GONZALEZ v. CROSBY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DE- PARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

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524 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
GONZALEZ v. CROSBY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DE-
PARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 04–6432. Argued April 25, 2005—Decided June 23, 2005
Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition was dismissed as time barred
when the District Court concluded that the federal limitations period
was not tolled while petitioner’s motion for postconviction relief was
pending in state court. After petitioner abandoned his attempt to seek
review of the District Court’s decision, this Court decided that a state
postconviction relief petition can toll the federal statute of limitations
even if, like petitioner’s, the petition is ultimately dismissed as procedur
ally barred. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4. Petitioner filed a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the judgment,
which the District Court denied. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
denial, holding that the Rule 60(b) motion was in substance a second or
successive habeas petition, which under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b), cannot be
filed without precertification by the court of appeals.
Held:
1. Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the District
Court’s previous ruling on AEDPA’s statute of limitations, it is not the
equivalent of a successive habeas petition and can be ruled upon by
the District Court without precertification by the Eleventh Circuit.
Pp. 528–536.
(a) Rule 60(b) applies in § 2254 habeas proceedings only “to the ex
tent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal statutes and
rules. § 2254 Rule 11. Because § 2244(b) applies only where a court
acts pursuant to a prisoner’s “habeas corpus application,” the question
here is whether a Rule 60(b) motion is such an application. The text of
§ 2244(b) shows that, for these purposes, a habeas application is a filing
containing one or more “claims.” Other federal habeas statutes and
this Court’s decisions also make clear that a “claim” is an asserted fed
eral basis for relief from a state-court conviction. If a Rule 60(b) mo
tion contains one or more “claims,” the motion is, if not in substance a
“habeas corpus application,” at least similar enough that failing to sub
ject it to AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas petitions would be
“inconsistent with” the statute. A Rule 60(b) motion can be said to
bring a “claim” if it seeks to add a new ground for relief from the state
conviction or attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim

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Syllabus
on the merits, though not if it merely attacks a defect in the federal
habeas proceedings’ integrity. Pp. 528–532.
(b) When no “claim” is presented, there is no basis for contending
that a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a habeas petition. If
neither the motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks
relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the mov
ant’s state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed on its own terms
creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules. Petitioner’s
motion, which alleges that the federal courts misapplied § 2244(d)’s stat
ute of limitations, fits this description. Nothing in Calderon v. Thomp
son, 523 U. S. 538, suggests that entertaining a filing confined to a non
merits aspect of the first federal habeas proceeding is “inconsistent
with” AEDPA. Pp. 533–536.
2. Under the proper Rule 60(b) standards, the District Court was
correct to deny relief. The change in the law worked by Artuz is not
an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6),
and it is made all the less extraordinary by the lack of diligence that
petitioner showed in seeking direct appellate review of the statute-of
limitations issue. Pp. 536–538.
366 F. 3d 1253, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 538. Stevens, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 539.
Paul M. Rashkind argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Richard C. Klugh.
Christopher M. Kise, Solicitor General of Florida, argued
the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Carolyn Snurkowski,
Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Cassandra Dolgin,
Assistant Attorney General.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief
were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney
General Wray, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Asso
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Joshua L. Dratel and David
Oscar Markus; for the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Middle
District of Tennessee by Paul R. Bottei; and for Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman

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526 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
After the federal courts denied petitioner habeas corpus
relief from his state conviction, he filed a motion for relief
from that judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce
dure 60(b). The question presented is whether, in a habeas
case, such motions are subject to the additional restrictions
that apply to “second or successive” habeas corpus petitions
under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(b).
I
Petitioner Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida Cir
cuit Court to one count of robbery with a firearm. He filed
no appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in 1982.
Some 12 years later, petitioner began to seek relief from his
conviction. He filed two motions for state postconviction re
lief, which the Florida courts denied. Thereafter, in June
1997, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
by Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, William P. Redick, Jr., Pamela S.
Karlan, and Bradley A. MacLean.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Tennessee et al. by Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee,
Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Joseph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor
General, and Christopher L. Morano, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecti
cut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Troy King of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkan
sas, John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert
E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of
Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Gregory D.
Stumbo of Kentucky, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon
of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Brian
Sandoval of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Okla
homa, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of
South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Judith
Williams Jagdmann of Virginia, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; and
for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.

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Opinion of the Court
alleging that his guilty plea had not been entered knowingly
and voluntarily.
Upon the State’s motion, the District Court dismissed peti
tioner’s habeas petition as barred by AEDPA’s statute of
limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d). Under Eleventh Circuit
precedent, petitioner’s filing deadline, absent tolling, was
April 23, 1997, one year after AEDPA’s statute of limitations
took effect. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 158
F. 3d 1209, 1211 (CA11 1998) (per curiam). Adopting a
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the District Court con
cluded that the limitations period was not tolled during the
163-day period while petitioner’s second motion for state
postconviction relief was pending. Section 2244(d)(2) tolls
the statute of limitations during the pendency of “properly
filed” applications only, and the District Court thought peti
tioner’s motion was not “properly filed” because it was both
untimely and successive. Without tolling, petitioner’s fed
eral habeas petition was two months late, so the District
Court dismissed it as time barred. A judge of the Elev
enth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) on
April 6, 2000, and petitioner did not file for rehearing or re
view of that decision.
On November 7, 2000, we held in Artuz v. Bennett, 531
U. S. 4, that an application for state postconviction relief can
be “properly filed” even if the state courts dismiss it as pro
cedurally barred. See id., at 8–9. Almost nine months
later, petitioner filed in the District Court a pro se “Motion
to Amend or Alter Judgment,” contending that the District
Court’s time-bar ruling was incorrect under Artuz’s con
struction of § 2244(d), and invoking Federal Rule of Civil Pro
cedure 60(b)(6), which permits a court to relieve a party from
the effect of a final judgment.1 The District Court denied
the motion, and petitioner appealed.
1 Although the title “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment” suggests that
petitioner was relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the sub
stance of the motion made clear that petitioner sought relief under Rule
60(b)(6).

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Opinion of the Court
A judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
granted petitioner a COA, but a panel quashed the certificate
as improvidently granted. 317 F. 3d 1308, 1310, 1314 (2003).
The full court vacated that order and reheard the case en
banc. It granted petitioner a COA but held, by a vote of 7
to 4, that the District Court was correct to deny his Rule
60(b) motion. The en banc majority determined that peti
tioner’s motion—indeed, any postjudgment motion under
Rule 60(b) save one alleging fraud on the court under Rule
60(b)(3)—was in substance a second or successive habeas cor
pus petition. 366 F. 3d 1253, 1278, 1281–1282 (2004). A
state prisoner may not file such a petition without precerti
fication by the court of appeals that the petition meets cer
tain stringent criteria. § 2244(b). Because petitioner’s mo
tion did not satisfy these requirements, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed its denial. Id., at 1282.
We granted certiorari. 543 U. S. 1086 (2005).
II
Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judg
ment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set
of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly dis
covered evidence.2 Rule 60(b)(6), the particular provision
2 Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part:
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the follow
ing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . . ,
misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have pro
spective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the oper
ation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.”

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under which petitioner brought his motion, permits reopen
ing when the movant shows “any . . . reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment” other than the more
specific circumstances set out in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). See Lil
jeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847,
863, n. 11 (1988); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601,
613 (1949) (opinion of Black, J.). The mere recitation of
these provisions shows why we give little weight to respond
ent’s appeal to the virtues of finality. That policy consider
ation, standing alone, is unpersuasive in the interpretation
of a provision whose whole purpose is to make an exception
to finality. The issue here is whether the text of Rule 60(b)
itself, or of some other provision of law, limits its application
in a manner relevant to the case before us.
AEDPA did not expressly circumscribe the operation of
Rule 60(b). (By contrast, AEDPA directly amended other
provisions of the Federal Rules. See, e. g., AEDPA, § 103,
110 Stat. 1218 (amending Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22).) The
new habeas restrictions introduced by AEDPA are made in
directly relevant, however, by the fact that Rule 60(b), like
the rest of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in habeas
corpus proceedings under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 3 only “to the
extent that [it is] not inconsistent with” applicable federal
statutory provisions and rules. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 Rule 11;
see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(2). The relevant provisions
of the AEDPA-amended habeas statutes, 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2244(b)(1)–(3), impose three requirements on second or
successive habeas petitions: First, any claim that has already
3 In this case we consider only the extent to which Rule 60(b) applies to
habeas proceedings under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, which governs federal habeas
relief for prisoners convicted in state court. Federal prisoners generally
seek postconviction relief under § 2255, which contains its own provision
governing second or successive applications. Although that portion of
§ 2255 is similar to, and refers to, the statutory subsection applicable to
second or successive § 2254 petitions, it is not identical. Accordingly, we
limit our consideration to § 2254 cases.

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been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed.
§ 2244(b)(1). Second, any claim that has not already been
adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a
new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts
showing a high probability of actual innocence. § 2244(b)(2).
Third, before the district court may accept a successive peti
tion for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it
presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to
meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions.
§ 2244(b)(3). We proceed to consider whether these provi
sions limit the application of Rule 60(b) to the present case.
A
“As a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies only where the
court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s ‘application’ ” for a writ
of habeas corpus. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 554
(1998). We therefore must decide whether a Rule 60(b) mo
tion filed by a habeas petitioner is a “habeas corpus applica
tion” as the statute uses that term.
Under § 2244(b), the first step of analysis is to determine
whether a “claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application” was also “presented in a prior applica
tion.” If so, the claim must be dismissed; if not, the analysis
proceeds to whether the claim satisfies one of two narrow
exceptions. In either event, it is clear that for purposes of
§ 2244(b) an “application” for habeas relief is a filing that con
tains one or more “claims.” That definition is consistent
with the use of the term “application” in the other habeas
statutes in chapter 153 of title 28. See, e. g., Woodford v.
Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 207 (2003) (for purposes of § 2254(d),
an application for habeas corpus relief is a filing that seeks
“an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner’s claims”).
These statutes, and our own decisions, make clear that a
“claim” as used in § 2244(b) is an asserted federal basis for
relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.
In some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one
or more “claims.” For example, it might straightforwardly

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assert that owing to “excusable neglect,” Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 60(b)(1), the movant’s habeas petition had omitted a
claim of constitutional error, and seek leave to present that
claim. Cf. Harris v. United States, 367 F. 3d 74, 80–81 (CA2
2004) (petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion sought relief from judg
ment because habeas counsel had failed to raise a Sixth
Amendment claim). Similarly, a motion might seek leave to
present “newly discovered evidence,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
60(b)(2), in support of a claim previously denied. E. g., Rod
well v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66, 69 (CA1 2003). Or a motion might
contend that a subsequent change in substantive law is a
“reason justifying relief,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6), from
the previous denial of a claim. E. g., Dunlap v. Litscher, 301
F. 3d 873, 876 (CA7 2002). Virtually every Court of Appeals
to consider the question has held that such a pleading, al
though labeled a Rule 60(b) motion, is in substance a suc
cessive habeas petition and should be treated accordingly.
E. g., Rodwell, supra, at 71–72; Dunlap, supra, at 876.
We think those holdings are correct. A habeas petition
er’s filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if not in
substance a “habeas corpus application,” at least similar
enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements
would be “inconsistent with” the statute. 28 U. S. C. § 2254
Rule 11. Using Rule 60(b) to present new claims for relief
from a state court’s judgment of conviction—even claims
couched in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion—circum
vents AEDPA’s requirement that a new claim be dismissed
unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or
newly discovered facts. § 2244(b)(2). The same is true of
a Rule 60(b)(2) motion presenting new evidence in support
of a claim already litigated: Even assuming that reliance
on a new factual predicate causes that motion to escape
§ 2244(b)(1)’s prohibition of claims “presented in a prior ap
plication,” § 2244(b)(2)(B) requires a more convincing factual
showing than does Rule 60(b). Likewise, a Rule 60(b) mo
tion based on a purported change in the substantive law gov
erning the claim could be used to circumvent § 2244(b)(2)(A)’s

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dictate that the only new law on which a successive petition
may rely is “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac
tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable.” In addition to the substantive
conflict with AEDPA standards, in each of these three exam
ples use of Rule 60(b) would impermissibly circumvent the
requirement that a successive habeas petition be precertified
by the court of appeals as falling within an exception to the
successive-petition bar. § 2244(b)(3).
In most cases, determining whether a Rule 60(b) motion
advances one or more “claims” will be relatively simple. A
motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief, as in
Harris, supra, will of course qualify. A motion can also be
said to bring a “claim” if it attacks the federal court’s previ
ous resolution of a claim on the merits,4 since alleging that
the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is ef
fectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is,
under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to
habeas relief. That is not the case, however, when a Rule
60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s
resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the
integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.5
4 The term “on the merits” has multiple usages. See, e. g., Semtek Int’l
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 501–503 (2001). We refer
here to a determination that there exist or do not exist grounds entitling
a petitioner to habeas corpus relief under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(a) and (d).
When a movant asserts one of those grounds (or asserts that a previous
ruling regarding one of those grounds was in error) he is making a habeas
corpus claim. He is not doing so when he merely asserts that a previous
ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error—for example,
a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or
statute-of-limitations bar.
5 Fraud on the federal habeas court is one example of such a defect.
See generally Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F. 3d 191, 199 (CA2 2001) (a
witness’s allegedly fraudulent basis for refusing to appear at a federal
habeas hearing “relate[d] to the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding,
not to the integrity of the state criminal trial”). We note that an attack
based on the movant’s own conduct, or his habeas counsel’s omissions, see,

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B
When no “claim” is presented, there is no basis for con
tending that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a
habeas corpus application. If neither the motion itself nor
the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substantively
addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant’s
state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed as denomi
nated creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or
rules. Petitioner’s motion in the present case, which alleges
that the federal courts misapplied the federal statute of limi
tations set out in § 2244(d), fits this description.6
Like the Court of Appeals, respondent relies heavily on
our decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538 (1998).
In that case we reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to recall
its mandate and reconsider the denial of Thompson’s first
federal habeas petition; the recall was, we held, an abuse
of discretion because of its inconsistency with the policies
embodied in AEDPA. Id., at 554–559. Analogizing an ap
pellate court’s recall of its mandate to a district court’s grant
of relief from judgment, the Eleventh Circuit thought that
Calderon’s disposition applied to Rule 60(b). 366 F. 3d, at
1272–1277. We think otherwise. To begin with, as the
opinion said, compliance with the actual text of AEDPA’s
e. g., supra, at 530–531, ordinarily does not go to the integrity of the pro
ceedings, but in effect asks for a second chance to have the merits deter
mined favorably.
6 Petitioner notes that we held in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473
(2000), that when a petition is dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted,
the refiled petition is not “successive.” He argues that, by parity of rea
soning, his Rule 60(b) motion challenging the District Court dismissal of
his petition on statute-of-limitations grounds is not “successive.” If this
argument is correct, petitioner would be able to file not just a Rule 60(b)
motion, but a full-blown habeas petition, without running afoul of § 2244(b).
But see, e. g., Murray v. Greiner, 394 F. 3d 78, 81 (CA2 2005). We need
not consider this contention, however, because we conclude that petition
er’s Rule 60(b) motion is not subject to the limitations applicable to ha
beas petitions.

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successive-petition provision was not at issue in Calderon—
because the Court of Appeals considered only the claims and
evidence presented in Thompson’s first federal habeas peti
tion. 523 U. S., at 554. Calderon did state, however, that
“a prisoner’s motion to recall the mandate on the basis of the
merits of the underlying decision can be regarded as a sec
ond or successive application.” Id., at 553 (emphasis added).
But that is entirely consonant with the proposition that a
Rule 60(b) motion that seeks to revisit the federal court’s
denial on the merits of a claim for relief should be treated as
a successive habeas petition. The problem for respondent is
that this case does not present a revisitation of the merits.
The motion here, like some other Rule 60(b) motions in § 2254
cases, confines itself not only to the first federal habeas peti
tion, but to a nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas
proceeding. Nothing in Calderon suggests that entertain
ing such a filing is “inconsistent with” AEDPA.
Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role to play in ha
beas cases. The Rule is often used to relieve parties from
the effect of a default judgment mistakenly entered against
them, e. g., Klapprott, 335 U. S., at 615 (opinion of Black, J.),
a function as legitimate in habeas cases as in run-of-the-mine
civil cases. The Rule also preserves parties’ opportunity to
obtain vacatur of a judgment that is void for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction—a consideration just as valid in habeas
cases as in any other, since absence of jurisdiction altogether
deprives a federal court of the power to adjudicate the rights
of the parties. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U. S. 83, 94, 101 (1998). In some instances, we may note,
it is the State, not the habeas petitioner, that seeks to use
Rule 60(b), to reopen a habeas judgment granting the writ.
See, e. g., Ritter v. Smith, 811 F. 2d 1398, 1400 (CA11 1987).
Moreover, several characteristics of a Rule 60(b) motion
limit the friction between the Rule and the successive
petition prohibitions of AEDPA, ensuring that our harmoni
zation of the two will not expose federal courts to an ava

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lanche of frivolous postjudgment motions. First, Rule 60(b)
contains its own limitations, such as the requirement that
the motion “be made within a reasonable time” and the more
specific 1-year deadline for asserting three of the most open
ended grounds of relief (excusable neglect, newly discovered
evidence, and fraud). Second, our cases have required a
movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to show “extraor
dinary circumstances” justifying the reopening of a final
judgment. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199
(1950); accord, id., at 202; Liljeberg, 486 U. S., at 864; id., at
873 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (“This very strict inter
pretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judg
ments is to be preserved”). Such circumstances will rarely
occur in the habeas context. Third, Rule 60(b) proceedings
are subject to only limited and deferential appellate review.
Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U. S.
257, 263, n. 7 (1978). Many Courts of Appeals have con
strued 28 U. S. C. § 2253 to impose an additional limitation on
appellate review by requiring a habeas petitioner to obtain
a COA as a prerequisite to appealing the denial of a Rule
60(b) motion.7
Because petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion challenges only the
District Court’s previous ruling on the AEDPA statute of
limitations, it is not the equivalent of a successive habeas
7 See Reid v. Angelone, 369 F. 3d 363, 369, n. 2 (CA4 2004) (citing cases);
366 F. 3d 1253, 1263 (CA11 2004) (case below); cf. Langford v. Day, 134
F. 3d 1381, 1382 (CA9 1998) (before AEDPA, a certificate of probable cause
was a prerequisite to appealing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion in a
habeas case); Reid, supra, at 368 (same). But see Dunn v. Cockrell, 302
F. 3d 491, 492 (CA5 2002); 366 F. 3d, at 1298–1300 (Tjoflat, J., specially
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although we do not decide in
this case whether this construction of § 2253 is correct (the Eleventh Cir
cuit granted petitioner a COA), the COA requirement appears to be a
more plausible and effective screening requirement, with sounder basis in
the statute, than the near-absolute bar imposed here by the Court of
Appeals.

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petition. The Eleventh Circuit therefore erred in holding
that petitioner did not qualify even to seek Rule 60(b) relief.
III
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is inconsistent
with our holding today, we nonetheless affirm its denial of
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion.
Petitioner’s only ground for reopening the judgment deny
ing his first federal habeas petition is that our decision in
Artuz showed the error of the District Court’s statute-of
limitations ruling. We assume for present purposes that the
District Court’s ruling was incorrect.8 As we noted above,
however, relief under Rule 60(b)(6)—the only subsection
petitioner invokes—requires a showing of “extraordinary
circumstances.” Petitioner contends that Artuz’s change in
the interpretation of the AEDPA statute of limitations
meets this description. We do not agree. The District
Court’s interpretation was by all appearances correct under
the Eleventh Circuit’s then-prevailing interpretation of 28
U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2). It is hardly extraordinary that subse
quently, after petitioner’s case was no longer pending, this
Court arrived at a different interpretation. Although our
constructions of federal statutes customarily apply to all
cases then pending on direct review, see, e. g., Harper v. Vir
ginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86, 97 (1993), not every
interpretation of the federal statutes setting forth the re
quirements for habeas provides cause for reopening cases
long since final.9 If Artuz justified reopening long-ago dis
8 Although respondent contends that petitioner’s motion for state post
conviction relief was untimely, and that the District Court’s denial of statu
tory tolling was therefore correct under Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S.
408 (2005), the Florida courts made no reference to untimeliness in dis
missing petitioner’s motion.
9 A change in the interpretation of a substantive statute may have con
sequences for cases that have already reached final judgment, particularly
in the criminal context. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 619–
621 (1998); cf. Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225, 228–229 (2001) (per curiam).

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537 Cite as: 545 U. S. 524 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
missals based on a lower court’s unduly parsimonious inter
pretation of § 2244(d)(2), then Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S.
408 (2005), would justify reopening long-ago grants of habeas
relief based on a lower court’s unduly generous interpreta
tion of the same tolling provision.
The change in the law worked by Artuz is all the less ex
traordinary in petitioner’s case, because of his lack of dili
gence in pursuing review of the statute-of-limitations issue.
At the time Artuz was decided, petitioner had abandoned
any attempt to seek review of the District Court’s decision
on this statute-of-limitations issue. Although the District
Court relied on Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a
state postconviction application is not “properly filed” if it is
procedurally defaulted, and although that precedent was at
odds with the rule in several other Circuits, petitioner nei
ther raised that issue in his application for a COA, nor filed
a petition for rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of a
COA, nor sought certiorari review of that denial.10 This
lack of diligence confirms that Artuz is not an extraordinary
circumstance justifying relief from the judgment in petition
er’s case. Indeed, in one of the cases in which we explained
Rule 60(b)(6)’s extraordinary-circumstances requirement, the
movant had failed to appeal an adverse ruling by the District
Court, whereas another party to the same judgment had
10 We granted review to resolve the conflict over the interpretation of
“properly filed” on April 17, 2000, only eight days after the Eleventh Cir
cuit denied petitioner a COA and well within the 90-day period in which
petitioner could have sought certiorari. Artuz v. Bennett, 529 U. S. 1065.
Whether or not petitioner was aware that the issue was pending before
us, see post, at 544–545, n. 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting), it is indisputable
that had he but filed a petition raising the statute-of-limitations argument
he now advances, we would surely have granted him the reconsideration
in light of Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), that he later sought in his
Rule 60(b) motion. See, e. g., Brown v. Moore, 532 U. S. 968 (2001) (grant
ing a pro se petition for certiorari, vacating the Eleventh Circuit’s judg
ment denying a COA, and remanding for reconsideration in light of Artuz,
531 U. S. 4).

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538 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY
Breyer, J., concurring
appealed and won reversal. Ackermann, 340 U. S., at 195.
Some years later, the petitioner sought Rule 60(b) relief,
which the District Court denied. We affirmed the denial of
Rule 60(b) relief, noting that the movant’s decision not to
appeal had been free and voluntary, although the favorable
ruling in the companion case made it appear mistaken in
hindsight. See id., at 198.
Under the Rule 60(b) standards that properly govern peti
tioner’s motion, the District Court was correct to deny relief.
* * *
We hold that a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a § 2254 case is not
to be treated as a successive habeas petition if it does not
assert, or reassert, claims of error in the movant’s state con
viction. A motion that, like petitioner’s, challenges only the
District Court’s failure to reach the merits does not warrant
such treatment, and can therefore be ruled upon by the Dis
trict Court without precertification by the Court of Appeals
pursuant to § 2244(b)(3). In this case, however, petitioner’s
Rule 60(b)(6) motion fails to set forth an “extraordinary cir
cumstance” justifying relief. For that reason, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, concurring.
The majority explains that a proper Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the
federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some
defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.”
Ante, at 532. This is consistent with Judge Tjoflat’s descrip
tion of the standard in his opinion below, see 366 F. 3d 1253,
1297 (CA11 2004) (specially concurring in part and dissenting
in part), and I agree with it. I fear that other language in
the majority’s opinion, especially its discussion of the signifi
cance of the word “claim,” could be taken to imply a different

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539 Cite as: 545 U. S. 524 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
standard, with which I would disagree. With that qualifi
cation, I join the majority’s opinion.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins,
dissenting.
The most significant aspect of today’s decision is the
Court’s unanimous rejection of the view that all postjudg
ment motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
except those alleging fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) should be
treated as second or successive habeas corpus petitions.
Not only do I agree with that holding, I believe that we
should have more promptly made clear that the Antiterror
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and
Rule 60(b) can coexist in harmony. See Abdur’Rahman v.
Bell, 537 U. S. 88, 90 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting from
dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted).
As the Court recognizes, whether a Rule 60(b) motion may
proceed in the habeas context depends on the nature of the
relief the motion seeks. See ante, at 533.1 Given the sub
stance of petitioner’s motion, I agree with the Court that
this was a “true” Rule 60(b) motion and that the District
Court and the Court of Appeals therefore erred in treating
it as a successive habeas petition. And while I also agree
with much of the Court’s reasoning in Parts I and II of its
opinion, I believe the Court goes too far in commenting on
1 Under the First Circuit’s useful formulation, which was invoked by
Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting opinion below, “[w]hen the motion’s factual pred
icate deals primarily with the constitutionality of the underlying state
conviction or sentence, then the motion should be treated as a second or
successive habeas petition. This situation should be distinguished from
one in which the motion’s factual predicate deals primarily with some ir
regularity or procedural defect in the procurement of the judgment deny
ing relief. That is the classic function of a Rule 60(b) motion, and such a
motion should be treated within the usual confines of Rule 60(b).” Rod
well v. Pepe, 324 F. 3d 66, 70 (2003) (citation omitted); see also 366 F. 3d
1253, 1297 (CA11 2004) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring in part and dissent
ing in part).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
issues that are not directly before us and that have not been
fully briefed. See, e. g., ante, at 530–532 (discussing various
Court of Appeals cases). My main disagreement, however,
pertains to Part III of the Court’s opinion.
The Court reaches beyond the question on which we
granted certiorari (whether petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion
should be treated as a successive habeas petition) and adjudi
cates the merits of that motion. In my judgment, however,
“correct procedure requires that the merits of the Rule 60(b)
motion be addressed in the first instance by the District
Court.” Abdur’Rahman, 537 U. S., at 97 (Stevens, J., dis
senting). A district court considering a Rule 60(b) motion
will often take into account a variety of factors in addition
to the specific ground given for reopening the judgment.
These factors include the diligence of the movant, the prob
able merit of the movant’s underlying claims, the oppos
ing party’s reliance interests in the finality of the judgment,
and other equitable considerations. See 11 C. Wright,
A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857
(2d ed. 1995 and Supp. 2004); see ibid. (noting that appellate
courts will reverse a district court’s decision only for an
abuse of discretion); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514
U. S. 211, 233–234 (1995) (Rule 60(b) “reflects and confirms
the courts’ own inherent and discretionary power, ‘firmly es
tablished in English practice long before the foundation of
our Republic,’ to set aside a judgment whose enforcement
would work inequity”). In light of the equitable, often fact
intensive nature of the Rule 60(b) inquiry, it is inappropriate
for an appellate court to undertake it in the first instance.
This is especially so in this case, in which both the briefing
and the record before us are insufficient with regard to the
merits issue.
Orderly procedure aside, the Court’s truncated analysis is
unsatisfactory. At least in some circumstances, a superven
ing change in AEDPA procedural law can be the kind of “ex
traordinary circumstanc[e],” Ackermann v. United States,

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541 Cite as: 545 U. S. 524 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950), that constitutes a “reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment” within the mean
ing of Rule 60(b)(6). In this case, the District Court dis
missed petitioner’s habeas petition as time barred after con
cluding that his second motion for state postconviction relief
did not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(d). After that judgment became final, however, we
decided Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), which made
clear that the District Court’s ruling on tolling was errone
ous and that the habeas petition should therefore not have
been dismissed.2
Unfortunately, the Court underestimates the significance
of the fact that petitioner was effectively shut out of federal
court—without any adjudication of the merits of his claims—
because of a procedural ruling that was later shown to be
flatly mistaken. As we have stressed, “[d]ismissal of a first
federal habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for
that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the
Great Writ entirely, risking injury to an important interest
in human liberty.” Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U. S. 314, 324
(1996); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 483 (2000)
(“The writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting
constitutional rights”). When a habeas petition has been
dismissed on a clearly defective procedural ground, the State
can hardly claim a legitimate interest in the finality of that
judgment. Indeed, the State has experienced a windfall,
while the state prisoner has been deprived—contrary to con
gressional intent—of his valuable right to one full round of
federal habeas review.
While this type of supervening change in procedural law
may not alone warrant the reopening of a habeas judgment,
there may be special factors that allow a prisoner to satisfy
2 Although the State contests this point in a footnote, see Brief for Re
spondent 40–41, n. 33, the Court rightly assumes that the District Court’s
decision was incorrect. See ante, at 536, and n. 8. If any doubt remains,
it should be resolved by the District Court in the first instance.

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542 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY
Stevens, J., dissenting
the high standard of Rule 60(b)(6). For instance, when a
prisoner has shown reasonable diligence in seeking relief
based on a change in procedural law, and when that prisoner
can show that there is probable merit to his underlying
claims, it would be well in keeping with a district court’s
discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) for that court to reopen the
habeas judgment and give the prisoner the one fair shot at
habeas review that Congress intended that he have. After
all, we have consistently recognized that Rule 60(b)(6) “pro
vides courts with authority ‘adequate to enable them to
vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to ac
complish justice.’ ” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisi
tion Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 864 (1988) (quoting Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614–615 (1949)). Here, peti
tioner, who is serving a 99-year term in Florida prison, filed
his Rule 60(b) motion approximately eight months after this
Court’s decision in Artuz. A district court could reasonably
conclude that this period reveals no lack of diligence on the
part of an incarcerated pro se litigant.3 And while we have
received scant briefing on the probable merit of his petition,
his allegation—that his guilty plea was not knowing and vol
untary because it was based on grossly inaccurate advice
about the actual time he would serve in prison—at least
states a colorable claim of a constitutional violation. See
Finch v. Vaughn, 67 F. 3d 909 (CA11 1995); see also Mabry
v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 504 (1984).4
The Court relies on petitioner’s supposed lack of diligence
in pursuing review of the District Court’s initial statute-of
3 While Rule 60(b)(6) contains no specific time limitation on filing, it is
worth noting that petitioner filed his motion within the strict 1-year limi
tation that applies to motions under Rules 60(b)(1)–(3).
4 It is also worth noting that Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), was
decided only seven months after petitioner’s habeas judgment became
final. In cases where significant time has elapsed between a habeas judg
ment and the relevant change in procedural law, it would be within a
district court’s discretion to leave such a judgment in repose.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
limitations ruling. See ante, at 537. In fact, petitioner did
appeal the District Court’s ruling, which the Court of Ap
peals correctly interpreted as a request for a certificate of
appealability (COA).5 As for petitioner’s failure to seek re
hearing or certiorari, he alleged in his Rule 60(b) motion,
App. 16, and again in his reply brief, that he filed a timely
petition for rehearing on April 18, 2000, but that the clerk of
the Court of Appeals returned the motion unfiled, “explain
ing, erroneously, that his appeal was dismissed and closed on
October 28, 1999.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis
deleted). According to petitioner, “[t]his official misinforma
tion carried the weight of a court decision and was enough to
convince a pro se litigant (and some lawyers) that the 90-day
window for filing a certiorari petition expired, as well.”
Ibid. The State, however, represents that petitioner erro
neously filed the petition for rehearing under the case num
ber of an earlier, dismissed appeal. Brief for Respondent 4.
5 See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22(b)(2) (“If no express request for a certifi
cate is filed, the notice of [appeal shall be deemed to constitute] a request
addressed to the judges of the court of appeals”). The procedural route
that petitioner navigated was actually more complicated. After the Mag
istrate Judge initially recommended dismissal of the petition as time
barred, petitioner filed an objection that raised a Third Circuit case,
Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F. 3d 146 (1998), which was among the circuit cases
that were later endorsed by Artuz, 531 U. S., at 8. The Magistrate’s final
report noted that the Eleventh Circuit had not addressed the relevant
issue of tolling, and then proceeded to rely (oddly) on Lovasz to deny
petitioner’s claim. In my view, the citation to Lovasz and the Magis
trate’s acknowledgment that there was no Eleventh Circuit precedent on
point provided a reasonable basis for the granting of a COA.
In fact, on September 23, 1998, petitioner filed an application for a COA,
and this application was granted by the District Court. The Court of
Appeals, however, dismissed petitioner’s appeal on October 28, 1999, and
remanded the COA for a determination of which specific issues merited
permission to appeal. On remand, petitioner filed a new application for a
COA, but this time the District Court denied the request. Petitioner
then filed a timely appeal, and the District Court granted his motion to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The Court of Appeals then de
clined to issue a COA and dismissed the appeal on April 6, 2000.

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544 GONZALEZ v. CROSBY
Stevens, J., dissenting
I do not know how to resolve these allegations, but this only
highlights the propriety of a remand. Even on the State’s
version of events, petitioner’s attempt at filing for rehearing
is proof of diligence on his part.
Putting these allegations aside, the Court’s reasoning is
too parsimonious. While petitioner could have shown even
greater diligence by seeking rehearing for a second time and
then filing for certiorari, we have never held pro se prisoners
to the standards of counseled litigants. See, e. g., Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). Indeed, petition
er’s situation contrasts dramatically with that of the movant
in the case the Court relies on, Ackermann v. United States,
340 U. S. 193 (1950). See ante, at 537–538. In upholding
the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief in Ackermann, the Court
put great emphasis on the fact that the movant had the bene
fit of paid counsel and that, for much of the relevant period,
he was not detained, but rather enjoyed “freedom of move
ment and action,” 340 U. S., at 201.6 In any event, I believe
that our rules governing prisoner litigation should favor a
policy of repose rather than a policy that encourages multiple
filings with a low probability of success.7
6 Ackermann is further distinguishable in that it did not involve the sort
of plain error of law that has been identified in this case. But even if
Ackermann were not distinguishable, I would find the views expressed
by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas in dissent, see 340 U. S., at
202 (opinion of Black, J.), more persuasive than those expressed by Jus
tice Minton.
7 A petition for certiorari seeking review of a denial of a COA has an
objectively low chance of being granted. Such a decision is not thought
to present a good vehicle for resolving legal issues, and error correction
is a disfavored basis for granting review, particularly in noncapital cases.
See generally this Court’s Rule 10. As for the fact that this Court
granted certiorari in Artuz eight days after the Eleventh Circuit denied
petitioner a COA, it would be unrealistic to fault petitioner for failing to
capitalize on this fortuity. In my experience, even lower courts and coun
seled litigants are often not aware of our grants of certiorari on issues
that may be relevant to their current business. It would be particularly
inappropriate to impose such a strict expectation on a pro se prisoner,

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Stevens, J., dissenting
Accordingly, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that peti
tioner filed a “true” Rule 60(b) motion. I respectfully dis
sent, however, because of the Court’s decision to rule on the
merits of the motion in the first instance.
particularly in the absence of any indication of when, given his circum
stances in prison, he could have reasonably been expected to learn of our
grant in Artuz.