ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP., dba THE MOONLIGHT CAFE

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500 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP., dba THE MOONLIGHT
CAFE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 04–944. Argued January 11, 2006—Decided February 22, 2006
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for “an
employer . . . to discriminate against any [employee] with respect to . . .
sex,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), and defines “employer” as “a person . . .
who has fifteen or more employees,” § 2000e(b). The Act’s jurisdic
tional provision empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil actions
“brought under” Title VII. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Title VII actions also fit
within the Judicial Code’s grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to federal
courts over actions “arising under” federal law. 28 U. S. C. § 1331. At
the time Title VII was enacted, § 1331 contained a $10,000 amount
in-controversy threshold, which left Title VII claims below that
amount uncovered. Section 2000e–5(f)(3) assured that the amount
in-controversy limitation would not impede a Title VII complainant’s
access to a federal forum. Since 1980, when Congress amended § 1331
to eliminate the amount-in-controversy threshold, § 2000e–5(f)(3) has
served simply to underscore Congress’ intention to provide a federal
forum for Title VII claims. Because Congress has also authorized fed
eral courts to exercise “supplemental” jurisdiction over state-law claims
linked to a federal claim, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, Title VII plaintiffs may pur
sue complete relief in federal court.
The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised at any stage in the
litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment, Rule 12(h)(3).
See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455. By contrast, the objection
that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted,” Rule 12(b)(6), endures only up to, not beyond, trial on the
merits, Rule 12(h)(2).
Petitioner Arbaugh sued her former employer, respondent Y & H
Corporation (Y&H), in Federal District Court, charging sexual harass
ment in violation of Title VII and asserting related state-law claims.
The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for Arbaugh.
After the court entered judgment on that verdict, Y&H moved to dis
miss the entire action for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
asserting, for the first time, that it had fewer than 15 employees on its
payroll and therefore was not amenable to suit under Title VII. Al

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though recognizing the unfairness and waste of judicial resources that
granting the motion would entail, the District Court, citing Federal
Rule 12(h)(3), considered itself obliged to do so because it believed the
15-or-more-employees requirement to be jurisdictional. It therefore
vacated its prior judgment and dismissed Arbaugh’s Title VII claim
with prejudice and her state-law claims without prejudice. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed based on its precedent holding that unless the
employee-numerosity requirement is met, federal-court subject-matter
jurisdiction does not exist.
Held: Title VII’s numerical threshold does not circumscribe federal-court
subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the employee-numerosity require
ment relates to the substantive adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title VII claim,
and therefore could not be raised defensively late in the lawsuit, i. e.,
after Y&H had failed to assert the objection prior to the close of trial on
the merits. The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter
jurisdiction are contained in 28 U. S. C. § 1331, which provides for
“[f]ederal-question” jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for “[d]iver
sity of citizenship” jurisdiction. A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 ju
risdiction when she pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Federal
Constitution or laws. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681–685. She
invokes § 1332 jurisdiction when she presents a claim between parties
of diverse citizenship that exceeds the required jurisdictional amount,
currently $75,000. See § 1332(a). Arbaugh invoked federal-question
jurisdiction under § 1331, but her case “aris[es]” under a federal law,
Title VII, that specifies, as a prerequisite to its application, the existence
of a particular fact, i. e., 15 or more employees. The Court resolves the
question whether that fact is “jurisdictional” or relates to the “merits”
of a Title VII claim mindful of the consequences of typing the 15
employee threshold a determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather
than an element of Arbaugh’s claim for relief. First, “subject-matter
jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never
be forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630.
Moreover, courts, including this Court, have an independent obligation
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the ab
sence of a challenge from any party. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U. S. 574, 583. Nothing in Title VII’s text indicates that Congress
intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the employee
numerosity requirement is met. Second, in some instances, if subject
matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be au
thorized to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on her own. If
satisfaction of an essential element of a claim is at issue, however, the
jury is the proper trier of contested facts. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumb

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502 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
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ing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150–151. Third, when a federal court
concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the complaint must
be dismissed in its entirety. Thus, the trial court below dismissed,
along with the Title VII claim, pendent state-law claims fully tried by
a jury and determined on the merits. In contrast, when a court grants
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, the court gener
ally retains discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to
§ 1367, over pendent state-law claims.
While Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement
“jurisdictional” if it so chose, neither § 1331 nor Title VII’s jurisdictional
provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), specifies any threshold ingredient
akin to 28 U. S. C. § 1332’s monetary floor. Instead, the 15-employee
threshold appears in a separate provision that “does not speak in juris
dictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district
courts.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394. Given
the unfairness and waste of judicial resources entailed in tying the
employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter jurisdiction, the
sounder course is to refrain from constricting § 1331 or § 2000e–5(f)(3),
and to leave the ball in Congress’ court. If the Legislature clearly
states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as
jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will
not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank
a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat
the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. Applying that readily
administrable bright line here yields the holding that Title VII’s 15
employee threshold is an element of a plaintiff ’s claim for relief, not a
jurisdictional issue. Pp. 510–516.
380 F. 3d 219, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except Alito, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
Jeffrey A. Schwartz argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper.
Daryl Joseffer argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen
eral Schlozman, Dennis J. Dimsey, Linda F. Thome, Eric S.
Dreiband, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Jennifer S. Goldstein.

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Opinion of the Court
Brett J. Prendergast argued the cause and filed a brief
for respondent.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the distinction between two sometimes
confused or conflated concepts: federal-court “subject
matter” jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essential in
gredients of a federal claim for relief. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “for an employer . . .
to discriminate,” inter alia, on the basis of sex. 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e–2(a)(1). The Act’s jurisdictional provision empow
ers federal courts to adjudicate civil actions “brought under”
Title VII. § 2000e–5(f)(3). Covering a broader field, the
Judicial Code gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction
over all civil actions “arising under” the laws of the United
States. 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Title VII actions fit that de
scription. In a provision defining 13 terms used in Title
VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, Congress limited the definition of
“employer” to include only those having “fifteen or more
employees,” § 2000e(b). The question here presented is
whether the numerical qualification contained in Title VII’s
definition of “employer” affects federal-court subject-matter
jurisdiction or, instead, delineates a substantive ingredient
of a Title VII claim for relief.
The question arises in this context. Jenifer Arbaugh,
plaintiff below, petitioner here, brought a Title VII action
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C.
Newsom, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respec
tive States as follows: John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of
Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii,
Phill Kline of Kansas, Jim Petro of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark
L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Catherine E. Stet
son, Robin S. Conrad, and Robert Costagliola; and for the International
Municipal Lawyers Association by Gene C. Schaerr, Henry W. Underhill,
Jr., Steffen N. Johnson, and Linda T. Coberly.

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504 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
in federal court against her former employer, defendant
respondent Y & H Corporation (hereinafter Y&H), charging
sexual harassment. The case was tried to a jury, which re
turned a verdict for Arbaugh in the total amount of $40,000.
Two weeks after the trial court entered judgment on the
jury verdict, Y&H moved to dismiss the entire action for
want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. For the first
time in the litigation, Y&H asserted that it had fewer than
15 employees on its payroll and therefore was not amenable
to suit under Title VII.
Although recognizing that it was “unfair and a waste of
judicial resources” to grant the motion to dismiss, App. to
Pet. for Cert. 47, the trial court considered itself obliged to
do so because it believed that the 15-or-more-employees re
quirement was jurisdictional. We reject that categorization
and hold that the numerical threshold does not circumscribe
federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the
employee-numerosity requirement relates to the substantive
adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title VII claim, and therefore could
not be raised defensively late in the lawsuit, i. e., after Y&H
had failed to assert the objection prior to the close of trial
on the merits.
I
We set out below statutory provisions and rules that bear
on this case. Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). To spare very small businesses
from Title VII liability, Congress provided that:
“[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or

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more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal
endar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .”
§ 2000e(b).1
This employee-numerosity requirement 2 appears in a section
headed “Definitions,” § 2000e, which also prescribes the
meaning, for Title VII purposes, of 12 other terms used in
the Act.3
Congress has broadly authorized the federal courts to ex
ercise subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions aris
ing under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Title VII surely is a “la[w] of
the United States.” Ibid. In 1964, however, when Title
VII was enacted, § 1331’s umbrella provision for federal
question jurisdiction contained an amount-in-controversy
limitation: Claims could not be brought under § 1331 unless
the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000. See § 1331(a)
(1964 ed.). Title VII, framed in that light, assured that
the amount-in-controversy limitation would not impede an
employment-discrimination complainant’s access to a fed
eral forum. The Act thus contains its own jurisdiction
conferring provision, which reads:
“Each United States district court and each United
States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the
1 The same provision further states that the term “employer” does not
include the United States, corporations wholly owned by the United
States, Indian tribes, certain departments and agencies of the District of
Columbia, or tax-exempt “bona fide private membership club[s]” (other
than labor organizations). § 2000e(b).
2 Congress originally prescribed a 25-or-more-employee threshold, Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 701, 78 Stat. 253, but lowered the minimum number
of employees to 15 in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2,
86 Stat. 103.
3 The other terms defined in § 2000e are: “person, ” “employment
agency,” “labor organization,” “employee,” “commerce,” “industry affect
ing commerce,” “State,” “religion,” “because of sex,” “complaining party,”
“demonstrates,” and “respondent.”

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United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought
under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3).4
Congress amended 28 U. S. C. § 1331 in 1980 to eliminate the
amount-in-controversy threshold. See Federal Question Ju
risdictional Amendments Act of 1980, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369.
Since that time, Title VII’s own jurisdictional provision, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), has served simply to underscore Con
gress’ intention to provide a federal forum for the adjudica
tion of Title VII claims. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.
We note, too, that, under 28 U. S. C. § 1367, federal courts
may exercise “supplemental” jurisdiction over state-law
claims linked to a claim based on federal law.5 Plaintiffs
suing under Title VII may avail themselves of the opportu
nity § 1367 provides to pursue complete relief in a federal
court lawsuit. Arbaugh did so in the instant case by adding
to her federal complaint pendent claims arising under state
law that would not independently qualify for federal-court
adjudication.
The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter ju
risdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised
by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage
in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.
Rule 12(h)(3) instructs: “Whenever it appears by suggestion
of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”
4 Title VII contains a separate jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e–6(b), authorizing suits by the Government to enjoin “pattern or
practice” discrimination.
5 Section 1367(a) states: “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or
as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that in
volve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.”

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See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455 (2004). By con
trast, the objection that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted,” Rule 12(b)(6), may not
be asserted post-trial. Under Rule 12(h)(2), that objection
endures up to, but not beyond, trial on the merits: “A defense
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
. . . may be made in any pleading . . . or by motion for judg
ment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.”
Cf. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 459.
II
From May 2000 through February 2001, Jenifer Arbaugh
worked as a bartender and waitress at the Moonlight Cafe,
a New Orleans restaurant owned and operated by Y&H.
Arbaugh alleged that Yalcin Hatipoglu, one of the company’s
owners, sexually harassed her and precipitated her construc
tive discharge.6 In November 2001, Arbaugh filed suit
against Y&H in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Her complaint asserted
claims under Title VII and Louisiana law. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 1–2.
Arbaugh’s pleadings alleged that her federal claim “ar[o]se
under Title VII” and that the Federal District Court had
jurisdiction over this claim under § 1331 plus supplemental
jurisdiction over her state-law claims under § 1367. Record,
Doc. 3, p. 1 (Amended Complaint). Y&H’s responsive plead
ings admitted Arbaugh’s “jurisdictional” allegations but de
nied her contentions on the merits. Id., Doc. 4, p. 1 (Answer
to Complaint). The pretrial order submitted and signed by
the parties, and later subscribed by the presiding judge, reit
erated that the court was “vested with jurisdiction over [Ar
baugh’s Title VII claim] pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1331,” and
6 See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129, 147 (2004) (con
structive discharge compensable under Title VII includes an employee’s
departure due to sexual harassment that renders “working conditions so
intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign”).

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“ha[d] supplemental jurisdiction over [her] state law claims
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1367.” Id., Doc. 19, p. 2. The
order listed “Uncontested Material Facts,” including: “Plain
tiff was employed as a waitress/ bartender at the Moonlight
for Defendants from May, 2000 through February 10, 2001
when she terminated her employment with the company.”
Id., p. 3. It did not list among “Contested Issues of Fact”
or “Contested Legal Issues” the question whether Y&H
had the requisite number of employees under 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e(b). Record, Doc. 19, pp. 4–5. Nor was the issue
raised at any other point pretrial or at trial.
The parties consented to trial before a Magistrate Judge.
See 28 U. S. C. § 636(c). After a two-day trial, the jury found
that Arbaugh had been sexually harassed and constructively
discharged in violation of Title VII and Louisiana anti
discrimination law. The verdict awarded Arbaugh $5,000
in backpay, $5,000 in compensatory damages, and $30,000 in
punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment for
Arbaugh on November 5, 2002.
Two weeks later, Y&H filed a motion under Federal Rule
12(h)(3) to dismiss Arbaugh’s complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Record, Doc. 44. As sole ground for
the motion, Y&H alleged, for the first time in the proceed
ings, that it “did not employ fifteen or more employees [dur
ing the relevant period] and thus is not an employer for Title
VII purposes.” Id., p. 2 (Memorandum in Support of Rule
12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Juris
diction). The trial court commented that “[i]t is unfair and
a waste of judicial resources to permit [Y&H] to admit Ar
baugh’s allegations of jurisdiction, try the case for two days
and then assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in re
sponse to an adverse jury verdict.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
47. Nevertheless, reciting the text of Rule 12(h)(3), see
supra, at 506, the trial court allowed Y&H to plead that it
did not qualify as an “employer” under Title VII’s definition
of that term. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47–48; see supra,
at 504–505.

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Discovery ensued. The dispute over the employee count
turned on the employment status of Y&H’s eight drivers,
engaged to make deliveries for the restaurant, and the com
pany’s four owners (the Moonlight Cafe’s two managers and
their shareholder spouses). As the trial court noted, “[i]f
either the delivery drivers or the four owners are counted
with the persons shown on the payroll journals, then Y&H
employed fifteen or more persons for the requisite time.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 27. After reviewing the parties’ sub
missions, however, the trial court concluded that neither the
delivery drivers nor the owner-managers nor their share
holder spouses qualified as “employees” for Title VII pur
poses. Id., at 32–43. Based on that determination, the
trial court vacated its prior judgment in favor of Arbaugh,
dismissed her Title VII claim with prejudice, and her state
law claims without prejudice. Id., at 23.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 380
F. 3d 219 (2004). Bound by its prior decisions, the Court
of Appeals held that a defendant’s “failure to qualify as an
‘employer’ under Title VII deprives a district court of sub
ject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at 224 (citing, e. g., Dumas v.
Mt. Vernon, 612 F. 2d 974, 980 (1980)). Dismissal for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction was proper, the Court of Appeals
ruled, for the record warranted the conclusion that Y&H’s
delivery drivers, its owner-managers, and their shareholder
wives were not “employees” for Title VII purposes, 380
F. 3d, at 225–230, and it was undisputed that Y&H “did not
employ the requisite 15 employees without the inclusion of ”
those persons, id., at 231.
We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 1031 (2005), to resolve
conflicting opinions in Courts of Appeals on the question
whether Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e(b), is jurisdictional or simply an element of a
plaintiff ’s claim for relief. Compare, e. g., 380 F. 3d, at 223–
225 (Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is juris
dictional), and Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F. 2d 1332, 1335

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(CA6 1983) (same), with, e. g., Da Silva v. Kinsho Interna
tional Corp., 229 F. 3d 358, 361–366 (CA2 2000) (Title VII’s
employee-numerosity requirement is not jurisdictional);
Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F. 3d 72, 76–83 (CA3
2003) (same); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial School,
117 F. 3d 621, 623–624 (CADC 1997) (Americans with Disa
bilities Act of 1990’s employee-numerosity requirement, 42
U. S. C. § 12111(5)(A), resembling Title VII’s requirement, is
not jurisdictional).
III
“Jurisdiction,” this Court has observed, “is a word of
many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This Court, no less than other courts, has
sometimes been profligate in its use of the term. For exam
ple, this Court and others have occasionally described a non
extendable time limit as “mandatory and jurisdictional.”
See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229
(1960). But in recent decisions, we have clarified that time
prescriptions, however emphatic, “are not properly typed
‘jurisdictional.’ ” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401,
414 (2004); accord Eberhart v. United States, ante, at 16–19
(per curiam); Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454–455. See also Car
lisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 434–435 (1996) (Gins
burg, J., concurring).
The dispute now before us concerns the proper classifica
tion of Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered employers
to those with 15 or more employees. If the limitation condi
tions subject-matter jurisdiction, as the lower courts held it
did, then a conclusion that Y&H had fewer than 15 employ
ees would require erasure of the judgment for Arbaugh en
tered on the jury verdict. But if the lower courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction characterization is incorrect, and the
issue, instead, concerns the merits of Arbaugh’s case, then
Y&H raised the employee-numerosity requirement too late.
Its pretrial stipulations, see supra, at 508, and its failure to

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speak to the issue prior to the conclusion of the trial on the
merits, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(2), supra, at 507, would
preclude vacation of the $40,000 judgment in Arbaugh’s
favor.
On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ ingredient-of-claim
for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less
than meticulous. “Subject matter jurisdiction in federal
question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a
plaintiff ’s need and ability to prove the defendant bound by
the federal law asserted as the predicate for relief—a
merits-related determination.” 2 J. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice § 12.30[1], p. 12–36.1 (3d ed. 2005) (herein
after Moore). Judicial opinions, the Second Circuit inci
sively observed, “often obscure the issue by stating that the
court is dismissing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when some
threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly
considering whether the dismissal should be for lack of sub
ject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.” Da
Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361. We have described such unrefined
dispositions as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” that should
be accorded “no precedential effect” on the question whether
the federal court had authority to adjudicate the claim in
suit. Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91.
Cases of this genre include Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U. S. 69 (1984), and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U. S. 244 (1991). Hishon involved a Title VII claim
brought by a lawyer denied partnership in a law firm. The
District Court ruled that Title VII did not apply to the selec
tion of partners and dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed that
judgment. We noted that the District Court’s reasoning
“ma[de] clear that it dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the
ground that her allegations did not state a claim cognizable
under Title VII.” 467 U. S., at 73, n. 2. Disagreeing with
the lower courts, we held that Title VII applies to part
nership decisions. Id., at 73–78. That holding, we said,

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“ma[de] it unnecessary to consider the wisdom of the District
Court’s invocation of Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule
12(b)(6).” Id., at 73, n. 2. The former Rule concerns
subject-matter jurisdiction, the latter, “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” See supra, at 507.
Our opinion in Hishon thus raised, but did not decide, the
question whether subject-matter jurisdiction was the proper
rubric for the District Court’s decisions.7
In Arabian American Oil Co., we affirmed the judgment
of the courts below that Title VII, as then composed, did not
apply to a suit by a United States employee working abroad
for a United States employer.8 That judgment had been
placed under a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction label. We
agreed with the lower courts’ view of the limited geographi
cal reach of the statute. 499 U. S., at 246–247. En passant,
we copied the petitioners’ characterizations of terms in
cluded in Title VII’s “Definitions” section, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e,
as “jurisdictional.” See 499 U. S., at 249, 251, 253. But our
decision did not turn on that characterization, and the parties
did not cross swords over it. See Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91
(declining to follow a decision treating an issue as jurisdic
tional because nothing “turned upon whether [the issue] was
technically jurisdictional” in that case). In short, we were
7 Y&H features Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S.
202 (1997), as supportive of the jurisdictional character of the employee
numerosity requirement. Brief for Respondent 8–10. Y&H urges that
the Court must have considered the requirement jurisdictional, for
Walters held definitively that, under the correct legal standard, the de
fendant had more than 15 employees. If the requirement had been seen
as a merits issue, Y&H contends, the Court would have remanded the
employee count for determination by the trier of fact. But the parties in
Walters apparently stipulated to all relevant facts, leaving nothing for a
fact trier to resolve on remand. Cf. 519 U. S., at 211–212.
8 Congress subsequently amended Title VII to extend protection to
United States citizens working overseas. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,
§ 109(a), 105 Stat. 1077, codified at 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(f) (“With respect
to employment in a foreign country,” the term “employee” “includes an
individual who is a citizen of the United States.”).

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not prompted in Arabian American Oil Co. to home in on
whether the dismissal had been properly based on the ab
sence of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than on the plain
tiff ’s failure to state a claim. 499 U. S., at 247.9
The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter
jurisdiction are contained in 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1332.
Section 1331 provides for “[f]ederal-question” jurisdiction,
§ 1332 for “[d]iversity of citizenship” jurisdiction. A plain
tiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a
colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of
the United States. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 681–685
(1946).10 She invokes § 1332 jurisdiction when she presents
a claim between parties of diverse citizenship that exceeds
the required jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000. See
§ 1332(a).
Arbaugh invoked federal-question jurisdiction under
§ 1331, but her case “aris[es]” under a federal law, Title VII,
that specifies, as a prerequisite to its application, the exist
ence of a particular fact, i. e., 15 or more employees. We
resolve the question whether that fact is “jurisdictional” or
relates to the “merits” of a Title VII claim mindful of the
consequences of typing the 15-employee threshold a determi
9 In EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107 (1988), also
featured by Y&H, see Brief for Respondent 12, a plurality of this Court
noted that “[r]eactivation of state proceedings after the conclusion of fed
eral proceedings serves [a] useful function,” in part because “Title VII
does not give the EEOC jurisdiction to enforce the Act against employers
of fewer than 15 employees.” 486 U. S., at 119, n. 5. That fleeting foot
note addressed the relative administrative provinces of the Equal Employ
ment Opportunity Commission and state agencies. It did not speak of
federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction, which was not at issue in the
case.
10 A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331,
Bell held, may be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is
not colorable, i. e., if it is “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction” or is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” 327
U. S., at 682–683; see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998). Arbaugh’s case surely does not belong in that
category.

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514 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
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nant of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than an element
of Arbaugh’s claim for relief.
First, “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a
court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002).
Moreover, courts, including this Court, have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 583 (1999).
Nothing in the text of Title VII indicates that Congress
intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the
employee-numerosity requirement is met.
Second, in some instances, if subject-matter jurisdiction
turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be authorized
to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on her own.
See 5B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce
dure § 1350, pp. 243–249 (3d ed. 2004); 2 Moore § 12.30[3],
pp. 12–37 to 12–38. If satisfaction of an essential element
of a claim for relief is at issue, however, the jury is the proper
trier of contested facts. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150–151 (2000).
Third, when a federal court concludes that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the com
plaint in its entirety. See 16 Moore § 106.66[1], pp. 106–88
to 106–89. Thus in the instant case, the trial court dis
missed, along with the Title VII claim, pendent state-law
claims, see supra, at 506, fully tried by a jury and deter
mined on the merits, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23, 47. In
contrast, when a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§ 1367, over pendent state-law claims. See 16 Moore
§ 106.66[1], pp. 106–86 to 106–89.
Of course, Congress could make the employee-numerosity
requirement “jurisdictional,” just as it has made an amount
in-controversy threshold an ingredient of subject-matter ju

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risdiction in delineating diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction
under 28 U. S. C. § 1332. But neither § 1331, nor Title VII’s
jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) (authoriz
ing jurisdiction over actions “brought under” Title VII),
specifies any threshold ingredient akin to 28 U. S. C. § 1332’s
monetary floor. Instead, the 15-employee threshold appears
in a separate provision that “does not speak in jurisdictional
terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district
courts.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385,
394 (1982). Given the “unfair[ness]” and “waste of judicial
resources,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47, entailed in tying the
employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter juris
diction, we think it the sounder course to refrain from con
stricting § 1331 or Title VII’s jurisdictional provision, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–5(f)(3), and to leave the ball in Congress’
court. If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold lim
itation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,11
then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not
11 Congress has exercised its prerogative to restrict the subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal district courts based on a wide variety of factors,
some of them also relevant to the merits of a case. Certain statutes con
fer subject-matter jurisdiction only for actions brought by specific plain
tiffs, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1345 (United States and its agencies and officers);
49 U. S. C. § 24301(l)(2) (Amtrak), or for claims against particular defend
ants, e. g., 7 U. S. C. § 2707(e)(3) (persons subject to orders of the Egg
Board); 28 U. S. C. § 1348 (national banking associations), or for actions in
which the amount in controversy exceeds, e. g., 16 U. S. C. § 814, or falls
below, e. g., 22 U. S. C. § 6713(a)(1)(B); 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2), a stated
amount. Other jurisdiction-conferring provisions describe particular
types of claims. See, e. g., § 1339 (“any civil action arising under any Act
of Congress relating to the postal service”); § 1347 (“any civil action com
menced by any tenant in common or joint tenant for the partition of lands
where the United States is one of the tenants in common or joint tenants”).
In a few instances, Congress has enacted a separate provision that ex
pressly restricts application of a jurisdiction-conferring statute. See, e. g.,
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 756–761 (1975) (42 U. S. C. § 405(h)
bars 28 U. S. C. § 1331 jurisdiction over suits to recover Social Security
benefits).

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516 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
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be left to wrestle with the issue. See Da Silva, 229 F. 3d,
at 361 (“Whether a disputed matter concerns jurisdiction or
the merits (or occasionally both) is sometimes a close ques
tion.”). But when Congress does not rank a statutory limi
tation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. Applying that
readily administrable bright line to this case, we hold that
the threshold number of employees for application of Title
VII is an element of a plaintiff ’s claim for relief, not a juris
dictional issue.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of this case.