed for relief in Federal
District Court.
Petitioners filed in federal court for the first time on
May 4, 1993. Petitioners’ first amended complaint alleged
four counts of due process (substantive and procedural) and
takings (facial and as-applied) 4 violations under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu
tion, one count seeking damages under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U. S. C. § 1983, for those violations, and one pendent state
law claim. The District Court granted respondents sum
mary judgment. As relevant to this action, the court found
that petitioners’ facial takings claim was untimely under the
applicable statute of limitations, and that the as-applied tak
ings claim was unripe under Williamson County, 473 U. S.
172.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
petitioners took the unusual position that the court should
not decide their federal claims, but instead should abstain
under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S.
496 (1941), because a return to state court could conceivably
moot the remaining federal questions. See App. 67–68; see
also 145 F. 3d, at 1101. The Court of Appeals obliged peti
tioners’ request with respect to the facial challenge, a re
quest that respondents apparently viewed as an “outrageous
act of chutzpah.” Id., at 1105. That claim, the court rea
4 Specifically, count 3 alleged that the HCO was facially unconstitutional
under the Takings Clause because it “fails to substantially advance legiti
mate government interests, deprives plaintiffs of the opportunity to earn
a fair return on its investment, denies plaintiffs economically viable use of
their property, and forces plaintiffs to bear the public burden of housing
the poor, all without just compensation.” First Amended and Supplemen
tal Complaint, No. C–93–1644–DLJ (ND Cal., Jan. 24, 1994), p. 20, ¶ 49.
Count 4, which advanced petitioners’ as-applied Takings Clause violation,
was predicated on the same rationale. Id., at 21.

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soned, was “ripe the instant the 1990 HCO was enacted,” id.,
at 1102, and appropriate for Pullman abstention principally
because petitioners’ “entire case” hinged on the propriety
of the planning commission’s zoning designation—the precise
subject of the pending state mandamus action, 145 F. 3d, at
1105.5 The court, however, affirmed the District Court’s de
termination that petitioners’ as-applied takings claim—the
claim that the application of the HCO to the San Remo Hotel
violated the Takings Clause—was unripe. Because petition
ers had failed to pursue an inverse condemnation action in
state court, they had not yet been denied just compensation
as contemplated by Williamson County. 145 F. 3d, at 1105.
At the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the court
appended a footnote stating that petitioners would be free
to raise their federal takings claims in the California courts.
If, however, they wanted to “retain [their] right to return
to federal court for adjudication of [their] federal claim,
[they] must make an appropriate reservation in state court.”
Id., at 1106, n. 7.6 That is precisely what petitioners at
tempted to do when they reactivated the dormant Califor
nia case. Yet petitioners advanced more than just the
claims on which the federal court had abstained, and phrased
their state claims in language that sounded in the rules and
standards established and refined by this Court’s takings ju
risprudence. Petitioners claimed, for instance, that “imposi
tion of the fee ‘fails to substantially advance a legitimate
government interest’ and that ‘[t]he amount of the fee im
posed is not roughly proportional to the impact’ of the pro
posed tourist use of the San Remo Hotel.” 27 Cal. 4th, at
656, 41 P. 3d, at 95 (quoting petitioners’ second amended
5 The Court of Appeals did not answer the question whether this claim
was barred by the statute of limitations, as the District Court had held.
6 The reservation discussed in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was the com
mon reservation of federal claims made in state litigation under England
v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 420–421 (1964).

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state complaint).7 The state trial court dismissed petition
ers’ amended complaint, but the intermediate appellate court
reversed. The court held that petitioners’ claim that the
payment of the “in lieu” fee effected a taking should have
been evaluated under heightened scrutiny. Under more ex
acting scrutiny, the fee failed this Court’s “essential nexus”
and “rough proportionality” tests because, inter alia, it was
based on the original flawed designation that the San Remo
Hotel was an entirely “residential use” facility. See id., at
657–658, 41 P. 3d, at 96–97 (summarizing appellate court
opinion (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The California Supreme Court reversed over the partial
dissent of three justices.8 The court initially noted that
petitioners had reserved their federal causes of action and
had sought no relief for any violation of the Federal Consti
tution. Id., at 649, n. 1, 41 P. 3d, at 91, n. 1.9 In the portion
of its opinion discussing the Takings Clause of the California
Constitution, however, the court noted that “we appear to
have construed the clauses congruently.” Id., at 664, 41
P. 3d, at 100–101 (citing cases). Accordingly, despite the fact
that petitioners sought relief only under California law, the
state court decided to “analyze their takings claim under the
7 With respect to claims that a regulation fails to advance a legitimate
state interest, see generally Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U. S. 528,
540–545 (2005). With respect to “rough proportionality” claims, see gen
erally Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987); Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994).
8 Justice Baxter and Justice Chin opined that because some hotel rooms
had been previously rented to tourists, the “in lieu” payment was exces
sive. 27 Cal. 4th, at 691, 41 P. 3d, at 119–120. Justice Brown opined that
a 1985 statute had effectively superseded the HCO and disagreed with the
majority’s analysis of the constitutional issues. Id., at 699, 700–704, 41
P. 3d, at 125–128.
9 “Plaintiffs sought no relief in state court for violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. They explicitly reserved
their federal causes of action. As their petition for writ of mandate, as
well, rests solely on state law, no federal question has been presented or
decided in this case.” Id., at 649, n. 1, 41 P. 3d, at 91, n. 1.

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relevant decisions of both this court and the United States
Supreme Court.” Ibid., 41 P. 3d, at 101.10
The principal constitutional issue debated by the parties
was whether a heightened level of scrutiny applied to the
claim that the housing replacement fee “ ‘does not substan
tially advance legitimate state interests.’ ” Ibid. (quoting
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003,
1016 (1992)). In resolving that debate the court focused on
our opinions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483
U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374
(1994). Rejecting petitioners’ argument that heightened
scrutiny should apply, the court emphasized the distinction
between discretionary exactions imposed by executive offi
cials on an ad hoc basis and “ ‘generally applicable zoning
regulations’ ” involving “ ‘legislative determinations.’ ” 27
Cal. 4th, at 666–668, 41 P. 3d, at 102–104 (quoting, e. g.,
Dolan, 512 U. S., at 385, 391, n. 8). The court situated the
HCO within the latter category, reasoning that the ordinance
relied upon fixed fees computed under a formula that is gen
erally applicable to broad classes of property owners.11 The
court concluded that the less demanding “reasonable rela
tionship” test should apply to the HCO’s monetary assess
ments, 27 Cal. 4th, at 671, 41 P. 3d, at 105.
10 See also id., at 665, 41 P. 3d, at 101 (“[I]t is the last mentioned prong of
the high court’s takings analysis that is at issue here” (emphasis added)).
11 See id., at 669, 41 P. 3d, at 104 (noting that the “HCO is generally
applicable legislation in that it applies, without discretion or discrimina
tion, to every residential hotel in the city” and that “no meaningful gov
ernment discretion enters into either the imposition or the calculation of
the in lieu fee”). The court noted that the general class of property own
ers included more than 500 properties containing over 18,000 rooms, id.,
at 669, n. 12, 41 P. 3d, at 104, n. 12, and concluded that the HCO “applies
to all property in the class logically subject to its strictures, that is, to all
residential hotel units; no more can rationally be demanded of local land
use legislation in order to qualify for deferential review,” id., at 669, 41
P. 3d, at 104.

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Applying the “reasonable relationship” test, the court up
held the HCO on its face and as applied to petitioners. As
to the facial challenge, the court concluded that the HCO’s
mandated conversion fees “bear a reasonable relationship to
loss of housing . . . in the generality or great majority of
cases . . . .” Id., at 673, 41 P. 3d, at 107. With respect to
petitioners’ as-applied challenge, the court concluded that
the conversion fee was reasonably based on the number of
units designated for conversion, which itself was based on
petitioners’ own estimate that had been provided to the City
in 1981 and had remained unchallenged for years. Id., at
678, and n. 17, 41 P. 3d, at 110–111, and n. 17. The court
therefore reversed the appellate court and reinstated the
trial court’s order dismissing petitioners’ complaint.
Petitioners did not seek a writ of certiorari from the Cali
fornia Supreme Court’s decision in this Court. Instead,
they returned to Federal District Court by filing an amended
complaint based on the complaint that they had filed prior to
invoking Pullman abstention.12 The District Court held
that petitioners’ facial attack on the HCO was not only
barred by the statute of limitations, but also by the general
rule of issue preclusion. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a–
12 The third amended complaint, which was filed on November 14, 2002,
alleged two separate counts. See App. 88–93. Count 1 alleged that the
HCO was facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to peti
tioners because (a) it failed “to substantially advance legitimate govern
ment interests”; (b) it forced petitioners “to bear the public burden of
housing the poor”; and (c) it imposed unreasonable conditions on petition
ers’ request for a conditional use permit (the in lieu fee and the required
lifetime leases to residential tenants). Id., at 88–89. Count 2 sought re
lief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 based on (a) extortion through the imposition
of the $567,000 fee; (b) an actual taking of property under Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978); (c) the failure of the
HCO as applied to petitioners to advance legitimate state interests; (d) the
City’s requirement that petitioners bear the full cost of providing a gen
eral public benefit (public housing) without just compensation.

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86a.13 The District Court reasoned that 28 U. S. C. § 1738
requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to any state
court judgment that would have preclusive effect under
the laws of the State in which the judgment was rendered.
Because California courts had interpreted the relevant sub
stantive state takings law coextensively with federal law,
petitioners’ federal claims constituted the same claims that
had already been resolved in state court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected peti
tioners’ contention that general preclusion principles should
be cast aside whenever plaintiffs “must litigate in state court
pursuant to Pullman and/or Williamson County.” 364
F. 3d 1088, 1096 (CA9 2004). Relying on unambiguous Cir
cuit precedent and the absence of any clearly contradictory
decisions from this Court, the Court of Appeals found itself
bound to apply general issue preclusion doctrine. Given
that general issue preclusion principles governed, the only
remaining question was whether the District Court properly
applied that doctrine; the court concluded that it did. The
court expressly rejected petitioners’ contention “that Cali
fornia takings law is not coextensive with federal takings
law,” ibid., and held that the state court’s application of the
“reasonable relationship” test was an “ ‘equivalent determi
nation’ of such claims under the federal takings clause,” id.,
at 1098.14 We granted certiorari and now affirm.
13 The District Court found that most of petitioners’ as-applied claims
amounted to nothing more than improperly labeled facial challenges. See
App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a–85a. The remainder of petitioners’ as-applied
claims, the court held, was barred by the statute of limitations. Id., at
84a–85a.
14 California courts apply issue preclusion to a final judgment in earlier
litigation between the same parties if “(1) the issue decided in the prior
case is identical with the one now presented; (2) there was a final judgment
on the merits in the prior case, and (3) the party to be estopped was a
party to the prior adjudication.” 364 F. 3d, at 1096. The court reasoned
that the California Supreme Court’s decision satisfied those criteria be
cause petitioners’ takings challenges “raised in state court are identical to

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II
Article IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution demands
that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws pre
scribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” In 1790, Con
gress responded to the Constitution’s invitation by enacting
the first version of the full faith and credit statute. See Act
of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.15 The modern version
of the statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, provides that “judicial pro
ceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Pos
sessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State . . . .” This statute has long been understood to en
compass the doctrines of res judicata, or “claim preclusion,”
and collateral estoppel, or “issue preclusion.” See Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94–96 (1980).16
The general rule implemented by the full faith and credit
statute—that parties should not be permitted to relitigate
issues that have been resolved by courts of competent juris
diction—predates the Republic.17 It “has found its way into
the federal claims . . . and are based on the same factual allegations.”
Ibid. Our limited review in this case does not include the question
whether the Court of Appeals’ reading of California preclusion law was
in error.
15 “This statute has existed in essentially unchanged form since its en
actment just after the ratification of the Constitution . . . .” Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 96, n. 8 (1980).
16 “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action pre
cludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or
could have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a
court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that
decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause
of action involving a party to the first case.” Id., at 94 (citations omitted).
17 “The authority of the res judicata, with the limitations under which
it is admitted, is derived by us from the Roman law and the Canonists.”
Washington, Alexandria, & Georgetown Steam-Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24

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every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious fit
ness and propriety, but because without it, an end could
never be put to litigation.” Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109,
114 (1821). This Court has explained that the rule
“is demanded by the very object for which civil courts
have been established, which is to secure the peace and
repose of society by the settlement of matters capable
of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential
to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial
tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of
rights of person and property, if, as between parties and
their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judg
ments of such tribunals in respect of all matters prop
erly put in issue and actually determined by them.”
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1,
49 (1897).
As this case is presented to us, under our limited grant of
certiorari, we have only one narrow question to decide:
whether we should create an exception to the full faith and
credit statute, and the ancient rule on which it is based, in
order to provide a federal forum for litigants who seek to
advance federal takings claims that are not ripe until the
entry of a final state judgment denying just compensation.
See Williamson County, 473 U. S. 172.18
How. 333, 341 (1861); see also id., at 343 (noting that the rule also has its
pedigree “[i]n the courts upon the continent of Europe, and in the courts
of chancery and admiralty in the United States and Great Britain, where
the function of adjudication is performed entire by a tribunal composed of
one or more judges . . . ”).
18 We did not grant certiorari on many of the issues discussed by the
parties and amici. We therefore assume for purposes of our decision that
all other issues in this protracted controversy have been correctly decided.
We assume, for instance, that the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted Cali
fornia preclusion law; that the California Supreme Court was correct in
its determination that California takings law is coextensive with federal
law; that, as a matter of California law, the HCO was lawfully applied to

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The essence of petitioners’ argument is as follows: because
no claim that a state agency has violated the federal Takings
Clause can be heard in federal court until the property
owner has “been denied just compensation” through an avail
able state compensation procedure, id., at 195, “federal
courts [should be] required to disregard the decision of the
state court” in order to ensure that federal takings claims
can be “considered on the merits in . . . federal court,” Brief
for Petitioners 8, 14. Therefore, the argument goes, when
ever plaintiffs reserve their claims under England v. Louisi
ana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964), federal
courts should review the reserved federal claims de novo,
regardless of what issues the state court may have decided
or how it may have decided them.
We reject petitioners’ contention. Although petitioners
were certainly entitled to reserve some of their federal
claims, as we shall explain, England does not support their
erroneous expectation that their reservation would fully ne
gate the preclusive effect of the state-court judgment with
respect to any and all federal issues that might arise in the
future federal litigation. Federal courts, moreover, are not
free to disregard 28 U. S. C. § 1738 simply to guarantee that
all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court. We
turn first to England.
III
England involved a group of plaintiffs who had graduated
from chiropractic school, but sought to practice in Louisiana
without complying with the educational requirements of the
State’s Medical Practice Act. 375 U. S., at 412. They filed
suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the
Act. The District Court invoked Pullman abstention and
stayed the proceedings to enable the Louisiana courts to
petitioners’ hotel; and that under California law, the “in lieu” fee was im
posed evenhandedly and substantially advanced legitimate state interests.

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decide a preliminary and essential question of state law—
namely, whether the state statute applied at all to chiroprac
tors. 375 U. S., at 413.19 The state court, however, reached
beyond the state-law question and held not only that the
statute applied to the plaintiffs but also that its application
was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed
eral Constitution. The Federal District Court then dis
missed the federal action without addressing the merits of
the federal claim.
On appeal, we held that when a federal court abstains from
deciding a federal constitutional issue to enable the state
courts to address an antecedent state-law issue, the plaintiff
may reserve his right to return to federal court for the dispo
sition of his federal claims. Id., at 419. In that case, the
antecedent state issue requiring abstention was distinct
from the reserved federal issue. See id., at 418–419. Our
discussion of the “typical case” in which reservations of fed
eral issues are appropriate makes clear that our holding was
limited to cases that are fundamentally distinct from peti
tioners’. “Typical” England cases generally involve federal
constitutional challenges to a state statute that can be
avoided if a state court construes the statute in a particular
manner.20 In such cases, the purpose of abstention is not to
afford state courts an opportunity to adjudicate an issue that
is functionally identical to the federal question. To the con
trary, the purpose of Pullman abstention in such cases is to
avoid resolving the federal question by encouraging a state
law determination that may moot the federal controversy.
19 We stressed in England that abstention was essential to prevent the
district court from deciding “ ‘questions of constitutionality on the basis of
preliminary guesses regarding local law.’ ” 375 U. S., at 416, n. 7 (quoting
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944)).
20 375 U. S., at 420 (describing the “typical case” as one in which “the
state courts are asked to construe a state statute against the backdrop of
a federal constitutional challenge”).

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See 375 U. S., at 416–417, and n. 7.21 Additionally, our opin
ion made it perfectly clear that the effective reservation of
a federal claim was dependent on the condition that plaintiffs
take no action to broaden the scope of the state court’s re
view beyond decision of the antecedent state-law issue.22
Our holding in England does not support petitioners’ at
tempt to relitigate issues resolved by the California courts.
With respect to petitioners’ facial takings claims, the Court
of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention after determining
that a ripe federal question existed—namely, “the facial tak
ings challenge to the 1990 HCO.” 145 F. 3d, at 1105.23 It
did so because “ ‘land use planning is a sensitive area of social
policy’ ” and because petitioners’ pending state mandamus
action had the potential of mooting their facial challenge
to the HCO by overturning the City’s original classification
of the San Remo Hotel as a “residential” property. Ibid.
Thus, petitioners were entitled to insulate from preclusive
effect one federal issue—their facial constitutional challenge
21 As we explained in Allen, 449 U. S., at 101–102, n. 17, “[t]he holding
in England depended entirely on this Court’s view of the purpose of ab
stention in such a case: Where a plaintiff properly invokes federal-court
jurisdiction in the first instance on a federal claim, the federal court has a
duty to accept that jurisdiction. Abstention may serve only to postpone,
rather than to abdicate, jurisdiction, since its purpose is to determine
whether resolution of the federal question is even necessary, or to obviate
the risk of a federal court’s erroneous construction of state law.” (Em
phasis added and citations omitted.)
22 375 U. S., at 419 (“[I]f a party freely and without reservation submits
his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates them there,
and has them decided there, then . . . he has elected to forgo his right to
return to the District Court”).
23 Petitioners’ facial challenges to the HCO were ripe, of course, under
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992), in which we held that facial
challenges based on the “substantially advances” test need not be ripened
in state court—the claims do “not depend on the extent to which petition
ers are deprived of the economic use of their particular pieces of property
or the extent to which these particular petitioners are compensated.”
Ibid.

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to the HCO—while they returned to state court to resolve
their petition for writ of mandate.
Petitioners, however, chose to advance broader issues than
the limited issues contained within their state petition for
writ of administrative mandamus on which the Ninth Circuit
relied when it invoked Pullman abstention. In their state
action, petitioners advanced not only their request for a writ
of administrative mandate, 27 Cal. 4th, at 653, 41 P. 3d, at 93,
but also their various claims that the HCO was unconstitu
tional on its face and as applied for (1) its failure to substan
tially advance a legitimate interest, (2) its lack of a nexus
between the required fees and the ultimate objectives sought
to be achieved via the ordinance, and (3) its imposition of an
undue economic burden on individual property owners. Id.,
at 672–676, 41 P. 3d, at 106–109. By broadening their state
action beyond the mandamus petition to include their “sub
stantially advances” claims, petitioners effectively asked the
state court to resolve the same federal issues they asked it
to reserve. England does not support the exercise of any
such right.
Petitioners’ as-applied takings claims fare no better. As
an initial matter, the Court of Appeals did not abstain with
respect to those claims. Instead, the court found that they
were unripe under Williamson County. The court there
fore affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of those claims.
145 F. 3d, at 1106. Unlike their “substantially advances”
claims, petitioners’ as-applied claims were never properly be
fore the District Court, and there was no reason to expect
that they could be relitigated in full if advanced in the state
proceedings. See Allen, 449 U. S., at 101, n. 17. In short,
our opinion in England does not support petitioners’ attempt
to circumvent § 1738.
IV
Petitioners’ ultimate submission, however, does not rely
on England alone. Rather, they argue that federal courts
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court judgments when a case is forced into state court by
the ripeness rule of Williamson County. For support, peti
tioners rely on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
decision in Santini, 342 F. 3d, at 130.
In Santini, the Second Circuit held that parties “who liti
gate state-law takings claims in state court involuntarily”
pursuant to Williamson County cannot be precluded from
having those very claims resolved “by a federal court.” 342
F. 3d, at 130. The court did not rest its decision on any
provision of the federal full faith and credit statute or our
cases construing that law. Instead, the court reasoned that
“[i]t would be both ironic and unfair if the very procedure
that the Supreme Court required [plaintiffs] to follow before
bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim . . . also pre
cluded [them] from ever bringing a Fifth Amendment tak
ings claim.” Ibid. We find this reasoning unpersuasive for
several reasons.
First, both petitioners and Santini ultimately depend on
an assumption that plaintiffs have a right to vindicate their
federal claims in a federal forum. We have repeatedly held,
to the contrary, that issues actually decided in valid state
court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the “right” to
have their federal claims relitigated in federal court. See,
e. g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S.
75, 84 (1984); Allen, 449 U. S., at 103–104. This is so even
when the plaintiff would have preferred not to litigate in
state court, but was required to do so by statute or pruden
tial rules. See id., at 104. The relevant question in such
cases is not whether the plaintiff has been afforded access to
a federal forum; rather, the question is whether the state
court actually decided an issue of fact or law that was neces
sary to its judgment.
In Allen, the plaintiff, Willie McCurry, invoked the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments in an unsuccessful attempt to
suppress evidence in a state criminal trial. After he was
convicted, he sought to remedy his alleged constitutional vio

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lation by bringing a suit for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983
against the officers who had entered his home. Relying on
“ ‘the special role of federal courts in protecting civil rights’ ”
and the fact that § 1983 provided the “only route to a federal
forum,” the Court of Appeals held that McCurry was entitled
to a federal trial unencumbered by collateral estoppel. 449
U. S., at 93. We rejected that argument emphatically.
“The actual basis of the Court of Appeals’ holding ap
pears to be a generally framed principle that every per
son asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencum
bered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal
district court, regardless of the legal posture in which
the federal claim arises. But the authority for this
principle is difficult to discern. It cannot lie in the Con
stitution, which makes no such guarantee, but leaves the
scope of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to
the wisdom of Congress. And no such authority is to
be found in § 1983 itself . . . . There is, in short, no
reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a
person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportu
nity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court
simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in
which he would rather not have been engaged at all.”
Id., at 103–104 (footnote omitted).24
As in Allen, we are presently concerned only with issues
actually decided by the state court that are dispositive of
federal claims raised under § 1983. And, also as in Allen, it
24 We expressed similar views in Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd.
of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 84 (1984):
“Although such a division may seem attractive from a plaintiff ’s perspec
tive, it is not the system established by § 1738. That statute embodies
the view that it is more important to give full faith and credit to state
court judgments than to ensure separate forums for federal and state
claims. This reflects a variety of concerns, including notions of comity,
the need to prevent vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial
resources.”

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is clear that petitioners would have preferred not to have
been forced to have their federal claims resolved by issues
decided in state court. Unfortunately for petitioners, it is
entirely unclear why their preference for a federal forum
should matter for constitutional or statutory purposes.
The only distinction between this case and Allen that is
possibly relevant is the fact that petitioners here originally
invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court, which
abstained on Pullman grounds while petitioners returned
to state court. But petitioners’ as-applied takings claims
were never properly before the District Court because they
were unripe. And, as we have already explained, the Court
of Appeals invoked Pullman abstention only with respect
to petitioners’ “substantially advances” takings challenge,
which petitioners then gratuitously presented to the state
court. At a bare minimum, with respect to the facial tak
ings claim, petitioners were “in an offensive posture in [their]
state-court proceeding, and could have proceeded first in fed
eral court had [they] wanted to litigate [their ‘substantially
advances’] federal claim in a federal forum.” Migra, 465
U. S., at 85, n. 7. Thus, the only distinction between this
case and Allen is a distinction of no relevant significance.
The second reason we find petitioners’ argument unper
suasive is that it assumes that courts may simply create ex
ceptions to 28 U. S. C. § 1738 wherever courts deem them ap
propriate. Even conceding, arguendo, the laudable policy
goal of making federal forums available to deserving liti
gants, we have expressly rejected petitioners’ view. “Such
a fundamental departure from traditional rules of preclusion,
enacted into federal law, can be justified only if plainly stated
by Congress.” Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S.
461, 485 (1982). Our cases have therefore made plain that
“an exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later
statute contains an express or implied partial repeal.” Id.,

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at 468 (citing Allen, 449 U. S., at 99). Even when the plain
tiff ’s resort to state court is involuntary and the federal
interest in denying finality is robust, we have held that
Congress “must ‘clearly manifest’ its intent to depart from
§ 1738.” 456 U. S., at 477.
The same concerns animate our decision here. Congress
has not expressed any intent to exempt from the full faith
and credit statute federal takings claims. Consequently, we
apply our normal assumption that the weighty interests in
finality and comity trump the interest in giving losing liti
gants access to an additional appellate tribunal. As we ex
plained in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U. S. 394 (1981):
“[W]e do not see the grave injustice which would be
done by the application of accepted principles of res judi
cata. ‘Simple justice’ is achieved when a complex body
of law developed over a period of years is evenhandedly
applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public
interests beyond any individual judge’s ad hoc determi
nation of the equities in a particular case. There is sim
ply ‘no principle of law or equity which sanctions the
rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of
res judicata.’ ” Id., at 401 (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff,
327 U. S. 726, 733 (1946)).
Third, petitioners have overstated the reach of William
son County throughout this litigation. Petitioners were
never required to ripen the heart of their complaint—the
claim that the HCO was facially invalid because it failed to
substantially advance a legitimate state interest—in state
court. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992).
Petitioners therefore could have raised most of their facial
takings challenges, which by their nature requested relief
distinct from the provision of “just compensation,” directly

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in federal court.25 Alternatively, petitioners had the option
of reserving their facial claims while pursuing their as
applied claims along with their petition for writ of adminis
trative mandamus. Petitioners did not have the right, how
ever, to seek state review of the same substantive issues
they sought to reserve. The purpose of the England reser
vation is not to grant plaintiffs a second bite at the apple in
their forum of choice.
With respect to those federal claims that did require rip
ening, we reject petitioners’ contention that Williamson
County prohibits plaintiffs from advancing their federal
claims in state courts. The requirement that aggrieved
property owners must seek “compensation through the pro
cedures the State has provided for doing so,” 473 U. S., at
194, does not preclude state courts from hearing simultane
ously a plaintiff ’s request for compensation under state law
and the claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensa
tion would violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Con
stitution. Reading Williamson County to preclude plain
tiffs from raising such claims in the alternative would
erroneously interpret our cases as requiring property own
ers to “resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair pro
cedures.” MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U. S. 340, 350, n. 7 (1986).
It is hardly a radical notion to recognize that, as a practical
matter, a significant number of plaintiffs will necessarily liti
gate their federal takings claims in state courts. It was set
tled well before Williamson County that “a claim that the
application of government regulations effects a taking of a
property interest is not ripe until the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a
25 In all events, petitioners may no longer advance such claims given our
recent holding that the “ ‘substantially advances’ formula is not a valid
takings test, and indeed . . . has no proper place in our takings jurispru
dence.” Lingle, 544 U. S., at 548.

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final decision regarding the application of the regulations to
the property at issue.” 473 U. S., at 186. As a conse
quence, there is scant precedent for the litigation in federal
district court of claims that a state agency has taken prop
erty in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
To the contrary, most of the cases in our takings jurispru
dence, including nearly all of the cases on which petitioners
rely, came to us on writs of certiorari from state courts of
last resort.26
Moreover, this is not the only area of law in which we have
recognized limits to plaintiffs’ ability to press their federal
claims in federal courts. See, e. g., Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 116 (1981) (hold
ing that taxpayers are “barred by the principle of comity
from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax
systems in federal courts”). State courts are fully compe
tent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use
decisions. Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more ex
perience than federal courts do in resolving the complex fac
tual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and
land-use regulations.
At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the
concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state
court proceedings that are not chosen, but are instead re
quired in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever
the merits of that concern may be, we are not free to disre
gard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the
availability of a federal forum. The Court of Appeals was
correct to decline petitioners’ invitation to ignore the re
26 See, e. g., Dolan, 512 U. S., at 383; Yee, 503 U. S., at 526; Nollan, 483
U. S., at 830; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 310–311 (1987); Penn Central, 438
U. S., at 120–122. Indeed, Justice Holmes’ famous “too far” formulation,
which spawned our regulatory takings jurisprudence, was announced in a
case that came to this Court via a writ of certiorari to Pennsylvania’s
highest court. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922).

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Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment
quirements of 28 U. S. C. § 1738. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered
Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice O’Con
nor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join, concur
ring in the judgment.
I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should
be affirmed. Whatever the reasons for petitioners’ chosen
course of litigation in the state courts, it is quite clear that
they are now precluded by the full faith and credit statute,
28 U. S. C. § 1738, from relitigating in their 42 U. S. C. § 1983
action those issues which were adjudicated by the California
courts. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed.,
465 U. S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 103–
105 (1980). There is no basis for us to except from § 1738’s
reach all claims brought under the Takings Clause. See,
e. g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 485
(1982). I write separately to explain why I think part of our
decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), may
have been mistaken.
In Williamson County, the respondent land developer
filed a § 1983 suit in federal court alleging a regulatory tak
ings claim after a regional planning commission disapproved
respondent’s plat proposals, but before respondent appealed
that decision to the zoning board of appeals. Id., at 181–182.
Rather than reaching the merits, we found the claim was
brought prematurely. Id., at 200. We first held that the
claim was “not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations [had] reached a final decision
regarding the application of the regulations to the property
at issue.” Id., at 186. Because respondent failed to seek
variances from the planning commission or the zoning board
of appeals, we decided that respondent had failed to meet
the final-decision requirement. Id., at 187–191. We then

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noted a “second reason the taking claim [was] not yet ripe”:
“respondent did not seek compensation through the proce
dures the State [had] provided for doing so.” Id., at 194.
Until the claimant had received a final denial of compensa
tion through all available state procedures, such as by an
inverse condemnation action, we said he could not “claim a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause.” Id., at 195–196.
It is not clear to me that Williamson County was correct
in demanding that, once a government entity has reached a
final decision with respect to a claimant’s property, the claim
ant must seek compensation in state court before bringing a
federal takings claim in federal court. The Court in Wil
liamson County purported to interpret the Fifth Amend
ment in divining this state-litigation requirement. See, e. g.,
id., at 194, n. 13 (“The nature of the constitutional right . . .
requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtain
ing compensation before bringing a § 1983 action”). More
recently, we have referred to it as merely a prudential re
quirement. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
520 U. S. 725, 733–734 (1997). It is not obvious that either
constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to
utilize all state compensation procedures before they can
bring a federal takings claim. Cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents
of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs suing
under § 1983 are not required to have exhausted state admin
istrative remedies).1
The Court today attempts to shore up the state-litigation
requirement by referring to Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981). Ante, at 347.
1 In creating the state-litigation rule, the Court, in addition to relying
on the Fifth Amendment’s text, analogized to Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984), and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). As
several of petitioners’ amici in this case have urged, those cases provided
limited support for the state-litigation requirement. See Brief for De
fenders of Property Rights et al. as Amici Curiae 9–12; Brief for Eliza
beth J. Neumont et al. as Amici Curiae 10–14.

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There, we held that the principle of comity (reflected in the
Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341) bars taxpayers from
asserting § 1983 claims against the validity of state tax sys
tems in federal courts. 454 U. S., at 116. Our decision that
such suits must be brought in state court was driven by the
unique and sensitive interests at stake when federal courts
confront claims that States acted impermissibly in adminis
tering their own tax systems. Id., at 102–103, 107–113.
Those historically grounded, federalism-based concerns had
led to a longstanding, “fundamental principle of comity be
tween federal courts and state governments . . . , particularly
in the area of state taxation,” a principle which predated the
enactment of § 1983 itself. Id., at 103, 107–114. We decided
that those interests favored requiring that taxpayers bring
challenges to the validity of state tax systems in state court,
despite the strong interests favoring federal court review of
alleged constitutional violations by state officials. Id., at
115–116.
The Court today makes no claim that any such longstand
ing principle of comity toward state courts in handling fed
eral takings claims existed at the time Williamson County
was decided, nor that one has since developed. The Court
does remark, however, that state courts are more familiar
with the issues involved in local land-use and zoning regula
tions, and it suggests that this makes it proper to relegate
federal takings claims to state court. Ante, at 347. But it
is not apparent that any such expertise matches the type of
historically grounded, federalism-based interests we found
necessary to our decision in Fair Assessment. In any event,
the Court has not explained why we should hand authority
over federal takings claims to state courts, based simply on
their relative familiarity with local land-use decisions and
proceedings, while allowing plaintiffs to proceed directly to
federal court in cases involving, for example, challenges to
municipal land-use regulations based on the First Amend
ment, see, e. g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S.

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41 (1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S.
50 (1976), or the Equal Protection Clause, see, e. g., Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985); Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974). In short, the
affirmative case for the state-litigation requirement has yet
to be made.
Finally, Williamson County’s state-litigation rule has cre
ated some real anomalies, justifying our revisiting the issue.
For example, our holding today ensures that litigants who go
to state court to seek compensation will likely be unable later
to assert their federal takings claims in federal court. Ante,
at 346–347. And, even if preclusion law would not block a
litigant’s claim, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine might, insofar
as Williamson County can be read to characterize the state
courts’ denial of compensation as a required element of the
Fifth Amendment takings claim. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280 (2005). As the
Court recognizes, ante, at 346–347, Williamson County all
but guarantees that claimants will be unable to utilize the
federal courts to enforce the Fifth Amendment’s just com
pensation guarantee. The basic principle that state courts
are competent to enforce federal rights and to adjudicate fed
eral takings claims is sound, see ante, at 347, and would
apply to any number of federal claims. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2254
(providing for limited federal habeas review of state-court
adjudications of alleged violations of the Constitution). But
that principle does not explain why federal takings claims in
particular should be singled out to be confined to state court,
in the absence of any asserted justification or congressional
directive.2
2 Indeed, in some States the courts themselves apply the state-litigation
requirement from Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), refusing to enter
tain any federal takings claim until the claimant receives a final denial
of compensation through all the available state procedures. See, e. g.,
Breneric Assoc. v. City of Del Mar, 69 Cal. App. 4th 166, 188–189, 81

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* * *
I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson County.
But further reflection and experience lead me to think that
the justifications for its state-litigation requirement are sus
pect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic.
Here, no court below has addressed the correctness of Wil
liamson County, neither party has asked us to reconsider
it, and resolving the issue could not benefit petitioners. In
an appropriate case, I believe the Court should reconsider
whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth Amendment takings
claim based on the final decision of a state or local govern
ment entity must first seek compensation in state courts.
Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 338–339 (1998); Melillo v. City of New Haven, 249 Conn.
138, 154, n. 28, 732 A. 2d 133, 143, n. 28 (1999). This precludes litigants
from asserting their federal takings claim even in state court. The Court
tries to avoid this anomaly by asserting that, for plaintiffs attempting to
raise a federal takings claim in state court as an alternative to their state
claims, Williamson County does not command that the state courts them
selves impose the state-litigation requirement. Ante, at 346. But that is
so only if Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement is merely a
prudential rule, and not a constitutional mandate, a question that the
Court today conspicuously leaves open.