GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT et al. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. WILSON

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409 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICT et al. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. WILSON
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 04–169. Argued April 20, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005
The False Claims Act (FCA) prohibits a person from making false or
fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. 31 U. S. C.
§ 3729(a). That prohibition may be enforced in suits filed by the Attor
ney General, § 3730(a), and in qui tam actions brought by private indi
viduals in the Government’s name, § 3730(b)(1). A 1986 amendment to
the FCA created a private cause of action for an individual retaliated
against by his employer for assisting an FCA investigation or proceed
ing, § 3730(h), and revised the FCA’s statute of limitations, § 3731(b).
Section 3731(b) provides that “[a] civil action under section 3730 may not
be brought . . . more than 6 years after the date on which the violation of
section 3729 is committed.” In 2001, relator Wilson brought an FCA
qui tam action against petitioners, along with an FCA retaliation claim.
Petitioner Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District em
ployed Wilson as a secretary. Wilson alleged that petitioner county
officials retaliated against her for alerting federal officials to the pur
ported fraud and for cooperating with the ensuing investigation, ulti
mately forcing her 1997 resignation from the district. Petitioners suc
cessfully moved to dismiss the retaliation claim as untimely, on the
ground that North Carolina’s 3-year statute of limitations governed Wil
son’s FCA action and barred it. Reversing, the Fourth Circuit found
it unnecessary to borrow a state limitations period because one was
supplied by § 3731(b)(1).
Held: Section 3731(b)(1)’s limitations period does not govern § 3730(h) re
taliation actions. Instead, the most closely analogous state statute of
limitations applies. Pp. 414–422.
(a) To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a cause of
action created by federal statute, this Court asks first whether the stat
ute expressly supplies a limitations period. If not, the most closely
analogous state limitations period applies. Pp. 414–415.
(b) Section 3730(h) is a subsection of § 3730, but § 3731(b)(1) is none
theless ambiguous about whether a § 3730(h) retaliation action is “a civil
action under section 3730” as that phrase is used in § 3731(b)(1). An
other reasonable reading is that § 3731(b)(1)’s limitations period applies
only to §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions. Section 3731(b)(1) starts the limita

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Syllabus
tions period running on “the date on which the violation of section 3729
is committed,” that is, on the date the false claim was actually sub
mitted. That language casts doubt on whether § 3731(b)(1) specifies a
limitations period for retaliation actions. For even a well-pleaded re
taliation complaint need not allege that the defendant submitted a
false claim, leaving the limitations period without a starting point if
§ 3731(b)(1) is applicable. By contrast, the section naturally applies to
well-pleaded §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions. Those actions require a plaintiff
to plead that the defendant submitted a false claim and therefore nec
essarily specify when § 3731(b)(1)’s time limit begins. At a minimum
this anomaly shows that § 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous about whether “ac
tion under section 3730” means all actions arising under that section.
Pp. 415–417.
(c) Two considerations show that the better way to resolve this ambi
guity is to read the 6-year period to govern only §§ 3730(a) and (b)
actions. First, the very next subsection, § 3730(c), uses the similarly
unqualified phrase “action brought under section 3730” to refer only to
§§ 3730(a) and (b) actions. Second, reading § 3731(b)(1) to apply only to
those actions is in keeping with the default rule that Congress generally
drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the plaintiff has a complete
and present cause of action. Where, as here, there are two plausible
constructions, this Court should adopt the construction that starts the
time limit running when the cause of action (here retaliation) accrues.
This approach resolves § 3731(b)(1)’s ambiguity in petitioners’ favor.
Reading § 3731(b)(1) to exclude retaliation actions will generally start
the limitations period running when the cause of action accrues, for the
likely analogous state statutes virtually all start when the retaliatory
action occurs. However, under the reading favored by Wilson and the
Government, the limitations period would begin at best on the date an
actual or suspected FCA violation occurred, which would precede the
retaliatory conduct. Pp. 417–422.
(d) The Court of Appeals should determine in the first instance the
appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow. P. 422.
367 F. 3d 245, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in which Sou
ter, J., joined as to all but n. 2. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment, post, p. 422. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 423.
Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Solicitor General of North
Carolina, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the

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briefs were Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Grayson G. Kel
ley, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Jill B. Hickey, Spe
cial Deputy Attorney General.
Mark T. Hurt argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief was Brian S. McCoy.
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With
him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement,
Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor Gen
eral Kneedler, and Douglas N. Letter.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.†
This case presents the question whether the 6-year statute
of limitations in the False Claims Act (FCA or Act), see 31
U. S. C. § 3731(b)(1), governs FCA civil actions for retalia
tion, see § 3730(h). We hold that it does not and therefore
conclude that the most closely analogous state limitations pe
riod applies.
I
The FCA prohibits any person from making false or fraud
ulent claims for payment to the United States. § 3729(a).
Persons who do so are liable for civil penalties of up to
$10,000 per claim and treble damages. Ibid. The Act sets
forth two principal enforcement mechanisms for policing this
proscription. First, the Attorney General may sue to rem
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Equal Em
ployment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Elizabeth Reesman, Stephen A.
Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Robert J. Costagliola; for the International
Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by John Charles Thomas and M.
Christine Klein; and for the National Defense Industrial Association et al.
by Mark R. Troy, C. Stanley Dees, and Lawrence S. Ebner.
Ann Lugbill, Mark Kleiman, and Robin Potter filed a brief for the
National Employment Lawyers Association et al. as amici curiae urging
affirmance.
Gregory Stuart Smith and Teresa Wynn Roseborough filed a brief for
the National Workrights Institute as amicus curiae.
†Justice Souter joins all but footnote 2 of this opinion.

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edy violations of § 3729. § 3730(a). Second, private individ
uals may bring qui tam actions in the Government’s name
for § 3729 violations. § 3730(b)(1); see Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S.
765, 769–772 (2000). The qui tam relator must give the Gov
ernment notice of the action, and the Government is entitled
to intervene in the suit. § 3730(b)(2). The relator receives
up to 30 percent of the proceeds of the action, in addition to
attorney’s fees and costs. §§ 3730(d)(1), (2).
The 1986 amendments to the FCA created a third enforce
ment mechanism: a private cause of action for an individual
retaliated against by his employer for assisting an FCA in
vestigation or proceeding. § 3730(h). Section 3730(h) pro
vides in relevant part that
“[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended,
threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discrimi
nated against in the terms and conditions of employment
by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by
the employee on behalf of the employee or others in fur
therance of an action under this section, including inves
tigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in
an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be
entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee
whole.”
Remedies for retaliation include reinstatement, two times
the amount of backpay plus interest, special damages, litiga
tion costs, and attorney’s fees. Ibid.
The 1986 amendments also revised the language of the 6
year statute of limitations applicable to FCA actions. The
previous version of the statute provided that “[a] civil action
under section 3730 of this title must be brought within 6
years from the date the violation is committed.” § 3731(b)
(1982 ed.). The 1986 amendments revised this provision to
read:

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“(b) A civil action under section 3730 may not be
brought—
“(1) more than 6 years after the date on which the
violation of section 3729 is committed, or
“(2) more than 3 years after the date when facts ma
terial to the right of action are known or reasonably
should have been known by the official of the United
States charged with responsibility to act in the circum
stances, but in no event more than 10 years after the
date on which the violation is committed . . . .” § 3731
(2000 ed.).
In January 2001, relator Karen T. Wilson brought an FCA
qui tam and retaliation action against petitioners. Petition
ers Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District
and Cherokee County Soil and Water Conservation District
are special-purpose local government entities; the other pe
titioners are various local and federal officials. Graham
County District employed Wilson as a secretary. Wilson al
leged that petitioners made numerous false claims for pay
ment to the United States in connection with a federal disas
ter relief program, the Emergency Watershed Protection
Program, App. 17–20, and in connection with agricultural
programs administered by North Carolina but funded by the
Federal Government, id., at 17–24.
Wilson contended, in addition, that Graham County Dis
trict officials retaliated against her for aiding federal officials
in their investigation of these false claims. Id., at 25–30.
Wilson alerted federal officials to petitioners’ suspected
fraudulent activities in December 1995 and cooperated with
the ensuing investigation. Id., at 26–27. Because of her co
operation, the complaint alleged, Graham County District of
ficials repeatedly harassed her from 1996 to 1997, eventually
inducing her to resign in March 1997. Id., at 28–30.
Petitioners successfully moved to dismiss Wilson’s retalia
tion action as untimely. They argued that the 6-year limita
tions period provided in § 3731(b)(1) did not apply to Wilson’s

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retaliation action. Absent an applicable federal limitations
period, they asked the District Court to borrow North Caro
lina’s 3-year statute of limitations for retaliatory-discharge
actions. The District Court agreed and dismissed the retal
iation claim, since Wilson filed it more than three years after
her March 1997 discharge. App. to Pet. for Cert. 67a–70a.
The court certified that ruling for interlocutory appeal. 224
F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050–1051 (WDNC 2002).
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. In the major
ity’s view, the plain language of § 3731(b)(1) supplies a limita
tions period for retaliation actions, making it unnecessary to
borrow one from North Carolina law. The court reasoned
that § 3731(b)(1) governs § 3730(h) retaliation actions, be
cause it applies its 6-year limitations period to “ ‘[a] civil ac
tion under section 3730.’ ” 367 F. 3d 245, 251 (2004) (brack
ets in original).
We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among
the Courts of Appeals regarding whether § 3731(b)(1)’s 6
year statute of limitations applies to § 3730(h) retaliation ac
tions or whether, instead, the most closely analogous state
limitations period governs. 543 U. S. 1042 (2005). Com
pare Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F. 3d 860, 865–866 (CA7
1994) (holding that FCA 6-year period applies), with United
States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 162 F. 3d 1027,
1034–1035 (CA9 1998) (holding that most closely analogous
state limitations period governs).
II
To determine the applicable statute of limitations for a
cause of action created by a federal statute, we first ask
whether the statute expressly supplies a limitations period.
If it does not, we generally “borrow” the most closely analo
gous state limitations period. See North Star Steel Co. v.
Thomas, 515 U. S. 29, 33–34 (1995); Reed v. Transportation
Union, 488 U. S. 319, 324 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. v.

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Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 157–165 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (tracing history of bor
rowing state limitations periods). In the rare case, we have
even borrowed analogous federal limitations periods in the
absence of an expressly applicable one, see, e. g., id., at 150–
157, but no party points to a reason why we should do so
here, and we can think of none. The only arguably applica
ble express statute of limitations is the 6-year limit set forth
in § 3731(b)(1). The question, then, is whether § 3731(b)(1)
applies by its terms to retaliation actions under § 3730(h); if
it does not, our cases dictate that the most closely analogous
state limitations period applies.
Under § 3731(b)(1), “[a] civil action under section 3730 may
not be brought . . . more than 6 years after the date on which
the violation of section 3729 is committed.” Following the
Court of Appeals’ lead and supported by the United States
appearing as amicus curiae, Wilson argues that this lan
guage unambiguously applies to FCA retaliation actions.
She points out that § 3731(b)(1) applies a 6-year limitations
period to “a civil action under section 3730,” and that
§ 3730(h) actions arise under § 3730; hence, she claims, the
6-year period governs § 3730(h) actions. See Neal, supra, at
865–866 (arguing same). We think the statute is more com
plex than this argument supposes. Statutory language has
meaning only in context, see, e. g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U. S. 1, 9 (2004), and § 3731(b)(1), read in its proper context,
does not govern § 3730(h) actions for retaliation.
Section 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous, rather than clear, about
whether a § 3730(h) retaliation action is “a civil action under
section 3730.” Another reasonable reading is that it applies
only to actions arising under §§ 3730(a) and (b), not to
§ 3730(h) retaliation actions. That reading is suggested by
the language in § 3731(b)(1) tying the start of the time limit
to “the date on which the violation of section 3729 is com
mitted.” In other words, the time limit begins to run on the
date the defendant submitted a false claim for payment.

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See supra, at 412– 413. This language casts doubt on
whether § 3731(b)(1) specifies a limitations period for retalia
tion actions. For even a well-pleaded retaliation complaint
need not allege that the defendant submitted a false claim,
leaving the limitations period without a starting point if
§ 3731(b)(1) is applicable. A retaliation plaintiff, instead,
need prove only that the defendant retaliated against him
for engaging in “lawful acts done . . . in furtherance of ” an
FCA “action filed or to be filed,” § 3730(h), language that
protects an employee’s conduct even if the target of an in
vestigation or action to be filed was innocent.1 Applying
§ 3731(b)(1) to FCA retaliation actions, then, sits uneasily
with § 3731(b)(1)’s language, which assumes that well-pleaded
“action[s] under section 3730” to which it is applicable include
a “violation of section 3729” certain from which to start the
time running. Section 3731(b)(1), by contrast, naturally ap
plies to well-pleaded §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions. They re
quire the plaintiff to plead that the defendant submitted a
false claim for payment, and therefore necessarily specify
when § 3731(b)(1)’s time limit begins. This textual anomaly,
at a minimum, shows that § 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous about
whether “action under section 3730” means all actions under
§ 3730, or only §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions.
1 See United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hospital, 360
F. 3d 220, 236 (CA1 2004) (holding that protected conduct is “conduct that
reasonably could lead to a viable FCA action”); United States ex rel. Ye
sudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F. 3d 731, 740 (CADC 1998) (same); Childree
v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 92 F. 3d 1140, 1146 (CA11 1996) (holding that
disclosure to employer of possible FCA violation protected conduct where
litigation is a “distinct possibility” at the time of the disclosure); Fanslow
v. Chicago Mfg. Center, Inc., 384 F. 3d 469, 480 (CA7 2004) (protected
conduct is where employee had reasonable, good-faith belief that the em
ployer is committing fraud against the United States); Wilkins v. St. Louis
Housing Auth., 314 F. 3d 927, 933 (CA8 2002) (same); Moore v. California
Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F. 3d 838, 845–846 (CA9 2002)
(same). We endorse none of these formulations; we note only that all of
them have properly recognized that proving a violation of § 3729 is not an
element of a § 3730(h) cause of action.

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Wilson and the United States dispute that the statute con
tains this anomaly, and instead urge that it clearly applies
by its terms to all § 3730 actions. They point out that every
§ 3730(h) action requires the plaintiff to prove that he en
gaged in protected conduct related to at least a suspected
violation of § 3729, and argue that § 3731(b)(1)’s limitations
period simply begins to run on the date of the suspected
violation. Assuming, without deciding, that § 3730(h) retali
ation actions have as an element a suspected violation of
§ 3729, their interpretation indeed removes the anomaly, but
only at the cost of reading into the statute the word “sus
pected” before the phrase “violation of section 3729.” Sec
tion 3731(b)(1) speaks of “violation[s] of section 3729”—
actual, not suspected, ones. Wilson and the United States
answer that this argument proves too much, because even
§§ 3730(a) and (b) actions involve only “suspected” violations
of § 3729 at the pleading stage of litigation; but this response
misses the point. Every § 3730(a) or (b) plaintiff who states
or proves a valid claim for relief must allege or prove an
actual violation of § 3729; retaliation plaintiffs need only al
lege or prove a suspected violation of § 3729 (or so we are
willing to assume). The point is that § 3731(b)(1)’s language
applies naturally to all successfully pleaded or proved retali
ation actions only if one reads “suspected” into its terms, as
the dissent essentially concedes. See post, at 425–426 (opin
ion of Breyer, J.).
Section 3731(b)(1)’s literal text, then, is ambiguous. Wil
son and the Government ask us to read it as if it said “the
[suspected or actual] violation of section 3729.” Petitioners
ask us to read § 3731(b) as if it said “civil action under section
3730[(a) or (b)].”
Two considerations convince us that the better way to re
solve this ambiguity is to read the 6-year period to govern
only §§ 3730(a) and (b) actions, and not § 3730(h) retaliation
actions. First, the very next subsection of the statute,
§ 3731(c), also uses the similarly unqualified phrase “action

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brought under section 3730” to refer only to §§ 3730(a) and
(b) actions. Section 3731(c) provides that “[i]n any action
brought under section 3730, the United States shall be re
quired to prove all essential elements of the cause of action,
including damages, by a preponderance of the evidence.”
As Wilson and the United States concede, the context of this
provision implies that the phrase “any action brought under
section 3730” is limited to § 3730(a) actions brought by the
United States and § 3730(b) actions in which the United
States intervenes as a party, as those are the types of § 3730
actions in which the United States necessarily participates.
Otherwise, the United States would be “required to prove
all essential elements of the cause of action,” § 3731(c), in all
§ 3730 actions, regardless of whether it participated in the
action (a consequence the dissent implicitly embraces by
claiming that “any action brought under section 3730” in
§ 3731(c) means all § 3730 actions, see post, at 423–424 (opin
ion of Breyer, J.)). This implicit limitation of the phrase
“action under section 3730” shows that Congress used the
term “action under section 3730” imprecisely in § 3731 and,
in particular, that Congress sometimes used the term to
refer only to a subset of § 3730 actions. It is reasonable to
read the same language in § 3731(b)(1) to be likewise limited.
Second, reading § 3731(b)(1) to apply only to §§ 3730(a) and
(b) actions is in keeping with the default rule that Congress
generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the
cause of action accrues. We have repeatedly recognized
that Congress legislates against the “standard rule that the
limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a com
plete and present cause of action.” Bay Area Laundry and
Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,
522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 305 (2005)
(calling it “highly doubtful” that Congress intended a time
limit on pursuing a claim to expire before the claim arose);
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U. S. 258, 267 (1993) (declining to coun

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tenance the “odd result” that a federal cause of action and
statute of limitations arise at different times “absen[t] . . .
any such indication in the statute”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U. S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Absent other indication, a statute of limitations begins
to run at the time the plaintiff has the right to apply to
the court for relief ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Therefore, where, as the case is here, there are two plausible
constructions of a statute of limitations, we should adopt the
construction that starts the time limit running when the
cause of action (here retaliation) accrues.2
This approach resolves the ambiguity in § 3731(b)(1) in
petitioners’ favor. On the one hand, reading § 3731(b)(1) to
exclude retaliation actions will generally start the limita
tions period running when the cause of action accrues. If
§ 3731(b)(1) excludes retaliation actions, then no express time
limit applies to § 3730(h) actions, and we borrow the most
closely analogous state time limit absent an expressly appli
cable one. See supra, at 414–415. The likely analogous
state statutes of limitations virtually all start to run when
the cause of action accrues—in retaliation actions, when the
retaliatory action occurs.3
2 Justice Stevens, we believe, misapplies this interpretive rule. Post,
p. 422 (opinion concurring in judgment). He argues that § 3731(b)(1) does
not govern § 3730(h) actions because “it is so unlikely that a legislature
would actually intend” to start the statute of limitations running before
the cause of action accrues that he “would presume that the anomaly was
the product of a drafting error” regardless of whether the text is ambigu
ous. Dodd v. United States, ante, at 362, n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This is not the proper analysis. Section 3731(b)(1) is ambiguous because
its text, literally read, admits of two plausible interpretations. Supra, at
415–417. We apply the rule that Congress generally drafts statutes of
limitations to begin when the cause of action accrues to resolve that ambi
guity, not to create it in the first instance.
3 Ala. Code § 6–2–38 (West 1993) (catchall for tort actions not otherwise
enumerated); § 36–26A–4(a) (West 2001) (retaliation action for whistle
blowers); Alaska Stat. § 09.10.070 (Lexis 2004) (catchall); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 12–541 (West 2003) (wrongful termination); Ark. Code Ann. § 16–

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The interpretation favored by Wilson and the Govern
ment, on the other hand, is in tension with this rule of con
struction. Under their reading, the statute of limitations
56–115 (Lexis 1987) (catchall); § 21–1–604 (Lexis 2004) (retaliation action
for whistle-blowers); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 335.1 (West Supp. 2005)
(personal injuries); § 343 (West 1982) (catchall); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13–80–
102(1)(g) (Lexis 2004) (catchall); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52–577, 31–51m (2005)
(catchall for tort actions; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Del. Code
Ann., Tit. 10, § 8119 (Lexis 1999) (personal injuries); Tit. 29, § 5115 (Lexis
2003) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); D. C. Code § 12–301(8) (West
Supp. 2005) (catchall); Fla. Stat. §§ 112.3187(8)(a), 448.103 (2003) (whistle
blower actions); Ga. Code Ann. § 9–3–33 (Lexis 1982) (personal injuries);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378–63(a) (Supp. 2004) (retaliation action for whistle
blowers); Idaho Code §§ 5–224, 6–2105(2) (Lexis 1998) (catchall; retaliation
action for whistle-blowers); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 735, § 5/13–202 (West
2003) (personal injuries); Ind. Code § 34–11–2–4 (2004) (personal injuries);
Iowa Code § 614.1 (2003) (personal injuries); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60–513,
75–2973(h) (Supp. 2003) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers);
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.120(7) (Lexis Supp. 2004) (catchall); § 61.103(2)
(Lexis 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); La. Civ. Code Ann.,
Art. 3492 (West 1994) (“[d]elictual actions”; starts running on day injury
or damage sustained, which is when the cause of action generally accrues
for retaliatory actions); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 14, § 752 (West 1980)
(catchall); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5–101 (Lexis 2002) (catchall
for civil actions at law); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 260, § 2A, ch. 149, § 185(d)
(West 2004) (catchall for tort actions for personal injuries; retaliation ac
tion for whistle-blowers); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.363(1) (West 2004)
(retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Minn. Stat. § 541.07 (2004) (per
sonal injuries); Miss. Code Ann. § 15–1–49 (Lexis 2003) (catchall); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 516.120 (2000) (catchall); Mont. Code Ann. § 39–2–911(1) (2003)
(wrongful discharge); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25–207, 25–212 (1995) (catchall);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 11.190.4(e) (2003) (personal injuries); N. H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 508:4 (West 1997) (personal actions other than slander or libel); N. J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:14–1, 34:19–5 (West 2000) (catchall; retaliation action for
whistle-blowers); § 2A:14–2(a) (West Supp. 2005) (personal injuries); N. M.
Stat. Ann. § 37–1–4 (1990) (catchall); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 215.4
(West 2003) (“action to enforce” a statute “given wholly or partly to any
person who will prosecute”); N. Y. Lab. Law Ann. § 740.4(a) (West 2002)
(retaliation action for whistle-blowers); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1–52, 126–86
(Lexis 2003) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); N. D. Cent.
Code § 28–01–16 (Lexis 1991) (catchall); § 34–01–20.3 (Lexis 2004) (retalia

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421 Cite as: 545 U. S. 409 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
for FCA retaliation actions begins to run, at best, on the
date the actual or suspected FCA violation occurred. Be
cause that date will precede the retaliatory conduct, their
reading starts the time limit running before the retaliation
action accrues. Even more oddly, their reading allows a re
taliation action to be time barred before it ever accrues—for
example, if the employer discovers more than six years after
the suspected violation of § 3729 that an employee aided in
investigating that fraud, then retaliates. As we have dis
cussed, § 3731(b)(1)’s text permits a construction that avoids
these counterintuitive results—that “civil action under sec
tion 3730” means only those civil actions under § 3730 that
tion actions for whistle-blowers); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.09 (Lexis
Supp. 2003) (catchall for torts); § 4113.52(D) (Lexis 2001) (retaliation action
for whistle-blowers); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 95 (West Supp. 2005)
(catchall); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (2003) (catchall); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 5524(7) (2002) (catchall); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 43, § 1424(a) (Purdon 1991)
(retaliation action for whistle-blowers); R. I. Gen. Laws § 9–1–14(a) (Lexis
1997) (injuries to the person); § 28–50–4 (Lexis 2003) (retaliation action
for whistle-blowers); S. C. Code Ann. § 15–3–530 (West 2005) (catchall);
§ 8–27–30(B) (West Supp. 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers);
S. D. Codified Laws § 15–2–14(3) (West 2004) (action for personal injury);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28–3–104(a)(1) (Lexis 2000) (personal injuries); Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 2002) (personal injuries); Tex.
Govt. Code Ann. § 554.005 (West 2004) (retaliation action for whistle
blowers); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78–12–29(1), (2) (Lexis 2002) (liability created
by statute of foreign state; liability created by statute); § 67–21–4(2) (Lexis
2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 511
(Lexis 2002) (catchall); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01–243(A), 8.01–248 (Lexis 2000)
(personal injuries; catchall); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2) (2004) (catchall
for injuries to person); W. Va. Code § 55–2–12 (Lexis 2000) (catchall); § 6C–
1–4(a) (Lexis 2003) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Wis. Stat.
§ 893.57 (2003–2004) (intentional torts); Wyo. Stat. §§ 1–3–105(a)(iv)(C), 9–
11–103(c) (2003) (catchall; retaliation action for whistle-blowers). But see
Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 512 (Lexis 2002) (personal injury statute of limita
tions starts on the date of the discovery of the injury); D. C. Code § 1–
615.54 (West 2001) (whistle-blower action may be brought within one year
of the time the employee learns of the retaliation). We stress that these
are only the likely candidates for analogous state statutes of limitations;
it may well not be an exhaustive or authoritative list of the possibilities.

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422 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
DIST. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. WILSON
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
have as an element a “violation of section 3729,” that is,
§§ 3730(a) and (b) actions.
Granted, other textual evidence cuts against this reading
of § 3731(b)(1). In particular, Congress used the phrase
“brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730” in
§ 3731(d); this, it is argued, shows that Congress could have
been similarly precise in § 3731(b)(1) if it wished. In the
context of this statute, however, that argument proves too
much, since the same could be said of § 3731(c), which all
agree uses the phrase “action under section 3730” in more
limited, and less precise, fashion. See supra, at 417–418.
We do not doubt that Congress could have draf ted
§ 3731(b)(1) with more precision than it did, but the presence
of the same inexact wording in § 3731(c) means that the more
precise language in § 3731(d) casts little doubt on our reading
of the statute.
* * *
For the reasons we have discussed, the FCA’s express lim
itations period does not apply to § 3730(h) actions. The most
closely analogous state statute of limitations therefore ap
plies. Judge Wilkinson, in his dissenting opinion below, con
cluded that the most closely analogous state statute of limi
tations in this case is North Carolina’s 3-year statute of
limitations governing wrongful-discharge claims. See 367
F. 3d, at 261–262. The appropriate state statute of limita
tions to borrow, however, is not within the scope of the ques
tion we granted certiorari to decide, and the Court of Ap
peals did not pass on the point. We therefore leave that
issue for remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Dodd v.
United States, ante, p. 360, I concur in the judgment.

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Breyer, J., dissenting
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
As the Court points out, it is unusual to find a statute of
limitations keyed not to the time of the plaintiff ’s injury,
but to other related events. Still, I believe that Congress
has written such a statute here, and we should respect its
decision.
The language of the statute, 31 U. S. C. § 3731(b)(1), is rea
sonably clear. It says that “[a] civil action under section
3730 may not be brought . . . more than 6 years after the
date on which the violation” of federal false claims law “is
committed.” (Emphasis added.) Section 3730 lists three
kinds of civil actions, including a retaliation action under
§ 3730(h). Thus, a retaliation action is a “civil action under
section 3730,” and § 3731(b)(1)’s 6-year limitations period
applies.
The Court tries to overcome the force of this syllogism
with the help of two textual arguments. First, it points to
the subsection that follows § 3731(b)—§ 3731(c)—which says
that “ ‘[i]n any action brought under section 3730, the United
States shall be required to prove all essential elements of
the cause of action, including damages, by a preponderance
of the evidence.’ ” See ante, at 418. The Court then rea
sons that, read in context, the phrase “action brought under
section 3730” could not refer to all the civil actions listed
under § 3730, for the United States is not ordinarily a party
to private retaliation suits brought under § 3730(h). Ibid.
Rather, the phrase “action brought under section 3730” must
refer only to the false claims actions listed in §§ 3730(a) and
(b). Ibid. Thus, according to the Court, if in § 3731(c), the
phrase “action brought under section 3730” refers only to a
subset of the actions listed under § 3730, one can read the
similar phrase in § 3731(b)(1) to contain a similar limitation.
Ibid.
The problem with this argument lies in its conclusion.
The reason that § 3731(c) may apply only to §§ 3730(a) and

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424 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
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Breyer, J., dissenting
(b) actions has nothing to do with the phrase “action brought
under section 3730.” Rather, any limitation on § 3731(c)’s
application comes from different words, namely, “the United
States.” These latter words make clear not that the phrase
“under section 3730” has a different meaning than in (b), but
that (c) comes into play only in cases in which the United
States is a party (and only in such cases, cf. ibid.). Because
it is these words—the subject of the subsection, “the United
States”—that determines whether (c) has application in any
given case, there is nothing in § 3731(c) that would make it
“reasonable,” ibid., to read the phrase “action under section
3730” in § 3731(b)(1) to apply, as the Court concludes, to only
“two out of three actions under section 3730.”
The subsections surrounding §§ 3731(b) and (c) further un
dermine the Court’s extratextual limitation on “[a] civil ac
tion under section 3730.” In § 3731(a), Congress apparently
used the phrase “under section 3730” to mean all three § 3730
actions. § 3731(a) (a “subpoena requiring the attendance of
a witness at a trial or hearing conducted under section 3730
of this title may be served at any place in the United
States”). And in § 3731(d), Congress used the very words
that the Court seeks to find in § 3731(b), but that do not there
exist—namely, the words “under subsection (a) or (b) of sec
tion 3730”—when it meant to narrow a provision’s compass
to two out of the three § 3730 causes of action. § 3731(d)
(“[A] final judgment rendered in favor of the United States
in any criminal proceeding charging fraud or false state
ments . . . shall estop the defendant from denying the essen
tial elements of the offense in any action which involves the
same transaction as in the criminal proceeding and which is
brought under subsection (a) or (b) of section 3730”); see also
ante, at 421–422. The statutory context therefore shows
that Congress did not intend for the phrase “[a] civil action
under section 3730” to mean anything other than what it
says.

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Breyer, J., dissenting
Second, the Court points to language in § 3731(b)(1) that
specifies when the limitations period begins to run: “the date
on which the violation” of the false claims provision, § 3729,
“is committed.” See ante, at 415–416. It then points out
that a retaliation action does not necessarily involve an ac
tual false claims violation, because (it assumes) a retaliation
plaintiff need only show “a suspected violation.” Ante, at
417 (emphasis in original). Thus, adopting relator’s and the
Government’s reading, the Court reasons, would require
reading some words into § 3731(b)(1)—so that it would say
“ ‘the [suspected or actual] violation’ ”—which would distort
the statute more than reading some other, different words
into the statute—so that it would say “ ‘[a] civil action under
section 3730[(a) or (b)].’ ” Ibid.
The difficulty with the Court’s choice of the latter linguis
tic addition is that the two sets of textual insertions—on the
one hand “suspected or actual,” on the other hand “(a) or
(b)”—are not equivalent. Statutes of limitations, when re
ferring to starting points, generally refer not to actual
events, but to alleged events. Thus, a plaintiff ’s tort action
is timely if he files it within, say, three years of the alleged
negligently caused injury; a plaintiff ’s breach-of-contract ac
tion is timely if filed within, say, one year of the alleged
breach. And a plaintiff who loses such an action because
the defendant shows, say, that there was no such injury or
no such breach, has not, for that reason, brought the action
outside the limitations period. Rather, the suit is still
timely even though the violation remains nothing more than
“alleged” after trial. Such a plaintiff has simply lost a
timely filed action on the merits.
The provision before us is no different. Section
3731(b)(1)’s 6-year time clock begins to run on “the date on
which the violation” of federal false claims law, § 3729, “is
committed.” Thus, any § 3730 plaintiff—even one bringing
a false claims action under § 3730(a) or § 3730(b)—has six

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426 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
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Breyer, J., dissenting
years from the moment of a suspected—that is, an un
proven—violation of the False Claims Act’s antifraud provi
sion. Thus, as naturally interpreted, the words “the date
on which the violation . . . is committed” refer to the date on
which the suspected violation occurs.
I recognize that there is a relevant distinction in this case.
In the typical case (say, the tort or contract case) the plaintiff
must ultimately prove all the relevant allegations. Here,
the retaliation victim need not prove that her employer did
in fact violate federal false claims law, but only that she be
lieved that there was such a violation. See ibid. But that
distinction does not make the difference. Given the clear
link between claimed violations of federal false claims law
and retaliation actions (the latter depend on the former) and
given that triggering events in statutes of limitations implic
itly mean alleged triggering events, § 3731(b)(1) remains
most naturally read as implicitly referring to alleged or sus
pected violations of federal false claims law. And at the
very least, reading the statute in this way, especially in light
of the other statutory indicators, see supra, at 423–424, does
far less violence to § 3731(b)(1)’s text than does the Court’s
addition of “(a) or (b).”
The Court’s far stronger argument is not textual. It con
cerns the limitations provision’s purpose. That purpose,
after all, includes providing victims of retaliation a reason
able time within which they can file an action to vindicate
their rights. Cf. S. Rep. No. 99–345, p. 34 (1986) (addition
of a retaliation cause of action intended “to halt companies
. . . from using the threat of economic retaliation to silence
‘whistleblowers’ ” and to “assure those who may be consider
ing exposing fraud that they are legally protected from retal
iatory acts”). How can we reconcile that purpose with a
reading of the statute that, as a matter of logic, could allow
the limitations period to begin to run, perhaps even to ter
minate, before the forbidden retaliation occurs? See ante,
at 421.

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Breyer, J., dissenting
The answer, in my view, is that Congress could have had
a particular qui tam-related purpose in mind. That is, it
could have intended to provide a fairly lengthy limitations
period, namely, six years from the time the false claims con
duct occurs, applicable to all related actions, and then to put
an end to all such litigation. This makes particular sense
given the reasonable assumption that false claims and retali
ation actions are likely to be litigated together. See, e. g.,
App. 11–35 (relator’s complaint pursuing both qui tam and
retaliation claims in same suit); United States ex rel. Lujan
v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 162 F. 3d 1027, 1030 (CA9 1998)
(same).
Of course, as the Court emphasizes, such an unusual provi
sion exacts a price, namely, possible injury to an individual
who suffers retaliation that comes late in the day. But ap
parently there is no such individual. Neither the Court nor
petitioners have been able to find any actual example. See,
e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 6; see also Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 27–28 (United States is unaware of any such
example). Nor have I.
By contrast, the Court’s reading of the statute exacts
a different, but certain, price. It substitutes for a fairly
lengthy—and uniform—6-year limitations term, a crazy
quilt of limitations periods stitched together from the laws
of 51 jurisdictions which, in some instances, might require a
plaintiff to bring a retaliation claim within 90 days, six
months, or one year after the retaliation takes place. See,
e. g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.103(2) (Lexis 2004) (90-day limi
tations period for certain whistle-blower actions); Fla. Stat.
§ 112.3187(8)(a) (2003) (180-day limitations period); Hughes
Aircraft Co., supra, at 1035 (California’s 1-year limitations
period for wrongful termination in violation of public policy
applies to § 3730(h) action). Rather than shed crocodile
tears for the imagined plight of a nonexistent whistle-blower
as petitioners ask us to do, I would read the statute to do
what the statute says Congress wanted: to provide a rela

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428 GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION
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Breyer, J., dissenting
tively long, single, uniform limitations period that, in prac
tice, seems to protect the many real potential plaintiffs, such
as relator, who will otherwise find themselves shut out of
court. Such a reading also avoids the attendant practical
difficulties and uncertainties inherent in requiring federal
courts to borrow state statutes of limitations. See Jones v.
R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 377–380, and n. 13
(2004) (discussing problems with this practice).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.