GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. OREGON et al.

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243 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
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GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v.
OREGON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 04–623. Argued October 5, 2005—Decided January 17, 2006
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA or Act), which was enacted in 1970
with the main objectives of combating drug abuse and controlling legiti
mate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances, criminalizes, inter
alia, the unauthorized distribution and dispensation of substances clas
sified in any of its five schedules. The Attorney General may add, re
move, or reschedule substances only after making particular findings,
and on scientific and medical matters, he must accept the findings of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). These proceed
ings must be on the record after an opportunity for comment. The
dispute here involves controlled substances listed in Schedule II, which
are generally available only by written prescription, 21 U. S. C. § 829(a).
A 1971 regulation promulgated by the Attorney General requires that
such prescriptions be used “for a legitimate medical purpose by an indi
vidual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional prac
tice.” 21 CFR § 1306.04. To prevent diversion of controlled sub
stances, the CSA regulates the activity of physicians, who must register
in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney
General. He may deny, suspend, or revoke a registration that, as rele
vant here, would be “inconsistent with the public interest.” 21 U. S. C.
§§ 824(a)(4), 822(a)(2). In determining consistency with the public inter
est, he must consider five factors, including the State’s recommendation,
compliance with state, federal, and local law regarding controlled sub
stances, and “public health and safety.” § 823(f). The CSA explicitly
contemplates a role for the States in regulating controlled substances.
See § 903.
The Oregon Death With Dignity Act (ODWDA) exempts from civil
or criminal liability state-licensed physicians who, in compliance with
ODWDA’s specific safeguards, dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of
drugs upon the request of a terminally ill patient. In 2001, the Attor
ney General issued an Interpretive Rule to address the implementation
and enforcement of the CSA with respect to ODWDA, declaring that
using controlled substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical
practice and that dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is
unlawful under the CSA. The State, a physician, a pharmacist, and

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244 GONZALES v. OREGON
Syllabus
some terminally ill state residents challenged the Rule. The District
Court permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Ninth Circuit invali
dated the Rule, reasoning that, by making a medical procedure author
ized under Oregon law a federal offense, it altered the balance between
the States and the Federal Government without the requisite clear
statement that the CSA authorized the action; and in the alternative,
that the Rule could not be squared with the CSA’s plain language, which
targets only conventional drug abuse and excludes the Attorney General
from medical policy decisions.
Held: The CSA does not allow the Attorney General to prohibit doctors
from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide
under state law permitting the procedure. Pp. 255–275.
(a) An administrative rule interpreting the issuing agency’s own am
biguous regulation may receive substantial deference. Auer v. Rob
bins, 519 U. S. 452, 461–463. So may an interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–845, but only “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 226–227. Otherwise, the interpretation is “entitled
to respect” only to the extent it has the “power to persuade.” Skid
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. Pp. 255–256.
(b) The Interpretive Rule at issue is not entitled to Auer deference
as an interpretation of 21 CFR § 1306.04. Unlike the underlying regu
lations in Auer, which gave specificity to a statutory scheme the Sec
retary of Labor was charged with enforcing and reflected the Labor
Department’s considerable experience and expertise, the underlying
regulation here does little more than restate the terms of the statute
itself. The CSA allows prescription of drugs that have a “currently
accepted medical use,” 21 U. S. C. § 812(b); requires a “medical purpose”
for dispensing the least controlled substances of those on the schedules,
§ 829(c); and defines a “valid prescription” as one “issued for a legitimate
medical purpose,” § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii). Similarly, physicians are consid
ered practitioners if they dispense controlled substances “in the course
of professional practice.” 21 U. S. C. § 802(21). The regulation just re
peats two of these statutory phrases and attempts to summarize the
others. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its
own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formu
late a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory lan
guage. Furthermore, any statutory authority for the Interpretive Rule
would have to come from 1984 CSA amendments adding the “public

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interest” requirement, but 21 CFR § 1306.04 was adopted in 1971. That
the current interpretation runs counter to the intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation is an additional reason why Auer deference is
unwarranted. Pp. 256–258.
(c) The Interpretive Rule is also not entitled to Chevron deference.
The statutory phrase “legitimate medical purpose” is ambiguous in the
relevant sense. However, Chevron deference is not accorded merely
because the statute is ambiguous and an administrative official is in
volved. A rule must be promulgated pursuant to authority Congress
has delegated to the official. The specific respects in which the Attor
ney General is authorized to make rules under the CSA show that he is
not authorized to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical standard
for patient care and treatment specifically authorized under state law.
Congress delegated to the Attorney General only the authority to pro
mulgate rules relating to “registration” and “control” of the dispensing
of controlled substances, 21 U. S. C. § 821 (2000 ed., Supp. V), and “for
the efficient execution of his [statutory] functions,” 21 U. S. C. § 871(b).
Control means “to add a . . . substance . . . to a schedule,” § 802(5),
following specified procedures. Because the Interpretive Rule does not
concern scheduling of substances and was not issued under the required
procedures, it cannot fall under the Attorney General’s control authority.
Even if “control” were understood to signify something other than its
statutory definition, it could not support the Interpretive Rule. Nor
can the Interpretive Rule be justified under the CSA’s registration pro
visions. It does not undertake the Act’s five-factor analysis for deter
mining when registration is “inconsistent with the public interest,”
§ 823(f), and it deals with much more than registration. It purports to
declare that using controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide is
a crime, an authority going well beyond the Attorney General’s statu
tory power to register or deregister physicians. It would be anomalous
for Congress to have painstakingly described the Attorney General’s
limited authority to deregister a single physician or schedule a single
drug, but to have given him, just by implication, authority to declare an
entire class of activity outside the course of professional practice and
therefore a criminal violation of the CSA. It is not enough that “public
interest,” “public health and safety,” and “Federal law” are used in the
part of the Act over which the Attorney General has authority.
Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471. The first two terms
do not call on the Attorney General, or any executive official, to make an
independent assessment of the meaning of federal law. The Attorney
General did not base the Interpretive Rule on an application of the
five-factor test generally, or the “public health and safety” factor spe
cifically. Even if he had, it is doubtful that he could cite those factors

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246 GONZALES v. OREGON
Syllabus
to deregister a physician simply because he deemed a controversial
practice permitted by state law to have an illegitimate medical purpose.
The federal-law factor requires the Attorney General to decide “[c]om
pliance” with the law but does not suggest that he may decide what the
law is. To say that he can define the substantive standards of medical
practice as part of his authority would also put 21 U. S. C. § 871(b) in
considerable tension with the narrowly defined control and registration
delegation. It would go, moreover, against the plain language of the
text to treat a delegation for the “execution” of his functions as a further
delegation to define other functions well beyond the Act’s specific grants
of authority. The authority desired by the Government is inconsistent
with the Act’s design in other fundamental respects, e. g., the Attorney
General must share power with, and in some respect defer to, the Secre
tary, whose functions are likewise delineated and confined by the Act.
Postenactment congressional commentary on the CSA’s regulation of
medical practice is also at odds with the Attorney General’s claimed
authority. The Government’s claim that the Attorney General’s deci
sion is a legal, not medical, one does not suffice, for the Interpretive
Rule places extensive reliance on medical judgments and views of the
medical community in concluding that assisted suicide is not a legitimate
medical purpose. The idea that Congress gave him such broad and un
usual authority through an implicit delegation is not sustainable. The
importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide makes the oblique
form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect. Pp. 258–269.
(d) The Attorney General’s opinion is unpersuasive under Skidmore.
The CSA and this Court’s case law amply support the conclusion that
Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors from
using their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit
drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally understood. Beyond
this, the Act manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine
generally, which is understandable given federalism’s structure and limi
tations. The CSA’s structure and operation presume and rely upon a
functioning medical profession regulated under the States’ police pow
ers. The Federal Government can set uniform standards for regulating
health and safety. In connection with the CSA, however, the only pro
vision in which Congress set general, uniform medical practice stand
ards, 42 U. S. C. § 290bb–2a, strengthens the understanding of the CSA
as a statute combating recreational drug abuse, and also indicates that
when Congress wants to regulate medical practice in the given scheme,
it does so by explicit statutory language. The difficulty in defending
the Attorney General’s declaration that the CSA impliedly criminalizes
physician-assisted suicide is compounded by the Act’s consistent delega
tion of medical judgments to the Secretary and its otherwise careful

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247 Cite as: 546 U. S. 243 (2006)
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allocation of powers for enforcing the CSA’s limited objectives. The
Government’s contention that the terms “medical” or “medicine” refer
to a healing or curative art, and thus cannot embrace the intentional
hastening of a patient’s death, rests on a reading of 21 U. S. C. § 829(a)’s
prescription requirement without the illumination of the rest of the stat
ute. Viewed in context, that requirement is better understood as en
suring that patients use controlled substances under a doctor’s super
vision so as to prevent addiction and recreational abuse. To read
prescriptions for assisted suicide as “drug abuse” under the CSA is dis
cordant with the phrase’s consistent use throughout the Act, not to men
tion its ordinary meaning. The Government’s interpretation of the pre
scription requirement also fails under the objection that the Attorney
General is an unlikely recipient of such broad authority, given the Secre
tary’s primacy in shaping medical policy under the CSA and the Act’s
otherwise careful allocation of decisionmaking powers. Pp. 269–275.
368 F. 3d 1118, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined, post,
p. 275. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 299.
Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for petition
ers. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney Gen
eral Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Douglas Hallward-
Driemeier, Mark B. Stern, and Jonathan H. Levy.
Robert M. Atkinson, Senior Assistant Attorney General of
Oregon, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the
brief for respondent State of Oregon were Hardy Myers, At
torney General, Peter Shepherd, Deputy Attorney General,
and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General. Nicholas W. van
Aelstyn, Aaron S. Jacobs, and Kathryn L. Tucker filed a
brief for Patient-Respondents. Eli D. Stutsman filed a brief
for respondents Peter A. Rasmussen, M. D., et al.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, Colby M. May, James
M. Henderson, Sr., Walter M. Weber, Thomas P. Monaghan, and Charles
E. Rice; for Americans United for Life by Nikolas T. Nikas; for the Catho

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248 GONZALES v. OREGON
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether the Controlled Sub
stances Act allows the United States Attorney General to
lic Medical Association by Teresa Stanton Collett; for the Christian Medi
cal Association et al. by Steven H. Aden, Gregory S. Baylor, and Kimber
lee W. Colby; for Focus on the Family et al. by William Wagner, Nelson
P. Miller, Stephen W. Reed, and Patrick A. Trueman; for the International
Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide by Rita L. Marker; for
Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver, Erik W. Stanley, Rena M. Linde
valdsen, and Mary E. McAlister; for the National Association of Pro-Life
Nurses by Daniel Avila; for the National Legal Center for the Medically
Dependent & Disabled, Inc., by James Bopp, Jr., Thomas J. Marzen, and
Richard E. Coleson; for Not Dead Yet et al. by Max Lapertosa; for the
Pro-Life Legal Defense Fund et al. by Dwight G. Duncan, Thomas M.
Harvey, and Richard F. Collier, Jr.; for the Thomas More Society by Paul
Benjamin Linton and Thomas Brejcha; for the United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops et al. by Mark E. Chopko and Michael F. Moses; and
for Senator Rick Santorum et al. by Donald A. Daugherty, Jr.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, and Tay
lor S. Carey, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Robert J. Spagnoletti
of the District of Columbia, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri, and Mike McGrath of Montana; for the American Civil
Liberties Union et al. by Andrew L. Frey, David M. Gossett, Steven R.
Shapiro, and Charles F. Hinkle; for the American College of Legal Medi
cine by Miles J. Zaremski; for the American Public Health Association by
David T. Goldberg, Sean H. Donahue, and Daniel N. Abrahamson; for
Autonomy, Inc., et al. by Amy R. Sabrin; for the Cato Institute by Pamela
Harris; for the Coalition of Medical Associations and Societies et al. by
Geoffrey J. Michael; for the Coalition of Mental Health Professionals by
Steven Alan Reiss; for Healthlaw Professors by Arthur B. LaFrance; for
Members of the Oregon Congressional Delegation by William R. Stein;
for Margaret P. Battin et al. by Rebecca P. Dick and Ronald A. Lindsay;
for Richard Briffault et al. by David W. Ogden and Paul R. Q. Wolfson;
and for 52 Religious and Religious Freedom Organizations and Leaders
by Gregory A. Castanias and Lawrence D. Rosenberg.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Physicians for Compassionate Care
Educational Foundation by Gregory P. Lynch; and for Surviving Family
Members by Robert A. Free and Katrin E. Frank.

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prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in
physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law per
mitting the procedure. As the Court has observed, “Ameri
cans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 735
(1997). The dispute before us is in part a product of this
political and moral debate, but its resolution requires an in
quiry familiar to the courts: interpreting a federal statute
to determine whether executive action is authorized by, or
otherwise consistent with, the enactment.
In 1994, Oregon became the first State to legalize assisted
suicide when voters approved a ballot measure enacting the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act (ODWDA). Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 127.800 et seq. (2003). ODWDA, which survived a 1997
ballot measure seeking its repeal, exempts from civil or
criminal liability state-licensed physicians who, in compliance
with the specific safeguards in ODWDA, dispense or pre
scribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally
ill patient.
The drugs Oregon physicians prescribe under ODWDA are
regulated under a federal statute, the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA or Act). 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U. S. C.
§ 801 et seq. The CSA allows these particular drugs to be
available only by a written prescription from a registered
physician. In the ordinary course the same drugs are pre
scribed in smaller doses for pain alleviation.
A November 9, 2001, Interpretive Rule issued by the At
torney General addresses the implementation and enforce
ment of the CSA with respect to ODWDA. It determines
that using controlled substances to assist suicide is not a
legitimate medical practice and that dispensing or prescrib
ing them for this purpose is unlawful under the CSA. The
Interpretive Rule’s validity under the CSA is the issue
before us.

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250 GONZALES v. OREGON
Opinion of the Court
I
A
We turn first to the text and structure of the CSA.
Enacted in 1970 with the main objectives of combating drug
abuse and controlling the legitimate and illegitimate traffic
in controlled substances, the CSA creates a comprehensive,
closed regulatory regime criminalizing the unauthorized
manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession of sub
stances classified in any of the Act’s five schedules. Gonza
les v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 12–13 (2005); 21 U. S. C. § 841 (2000
ed. and Supp. II); 21 U. S. C. § 844. The Act places sub
stances in one of five schedules based on their potential for
abuse or dependence, their accepted medical use, and their
accepted safety for use under medical supervision. Sched
ule I contains the most severe restrictions on access and use,
and Schedule V the least. Raich, supra, at 14; 21 U. S. C.
§ 812. Congress classified a host of substances when it
enacted the CSA, but the statute permits the Attorney Gen
eral to add, remove, or reschedule substances. He may do
so, however, only after making particular findings, and on
scientific and medical matters he is required to accept the
findings of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Sec
retary). These proceedings must be on the record after an
opportunity for comment. See 21 U. S. C. § 811 (2000 ed. and
Supp. V).
The present dispute involves controlled substances listed
in Schedule II, substances generally available only pursuant
to a written, nonrefillable prescription by a physician. 21
U. S. C. § 829(a). A 1971 regulation promulgated by the At
torney General requires that every prescription for a con
trolled substance “be issued for a legitimate medical purpose
by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.” 21 CFR § 1306.04(a) (2005).
To prevent diversion of controlled substances with medical
uses, the CSA regulates the activity of physicians. To issue

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lawful prescriptions of Schedule II drugs, physicians must
“obtain from the Attorney General a registration issued in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
him.” 21 U. S. C. § 822(a)(2). The Attorney General may
deny, suspend, or revoke this registration if, as relevant here,
the physician’s registration would be “inconsistent with the
public interest.” § 824(a)(4); § 822(a)(2). When deciding
whether a practitioner’s registration is in the public interest,
the Attorney General “shall” consider:
“(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State li
censing board or professional disciplinary authority.
“(2) The applicant’s experience in dispensing, or con
ducting research with respect to controlled substances.
“(3) The applicant’s conviction record under Federal
or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution,
or dispensing of controlled substances.
“(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or
local laws relating to controlled substances.
“(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the pub
lic health and safety.” § 823(f).
The CSA explicitly contemplates a role for the States in
regulating controlled substances, as evidenced by its pre
emption provision.
“No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to oc
cupy the field in which that provision operates . . . to the
exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter
which would otherwise be within the authority of the
State, unless there is a positive conflict between that
provision . . . and that State law so that the two cannot
consistently stand together.” § 903.
B
Oregon voters enacted ODWDA in 1994. For Oregon
residents to be eligible to request a prescription under

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252 GONZALES v. OREGON
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ODWDA, they must receive a diagnosis from their attending
physician that they have an incurable and irreversible dis
ease that, within reasonable medical judgment, will cause
death within six months. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.815,
127.800(12) (2003). Attending physicians must also deter
mine whether a patient has made a voluntary request, ensure
a patient’s choice is informed, and refer patients to counsel
ing if they might be suffering from a psychological disorder
or depression causing impaired judgment. §§ 127.815,
127.825. A second “consulting” physician must examine the
patient and the medical record and confirm the attending
physician’s conclusions. § 127.800(8). Oregon physicians
may dispense or issue a prescription for the requested drug,
but may not administer it. §§ 127.815(1)(L), 127.880.
The reviewing physicians must keep detailed medical rec
ords of the process leading to the final prescription, § 127.855,
records that Oregon’s Department of Human Services re
views, § 127.865. Physicians who dispense medication pur
suant to ODWDA must also be registered with both the
State’s Board of Medical Examiners and the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). § 127.815(1)(L). In
2004, 37 patients ended their lives by ingesting a lethal dose
of medication prescribed under ODWDA. Oregon Dept. of
Human Servs., Seventh Annual Report on Oregon’s Death
with Dignity Act 20 (Mar. 10, 2005).
C
In 1997, Members of Congress concerned about ODWDA
invited the DEA to prosecute or revoke the CSA registra
tion of Oregon physicians who assist suicide. They con
tended that hastening a patient’s death is not legitimate med
ical practice, so prescribing controlled substances for that
purpose violates the CSA. Letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch
and Rep. Henry Hyde to Thomas A. Constantine (July 25,
1997), reprinted in Hearing on S. 2151 before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., 2–3 (1999)

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(hereinafter Hearing). The letter received an initial, favor
able response from the director of the DEA, see Letter from
Thomas A. Constantine to Sen. Orrin Hatch (Nov. 5, 1997),
Hearing 4–5, but Attorney General Reno considered the
matter and concluded that the DEA could not take the pro
posed action because the CSA did not authorize it to “dis
place the states as the primary regulators of the medical
profession, or to override a state’s determination as to what
constitutes legitimate medical practice,” Letter from Attor
ney General Janet Reno to Sen. Orrin Hatch, on Oregon’s
Death with Dignity Act (June 5, 1998), Hearing 5–6. Legis
lation was then introduced to grant the explicit authority
Attorney General Reno found lacking; but it failed to pass.
See H. R. 4006, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); H. R. 2260, 106th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
In 2001, John Ashcroft was appointed Attorney General.
Perhaps because Mr. Ashcroft had supported efforts to cur
tail assisted suicide while serving as a Senator, see, e. g., 143
Cong. Rec. 5589–5590 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Ashcroft), Ore
gon Attorney General Hardy Myers wrote him to request a
meeting with Department of Justice officials should the De
partment decide to revisit the application of the CSA to as
sisted suicide. Letter of Feb. 2, 2001, App. to Brief for
Patient-Respondents in Opposition 55a. Attorney General
Myers received a reply letter from one of Attorney General
Ashcroft’s advisers writing on his behalf, which stated:
“I am aware of no pending legislation in Congress that
would prompt a review of the Department’s interpreta
tion of the CSA as it relates to physician-assisted sui
cide. Should such a review be commenced in the future,
we would be happy to include your views in that re
view.” Letter from Lori Sharpe (Apr. 17, 2001), id.,
at 58a.
On November 9, 2001, without consulting Oregon or appar
ently anyone outside his Department, the Attorney General

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issued an Interpretive Rule announcing his intent to restrict
the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted sui
cide. Incorporating the legal analysis of a memorandum he
had solicited from his Office of Legal Counsel, the Attorney
General ruled:
“[A]ssisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical purpose’
within the meaning of 21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and that
prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally con
trolled substances to assist suicide violates the Con
trolled Substances Act. Such conduct by a physician
registered to dispense controlled substances may ‘ren
der his registration . . . inconsistent with the public in
terest’ and therefore subject to possible suspension or
revocation under 21 U. S. C. 824(a)(4). The Attorney
General’s conclusion applies regardless of whether state
law authorizes or permits such conduct by practitioners
or others and regardless of the condition of the person
whose suicide is assisted.” 66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (2001).
There is little dispute that the Interpretive Rule would
substantially disrupt the ODWDA regime. Respondents
contend, and petitioners do not dispute, that every prescrip
tion filled under ODWDA has specified drugs classified under
Schedule II. A physician cannot prescribe the substances
without DEA registration, and revocation or suspension of
the registration would be a severe restriction on medical
practice. Dispensing controlled substances without a valid
prescription, furthermore, is a federal crime. See, e. g., 21
U. S. C. § 841(a)(1); United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122
(1975).
In response the State of Oregon, joined by a physician, a
pharmacist, and some terminally ill patients, all from Ore
gon, challenged the Interpretive Rule in federal court. The
United States District Court for the District of Oregon
entered a permanent injunction against the Interpretive
Rule’s enforcement.

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Opinion of the Court
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir
cuit granted the petitions for review and held the Interpre
tive Rule invalid. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F. 3d 1118 (2004).
It reasoned that, by making a medical procedure authorized
under Oregon law a federal offense, the Interpretive Rule
altered the “ ‘ “usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government” ’ ” without the requisite
clear statement that the CSA authorized such action. Id.,
at 1124–1125 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460
(1991), in turn quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)). The Court of Appeals held in the
alternative that the Interpretive Rule could not be squared
with the plain language of the CSA, which targets only con
ventional drug abuse and excludes the Attorney General
from decisions on medical policy. 368 F. 3d, at 1125–1129.
We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari. 543
U. S. 1145 (2005).
II
Executive actors often must interpret the enactments
Congress has charged them with enforcing and implement
ing. The parties before us are in sharp disagreement both
as to the degree of deference we must accord the Interpre
tive Rule’s substantive conclusions and whether the Rule is
authorized by the statutory text at all. Although balancing
the necessary respect for an agency’s knowledge, expertise,
and constitutional office with the courts’ role as interpreter
of laws can be a delicate matter, familiar principles guide us.
An administrative rule may receive substantial deference if
it interprets the issuing agency’s own ambiguous regulation.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461–463 (1997). An interpre
tation of an ambiguous statute may also receive substantial
deference. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De
fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–845 (1984). Defer
ence in accordance with Chevron, however, is warranted only
“when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,

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and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 226–227 (2001). Other
wise, the interpretation is “entitled to respect” only to the
extent it has the “power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
A
The Government first argues that the Interpretive Rule is
an elaboration of one of the Attorney General’s own reg
ulations, 21 CFR § 1306.04 (2005), which requires all pre
scriptions be issued “for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.” As such, the Government says, the
Interpretive Rule is entitled to considerable deference in ac
cordance with Auer.
In our view Auer and the standard of deference it accords
to an agency are inapplicable here. Auer involved a dis
puted interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
as applied to a class of law enforcement officers. Under reg
ulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, an exemp
tion from overtime pay depended, in part, on whether the
employees met the “salary basis” test. 519 U. S., at 454–
455. In this Court the Secretary of Labor filed an amicus
brief explaining why, in his view, the regulations gave ex
empt status to the officers. Id., at 461. We gave weight to
that interpretation, holding that because the applicable test
was “a creature of the Secretary’s own regulations, his in
terpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling un
less plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Auer, the underlying regulations gave specificity to a
statutory scheme the Secretary of Labor was charged with
enforcing and reflected the considerable experience and ex
pertise the Department of Labor had acquired over time
with respect to the complexities of the Fair Labor Standards

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Act. Here, on the other hand, the underlying regulation
does little more than restate the terms of the statute itself.
The language the Interpretive Rule addresses comes from
Congress, not the Attorney General, and the near equiva
lence of the statute and regulation belies the Government’s
argument for Auer deference.
The Government does not suggest that its interpretation
turns on any difference between the statutory and regula
tory language. The CSA allows prescription of drugs only
if they have a “currently accepted medical use,” 21 U. S. C.
§ 812(b); requires a “medical purpose” for dispensing the
least controlled substances of those on the schedules, § 829(c);
and, in its reporting provision, defines a “valid prescrip
tion” as one “issued for a legitimate medical purpose,”
§ 830(b)(3)(A)(ii). Similarly, physicians are considered to be
acting as practitioners under the statute if they dispense
controlled substances “in the course of professional practice.”
§ 802(21). The regulation uses the terms “legitimate medi
cal purpose” and “the course of professional practice,” ibid.,
but this just repeats two statutory phrases and attempts to
summarize the others. It gives little or no instruction on a
central issue in this case: Who decides whether a particular
activity is in “the course of professional practice” or done for
a “legitimate medical purpose”? Since the regulation gives
no indication how to decide this issue, the Attorney General’s
effort to decide it now cannot be considered an interpretation
of the regulation. Simply put, the existence of a parroting
regulation does not change the fact that the question here is
not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the
statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to in
terpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise
and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected
merely to paraphrase the statutory language.
Furthermore, as explained below, if there is statutory au
thority to issue the Interpretive Rule it comes from the 1984
amendments to the CSA that gave the Attorney General au

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thority to register and deregister physicians based on the
public interest. The regulation was enacted before those
amendments, so the Interpretive Rule cannot be justified as
indicative of some intent the Attorney General had in 1971.
That the current interpretation runs counter to the “intent
at the time of the regulation’s promulgation” is an additional
reason why Auer deference is unwarranted. Thomas Jef
ferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U. S. 504, 512 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Deference under Auer being in
appropriate, we turn to the question whether the Interpre
tive Rule, on its own terms, is a permissible interpretation
of the CSA.
B
Just as the Interpretive Rule receives no deference under
Auer, neither does it receive deference under Chevron. If
a statute is ambiguous, judicial review of administrative
rulemaking often demands Chevron deference; and the rule
is judged accordingly. All would agree, we should think,
that the statutory phrase “legitimate medical purpose” is a
generality, susceptible to more precise definition and open to
varying constructions, and thus ambiguous in the relevant
sense. Chevron deference, however, is not accorded merely
because the statute is ambiguous and an administrative offi
cial is involved. To begin with, the rule must be promul
gated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the
official. Mead, supra, at 226–227.
The Attorney General has rulemaking power to fulfill his
duties under the CSA. The specific respects in which he is
authorized to make rules, however, instruct us that he is not
authorized to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical
standard for care and treatment of patients that is specifi
cally authorized under state law.
The starting point for this inquiry is, of course, the lan
guage of the delegation provision itself. In many cases au
thority is clear because the statute gives an agency broad
power to enforce all provisions of the statute. See, e. g., Na

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tional Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X In
ternet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 980 (2005) (explaining that a
Federal Communications Commission regulation received
Chevron deference because “Congress has delegated to the
Commission the authority to . . . ‘prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to
carry out the provisions’ of the Act” (quoting 47 U. S. C.
§ 201(b))); Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 541
U. S. 232, 238 (2004) (giving Chevron deference to a Federal
Reserve Board regulation where “Congress has expressly
delegated to the Board the authority to prescribe reg
ulations . . . as, in the judgment of the Board, ‘are neces
sary or proper to effectuate the purposes of ’ ” the statute
(quoting 15 U. S. C. § 1604(a))). The CSA does not grant the
Attorney General this broad authority to promulgate rules.
The CSA gives the Attorney General limited powers, to
be exercised in specific ways. His rulemaking authority
under the CSA is described in two provisions: (1) “The At
torney General is authorized to promulgate rules and regu
lations and to charge reasonable fees relating to the regis
tration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and
dispensing of controlled substances and to listed chemicals,”
21 U. S. C. § 821 (2000 ed., Supp. V); and (2) “The Attorney
General may promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations,
and procedures which he may deem necessary and appro
priate for the efficient execution of his functions under this
subchapter,” 21 U. S. C. § 871(b). As is evident from these
sections, Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General
authority to carry out or effect all provisions of the CSA.
Rather, he can promulgate rules relating only to “registra
tion” and “control,” and “for the efficient execution of his
functions” under the statute.
Turning first to the Attorney General’s authority to make
regulations for the “control” of drugs, this delegation cannot
sustain the Interpretive Rule’s attempt to define standards
of medical practice. Control is a term of art in the CSA.

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“As used in this subchapter,” § 802––the subchapter that in
cludes § 821––
“The term ‘control’ means to add a drug or other sub
stance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule under part
B of this subchapter, whether by transfer from another
schedule or otherwise.” § 802(5).
To exercise his scheduling power, the Attorney General must
follow a detailed set of procedures, including requesting a
scientific and medical evaluation from the Secretary. See 21
U. S. C. §§ 811, 812 (2000 ed. and Supp. V). The statute is
also specific as to the manner in which the Attorney General
must exercise this authority: “Rules of the Attorney Gen
eral under this subsection [regarding scheduling] shall be
made on the record after opportunity for a hearing pur
suant to the rulemaking procedures prescribed by [the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 553].” 21 U. S. C.
§ 811(a). The Interpretive Rule now under consideration
does not concern the scheduling of substances and was not
issued after the required procedures for rules regarding
scheduling, so it cannot fall under the Attorney General’s
“control” authority.
Even if “control” in § 821 were understood to signify some
thing other than its statutory definition, it would not support
the Interpretive Rule. The statutory references to “con
trol” outside the scheduling context make clear that the At
torney General can establish controls “against diversion,”
e. g., § 823(a)(1), but do not give him authority to define diver
sion based on his view of legitimate medical practice. As
explained below, the CSA’s express limitations on the Attor
ney General’s authority, and other indications from the statu
tory scheme, belie any notion that the Attorney General has
been granted this implicit authority. Indeed, if “control”
were given the expansive meaning required to sustain the
Interpretive Rule, it would transform the carefully described

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limits on the Attorney General’s authority over registration
and scheduling into mere suggestions.
We turn, next, to the registration provisions of the CSA.
Before 1984, the Attorney General was required to register
any physician who was authorized by his State. The Attor
ney General could only deregister a physician who falsified
his application, was convicted of a felony relating to con
trolled substances, or had his state license or registration
revoked. See 84 Stat. 1255. The CSA was amended in
1984 to allow the Attorney General to deny registration to
an applicant “if he determines that the issuance of such reg
istration would be inconsistent with the public interest.” 21
U. S. C. § 823(f). Registration may also be revoked or sus
pended by the Attorney General on the same grounds.
§ 824(a)(4). In determining consistency with the public in
terest, the Attorney General must, as discussed above, con
sider five factors, including: the State’s recommendation;
compliance with state, federal, and local laws regarding con
trolled substances; and public health and safety. § 823(f).
The Interpretive Rule cannot be justified under this part
of the statute. It does not undertake the five-factor analysis
and concerns much more than registration. Nor does the
Interpretive Rule on its face purport to be an application
of the registration provision in § 823(f). It is, instead, an
interpretation of the substantive federal law requirements
(under 21 CFR § 1306.04 (2005)) for a valid prescription. It
begins by announcing that assisting suicide is not a “legiti
mate medical purpose” under § 1306.04, and that dispensing
controlled substances to assist a suicide violates the CSA.
66 Fed. Reg. 56608. Violation is a criminal offense, and
often a felony, under 21 U. S. C. § 841 (2000 ed. and Supp. II).
The Interpretive Rule thus purports to declare that using
controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide is a
crime, an authority that goes well beyond the Attorney Gen
eral’s statutory power to register or deregister.

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The Attorney General’s deregistration power, of course,
may carry implications for criminal enforcement because if a
physician dispenses a controlled substance after he is dereg
istered, he violates § 841. The Interpretive Rule works in
the opposite direction, however: It declares certain conduct
criminal, placing in jeopardy the registration of any physi
cian who engages in that conduct. To the extent the Inter
pretive Rule concerns registration, it simply states the obvi
ous because one of the five factors the Attorney General
must consider in deciding the “public interest” is “[c]ompli
ance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws relating to
controlled substances.” 21 U. S. C. § 823(f)(4). The prob
lem with the design of the Interpretive Rule is that it cannot,
and does not, explain why the Attorney General has the au
thority to decide what constitutes an underlying violation of
the CSA in the first place. The explanation the Government
seems to advance is that the Attorney General’s authority to
decide whether a physician’s actions are inconsistent with
the “public interest” provides the basis for the Interpretive
Rule.
By this logic, however, the Attorney General claims ex
traordinary authority. If the Attorney General’s argument
were correct, his power to deregister necessarily would in
clude the greater power to criminalize even the actions of
registered physicians, whenever they engage in conduct he
deems illegitimate. This power to criminalize—unlike his
power over registration, which must be exercised only after
considering five express statutory factors—would be unre
strained. It would be anomalous for Congress to have so
painstakingly described the Attorney General’s limited au
thority to deregister a single physician or schedule a single
drug, but to have given him, just by implication, authority
to declare an entire class of activity outside “the course of
professional practice,” and therefore a criminal violation of
the CSA. See Federal Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 744 (1973) (“In light of these specific

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grants of . . . authority, we are unwilling to construe the
ambiguous provisions . . . to serve this purpose [of creating
further authority]—a purpose for which it obviously was
not intended”).
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471 (1999), is
instructive. The statute at issue was the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which, like the CSA, divides
interpretive authority among various executive actors. The
Court relied on “the terms and structure of the ADA” to
decide that neither the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), nor any other agency, had authority to
define “disability” in the ADA. Id., at 479. Specifically, the
delegating provision stated that the EEOC “shall issue
regulations . . . to carry out this subchapter,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 12116, and the section of the statute defining “disability”
was in a different subchapter. The Court did not accept the
idea that because “the employment subchapter, i. e., ‘this
subchapter,’ includes other provisions that use the defined
terms, . . . [t]he EEOC might elaborate, through regulations,
on the meaning of ‘disability’ . . . if elaboration is needed in
order to ‘carry out’ the substantive provisions of ‘this sub
chapter.’ ” 527 U. S., at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See
also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U. S. 638, 649–650
(1990) (holding that a delegation of authority to promulgate
motor vehicle safety “standards” did not include the author
ity to decide the pre-emptive scope of the federal statute
because “[n]o such delegation regarding [the statute’s] en
forcement provisions is evident in the statute”).
The same principle controls here. It is not enough that
the terms “public interest,” “public health and safety,” and
“Federal law” are used in the part of the statute over which
the Attorney General has authority. The statutory terms
“public interest” and “public health” do not call on the Attor
ney General, or any other executive official, to make an in
dependent assessment of the meaning of federal law. The
Attorney General did not base the Interpretive Rule on an

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application of the five-factor test generally, or the “public
health and safety” factor specifically. Even if he had, it is
doubtful the Attorney General could cite the “public inter
est” or “public health” to deregister a physician simply be
cause he deemed a controversial practice permitted by state
law to have an illegitimate medical purpose.
As for the federal-law factor, though it does require the
Attorney General to decide “[c]ompliance” with the law, it
does not suggest that he may decide what the law says.
Were it otherwise, the Attorney General could authorita
tively interpret “State” and “local laws,” which are also in
cluded in 21 U. S. C. § 823(f), despite the obvious constitu
tional problems in his doing so. Just as he must evaluate
compliance with federal law in deciding about registration,
the Attorney General must as surely evaluate compliance
with federal law in deciding whether to prosecute; but this
does not entitle him to Chevron deference. See Crandon v.
United States, 494 U. S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur
ring in judgment) (“The Justice Department, of course, has
a very specific responsibility to determine for itself what this
statute means, in order to decide when to prosecute; but we
have never thought that the interpretation of those charged
with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference”).
The limits on the Attorney General’s authority to define
medical standards for the care and treatment of patients
bear also on the proper interpretation of § 871(b). This sec
tion allows the Attorney General to best determine how to
execute “his functions.” It is quite a different matter, how
ever, to say that the Attorney General can define the sub
stantive standards of medical practice as part of his author
ity. To find a delegation of this extent in § 871 would put
that part of the statute in considerable tension with the nar
rowly defined delegation concerning control and registration.
It would go, moreover, against the plain language of the text
to treat a delegation for the “execution” of his functions as
a further delegation to define other functions well beyond

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the statute’s specific grants of authority. When Congress
chooses to delegate a power of this extent, it does so not by
referring back to the administrator’s functions but by giving
authority over the provisions of the statute he is to interpret.
See, e. g., National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., 545
U. S. 967; Household Credit Services, 541 U. S. 232.
The authority desired by the Government is inconsistent
with the design of the statute in other fundamental respects.
The Attorney General does not have the sole delegated au
thority under the CSA. He must instead share it with, and
in some respects defer to, the Secretary, whose functions are
likewise delineated and confined by the statute. The CSA
allocates decisionmaking powers among statutory actors so
that medical judgments, if they are to be decided at the fed
eral level and for the limited objects of the statute, are
placed in the hands of the Secretary. In the scheduling con
text, for example, the Secretary’s recommendations on scien
tific and medical matters bind the Attorney General. The
Attorney General cannot control a substance if the Secretary
disagrees. 21 U. S. C. § 811(b). See H. R. Rep. No. 91–1444,
pt. 1, p. 33 (1970) (the section “is not intended to authorize
the Attorney General to undertake or support medical and
scientific research [for the purpose of scheduling], which is
within the competence of the Department of Health, Educa
tion, and Welfare”).
In a similar vein the 1970 Act’s regulation of medical prac
tice with respect to drug rehabilitation gives the Attorney
General a limited role; for it is the Secretary who, after con
sultation with the Attorney General and national medical
groups, “determine[s] the appropriate methods of profes
sional practice in the medical treatment of . . . narcotic addic
tion.” 42 U. S. C. § 290bb–2a; see 21 U. S. C. § 823(g) (2000
ed. and Supp. II) (stating that the Attorney General shall
register practitioners who dispense drugs for narcotics treat
ment when the Secretary has determined the applicant is
qualified to treat addicts and the Attorney General has con

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cluded the applicant will comply with recordkeeping and se
curity regulations); Moore, 423 U. S., at 144 (noting that
in enacting the addiction-treatment provisions, Congress
sought to change the fact “that ‘criminal prosecutions’ in the
past had turned on the opinions of federal prosecutors”);
H. R. Rep. No. 93–884, p. 6 (1974) (“This section preserves
the distinctions found in the [CSA] between the functions of
the Attorney General and the Secretary . . . . All decisions
of a medical nature are to be made by the Secretary . . . .
Law enforcement decisions respecting the security of stocks
of narcotic drugs and the maintenance of records on such
drugs are to be made by the Attorney General”).
Postenactment congressional commentary on the CSA’s
regulation of medical practice is also at odds with the Attor
ney General’s claimed authority to determine appropriate
medical standards. In 1978, in preparation for ratification
of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971,
[1979–1980] 32 U. S. T. 543, T. I. A. S. No. 9725, Congress
decided it would implement the United States’ compliance
through “the framework of the procedures and criteria for
classification of substances provided in the” CSA. 21
U. S. C. § 801a(3). It did so to ensure that “nothing in the
Convention will interfere with ethical medical practice in
this country as determined by [the Secretary] on the basis of
a consensus of the views of the American medical and scien
tific community.” Ibid.
The structure of the CSA, then, conveys unwillingness to
cede medical judgments to an executive official who lacks
medical expertise. In interpreting statutes that divide
authority, the Court has recognized: “Because historical
familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first
instance for the presumption that Congress delegates in
terpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than to
the reviewing court, we presume here that Congress in
tended to invest interpretive power in the administrative
actor in the best position to develop these attributes.” Mar

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tin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499
U. S. 144, 153 (1991) (citations omitted). This presumption
works against a conclusion that the Attorney General has
authority to make quintessentially medical judgments.
The Government contends the Attorney General’s decision
here is a legal, not a medical, one. This generality, however,
does not suffice. The Attorney General’s Interpretive Rule,
and the Office of Legal Counsel memo it incorporates, place
extensive reliance on medical judgments and the views of
the medical community in concluding that assisted suicide is
not a “legitimate medical purpose.” See 66 Fed. Reg. 56608
(noting the “medical” distinctions between assisting suicide
and giving sufficient medication to alleviate pain); Memoran
dum from Office of Legal Counsel to Attorney General (June
27, 2001), App. to Pet. for Cert. 121a–122a, and n. 17 (discuss
ing the “Federal medical policy” against physician-assisted
suicide), id., at 124a–130a (examining views of the medical
community). This confirms that the authority claimed by
the Attorney General is both beyond his expertise and incon
gruous with the statutory purposes and design.
The idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such
broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation
in the CSA’s registration provision is not sustainable. “Con
gress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details
of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provi
sions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouse
holes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531
U. S. 457, 468 (2001); see FDA v. Brown & Williamson To
bacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 160 (2000) (“[W]e are confident
that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision
of such economic and political significance to an agency in so
cryptic a fashion”).
The importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide,
which has been the subject of an “earnest and profound de
bate” across the country, Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 735, makes
the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more sus

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pect. Under the Government’s theory, moreover, the med
ical judgments the Attorney General could make are not
limited to physician-assisted suicide. Were this argument
accepted, he could decide whether any particular drug may
be used for any particular purpose, or indeed whether a phy
sician who administers any controversial treatment could be
deregistered. This would occur, under the Government’s
view, despite the statute’s express limitation of the Attorney
General’s authority to registration and control, with attend
ant restrictions on each of those functions, and despite the
statutory purposes to combat drug abuse and prevent illicit
drug trafficking.
We need not decide whether Chevron deference would be
warranted for an interpretation issued by the Attorney Gen
eral concerning matters closer to his role under the CSA,
namely, preventing doctors from engaging in illicit drug traf
ficking. In light of the foregoing, however, the CSA does
not give the Attorney General authority to issue the Inter
pretive Rule as a statement with the force of law.
If, in the course of exercising his authority, the Attorney
General uses his analysis in the Interpretive Rule only for
guidance in deciding when to prosecute or deregister, then
the question remains whether his substantive interpretation
is correct. Since the Interpretive Rule was not promul
gated pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority, its inter
pretation of “legitimate medical purpose” does not receive
Chevron deference. Instead, it receives deference only in
accordance with Skidmore. “The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evi
dent in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its con
sistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.” 323 U. S., at 140; see also Mead, 533 U. S., at 235
(noting that an opinion receiving Skidmore deference may
“claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic, and ex
pertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other

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sources of weight”). The deference here is tempered by the
Attorney General’s lack of expertise in this area and the ap
parent absence of any consultation with anyone outside the
Department of Justice who might aid in a reasoned judg
ment. In any event, under Skidmore, we follow an agency’s
rule only to the extent it is persuasive, see Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000); and for the reasons
given and for further reasons set out below, we do not find
the Attorney General’s opinion persuasive.
III
As we have noted before, the CSA “repealed most of the
earlier antidrug laws in favor of a comprehensive regime
to combat the international and interstate traffic in illicit
drugs.” Raich, 545 U. S., at 12. In doing so, Congress
sought to “conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate
and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.” Ibid. It
comes as little surprise, then, that we have not considered
the extent to which the CSA regulates medical practice be
yond prohibiting a doctor from acting as a drug “ ‘pusher’ ”
instead of a physician. Moore, 423 U. S., at 143. In Moore,
we addressed a situation in which a doctor “sold drugs, not
for legitimate purposes, but primarily for the profits to
be derived therefrom.” Id., at 135 (quoting H. R. Rep.
No. 91–1444, pt. 1, at 10; internal quotation marks omitted).
There the defendant, who had engaged in large-scale over
prescribing of methadone, “concede[d] in his brief that he
did not observe generally accepted medical practices.” 423
U. S., at 126. And in United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483 (2001), Congress’ express
determination that marijuana had no accepted medical use
foreclosed any argument about statutory coverage of drugs
available by a doctor’s prescription.
In deciding whether the CSA can be read as prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide, we look to the statute’s text and
design. The statute and our case law amply support the

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conclusion that Congress regulates medical practice insofar
as it bars doctors from using their prescription-writing pow
ers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and traffick
ing as conventionally understood. Beyond this, however,
the statute manifests no intent to regulate the practice of
medicine generally. The silence is understandable given the
structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the
States “ ‘great latitude under their police powers to legislate
as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons.’ ” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S.
470, 475 (1996) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massa
chusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 756 (1985)).
The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely
upon a functioning medical profession regulated under the
States’ police powers. The Attorney General can register a
physician to dispense controlled substances “if the applicant
is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which he practices.” 21 U. S. C. § 823(f).
When considering whether to revoke a physician’s regis
tration, the Attorney General looks not just to violations of
federal drug laws; but he “shall” also consider “[t]he recom
mendation of the appropriate State licensing board or pro
fessional disciplinary authority” and the registrant’s com
pliance with state and local drug laws. Ibid. The very
definition of a “practitioner” eligible to prescribe includes
physicians “licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by
the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices”
to dispense controlled substances. § 802(21). Further cau
tioning against the conclusion that the CSA effectively dis
places the States’ general regulation of medical practice is
the Act’s pre-emption provision, which indicates that, absent
a positive conflict, none of the Act’s provisions should be
“construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Con
gress to occupy the field in which that provision operates . . .
to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject mat

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ter which would otherwise be within the authority of the
State.” § 903.
Oregon’s regime is an example of the state regulation of
medical practice that the CSA presupposes. Rather than
simply decriminalizing assisted suicide, ODWDA limits its
exercise to the attending physicians of terminally ill patients,
physicians who must be licensed by Oregon’s Board of Medi
cal Examiners. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.815, 127.800(10)
(2003). The statute gives attending physicians a central
role, requiring them to provide prognoses and prescriptions,
give information about palliative alternatives and counsel
ing, and ensure patients are competent and acting voluntar
ily. § 127.815. Any eligible patient must also get a second
opinion from another registered physician, § 127.820, and the
statute’s safeguards require physicians to keep and submit
to inspection detailed records of their actions, §§ 127.855,
127.865.
Even though regulation of health and safety is “primarily,
and historically, a matter of local concern,” Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S.
707, 719 (1985), there is no question that the Federal Govern
ment can set uniform national standards in these areas. See
Raich, supra, at 9. In connection to the CSA, however, we
find only one area in which Congress set general, uniform
standards of medical practice. Title I of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, of which
the CSA was Title II, provides:
“[The Secretary], after consultation with the Attorney
General and with national organizations representative
of persons with knowledge and experience in the treat
ment of narcotic addicts, shall determine the appro
priate methods of professional practice in the medical
treatment of the narcotic addiction of various classes of
narcotic addicts, and shall report thereon from time to
time to the Congress.” § 4, 84 Stat. 1241, codified at 42
U. S. C. § 290bb–2a.

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272 GONZALES v. OREGON
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This provision strengthens the understanding of the CSA as
a statute combating recreational drug abuse, and also indi
cates that when Congress wants to regulate medical practice
in the given scheme, it does so by explicit language in the
statute.
In the face of the CSA’s silence on the practice of medi
cine generally and its recognition of state regulation of the
medical profession it is difficult to defend the Attorney Gen
eral’s declaration that the statute impliedly criminalizes
physician-assisted suicide. This difficulty is compounded by
the CSA’s consistent delegation of medical judgments to the
Secretary and its otherwise careful allocation of powers for
enforcing the limited objects of the CSA. See Part II–B,
supra. The Government’s attempt to meet this challenge
rests, for the most part, on the CSA’s requirement that every
Schedule II drug be dispensed pursuant to a “written pre
scription of a practitioner.” 21 U. S. C. § 829(a). A pre
scription, the Government argues, necessarily implies that
the substance is being made available to a patient for a legiti
mate medical purpose. The statute, in this view, requires
an anterior judgment about the term “medical” or “medi
cine.” The Government contends ordinary usage of these
words ineluctably refers to a healing or curative art, which
by these terms cannot embrace the intentional hastening of
a patient’s death. It also points to the teachings of Hippoc
rates, the positions of prominent medical organizations, the
Federal Government, and the judgment of the 49 States that
have not legalized physician-assisted suicide as further sup
port for the proposition that the practice is not legitimate
medicine. See Brief for Petitioners 22–24; Memorandum
from Office of Legal Counsel to Attorney General, App. to
Pet. for Cert. 124a–130a.
On its own, this understanding of medicine’s boundaries is
at least reasonable. The primary problem with the Govern
ment’s argument, however, is its assumption that the CSA

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impliedly authorizes an executive officer to bar a use simply
because it may be inconsistent with one reasonable under
standing of medical practice. Viewed alone, the prescription
requirement may support such an understanding, but stat
utes “should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated
provisions.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 570
(1995). The CSA’s substantive provisions and their arrange
ment undermine this assertion of an expansive federal au
thority to regulate medicine.
The statutory criteria for deciding what substances are
controlled, determinations which are central to the Act, con
sistently connect the undefined term “drug abuse” with ad
diction or abnormal effects on the nervous system. When
the Attorney General schedules drugs, he must consider a
substance’s psychic or physiological dependence liability. 21
U. S. C. § 811(c)(7). To classify a substance in Schedules II
through V, the Attorney General must find abuse of the drug
leads to psychological or physical dependence. § 812(b).
Indeed, the differentiation of Schedules II through V turns
in large part on a substance’s habit-forming potential: The
more addictive a substance, the stricter the controls. Ibid.
When Congress wanted to extend the CSA’s regulation to
substances not obviously habit forming or psychotropic,
moreover, it relied not on executive ingenuity, but rather on
specific legislation. See § 1902(a) of the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4851 (placing anabolic steroids
in Schedule III).
The statutory scheme with which the CSA is intertwined
further confirms a more limited understanding of the pre
scription requirement. When the Secretary considers Food
and Drug Administration approval of a substance with “stim
ulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect,” he must forward
the information to the Attorney General for possible schedul
ing. Shedding light on Congress’ understanding of drug
abuse, this requirement appears under the heading “Abuse

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274 GONZALES v. OREGON
Opinion of the Court
potential.” 21 U. S. C. § 811(f). Similarly, when Congress
prepared to implement the Convention on Psychotropic Sub
stances, it did so through the CSA. § 801a.
The Interpretive Rule rests on a reading of the prescrip
tion requirement that is persuasive only to the extent one
scrutinizes the provision without the illumination of the rest
of the statute. See Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107,
114–115 (1989). Viewed in its context, the prescription re
quirement is better understood as a provision that ensures
patients use controlled substances under the supervision of
a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational abuse.
As a corollary, the provision also bars doctors from peddling
to patients who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses.
See Moore, 423 U. S., at 135, 143. To read prescriptions for
assisted suicide as constituting “drug abuse” under the CSA
is discordant with the phrase’s consistent use throughout the
statute, not to mention its ordinary meaning.
The Government’s interpretation of the prescription re
quirement also fails under the objection that the Attorney
General is an unlikely recipient of such broad authority,
given the Secretary’s primacy in shaping medical policy
under the CSA, and the statute’s otherwise careful allocation
of decisionmaking powers. Just as the conventions of ex
pression indicate that Congress is unlikely to alter a statute’s
obvious scope and division of authority through muffled
hints, the background principles of our federal system also
belie the notion that Congress would use such an obscure
grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally supervised
by the States’ police power. It is unnecessary even to con
sider the application of clear statement requirements, see,
e. g., United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971); cf. BFP
v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 544–546
(1994), or presumptions against pre-emption, see, e. g., Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U. S. 355, 387 (2002), to
reach this commonsense conclusion. For all these reasons,
we conclude the CSA’s prescription requirement does not au

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275 Cite as: 546 U. S. 243 (2006)
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thorize the Attorney General to bar dispensing controlled
substances for assisted suicide in the face of a state medical
regime permitting such conduct.
IV
The Government, in the end, maintains that the prescrip
tion requirement delegates to a single executive officer the
power to effect a radical shift of authority from the States
to the Federal Government to define general standards of
medical practice in every locality. The text and structure of
the CSA show that Congress did not have this far-reaching
intent to alter the federal-state balance and the congres
sional role in maintaining it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
The Court concludes that the Attorney General lacked
authority to declare assisted suicide illicit under the Con
trolled Substances Act (CSA), because the CSA is con
cerned only with “illicit drug dealing and trafficking,” ante,
at 270 (emphasis added). This question-begging conclusion
is obscured by a flurry of arguments that distort the stat
ute and disregard settled principles of our interpretive
jurisprudence.
Contrary to the Court’s analysis, this case involves not one
but three independently sufficient grounds for reversing the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment. First, the Attorney General’s in
terpretation of “legitimate medical purpose” in 21 CFR
§ 1306.04 (2005) (hereinafter Regulation) is clearly valid,
given the substantial deference we must accord it under
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461 (1997), and his two re
maining conclusions follow naturally from this interpreta
tion. See Part I, infra. Second, even if this interpretation
of the Regulation is entitled to lesser deference or no defer

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276 GONZALES v. OREGON
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ence at all, it is by far the most natural interpretation of the
Regulation—whose validity is not challenged here. This in
terpretation is thus correct even upon de novo review. See
Part II, infra. Third, even if that interpretation of the Reg
ulation were incorrect, the Attorney General’s independent
interpretation of the statutory phrase “public interest” in 21
U. S. C. §§ 824(a) and 823(f), and his implicit interpretation of
the statutory phrase “public health and safety” in § 823(f)(5),
are entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Nat
ural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984),
and they are valid under Chevron. See Part III, infra.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I
The Interpretive Rule issued by the Attorney General
(hereinafter Directive) provides in relevant part as follows:
“For the reasons set forth in the OLC Opinion, I hereby
determine that assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate med
ical purpose’ within the meaning of 21 CFR § 1306.04
(2001), and that prescribing, dispensing, or administer
ing federally controlled substances to assist suicide vio
lates the CSA. Such conduct by a physician registered
to dispense controlled substances may ‘render his
registration . . . inconsistent with the public interest’
and therefore subject to possible suspension or rev
ocation under 21 U. S. C. [§] 824(a)(4).” 66 Fed. Reg.
56608 (2001).
The Directive thus purports to do three distinct things: (1) to
interpret the phrase “legitimate medical purpose” in the
Regulation to exclude physician-assisted suicide; (2) to deter
mine that prescribing, dispensing, and administering feder
ally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the CSA;
and (3) to determine that participating in physician-assisted
suicide may render a practitioner’s registration “inconsistent
with the public interest” within the meaning of 21 U. S. C.
§§ 823(f) and 824(a)(4) (which incorporates § 823(f) by refer

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ence). The Court’s analysis suffers from an unremitting fail
ure to distinguish among these distinct propositions in the
Directive.
As an initial matter, the validity of the Regulation’s inter
pretation of “prescription” in § 829 to require a “legitimate
medical purpose” is not at issue. Respondents conceded the
validity of this interpretation in the lower court, see Oregon
v. Ashcroft, 368 F. 3d 1118, 1133 (CA9 2004), and they have
not challenged it here. By its assertion that the Regula
tion merely restates the statutory standard of 21 U. S. C.
§ 830(b)(3)(A)(ii), see ante, at 257, the Court likewise accepts
that the “legitimate medical purpose” interpretation for pre
scriptions is proper. See also ante, at 258 (referring to
“legitimate medical purpose” as a “statutory phrase”). It is
beyond dispute, then, that a “prescription” under § 829 must
issue for a “legitimate medical purpose.”
A
Because the Regulation was promulgated by the Attorney
General, and because the Directive purported to interpret
the language of the Regulation, see 66 Fed. Reg. 56608, this
case calls for the straightforward application of our rule that
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is “control
ling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula
tion.” Auer, supra, at 461 (internal quotation marks omit
ted). The Court reasons that Auer is inapplicable because
the Regulation “does little more than restate the terms of
the statute itself.” Ante, at 257. “Simply put,” the Court
asserts, “the existence of a parroting regulation does not
change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of
the regulation but the meaning of the statute.” Ibid.
To begin with, it is doubtful that any such exception to the
Auer rule exists. The Court cites no authority for it, be
cause there is none. To the contrary, our unanimous deci
sion in Auer makes clear that broadly drawn regulations are
entitled to no less respect than narrow ones. “A rule requir

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278 GONZALES v. OREGON
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ing the Secretary to construe his own regulations narrowly
would make little sense, since he is free to write the regula
tions as broadly as he wishes, subject only to the limits im
posed by the statute.” 519 U. S., at 463 (emphasis added).
Even if there were an antiparroting canon, however, it
would have no application here. The Court’s description of
21 CFR § 1306.04 (2005) as a regulation that merely “para
phrase[s] the statutory language,” ante, at 257, is demonstra
bly false. In relevant part, the Regulation interprets the
word “prescription” as it appears in 21 U. S. C. § 829, which
governs the dispensation of controlled substances other than
those on Schedule I (which may not be dispensed at all).
Entitled “[p]rescriptions,” § 829 requires, with certain excep
tions not relevant here, “the written prescription of a prac
titioner” (usually a medical doctor) for the dispensation of
Schedule II substances (§ 829(a)), “a written or oral prescrip
tion” for substances on Schedules III and IV (§ 829(b)), and
no prescription but merely a “medical purpose” for the dis
pensation of Schedule V substances (§ 829(c)).
As used in this section, “prescription” is susceptible of at
least three reasonable interpretations. First, it might mean
any oral or written direction of a practitioner for the dispen
sation of drugs. See United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 122,
137, n. 13 (1975) (“On its face § 829 addresses only the form
that a prescription must take. . . . [Section] 829 by its terms
does not limit the authority of a practitioner”). Second, in
light of the requirement of a “medical purpose” for the dis
pensation of Schedule V substances, see § 829(c), it might
mean a practitioner’s oral or written direction for the dispen
sation of drugs that the practitioner believes to be for a legit
imate medical purpose. See Webster’s New International
Dictionary 1954 (2d ed. 1950) (hereinafter Webster’s Second)
(defining “prescription” as “[a] written direction for the prep
aration and use of a medicine”); id., at 1527 (defining “med
icine” as “[a]ny substance or preparation used in treating
disease”) (emphasis added). Finally, “prescription” might

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refer to a practitioner’s direction for the dispensation of
drugs that serves an objectively legitimate medical purpose,
regardless of the practitioner’s subjective judgment about
the legitimacy of the anticipated use. See ibid.
The Regulation at issue constricts or clarifies the statute
by adopting the last and narrowest of these three possi
ble interpretations of the undefined statutory term:
“A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective
must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose . . . .” 21
CFR § 1306.04(a) (2005). We have previously acknowledged
that the Regulation gives added content to the text of
the statute: “The medical purpose requirement explicit in
subsection (c) [of § 829] could be implicit in subsections (a)
and (b). Regulation § [1]306.04 makes it explicit.” Moore,
supra, at 137, n. 13.1
The Court points out that the Regulation adopts some of
the phrasing employed in unrelated sections of the statute.
See ante, at 257. This is irrelevant. A regulation that sig
nificantly clarifies the meaning of an otherwise ambiguous
statutory provision is not a “parroting” regulation, regard
less of the sources that the agency draws upon for the clari
fication. Moreover, most of the statutory phrases that the
Court cites as appearing in the Regulation, see ibid. (citing
21 U. S. C. §§ 812(b) (“ ‘currently accepted medical use’ ”),
829(c) (“ ‘medical purpose’ ”), 802(21) (“ ‘in the course of pro
fessional practice’ ”)), are inapposite because they do not
“parrot” the only phrase in the Regulation that the Directive
purported to construe. See 66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (“I hereby
1 To be sure, this acknowledgment did not go far enough, because it
overlooked the significance of the word “legitimate,” which is most natu
rally understood to create an objective, federal standard for appropriate
medical uses. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U. S. 30, 43 (1989) (“We start . . . with the general assumption that in the
absence of a plain indication to the contrary, . . . Congress when it enacts
a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on
state law” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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280 GONZALES v. OREGON
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determine that assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical
purpose’ within the meaning of 21 CFR § 1306.04 . . . ”).
None of them includes the key word “legitimate,” which
gives the most direct support to the Directive’s theory that
§ 829(c) presupposes a uniform federal standard of medical
practice.2
Since the Regulation does not run afowl (so to speak) of
the Court’s newly invented prohibition of “parroting”; and
since the Directive represents the agency’s own interpreta
tion of that concededly valid regulation; the only question
remaining is whether that interpretation is “plainly errone
ous or inconsistent with the regulation”; otherwise, it is “con
trolling.” Auer, 519 U. S., at 461 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This is not a difficult question. The Directive is
assuredly valid insofar as it interprets “prescription” to re
quire a medical purpose that is “legitimate” as a matter of
federal law—since that is an interpretation of “prescription”
that we ourselves have adopted. Webb v. United States, 249
U. S. 96 (1919), was a prosecution under the Harrison Act of
a doctor who wrote prescriptions of morphine “for the pur
pose of providing the user with morphine sufficient to keep
him comfortable by maintaining his customary use,” id.,
2 The only place outside 21 U. S. C. § 801 in which the statute uses the
phrase “legitimate medical purpose” is in defining the phrase “valid pre
scription” for purposes of the reporting requirements that apply to mail
orders of regulated substances. See § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii). The Regulation
did not “parrot” this statutory section, because the Regulation was
adopted in 1971 and the statutory language was added in 2000. See Brief
for Petitioners 17 (citing the Children’s Health Act of 2000, § 3652, 114
Stat. 1239, 21 U. S. C. § 830(b)(3)). But even if the statutory language had
predated the Regulation, there would be no “parroting” of that phrase.
In using the word “prescription” without definition in the much more criti
cal § 829, Congress left the task of resolving any ambiguity in that word,
used in that context, to the relevant executive officer. That the officer
did so by deeming relevant a technically inapplicable statutory definition
contained elsewhere in the statute does not make him a parrot. He has
given to the statutory text a meaning it did not explicitly—and perhaps
even not necessarily—contain.

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at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted). The dispositive
issue in the case was whether such authorizations were “pre
scriptions” within the meaning of § 2(b) of the Harrison Act,
predecessor to the CSA. Ibid. We held that “to call such
an order for the use of morphine a physician’s prescription
would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion
of the subject is required.” Id., at 99–100. Like the Direc
tive, this interprets “prescription” to require medical pur
pose that is legitimate as a matter of federal law. And the
Directive is also assuredly valid insofar as it interprets “le
gitimate medical purpose” as a matter of federal law to ex
clude physician-assisted suicide, because that is not only a
permissible but indeed the most natural interpretation of
that phrase. See Part II, infra.
B
Even if the Regulation merely parroted the statute, and
the Directive therefore had to be treated as though it con
strued the statute directly, see ante, at 257, the Directive
would still be entitled to deference under Chevron. The
Court does not take issue with the Solicitor General’s conten
tion that no alleged procedural defect, such as the absence of
notice-and-comment rulemaking before promulgation of the
Directive, renders Chevron inapplicable here. See Reply
Brief for Petitioners 4 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S.
212, 219–222 (2002); 5 U. S. C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (exempting in
terpretive rules from notice-and-comment rulemaking)).
Instead, the Court holds that the Attorney General lacks in
terpretive authority to issue the Directive at all, on the
ground that the explicit delegation provision, 21 U. S. C.
§ 821 (2000 ed., Supp. V), limits his rulemaking authority to
“registration and control,” which (according to the Court)
are not implicated by the Directive’s interpretation of the
prescription requirement. See ante, at 259–262.
Setting aside the implicit delegation inherent in Congress’s
use of the undefined term “prescription” in § 829, the Court’s

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reading of “control” in § 821 is manifestly erroneous. The
Court urges, ante, at 260, that “control” is a term defined
in part A of the subchapter (entitled “Introductory Provi
sions”) to mean “to add a drug or other substance . . . to a
schedule under part B of this subchapter,” 21 U. S. C.
§ 802(5) (emphasis added). But § 821 is not included in “part
B of this subchapter,” which is entitled “Authority to Con
trol; Standards and Schedules,” and consists of the sections
related to scheduling, 21 U. S. C. §§ 811–814 (2000 ed. and
Supp. V), where the statutory definition is uniquely appro
priate. Rather, § 821 is found in part C of the subchapter,
§§ 821–830, entitled “Registration of Manufacturers, Distrib
utors, and Dispensers of Controlled Substances,” which in
cludes all and only the provisions relating to the “manufac
ture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances,”
§ 821. The artificial definition of “control” in § 802(5) has no
conceivable application to the use of that word in § 821.
Under that definition, “control” must take a substance as its
direct object, see 21 U. S. C. § 802(5) (“to add a drug or other
substance . . . to a schedule”)—and that is how “control” is
consistently used throughout part B. See, e. g., §§ 811(b)
(“proceedings . . . to control a drug or other substance”),
811(c) (“each drug or other substance proposed to be con
trolled or removed from the schedules”), 811(d)(1) (“If con
trol is required . . . the Attorney General shall issue an order
controlling such drug . . . ”), 812(b) (“Except where control
is required . . . a drug or other substance may not be placed
in any schedule . . . ”). In § 821, by contrast, the term “con
trol” has as its object, not “a drug or other substance,” but
rather the processes of “manufacture, distribution, and dis
pensing of controlled substances.” It could not be clearer
that the artificial definition of “control” in § 802(5) is inappli
cable. It makes no sense to speak of “adding the manufac
turing, distribution, and dispensing of substances to a sched
ule.” We do not force term-of-art definitions into contexts
where they plainly do not fit and produce nonsense. What

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is obviously intended in § 821 is the ordinary meaning of
“control”—namely, “[t]o exercise restraining or directing in
fluence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold from ac
tion; to curb,” Webster’s Second 580. “Control” is regularly
used in this ordinary sense elsewhere in part C of the sub
chapter. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. §§ 823(a)(1), (b)(1), (d)(1),
(e)(1), (h)(1) (“maintenance of effective controls against di
version”); §§ 823(a)(5), (d)(5) (“establishment of effective
control against diversion”); § 823(g)(2)(H)(i) (“to exercise
supervision or control over the practice of medicine”);
§ 830(b)(1)(C) (“a listed chemical under the control of the reg
ulated person”); § 830(c)(2)(D) (“chemical control laws”) (em
phasis added).
When the word is given its ordinary meaning, the Attor
ney General’s interpretation of the prescription requirement
of § 829 plainly “relat[es] to the . . . control of the . . . dispens
ing of controlled substances,” 21 U. S. C. § 821 (2000 ed.,
Supp. V) (emphasis added), since a prescription is the chief
requirement for “dispensing” such drugs, see § 829. The
same meaning is compelled by the fact that § 821 is the first
section not of part B of the subchapter, which deals entirely
with “control” in the artificial sense, but of part C, every
section of which relates to the “registration and control of
the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled
substances,” § 821. See §§ 822 (persons required to regis
ter), 823 (registration requirements), 824 (denial, revocation,
or suspension of registration), 825 (labeling and packaging),
826 (production quotas for controlled substances), 827 (rec
ordkeeping and reporting requirements of registrants), 828
(order forms), 829 (prescription requirements), 830 (regula
tion of listed chemicals and certain machines). It would be
peculiar for the first section of this part to authorize rule
making for matters covered by the previous part. The only
sensible interpretation of § 821 is that it gives the Attorney
General interpretive authority over the provisions of part C,
all of which “relat[e] to the registration and control of the

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manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled sub
stances.” These provisions include both the prescription re
quirement of § 829, and the criteria for registration and
deregistration of §§ 823 and 824 (as relevant below, see
Part III, infra).3
C
In sum, the Directive’s construction of “legitimate medical
purpose” is a perfectly valid agency interpretation of its own
regulation; and if not that, a perfectly valid agency interpre
tation of the statute. No one contends that the construction
is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,”
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414
(1945), or beyond the scope of ambiguity in the statute, see
Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843. In fact, as explained below, the
Directive provides the most natural interpretation of the
Regulation and of the statute. The Directive thus defini
tively establishes that a doctor’s order authorizing the dis
pensation of a Schedule II substance for the purpose of as
sisting a suicide is not a “prescription” within the meaning
of § 829.
3 The Court concludes that “[e]ven if ‘control’ in § 821 were understood
to signify something other than its statutory definition, it would not sup
port the Interpretive Rule.” Ante, at 260. That conclusion rests upon a
misidentification of the text that the Attorney General, pursuant to his
“control” authority, is interpreting. No one argues that the word “con
trol” in § 821 gives the Attorney General “authority to define diversion
based on his view of legitimate medical practice,” ibid. Rather, that word
authorizes the Attorney General to interpret (among other things) the
“prescription” requirement of § 829. The question then becomes whether
the phrase “legitimate medical purpose” (which all agree is included in
“prescription”) is at least open to the interpretation announced in the Di
rective. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). And of course it is—as the Court effec
tively concedes two pages earlier: “All would agree, we should think, that
the statutory phrase ‘legitimate medical purpose’ is a generality, suscepti
ble to more precise definition and open to varying constructions, and thus
ambiguous in the relevant sense.” Ante, at 258 (citing Chevron).

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Once this conclusion is established, the other two conclu
sions in the Directive follow inevitably. Under our reason
ing in Moore, writing prescriptions that are illegitimate
under § 829 is certainly not “in the [usual] course of profes
sional practice” under § 802(21) and thus not “authorized by
this subchapter” under § 841(a). See 423 U. S., at 138, 140–
141. A doctor who does this may thus be prosecuted under
§ 841(a), and so it follows that such conduct “violates the Con
trolled Substances Act,” 66 Fed. Reg. 56608. And since such
conduct is thus not in “[c]ompliance with applicable . . .
Federal . . . laws relating to controlled substances,” 21
U. S. C. § 823(f)(4), and may also be fairly judged to “threaten
the public health and safety,” § 823(f)(5), it follows that
“[s]uch conduct by a physician registered to dispense con
trolled substances may ‘render his registration . . . inconsist
ent with the public interest’ and therefore subject to possible
suspension or revocation under 21 U. S. C. [§] 824(a)(4),” 66
Fed. Reg. 56608 (emphasis added).
II
Even if the Directive were entitled to no deference what
ever, the most reasonable interpretation of the Regulation
and of the statute would produce the same result. Virtually
every relevant source of authoritative meaning confirms that
the phrase “legitimate medical purpose” 4 does not include
intentionally assisting suicide. “Medicine” refers to “[t]he
science and art dealing with the prevention, cure, or allevia
tion of disease.” Webster’s Second 1527. The use of the
word “legitimate” connotes an objective standard of “medi
cine,” and our presumption that the CSA creates a uniform
federal law regulating the dispensation of controlled sub
stances, see Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holy
4 This phrase appears only in the Regulation and not in the relevant
section of the statute. But as pointed out earlier, the Court does not
contest that this is the most reasonable interpretation of the section—
regarding it, indeed, as a mere “parroting” of the statute.

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field, 490 U. S. 30, 43 (1989), means that this objective stand
ard must be a federal one. As recounted in detail in the
memorandum for the Attorney General that is attached as
an appendix to the Directive (OLC Memo), virtually every
medical authority from Hippocrates to the current American
Medical Association (AMA) confirms that assisting suicide
has seldom or never been viewed as a form of “prevention,
cure, or alleviation of disease,” and (even more so) that as
sisting suicide is not a “legitimate” branch of that “science
and art.” See OLC Memo, App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a–130a.
Indeed, the AMA has determined that “ ‘[p]hysician-assisted
suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s
role as healer.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702,
731 (1997). “[T]he overwhelming weight of authority in ju
dicial decisions, the past and present policies of nearly all of
the States and of the Federal Government, and the clear,
firm and unequivocal views of the leading associations within
the American medical and nursing professions, establish that
assisting in suicide . . . is not a legitimate medical purpose.”
OLC Memo, supra, at 129a. See also Glucksberg, supra, at
710, n. 8 (prohibitions or condemnations of assisted suicide in
50 jurisdictions, including 47 States, the District of Colum
bia, and 2 Territories).
In the face of this “overwhelming weight of authority,” the
Court’s admission that “[o]n its own, this understanding of
medicine’s boundaries is at least reasonable,” ante, at 272
(emphasis added), tests the limits of understatement. The
only explanation for such a distortion is that the Court con
fuses the normative inquiry of what the boundaries of medi
cine should be—which it is laudably hesitant to undertake—
with the objective inquiry of what the accepted definition of
“medicine” is. The same confusion is reflected in the Court’s
remarkable statement that “[t]he primary problem with the
Government’s argument . . . is its assumption that the CSA
impliedly authorizes an executive officer to bar a use simply

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because it may be inconsistent with one reasonable under
standing of medical practice.” Ante, at 272–273 (emphasis
added). The fact that many in Oregon believe that the
boundaries of “legitimate medicine” should be extended to
include assisted suicide does not change the fact that the
overwhelming weight of authority (including the 47 States
that condemn physician-assisted suicide) confirms that they
have not yet been so extended. Not even those of our
Eighth Amendment cases most generous in discerning an
“evolution” of national standards would have found, on this
record, that the concept of “legitimate medicine” has evolved
so far. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 564–567 (2005).
The Court contends that the phrase “legitimate medical
purpose” cannot be read to establish a broad, uniform fed
eral standard for the medically proper use of controlled sub
stances. Ante, at 268. But it also rejects the most plausi
ble alternative proposition, urged by the State, that any use
authorized under state law constitutes a “legitimate medical
purpose.” (The Court is perhaps leery of embracing this po
sition because the State candidly admitted at oral argument
that, on its view, a State could exempt from the CSA’s cover
age the use of morphine to achieve euphoria.) Instead, the
Court reverse-engineers an approach somewhere between a
uniform national standard and a state-by-state approach,
holding (with no basis in the CSA’s text) that “legitimate
medical purpose” refers to all uses of drugs unrelated to
“addiction and recreational abuse.” Ante, at 274. Thus,
though the Court pays lipservice to state autonomy, see ante,
at 269–271, its standard for “legitimate medical purpose”
is in fact a hazily defined federal standard based on its pur
posive reading of the CSA, and extracted from obliquely rel
evant sections of the Act. In particular, relying on its
observation that the criteria for scheduling controlled sub
stances are primarily concerned with “addiction or abnormal
effects on the nervous system,” ante, at 273 (citing 21

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U. S. C. §§ 811(c)(7), 812(b), 811(f), 801a), the Court concludes
that the CSA’s prescription requirement must be interpreted
in light of this narrow view of the statute’s purpose.
Even assuming, however, that the principal concern of the
CSA is the curtailment of “addiction and recreational abuse,”
there is no reason to think that this is its exclusive concern.
We have repeatedly observed that Congress often passes
statutes that sweep more broadly than the main problem
they were designed to address. “[S]tatutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably compa
rable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws
rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 79 (1998). See also H. J. Inc. v. Northwest
ern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 248 (1989).
The scheduling provisions of the CSA on which the Court
relies confirm that the CSA’s “design,” ante, at 269, is not as
narrow as the Court asserts. In making scheduling deter
minations, the Attorney General must not only consider a
drug’s “psychic or physiological dependence liability” as the
Court points out, ante, at 273 (citing 21 U. S. C. § 811(c)(7)),
but must also consider such broad factors as “[t]he state of
current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other sub
stance,” § 811(c)(3), and (most notably) “[w]hat, if any, risk
there is to the public health,” § 811(c)(6). If the latter factor
were limited to addiction-related health risks, as the Court
supposes, it would be redundant of § 811(c)(7). Moreover, in
making registration determinations regarding manufactur
ers and distributors, the Attorney General “shall” consider
“such other factors as may be relevant to and consistent with
the public health and safety,” §§ 823(a)(6), (b)(5), (d)(6), (e)(5)
(emphasis added)—over and above the risk of “diversion” of
controlled substances, §§ 823(a)(1), (a)(5), (b)(1), (d)(1), (d)(5),
(e)(1). And, most relevant of all, in registering and deregis
tering physicians, the Attorney General “may deny an appli

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cation for such registration if he determines that the issu
ance of such registration would be inconsistent with the pub
lic interest,” § 823(f); see also § 824(a)(4), and in making that
determination “shall” consider “[s]uch other conduct which
may threaten the public health and safety,” § 823(f)(5). All
of these provisions, not just those selectively cited by the
Court, shed light upon the CSA’s repeated references to the
undefined term “abuse.” See §§ 811(a)(1)(A), (c)(1), (c)(4),
(c)(5); §§ 812(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), (b)(4)(A), (b)(5)(A).
By disregarding all these public-interest, public-health,
and public-safety objectives, and limiting the CSA to “addic
tion and recreational abuse,” the Court rules out the prohibi
tion of anabolic-steroid use for bodybuilding purposes. It
seeks to avoid this consequence by invoking the Anabolic
Steroids Control Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4851. Ante, at 273.
But the only effect of that legislation is to make anabolic
steroids controlled drugs under Schedule III of the CSA. If
the only basis for control is (as the Court says) “addiction
and recreational abuse,” dispensation of these drugs for
bodybuilding could not be proscribed.
Although, as I have described, the Court’s opinion no more
defers to state law than does the Directive, the Court relies
on two provisions for the conclusion that “[t]he structure and
operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning
medical profession regulated under the States’ police pow
ers,” ante, at 270—namely, the registration provisions of
§ 823(f) and the nonpre-emption provision of § 903. Reli
ance on the former is particularly unfortunate, because
the Court’s own analysis recounts how Congress amended
§ 823(f) in 1984 in order to liberate the Attorney General’s
power over registration from the control of state regulators.
See ante, at 261; 21 U. S. C. § 823(f); see also Brief for Peti
tioners 34–35. And the nonpre-emption clause is embar
rassingly inapplicable, since it merely disclaims field pre
emption, and affirmatively prescribes federal pre-emption

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whenever state law creates a conflict.5 In any event, the
Directive does not purport to pre-empt state law in any way,
not even by conflict pre-emption—unless the Court is under
the misimpression that some States require assisted suicide.
The Directive merely interprets the CSA to prohibit, like
countless other federal criminal provisions, conduct that hap
pens not to be forbidden under state law (or at least the law
of the State of Oregon).
With regard to the CSA’s registration provisions, 21
U. S. C. §§ 823(f), 824(a), the Court argues that the statute
cannot fairly be read to “ ‘hide elephants in mouseholes’ ” by
delegating to the Attorney General the power to determine
the legitimacy of medical practices in “ ‘vague terms or ancil
lary provisions.’ ” Ante, at 267 (quoting Whitman v. Ameri
can Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001)). This
case bears not the remotest resemblance to Whitman, which
held that “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental de
tails of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary pro
visions.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The Attorney General’s
power to issue regulations against questionable uses of con
trolled substances in no way alters “the fundamental details”
of the CSA. I am aware of only four areas in which the
Department of Justice has exercised that power to regulate
uses of controlled substances unrelated to “addiction and
recreational abuse” as the Court apparently understands
that phrase: assisted suicide, aggressive pain management
therapy, anabolic-steroid use, and cosmetic weight-loss ther
apy. See, e. g., In re Harline, 65 Fed. Reg. 5665, 5667 (2000)
(weight loss); In re Tecca, 62 Fed. Reg. 12842, 12846 (1997)
(anabolic steroids); In re Roth, 60 Fed. Reg. 62262, 62263,
62267 (1995) (pain management). There is no indication that
5 Title 21 U. S. C. § 903 reads, in relevant part, as follows: “No provision
of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part
of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, in
cluding criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same
subject matter . . . unless there is a positive conflict . . . .”

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enforcement in these areas interferes with the prosecution
of “drug abuse” as the Court understands it. Unlike in
Whitman, the Attorney General’s additional power to ad
dress other forms of drug “abuse” does absolutely nothing
to undermine the central features of this regulatory scheme.
Of course it was critical to our analysis in Whitman that
the language of the provision did not bear the meaning that
respondents sought to give it. See 531 U. S., at 465. Here,
for the reasons stated above, the provision is most naturally
interpreted to incorporate a uniform federal standard for le
gitimacy of medical practice.6
Finally, respondents argue that the Attorney General
must defer to state-law judgments about what constitutes
legitimate medicine, on the ground that Congress must speak
clearly to impose such a uniform federal standard upon the
States. But no line of our clear-statement cases is applica
ble here. The canon of avoidance does not apply, since the
Directive does not push the outer limits of Congress’s com
merce power, compare Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 172
(2001) (regulation of isolated ponds), with United States v.
Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 698 (1948) (regulation of labeling of
drugs shipped in interstate commerce), or impinge on a core
aspect of state sovereignty, cf. Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985) (sovereign immunity);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991) (qualifications
of state government officials). The clear-statement rule
based on the presumption against pre-emption does not
6 The other case cited by the Court, FDA v. Brown & Williamson To
bacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 (2000), is even more obviously inapt. There we
relied on the first step of the Chevron analysis to determine that Congress
had spoken to the precise issue in question, impliedly repealing the grant
of jurisdiction on which the Food and Drug Administration relied. 529
U. S., at 160–161. Here, Congress has not expressly or impliedly author
ized the practice of assisted suicide, or indeed “spoken directly” to the
subject in any way beyond the text of the CSA.

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apply because the Directive does not pre-empt any state law,
cf. id., at 456–457; Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U. S. 355, 359 (2002). And finally, no clear statement is
required on the ground that the Directive intrudes upon an
area traditionally reserved exclusively to the States, cf. BFP
v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 544 (1994)
(state regulation of titles to real property), because the Fed
eral Government has pervasively regulated the dispensation
of drugs for over 100 years. See generally Brief for Pro-
Life Legal Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 3–15. It
would be a novel and massive expansion of the clear
statement rule to apply it in a commerce case not involving
pre-emption or constitutional avoidance, merely because
Congress has chosen to prohibit conduct that a State has
made a contrary policy judgment to permit. See Sullivan,
supra, at 693.
III
Even if the Regulation did not exist and “prescription” in
§ 829 could not be interpreted to require a “legitimate medi
cal purpose,” the Directive’s conclusion that “prescribing,
dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances
. . . by a physician . . . may ‘render his registration . . .
inconsistent with the public interest’ and therefore sub
ject to possible suspension or revocation under 21 U. S. C.
[§] 824(a)(4),” 66 Fed. Reg. 56608, would nevertheless be un
assailable in this Court.
Sections 823(f) and 824(a) explicitly grant the Attorney
General the authority to register and deregister physicians,
and his discretion in exercising that authority is spelled out
in very broad terms. He may refuse to register or deregis
ter if he determines that registration is “inconsistent with
the public interest,” 21 U. S. C. § 823(f), after considering five
factors, the fifth of which is “[s]uch other conduct which may
threaten the public health and safety,” § 823(f)(5). See also
In re Arora, 60 Fed. Reg. 4447, 4448 (1995) (“It is well estab
lished that these factors are to be considered in the disjunc

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tive, i. e., the Deputy Administrator may properly rely on
any one or a combination of factors, and give each factor the
weight he deems appropriate”). As the Court points out,
these broad standards were enacted in the 1984 amendments
for the specific purpose of freeing the Attorney General’s dis
cretion over registration from the decisions of state authori
ties. See ante, at 261.
The fact that assisted-suicide prescriptions are issued in
violation of § 829 is of course sufficient to support the Direc
tive’s conclusion that issuing them may be cause for deregis
tration: such prescriptions would violate the fourth factor of
§ 823(f), namely, “[c]ompliance with applicable . . . Federal . . .
laws relating to controlled substances,” 21 U. S. C. § 823(f)(4).
But the Attorney General did not rely solely on subsection
(f)(4) in reaching his conclusion that registration would be
“inconsistent with the public interest”; nothing in the text of
the Directive indicates that. Subsection (f)(5) (“[s]uch other
conduct which may threaten the public health and safety”)
provides an independent, alternative basis for the Directive’s
conclusion regarding deregistration—provided that the At
torney General has authority to interpret “public interest”
and “public health and safety” in § 823(f) to exclude assisted
suicide.
Three considerations make it perfectly clear that the stat
ute confers authority to interpret these phrases upon the
Attorney General. First, the Attorney General is solely and
explicitly charged with administering the registration and
deregistration provisions. See §§ 823(f), 824(a). By mak
ing the criteria for such registration and deregistration such
obviously ambiguous factors as “public interest” and “public
health and safety,” Congress implicitly (but clearly) gave the
Attorney General authority to interpret those criteria—
whether or not there is any explicit delegation provision in
the statute. “Sometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than ex
plicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own

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construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter
pretation made by the administrator of an agency.” Chev
ron, 467 U. S., at 844. The Court’s exclusive focus on the
explicit delegation provisions is, at best, a fossil of our pre-
Chevron era; at least since Chevron, we have not conditioned
our deferral to agency interpretations upon the existence of
explicit delegation provisions. United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U. S. 218, 229 (2001), left this principle of implicit delega
tion intact.
Second, even if explicit delegation were required, Con
gress provided it in § 821, which authorizes the Attorney
General to “promulgate rules and regulations . . . relating to
the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution,
and dispensing of controlled substances . . . .” (Emphasis
added.) Because “dispensing” refers to the delivery of a
controlled substance “pursuant to the lawful order of, a prac
titioner,” 21 U. S. C. § 802(10), the deregistration of such
practitioners for writing impermissible orders “relat[es] to
the registration . . . of the . . . dispensing” of controlled sub
stances, 21 U. S. C. § 821 (2000 ed., Supp. V).
Third, § 821 also gives the Attorney General authority to
promulgate rules and regulations “relating to the . . . control
of the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.” As dis
cussed earlier, it is plain that the ordinary meaning of “con
trol” must apply to § 821, so that the plain import of the pro
vision is to grant the Attorney General rulemaking authority
over all the provisions of part C of the CSA, §§ 821–830 (main
ed. and Supp. 2005). Registering and deregistering the
practitioners who issue the prescriptions necessary for law
ful dispensation of controlled substances plainly “relat[es] to
the . . . control of the . . . dispensing of controlled sub
stances.” § 821 (Supp. 2005).
The Attorney General is thus authorized to promulgate
regulations interpreting §§ 823(f) and 824(a), both by implicit
delegation in § 823(f) and by two grounds of explicit delega
tion in § 821. The Court nevertheless holds that this triply

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unambiguous delegation cannot be given full effect because
“the design of the statute,” ante, at 265, evinces the intent to
grant the Secretary of Health and Human Services exclusive
authority over scientific and medical determinations. This
proposition is not remotely plausible. The Court cites as au
thority for the Secretary’s exclusive authority two specific
areas in which his medical determinations are said to be
binding on the Attorney General—with regard to the “scien
tific and medical evaluation” of a drug’s effects that precedes
its scheduling, § 811(b), and with regard to “the appropriate
methods of professional practice in the medical treatment of
the narcotic addiction of various classes of narcotic addicts,”
42 U. S. C. § 290bb–2a; see also 21 U. S. C. § 823(g) (2000 ed.
and Supp. II). See ante, at 265–266. Far from establishing
a general principle of Secretary supremacy with regard to all
scientific and medical determinations, the fact that Congress
granted the Secretary specifically defined authority in the
areas of scheduling and addiction treatment, without other
wise mentioning him in the registration provisions, sug
gests, to the contrary, that Congress envisioned no role for
the Secretary in that area—where, as we have said, interpre
tive authority was both implicitly and explicitly conferred
upon the Attorney General.
Even if we could rewrite statutes to accord with sensible
“design,” it is far from a certainty that the Secretary, rather
than the Attorney General, ought to control the registration
of physicians. Though registration decisions sometimes re
quire judgments about the legitimacy of medical practices,
the Department of Justice has seemingly had no difficulty
making them. See In re Harline, 65 Fed. Reg. 5665; In re
Tecca, 62 Fed. Reg. 12842; In re Roth, 60 Fed. Reg. 62262.
But unlike decisions about whether a substance should be
scheduled or whether a narcotics addiction treatment is le
gitimate, registration decisions are not exclusively, or even
primarily, concerned with “medical [and] scientific” factors.
See 21 U. S. C. § 823(f). Rather, the decision to register, or

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to bring an action to deregister, an individual physician im
plicates all the policy goals and competing enforcement pri
orities that attend any exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
It is entirely reasonable to think (as Congress evidently did)
that it would be easier for the Attorney General occasionally
to make judgments about the legitimacy of medical practices
than it would be for the Secretary to get into the business
of law enforcement. It is, in other words, perfectly consist
ent with an intelligent “design of the statute” to give the
Nation’s chief law enforcement official, not its chief health
official, broad discretion over the substantive standards that
govern registration and deregistration. That is especially
true where the contested “scientific and medical” judgment
at issue has to do with the legitimacy of physician-assisted
suicide, which ultimately rests, not on “science” or “medi
cine,” but on a naked value judgment. It no more depends
upon a “quintessentially medical judgmen[t],” ante, at 267,
than does the legitimacy of polygamy or eugenic infanticide.
And it requires no particular medical training to undertake
the objective inquiry into how the continuing traditions of
Western medicine have consistently treated this subject.
See OLC Memo, App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a–130a. The Sec
retary’s supposedly superior “medical expertise” to make
“medical judgments,” ante, at 266, is strikingly irrelevant to
the case at hand.
The Court also reasons that, even if the CSA grants the
Attorney General authority to interpret § 823(f), the Direc
tive does not purport to exercise that authority, because
it “does not undertake the five-factor analysis” of § 823(f)
and does not “on its face purport to be an application of
the registration provision in § 823(f).” Ante, at 261 (empha
sis added). This reasoning is sophistic. It would be im
proper—indeed, impossible—for the Attorney General to
“undertake the five-factor analysis” of § 823(f) and to “appl[y]
the registration provision” outside the context of an actual
enforcement proceeding. But of course the Attorney Gen

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eral may issue regulations to clarify his interpretation of the
five factors, and to signal how he will apply them in fu
ture enforcement proceedings. That is what the Directive
plainly purports to do by citing § 824(a)(4), and that is why
the Directive’s conclusion on deregistration is couched in
conditional terms: “Such conduct by a physician . . . may
‘render his registration . . . inconsistent with the public in
terest’ and therefore subject to possible suspension or rev
ocation under 21 U. S. C. [§] 824(a)(4).” 66 Fed. Reg. 56608
(emphasis added).
It follows from what we have said that the Attorney Gen
eral’s authoritative interpretations of “public interest” and
“public health and safety” in § 823(f) are subject to Chevron
deference. As noted earlier, the Court does not contest that
the absence of notice-and-comment procedures for the Direc
tive renders Chevron inapplicable. And there is no serious
argument that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue,” or that the Directive’s interpretations of
“public health and safety” and “inconsistent with the pub
lic interest” are not “permissible.” Chevron, 467 U. S., at
842–843. On the latter point, in fact, the condemnation
of assisted suicide by 50 American jurisdictions supports
the Attorney General’s view. The Attorney General may
therefore weigh a physician’s participation in assisted suicide
as a factor counseling against his registration, or in favor of
deregistration, under § 823(f).
In concluding to the contrary, the Court merely presents
the conclusory assertion that “it is doubtful the Attorney
General could cite the ‘public interest’ or ‘public health’ to
deregister a physician simply because he deemed a contro
versial practice permitted by state law to have an illegiti
mate medical purpose.” Ante, at 264. But why on earth
not?—especially when he has interpreted the relevant statu
tory factors in advance to give fair warning that such a prac
tice is “inconsistent with the public interest.” The Attorney
General’s discretion to determine the public interest in this

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298 GONZALES v. OREGON
Scalia, J., dissenting
area is admittedly broad—but certainly no broader than
other congressionally conferred executive powers that we
have upheld in the past. See, e. g., National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 216–217 (1943) (“public
interest”); New York Central Securities Corp. v. United
States, 287 U. S. 12, 24–25 (1932) (same); see also Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 415–416 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
* * *
In sum, the Directive’s first conclusion—namely, that
physician-assisted suicide is not a “legitimate medical pur
pose”—is supported both by the deference we owe to the
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and by the def
erence we owe to its interpretation of the statute. The
other two conclusions—(2) that prescribing controlled drugs
to assist suicide violates the CSA, and (3) that such conduct
is also “inconsistent with the public interest”—are inevitable
consequences of that first conclusion. Moreover, the third
conclusion, standing alone, is one that the Attorney General
is authorized to make.
The Court’s decision today is perhaps driven by a feeling
that the subject of assisted suicide is none of the Federal
Government’s business. It is easy to sympathize with that
position. The prohibition or deterrence of assisted suicide
is certainly not among the enumerated powers conferred on
the United States by the Constitution, and it is within the
realm of public morality (bonos mores) traditionally ad
dressed by the so-called police power of the States. But
then, neither is prohibiting the recreational use of drugs or
discouraging drug addiction among the enumerated powers.
From an early time in our national history, the Federal Gov
ernment has used its enumerated powers, such as its power
to regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protect
ing public morality—for example, by banning the interstate
shipment of lottery tickets, or the interstate transport of
women for immoral purposes. See Hoke v. United States,

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Thomas, J., dissenting
227 U. S. 308, 321–323 (1913); Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321,
356 (1903). Unless we are to repudiate a long and well
established principle of our jurisprudence, using the federal
commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is unquestion
ably permissible. The question before us is not whether
Congress can do this, or even whether Congress should do
this; but simply whether Congress has done this in the CSA.
I think there is no doubt that it has. If the term “legitimate
medical purpose” has any meaning, it surely excludes the
prescription of drugs to produce death.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the
judgment of the Court.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
When Angel Raich and Diane Monson challenged the ap
plication of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U. S. C.
§ 801 et seq., to their purely intrastate possession of mari
juana for medical use as authorized under California law, a
majority of this Court (a mere seven months ago) determined
that the CSA effectively invalidated California’s law because
“the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifically
designed to regulate which controlled substances can be uti
lized for medicinal purposes, and in what manner.” Gonza
les v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 27 (2005) (emphasis added). The
majority employed unambiguous language, concluding that
the “manner” in which controlled substances can be utilized
“for medicinal purposes” is one of the “core activities regu
lated by the CSA.” Id., at 28. And, it described the CSA
as “creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the
production, distribution, and possession of . . . ‘controlled
substances,’ ” including those substances that “ ‘have a use
ful and legitimate medical purpose,’ ” in order to “foster the
beneficial use of those medications” and “to prevent their
misuse.” Id., at 24.
Today the majority beats a hasty retreat from these con
clusions. Confronted with a regulation that broadly re

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300 GONZALES v. OREGON
Thomas, J., dissenting
quires all prescriptions to be issued for a “legitimate medical
purpose,” 21 CFR § 1306.04(a) (2005), a regulation recognized
in Raich as part of the Federal Government’s “closed . . .
system” for regulating the “manner” in “which controlled
substances can be utilized for medicinal purposes,” 545 U. S.,
at 13, 27, the majority rejects the Attorney General’s admit
tedly “at least reasonable,” ante, at 272, determination that
administering controlled substances to facilitate a patient’s
death is not a “ ‘legitimate medical purpose.’ ” The majority
does so based on its conclusion that the CSA is only con
cerned with the regulation of “medical practice insofar as it
bars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers as
a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as
conventionally understood.” Ante, at 270. In other words,
in stark contrast to Raich’s broad conclusions about the
scope of the CSA as it pertains to the medicinal use of con
trolled substances, today this Court concludes that the CSA
is merely concerned with fighting “ ‘drug abuse’ ” and only
insofar as that abuse leads to “addiction or abnormal effects
on the nervous system.” 1 Ante, at 273.
The majority’s newfound understanding of the CSA as a
statute of limited reach is all the more puzzling because
it rests upon constitutional principles that the majority of
the Court rejected in Raich. Notwithstanding the States’
“ ‘traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens,’ ” 545
U. S., at 30, n. 38, the Raich majority concluded that the CSA
applied to the intrastate possession of marijuana for medici
nal purposes authorized by California law because “Congress
could have rationally” concluded that such an application was
necessary to the regulation of the “larger interstate mari
juana market.” Id., at 30, 32. Here, by contrast, the major
1 The majority does not expressly address whether the ingestion of a
quantity of drugs that is sufficient to cause death has an “abnormal effec[t]
on the nervous system,” ante, at 273, though it implicitly rejects such
a conclusion.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
ity’s restrictive interpretation of the CSA is based in no
small part on “the structure and limitations of federalism,
which allow the States ‘ “great latitude under their police
powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.” ’ ” Ante, at 270
(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 475 (1996), in
turn quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U. S. 724, 756 (1985)). According to the majority, these
“background principles of our federal system . . . belie the
notion that Congress would use . . . an obscure grant of au
thority to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the
States’ police power.” Ante, at 274.
Of course there is nothing “obscure” about the CSA’s grant
of authority to the Attorney General. Ante, p. 275 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). And, the Attorney General’s conclusion that
the CSA prohibits the States from authorizing physician as
sisted suicide is admittedly “at least reasonable,” ante, at 272
(opinion of the Court), and is therefore entitled to deference.
Ante, at 284–285 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While the scope
of the CSA and the Attorney General’s power thereunder
are sweeping, and perhaps troubling, such expansive federal
legislation and broad grants of authority to administrative
agencies are merely the inevitable and inexorable conse
quence of this Court’s Commerce Clause and separation-of
powers jurisprudence. See, e. g., Raich, supra; Whitman v.
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457 (2001).
I agree with limiting the applications of the CSA in a man
ner consistent with the principles of federalism and our
constitutional structure. Raich, supra, at 74 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); cf. Whitman, supra, at 486–487 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting constitutional concerns with broad dele
gations of authority to administrative agencies). But that is
now water over the dam. The relevance of such considera
tions was at its zenith in Raich, when we considered whether
the CSA could be applied to the intrastate possession of a
controlled substance consistent with the limited federal pow

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302 GONZALES v. OREGON
Thomas, J., dissenting
ers enumerated by the Constitution. Such considerations
have little, if any, relevance where, as here, we are merely
presented with a question of statutory interpretation, and
not the extent of constitutionally permissible federal power.
This is particularly true where, as here, we are interpreting
broad, straightforward language within a statutory frame
work that a majority of this Court has concluded is so
comprehensive that it necessarily nullifies the States’
“ ‘traditional . . . powers . . . to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens.’ ” 2 Raich, supra, at 30, n. 38. The
Court’s reliance upon the constitutional principles that it re
jected in Raich—albeit under the guise of statutory in
terpretation—is perplexing to say the least. Accordingly,
I respectfully dissent.
2 Notably, respondents have not seriously pressed a constitutional claim
here, conceding at oral argument that their “point is not necessarily that
[the CSA] would be unconstitutional.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. In any event,
to the extent respondents do present a constitutional claim, they do so
solely within the framework of Raich. Framed in this manner, the claim
must fail. The respondents in Raich were “local growers and users of
state-authorized, medical marijuana,” who stood “outside the interstate
drug market” and possessed “ ‘medicinal marijuana . . . not intended for . . .
the stream of commerce.’ ” 545 U. S., at 62, 72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Here, by contrast, the respondent-physicians are active participants in the
interstate controlled substances market, and the drugs they prescribe for
assisting suicide have likely traveled in interstate commerce. If the re
spondents in Raich could not sustain a constitutional claim, then a fortiori
respondents here cannot sustain one. Respondents’ acceptance of Raich
forecloses their constitutional challenge.

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303 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
WACHOVIA BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v.
SCHMIDT et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 04–1186. Argued November 28, 2005—Decided January 17, 2006
Petitioner Wachovia Bank, National Association (Wachovia), is a national
banking association with its designated main office in North Carolina
and branch offices in many States, including South Carolina. Plaintiff
respondent Schmidt and other South Carolina citizens sued Wachovia in
a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing them to partici
pate in an illegitimate tax shelter. Shortly thereafter, Wachovia filed
a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of
the dispute. As the sole basis for federal-court jurisdiction, Wachovia
alleged the parties’ diverse citizenship. See 28 U. S. C. § 1332. The
District Court denied Wachovia’s petition on the merits. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the District Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the action, vacated the judgment, and instructed the
District Court to dismiss the case. The appeals court observed that
Wachovia’s citizenship for diversity purposes is controlled by § 1348,
which provides that “national banking associations” are “deemed citi
zens of the States in which they are respectively located.” As the court
read § 1348, Wachovia is “located” in, and is therefore a “citizen” of,
every State in which it maintains a branch office. Thus, Wachovia’s
South Carolina branch operations rendered it a citizen of that State.
Given the South Carolina citizenship of the opposing parties, the court
concluded that the matter could not be adjudicated in federal court.
Held: A national bank, for § 1348 purposes, is a citizen of the State in
which its main office, as set forth in its articles of association, is lo
cated. Pp. 309–319.
(a) When Congress first authorized national banks, it allowed them
to sue and be sued in federal court in any and all civil proceedings.
State banks, however, could initiate actions in federal court only on the
basis of diversity of citizenship or the existence of a federal question.
Congress ended national banks’ automatic qualification for federal juris
diction in 1882, placing them “on the same footing as the banks of the
state where they were located,” Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v.
Cooper, 120 U. S. 778, 780. In an 1887 enactment, Congress first used
the “located” language today contained in § 1348. Like its 1882 prede
cessor, the 1887 Act “sought to limit . . . the access of national banks to,

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304 WACHOVIA BANK, N. A. v. SCHMIDT
Syllabus
and their suability in, the federal courts to the same extent [as] non
national banks.” Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371
U. S. 555, 565–566. In the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress combined
two formerly discrete provisions on proceedings involving national
banks, but retained without alteration the “located” clause. Finally, as
part of the 1948 Judicial Code revision, Congress enacted § 1348 in its
current form. Pp. 309–312.
(b) The Fourth Circuit advanced three principal reasons for deciding
that Wachovia is “located” in, and therefore a “citizen” of, every State
in which it maintains a branch office. First, consulting dictionaries, the
court observed that the term “located” refers to “physical presence in a
place.” Next, the court noted that § 1348 uses two distinct terms to
refer to the presence of a banking association: “established” and “lo
cated.” The court concluded that, to give independent meaning to each
word, “established” should be read to refer to the bank’s charter location
and “located,” to the place where the bank has a physical presence.
Finally, the court relied on Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas,
434 U. S. 35, in which this Court interpreted the term “located” in the
former venue statute for national banks, see 12 U. S. C. § 94 (1976 ed.),
as encompassing any county in which a bank maintains a branch office.
Viewing the jurisdiction and venue statutes as pertaining to the same
subject matter, the court concluded that, under the in pari materia
canon, the two statutes should be interpreted consistently. Pp. 312–313.
(c) None of the Fourth Circuit’s rationales persuade this Court to read
§ 1348 to attribute to a national bank, for diversity-jurisdiction purposes,
the citizenship of each State in which the bank has established branch
operations. First, the term “located,” as it appears in the National
Bank Act, has no fixed, plain meaning. In some provisions, the word
unquestionably refers to the site of the banking association’s designated
main office, but in others, “located” apparently refers to or includes
branch offices. Recognizing the controlling significance of context, this
Court stated in Bougas: “There is no enduring rigidity about the word
‘located.’ ” 434 U. S., at 44. Second, Congress may well have compre
hended the words “located” and “established,” as used in § 1348, as syn
onymous terms. When Congress enacted § 1348’s statutory predeces
sors and § 1348 itself, a national bank was almost always “located” only
in the State in which it was “established,” under any of the proffered
definitions of the two words. For with rare exceptions a national bank
could not operate a branch outside its home State until 1994, when Con
gress broadly authorized national banks to establish branches across
state lines. Congress’ use of the two terms may be best explained as
a coincidence of statutory codification. Deriving from separate provi
sions enacted in different years, the word “established” appearing in
the first paragraph of § 1348 and the word “located” appearing in the

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305 Cite as: 546 U. S. 303 (2006)
Syllabus
second paragraph were placed in the same section in the 1911 revision.
The codifying Act stated that provisions substantially the same as exist
ing statutes should not be treated as new enactments. Thus, it is un
surprising that, in 1947, this Court, referring to a national bank’s citi
zenship under the 1911 Act, used the terms “established” and “located”
as alternatives. See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461, 467. Finally,
Bougas does not control § 1348’s meaning. Although it is true that,
under the in pari materia canon, statutes addressing the same subject
matter generally should be read “ ‘as if they were one law,’ ” Erlenbaugh
v. United States, 409 U. S. 239, 243, venue and subject-matter jurisdic
tion are not concepts of the same order. Venue, largely a matter of
litigational convenience, is waived if not timely raised. Subject-matter
jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court’s competence to adjudi
cate a particular category of cases; a matter far weightier than venue,
subject-matter jurisdiction must be considered by the court on its own
motion, even if no party raises an objection. Cognizant that venue “is
primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum,” Leroy v. Great
Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 180, the Court in Bougas stressed
that its “interpretation of [the former] § 94 [would] not inconvenience
the bank or unfairly burden it with distant litigation,” 434 U. S., at 44,
n. 10. Subject-matter jurisdiction, however, does not entail an assess
ment of convenience. It poses the question “whether” the Legislature
empowered the court to hear cases of a certain genre. Thus, the consid
erations that account for the Bougas decision are inapplicable to § 1348,
a prescription governing subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court of
Appeals erred in interpreting § 1348 in pari materia with the former
§ 94. Significantly, Bougas’ reading of former § 94 effectively aligned
the treatment of national banks for venue purposes with the treatment
of state banks and corporations. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit’s deci
sion in this case severely constricts national banks’ access to diversity
jurisdiction as compared to the access generally available to corpora
tions, for corporations ordinarily rank as citizens only of States in which
they are incorporated or maintain their principal place of business, and
are not deemed citizens of every State in which they maintain a business
establishment. Pp. 313–318.
388 F. 3d 414, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except Thomas, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
Andrew L. Frey argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Charles A. Rothfeld, Evan M. Tager,
and Robert W. Fuller III.

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306 WACHOVIA BANK, N. A. v. SCHMIDT
Opinion of the Court
Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney Gen
eral Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Michael S.
Raab, Julie L. Williams, Daniel P. Stipano, and Douglas
B. Jordan.
James R. Gilreath argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief was John P. Freeman.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the citizenship, for purposes of federal
court diversity jurisdiction, of national banks, i. e., corporate
entities chartered not by any State, but by the Comptroller
of the Currency of the U. S. Treasury. Congress empowered
federal district courts to adjudicate civil actions between
“citizens of different States” where the amount in contro
versy exceeds $75,000. 28 U. S. C. § 1332(a)(1). A business
organized as a corporation, for diversity jurisdiction pur
poses, is “deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated” and, since 1958, also “of the State where
it has its principal place of business.” § 1332(c)(1). State
banks, usually chartered as corporate bodies by a particular
State, ordinarily fit comfortably within this prescription.
Federally chartered national banks do not, for they are not
incorporated by “any State.” For diversity jurisdiction pur
poses, therefore, Congress has discretely provided that na
tional banks “shall . . . be deemed citizens of the States in
which they are respectively located.” § 1348.
The question presented turns on the meaning, in § 1348’s
context, of the word “located.” Does it signal, as the peti
tioning national bank and the United States, as amicus cu
riae, urge, that the bank’s citizenship is determined by the
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Bankers Association by Gregory F. Taylor; for the Clearing House Associ
ation L. L. C. by David B. Tulchin and Michael M. Wiseman; and for
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A., by Carter G. Phillips, Eric A. Shumsky,
and Bradley J. Johnson.

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307 Cite as: 546 U. S. 303 (2006)
Opinion of the Court
place designated in the bank’s articles of association as the
location of its main office? Or does it mean, in addition, as
respondents urge and the Court of Appeals held, that a na
tional bank is a citizen of every State in which it maintains
a branch?
Recognizing that “located” is not a word of “enduring ri
gidity,” Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S.
35, 44 (1977), but one that gains its precise meaning from
context, we hold that a national bank, for § 1348 purposes, is
a citizen of the State in which its main office, as set forth in
its articles of association, is located. Were we to hold, as
the Court of Appeals did, that a national bank is additionally
a citizen of every State in which it has established a branch,
the access of a federally chartered bank to a federal forum
would be drastically curtailed in comparison to the access
afforded state banks and other state-incorporated entities.
Congress, we are satisfied, created no such anomaly.
I
Petitioner Wachovia Bank, National Association (Wacho
via), is a national banking association with its designated
main office in Charlotte, North Carolina.1 Wachovia oper
ates branch offices in many States, including South Carolina.2
1 A national bank, on formation, must designate, in its organization
certificate and articles of association, the “place where its operations of
discount and deposit are to be carried on.” 12 U. S. C. § 22 (Second);
see § 21; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Instructions—
Articles of Association, Specific Requirements ¶ 12, available at http://
www.occ.treas.gov/corpbook/forms/articles-conv.doc. (All Internet mate
rials as visited Jan. 13, 2006, and included in Clerk of Court’s case file.)
The place so designated serves as the bank’s “main office.” Changes in
the location of that office are effected by amendment to the bank’s articles
of association. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 21a, 30(b); 12 CFR § 5.40(d)(2)(ii) (2005).
The State in which the main office is located qualifies as the bank’s “home
State” under the banking laws. 12 U. S. C. § 36(g)(3)(B).
2 National banks originally lacked authority to operate branch offices.
Act of Feb. 25, 1863, § 11, 12 Stat. 668. In 1865, Congress enacted an ex
ception permitting a state bank that converted to a national bank to retain
its pre-existing branches. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, § 7, 13 Stat. 484. Congress

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308 WACHOVIA BANK, N. A. v. SCHMIDT
Opinion of the Court
The litigation before us commenced when plaintiff
respondent Daniel G. Schmidt III and others, citizens of
South Carolina, sued Wachovia in a South Carolina state
court for fraudulently inducing them to participate in an ille
gitimate tax shelter. Shortly thereafter, Wachovia filed a
petition in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, seeking to compel arbitration of the dis
pute. As the sole basis for federal-court jurisdiction, Wa
chovia alleged the parties’ diverse citizenship. See 28
U. S. C. § 1332. The District Court denied Wachovia’s peti
tion on the merits; neither the parties nor the court ques
tioned the existence of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, a divided Fourth Circuit panel determined that
the District Court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the ac
tion; it therefore vacated the judgment and instructed the
District Court to dismiss the case.
The Court of Appeals’ majority observed that Wachovia’s
citizenship for diversity purposes is controlled by § 1348,
which provides that “national banking associations” are
“deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively
located.” As the panel majority read § 1348, Wachovia is
“located” in, and is therefore a “citizen” of, every State in
which it maintains a branch office. Thus Wachovia’s branch
operations in South Carolina, in the majority’s view, ren
dered the bank a citizen of South Carolina. Given the South
authorized limited branch operations in the bank’s home State in 1927 and
1933. McFadden Act (Branch Banks), 1927, § 7(c), 44 Stat. 1228; Glass-
Steagall Act, 1933, § 23, 48 Stat. 189–190. These Acts, like the 1865 enact
ment, allowed interstate branching only under narrow “grandfather” pro
visions. McFadden Act, § 7(a)–(b), 44 Stat. 1228; see Girard Bank v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System, 748 F. 2d 838, 840 (CA3 1984)
(observing that only two national banks had “grandfathered” interstate
branches). Not until 1994 did Congress grant national banks broad au
thority to establish branch offices across state lines. See Riegle-Neal In
terstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, § 101, 108 Stat.
2339. See generally J. Macey, G. Miller, & R. Carnell, Banking Law and
Regulation 18–19, 23, 32–33 (3d ed. 2001).

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Opinion of the Court
Carolina citizenship of the opposing parties, the majority
concluded that the matter could not be adjudicated in federal
court. 388 F. 3d 414, 432 (CA4 2004).
Circuit Judge King dissented. He read § 1348 and its stat
utory precursors to provide national banks with “the same
access to federal courts as that accorded other banks and
corporations.” Id., at 434. On his reading, Wachovia is a
citizen only of North Carolina, the State in which its main
office is located, not of every State in which it maintains a
branch office; accordingly, he concluded, Wachovia’s petition
qualified for federal-court adjudication.3
We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among
Courts of Appeals on the meaning of § 1348. 545 U. S. 1113
(2005). Compare Horton v. Bank One, N. A., 387 F. 3d 426,
429, 431 (CA5 2004) (for § 1348 purposes, “a national bank is
not ‘located’ in, and thus [is] not a citizen of, every state in
which it has a branch”; rather, the provision retains “juris
dictional parity for national banks vis-a` -vis state banks and
corporations”), and Firstar Bank, N. A. v. Faul, 253 F. 3d
982, 993–994 (CA7 2001) (same), with 388 F. 3d, at 432 (§ 1348
renders national bank a citizen, not only of the State in which
its main office is located, but also of every State in which it
has branch operations), and World Trade Center Properties,
LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F. 3d 154, 161 (CA2 2003)
(dictum) (same).
II
When Congress first authorized national banks in 1863, it
specified that any “suits, actions, and proceedings by and
against [them could] be had” in federal court. See Act of
Feb. 25, 1863, § 59, 12 Stat. 681. National banks thus could
“sue and be sued in the federal district and circuit courts
3 Wachovia unsuccessfully moved for rehearing en banc. Six judges
voted to grant the rehearing petition, three voted to deny it, and four
recused themselves. Thus the petition failed to garner the required ma
jority of the Circuit’s 13 active judges. No. 03–2061 (CA4, Jan. 28, 2005),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a–58a.

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310 WACHOVIA BANK, N. A. v. SCHMIDT
Opinion of the Court
solely because they were national banks, without regard to
diversity, amount in controversy or the existence of a federal
question in the usual sense.” Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dal
las v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 565–566 (1963). State banks,
however, like other state-incorporated entities, could initiate
actions in federal court only on the basis of diversity of citi
zenship or the existence of a federal question. See Petri v.
Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago, 142 U. S. 644, 648–649
(1892).
Congress ended national banks’ automatic qualification for
federal jurisdiction in 1882. An enactment that year pro
vided in relevant part:
“[T]he jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or
against any association established under any law pro
viding for national-banking associations . . . shall be the
same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by
or against banks not organized under any law of the
United States which do or might do banking business
where such national-banking associations may be doing
business when such suits may be begun[.]” Act of July
12, 1882, § 4, 22 Stat. 163.
Under this measure, national banks could no longer invoke
federal-court jurisdiction solely “on the ground of their Fed
eral origin,” Petri, 142 U. S., at 649; instead, for federal juris
dictional purposes, Congress placed national banks “on the
same footing as the banks of the state where they were lo
cated,” Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S.
778, 780 (1887).
In 1887 revisions to prescriptions on federal jurisdiction,
Congress replaced the 1882 provision on jurisdiction over na
tional banks and first used the “located” language today con
tained in § 1348. The 1887 provision stated in relevant part:
“[A]ll national banking associations established under
the laws of the United States shall, for the purposes of
all actions by or against them, real, personal or mixed,
and all suits in equity, be deemed citizens of the States

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in which they are respectively located; and in such cases
the circuit and district courts shall not have jurisdiction
other than such as they would have in cases between
individual citizens of the same State.” Act of Mar. 3,
1887, § 4, 24 Stat. 554–555 (emphasis added).4
Like its 1882 predecessor, the 1887 Act “sought to limit . . .
the access of national banks to, and their suability in, the
federal courts to the same extent to which non-national
banks [were] so limited.” Langdeau, 371 U. S., at 565–566.
In the Judicial Code of 1911,5 Congress combined two for
merly discrete provisions on proceedings involving national
banks, but retained without alteration the clause deeming
national banks to be “citizens of the States in which they are
respectively located.” Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 24 (Sixteenth),
36 Stat. 1091–1093.6 Finally, as part of the 1948 Judicial
4 The term “established under” did appear in the 1882 and 1887 formula
tions, in both texts as synonymous with the term “organized under.” In
neither measure is the word used in a locational sense.
5 Earlier, in 1888, Congress had revised the 1887 prescription by adding
as a separate paragraph this caveat: “The provisions of this section shall
not be held to affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in
cases commenced by the United States or by direction of any officer
thereof, or cases for winding up the affairs of any such bank.” Act of
Aug. 13, 1888, § 4, 25 Stat. 436.
6 In full, the 1911 text stated:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . [o]f all cases
commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof,
against any national banking association, and cases for winding up the
affairs of any such bank; and of all suits brought by any banking asso
ciation established in the district for which the court is held, under the
provisions of title ‘National Banks,’ Revised Statutes, to enjoin the Comp
troller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as pro
vided by said title. And all national banking associations established
under the laws of the United States shall, for the purposes of all other
actions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, and all suits in equity,
be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”
36 Stat. 1091–1093.
The first sentence of this formulation merged the 1888 caveat with text,
including the word “established,” originally contained in the Act of Dec. 1,

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Code revision, Congress enacted § 1348 in its current form.
Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 933. The provision now reads:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced by the United States, or by
direction of any officer thereof, against any national
banking association, any civil action to wind up the af
fairs of any such association, and any action by a banking
association established in the district for which the court
is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comp
troller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his
direction, as provided by such chapter.
“All national banking associations shall, for the pur
poses of all other actions by or against them, be deemed
citizens of the States in which they are respectively lo
cated.” 28 U. S. C. § 1348.
III
The Fourth Circuit panel majority advanced three princi
pal reasons for deciding that Wachovia is “located” in, and
therefore a “citizen” of, every State in which it maintains
a branch office. First, consulting dictionaries, the Court of
Appeals observed that “[i]n ordinary parlance” the term “lo
cated” refers to “physical presence in a place.” 388 F. 3d, at
416–417 (internal quotation marks omitted). Banks have a
physical presence, the Fourth Circuit stated, wherever they
operate branches. Id., at 417. Next, the court noted, “Sec
tion 1348 uses two distinct terms to refer to the presence of
a banking association: ‘established’ and ‘located.’ ” Id., at
419. “To give independent meaning” to each word, the
court said, “it is most reasonable to understand the place
where a national bank is ‘established’ to refer to a bank’s
charter location, and to understand the place where it is ‘lo
cated’ to refer to the place or places where it has a physical
1873, § 629 (Tenth to Eleventh), 18 Stat. 111. The second sentence, includ
ing the word “located,” derives from the 1887 formulation.

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presence.” Ibid. Finally, the Court of Appeals stressed
that in Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S.
35 (1977), this Court interpreted the term “located” in the
former venue statute for national banks, see 12 U. S. C. § 94
(1976 ed.), as encompassing any county in which a bank main
tains a branch office. 388 F. 3d, at 419–420. Reasoning that
“the jurisdiction and venue statutes pertain to the same sub
ject matter, namely the amenability of national banking asso
ciations to suit in federal court,” the panel majority con
cluded that, “under the in pari materia canon[,] the two
statutes should be interpreted” consistently. Id., at 422.
IV
None of the Court of Appeals’ rationales persuade us to
read § 1348 to attribute to a national bank, for diversity juris
diction purposes, the citizenship of each State in which the
bank has established branch operations. First, the term “lo
cated,” as it appears in the National Bank Act, has no fixed,
plain meaning. In some provisions, the word unquestion
ably refers to a single place: the site of the banking associa
tion’s designated main office. See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. § 52 (na
tional bank’s capital stock certificates must state “the name
and location of the association”); § 55 (requiring notice of sale
of capital stock “in a newspaper of the city or town in which
the bank is located”); § 75 (bank’s regular annual sharehold
ers’ meeting shall be rescheduled when it “falls on a legal
holiday in the State in which the bank is located”); § 182 (re
quiring publication of a notice of dissolution “in the city or
town in which the association is located”). In other provi
sions, “located” apparently refers to or includes branch of
fices. See, e. g., § 36( j) (defining “branch” to include “any
branch place of business located in any State”); § 85 (limiting
interest rate charged by national bank to “rate allowed by
the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank
is located”) (construed in OCC Interpretive Letter No. 822
(Feb. 17, 1998), [1997–1998 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Bank

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ing L. Rep. ¶ 81–265, pp. 90, 256–90, 257); 12 U. S. C. § 92
(permitting national bank to act as insurance agent in certain
circumstances when bank is “located and doing business in
any place the population of which does not exceed five thou
sand inhabitants”) (construed in 12 CFR § 7.1001 (2005)).7
Recognizing the controlling significance of context, we stated
in Bougas, regarding a venue provision for national banks:
“There is no enduring rigidity about the word ‘located.’ ”
434 U. S., at 44.
Second, Congress may well have comprehended the words
“located” and “established,” as used in § 1348, not as con
trasting, but as synonymous or alternative terms. When
Congress enacted § 1348’s statutory predecessors and then
§ 1348 itself, a national bank was almost always “located”
only in the State in which it was “established,” under any
of the proffered definitions of the two words, for, with rare
exceptions, a national bank could not operate a branch out
side its home State. Not until 1994 did Congress provide
broad authorization for national banks to establish branches
across state lines. See supra, at 307–308, n. 2. Congress’
use of the two terms may be best explained as a coincidence
of statutory codification. Deriving from separate provisions
enacted in different years, the word “established” appearing
in the first paragraph of § 1348 and the word “located” ap
pearing in the second paragraph were placed in the same
section in the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code. See supra,
at 311–312, n. 6. The codifying Act explicitly stated that “so
far as [its provisions were] substantially the same as exist
7 The Court of Appeals did not overlook these nonuniform uses of the
word “located” in various provisions of the National Bank Act. See 388
F. 3d 414, 425 (CA4 2004). Nevertheless, it declared that, in § 1348, “lo
cated” unambiguously means “physically present.” Ibid. (internal quota
tion marks omitted). The court did not say what facilities other than
branch offices, for example, storage sites or even automated teller ma
chines, would suffice to establish a bank’s physical presence. Cf. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 36–37 (counsel for respondents stated that an ATM, although an
arguable question, probably would suffice to locate a bank in a State for
§ 1348 purposes).

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ing statutes,” they should “be construed as continuations
thereof, and not as new enactments.” Act of Mar. 3, 1911,
§ 294, 36 Stat. 1167; see Federal Intermediate Credit Bank
of Columbia v. Mitchell, 277 U. S. 213, 216 (1928) (1911 Act
“was in substance a reenactment of the earlier provisions in
respect of . . . jurisdiction”). In this light, it is unsurpris
ing that, in 1947, this Court, referring to a national bank’s
citizenship under the 1911 Act, used the terms “located”
and “established” as alternatives. See Cope v. Anderson,
331 U. S. 461, 467 (“For jurisdictional purposes, a national
bank is a ‘citizen’ of the state in which it is established
or located[.]”).8
Finally, Bougas does not control the meaning of § 1348.
In that case, we construed a now-repealed venue provision,
which stated that actions against national banking associa
tions could be filed “in any State, county, or municipal court
in the county or city in which said association [was] located.”
434 U. S., at 35–36 (quoting 12 U. S. C. § 94 (1976 ed.)). We
held that, for purposes of this provision, a national bank was
located, and venue was therefore proper, in any county or
city where the bank maintained a branch office. 434 U. S., at
44–45. True, under the in pari materia canon of statutory
8 Context also matters in assigning meaning to the word “established.”
See, e. g., Convention Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 107–19, Art. 5, pp. 8–9 (2002) (“For the purposes of this
Convention, the term ‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed place of
business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly
carried on . . . .”). Given the character of the proceedings covered by the
first paragraph of § 1348, see supra, at 312, one might read “established”
as referring to the bank’s main office as set forth in its articles of associa
tion. Other readings mentioned in Court of Appeals opinions are the
bank’s principal place of business and the place listed in the bank’s organi
zation certificate. See Horton v. Bank One, N. A., 387 F. 3d 426, 434 (CA5
2004); Firstar Bank, N. A. v. Faul, 253 F. 3d 982, 992 (CA7 2001). Because
this issue is not presented by the parties or necessary to today’s decision,
we express no opinion on it. Cf. ibid.

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construction, statutes addressing the same subject matter
generally should be read “ ‘as if they were one law.’ ” Er
lenbaugh v. United States, 409 U. S. 239, 243 (1972) (quoting
United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564 (1845)). But
venue and subject-matter jurisdiction are not concepts of the
same order. Venue is largely a matter of litigational con
venience; accordingly, it is waived if not timely raised. See,
e. g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 638, n. 25 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissent
ing in part); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(1). Subject-matter
jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court’s compe
tence to adjudicate a particular category of cases; a matter
far weightier than venue, subject-matter jurisdiction must
be considered by the court on its own motion, even if
no party raises an objection. See, e. g., Mansfield, C. &
L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884); Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3).
Cognizant that venue “is primarily a matter of choosing a
convenient forum,” Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443
U. S. 173, 180 (1979), the Court in Bougas stressed that its
“interpretation of [the former] § 94 [would] not inconvenience
the bank or unfairly burden it with distant litigation,” 434
U. S., at 44, n. 10. Subject-matter jurisdiction, however,
does not entail an assessment of convenience. It poses a
“whether,” not a “where” question: Has the Legislature em
powered the court to hear cases of a certain genre? See
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165,
168 (1939) (“This basic difference between the court’s power
and the litigant’s convenience is historic in the federal
courts.”). Thus, the considerations that account for our de
cision in Bougas are inapplicable to § 1348, a prescription
governing subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Ap
peals erred in interpreting § 1348 in pari materia with the
former § 94.
Significantly, this Court’s reading of the venue provision
in Bougas effectively aligned the treatment of national banks

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for venue purposes with the treatment of state banks and
corporations. For venue in suits against state banks and
other state-created corporations typically lies wherever
those entities have business establishments. See 19 C. J. S.,
Corporations § 717(d), p. 374, n. 30 (1990) (under typical state
venue statutes, “[v]enue in action against domestic corpo
ration can be laid in any county where corporation maintains
branch office”). By contrast, the Court of Appeals’ decision
in the instant case severely constricts national banks’ access
to diversity jurisdiction as compared to the access available
to corporations generally. For purposes of diversity, a cor
poration surely is not deemed a citizen of every State in
which it maintains a business establishment. See Penn
sylvania R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 118 U. S.
290, 295–296 (1886). Rather, under 28 U. S. C. § 1332(c)(1),
a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen” only of “any State
by which it has been incorporated” and “of the State where
it has its principal place of business.” Accordingly, while
corporations ordinarily rank as citizens of at most 2 States,
Wachovia, under the Court of Appeals’ novel citizenship
rule, would be a citizen of 16 States. See FDIC Institution
Directory, available at http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp.9
Bougas does not call for this anomalous result.
9 To achieve complete parity with state banks and other state
incorporated entities, a national banking association would have to be
deemed a citizen of both the State of its main office and the State of its
principal place of business. See Horton, 387 F. 3d, at 431, and n. 26;
Firstar Bank, N. A., 253 F. 3d, at 993–994. Congress has prescribed that
a corporation “shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.” 28 U. S. C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). The counterpart
provision for national banking associations, § 1348, however, does not refer
to “principal place of business”; it simply deems such associations “citizens
of the States in which they are respectively located.” The absence of a
“principal place of business” reference in § 1348 may be of scant practical
significance for, in almost every case, as in this one, the location of a na
tional bank’s main office and of its principal place of business coincide.

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V
To summarize, “located,” as its appearances in the banking
laws reveal, see supra, at 313–314, is a chameleon word; its
meaning depends on the context in and purpose for which it
is used.
In the context of venue, “located” may refer to multiple
places, for a venue prescription, e. g., the current and former
12 U. S. C. § 94, presupposes subject-matter jurisdiction and
simply delineates where within a given judicial system a case
may be maintained. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1391(c) (for venue
purposes, “a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction
at the time the action is commenced”).
In contrast, in § 1348, “located” appears in a prescription
governing not venue but federal-court subject-matter ju
risdiction. Concerning access to the federal court system,
§ 1348 deems national banks “citizens of the States in which
they are respectively located.” There is no reason to sup
pose Congress used those words to effect a radical departure
from the norm. An individual who resides in more than one
State is regarded, for purposes of federal subject-matter (di
versity) jurisdiction, as a citizen of but one State. See
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 828
(1989) (an individual is deemed a citizen of the State of her
domicil); Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 625 (1914)
(domicil is the “technically preeminent headquarters” of a
person; “[i]n its nature it is one”). Similarly, a corporation’s
citizenship derives, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, from
its State of incorporation and principal place of business.
§ 1332(c)(1). It is not deemed a citizen of every State in
which it conducts business or is otherwise amenable to per
sonal jurisdiction. Reading § 1348 in this context, one would
sensibly “locate” a national bank for the very same purpose,
i. e., qualification for diversity jurisdiction, in the State des
ignated in its articles of association as its main office.

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Treating venue and subject-matter jurisdiction prescrip
tions as in pari materia, 388 F. 3d, at 422–423, the Court
of Appeals majority overlooked the discrete offices of those
concepts. See supra, at 315–316; cf. Cook, “Substance” and
“Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L. J. 333, 337
(1933) (“The tendency to assume that a word which appears
in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more
than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same
scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It
has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be
guarded against.”). The resulting Fourth Circuit decision
rendered national banks singularly disfavored corporate bod
ies with regard to their access to federal courts. The lan
guage of § 1348 does not mandate that incongruous outcome,
nor does this Court’s precedent.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of this case.