BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. v. WHITE

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BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE
RAILWAY CO. v. WHITE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 05–259. Argued April 17, 2006—Decided June 22, 2006
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimina
tion based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e–2(a), and its antiretaliation provision forbids “discriminat[ion]
against” an employee or job applicant who, inter alia, has “made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title VII proceeding or
investigation, § 2000e–3(a). Respondent White, the only woman in her
department, operated the forklift at the Tennessee Yard of petitioner
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. (Burlington). After she
complained, her immediate supervisor was disciplined for sexual harass
ment, but she was removed from forklift duty to standard track laborer
tasks. She filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), claiming that the reassignment was unlawful gen
der discrimination and retaliation for her complaint. Subsequently, she
was suspended without pay for insubordination. Burlington later found
that she had not been insubordinate, reinstated her, and awarded her
backpay for the 37 days she was suspended. The suspension led to
another EEOC retaliation charge. After exhausting her administrative
remedies, White filed an action against Burlington in federal court
claiming, as relevant here, that Burlington’s actions in changing her job
responsibilities and suspending her for 37 days amounted to unlawful
retaliation under Title VII. A jury awarded her compensatory dam
ages. In affirming, the Sixth Circuit applied the same standard for re
taliation that it applies to a substantive discrimination offense, holding
that a retaliation plaintiff must show an “adverse employment action,”
defined as a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions”
of employment. The Circuits have come to different conclusions about
whether the challenged action has to be employment or workplace
related and about how harmful that action must be to constitute
retaliation.
Held:
1. The antiretaliation provision does not confine the actions and
harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the
workplace. The language of the substantive and antiretaliation provi
sions differ in important ways. The terms “hire,” “discharge,” “com

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54 BURLINGTON N. & S. F. R. CO. v. WHITE
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pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” “employ
ment opportunities,” and “status as an employee” explicitly limit the
substantive provision’s scope to actions that affect employment or alter
workplace conditions. The antiretaliation provision has no such limit
ing words. This Court presumes that, where words differ as they do
here, Congress has acted intentionally and purposely. There is strong
reason to believe that Congress intended the differences here, for the
two provisions differ not only in language but also in purpose. The
antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are
not discriminated against because of their status, while the antiretalia
tion provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with an
employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic
guarantees. To secure the first objective, Congress needed only to pro
hibit employment-related discrimination. But this would not achieve
the second objective because it would not deter the many forms that
effective retaliation can take, therefore failing to fully achieve the anti
retaliation provision’s purpose of “[m]aintaining unfettered access to
statutory remedial mechanisms,” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S.
337, 346. Thus, purpose reinforces what the language says, namely,
that the antiretaliation provision is not limited to actions affecting em
ployment terms and conditions. Neither this Court’s precedent nor the
EEOC’s interpretations support a contrary conclusion. Nor is it anom
alous to read the statute to provide broader protection for retaliation
victims than for victims of discrimination. Congress has provided simi
lar protection from retaliation in comparable statutes. And differences
in the purpose of the two Title VII provisions remove any perceived
“anomaly,” for they justify this difference in interpretation. Pp. 61–67.
2. The antiretaliation provision covers only those employer actions
that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or
applicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Colum
bia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliation plaintiff
to show that the challenged action “well might have ‘dissuaded a reason
able worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ”
Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219. The Court refers to material
adversity to separate significant from trivial harms. The antiretalia
tion provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered
access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms by prohibiting employer ac
tions that are likely to deter discrimination victims from complaining to
the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. The
Court refers to a reasonable employee’s reactions because the provi
sion’s standard for judging harm must be objective, and thus judicially
administrable. The standard is phrased in general terms because the

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significance of any given act of retaliation may depend upon the particu
lar circumstances. Pp. 67–70.
3. Applying the standard to the facts of this case, there was a suffi
cient evidentiary basis to support the jury’s verdict on White’s retalia
tion claim. Contrary to Burlington’s claim, a reassignment of duties
can constitute retaliatory discrimination where both the former and
present duties fall within the same job description. Almost every job
category involves some duties that are less desirable than others. That
is presumably why the EEOC has consistently recognized retaliatory
work assignments as forbidden retaliation. Here, the jury had consid
erable evidence that the track laborer duties were more arduous and
dirtier than the forklift operator position, and that the latter position
was considered a better job by male employees who resented White for
occupying it. Based on this record, a jury could reasonably conclude
that the reassignment would have been materially adverse to a reason
able employee. Burlington also argues that the 37-day suspension
without pay lacked statutory significance because White was reinstated
with backpay. The significance of the congressional judgment that vic
tims of intentional discrimination can recover compensatory and puni
tive damages to make them whole would be undermined if employers
could avoid liability in these circumstances. Any insufficient evidence
claim is unconvincing. White received backpay, but many reasonable
employees would find a month without pay a serious hardship. White
described her physical and emotional hardship to the jury, noting that
she obtained medical treatment for emotional distress. An indefinite
suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent to the filing of
a discrimination complaint, even if the suspended employee eventually
receives backpay. Thus, the jury’s conclusion that the suspension was
materially adverse was reasonable. Pp. 70–73.
364 F. 3d 789, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 73.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Stephen B. Kinnaird, Eric A.
Shumsky, James H. Gallegos, Lawrence M. Stroik, David M.
Pryor, and Bryan P. Neal.
Deputy Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney Gen

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56 BURLINGTON N. & S. F. R. CO. v. WHITE
Opinion of the Court
eral Kim, Acting Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Irving
L. Gornstein, Marleigh D. Dover, and Stephanie R. Marcus.
Donald A. Donati argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the briefs were William B. Ryan and Eric
Schnapper.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employ
ment discrimination against “any individual” based on that
individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
Pub. L. 88–352, § 704, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e–2(a). A separate section of the Act—its antiretalia
tion provision—prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]
against” an employee or job applicant because that individual
“opposed any practice” made unlawful by Title VII or “made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title VII
proceeding or investigation. § 2000e–3(a).
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of
American Railroads by Maureen E. Mahoney, Jonathan C. Su, and Daniel
Saphire; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Eliza
beth Reesman, Laura Anne Giantris, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad,
and Ellen Dunham Bryant; for the International Municipal Lawyers As
sociation by Frank Waite and Elizabeth Lutton; for the Pacific Legal
Foundation by Deborah J. La Fetra; and for the Society for Human Re
source Management et al. by Allan H. Weitzman, Paul Salvatore, and
Edward Cerasia II.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by
Jonathan P. Hiatt, James B. Coppess, William A. Bon, Laurence Gold,
and Mitchell M. Kraus; for the National Employment Lawyers Associa
tion et al. by Douglas B. Huron, Stephen Z. Chertkof, Andrew S. Golub,
and Marissa M. Tirona; and for the National Women’s Law Center et al.
by Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, Pamela S. Kar
lan, Marcia D. Greenberger, Jocelyn Samuels, Dina R. Lassow, and Char
lotte Fishman.
Michael Foreman, Sarah Crawford, and Dennis Courtland Hayes filed
a brief for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as
amici curiae.

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The Courts of Appeals have come to different conclusions
about the scope of the Act’s antiretaliation provision, particu
larly the reach of its phrase “discriminate against.” Does
that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity
that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And
how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its
scope?
We conclude that the antiretaliation provision does not
confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are
related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also
conclude that the provision covers those (and only those)
employer actions that would have been materially adverse
to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present
context that means that the employer’s actions must be
harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a rea
sonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.
I
A
This case arises out of actions that supervisors at peti
tioner Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company
took against respondent Sheila White, the only woman work
ing in the Maintenance of Way department at Burlington’s
Tennessee Yard. In June 1997, Burlington’s roadmaster,
Marvin Brown, interviewed White and expressed interest
in her previous experience operating forklifts. Burlington
hired White as a “track laborer,” a job that involves remov
ing and replacing track components, transporting track ma
terial, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo spillage
from the right-of-way. Soon after White arrived on the job,
a co-worker who had previously operated the forklift chose
to assume other responsibilities. Brown immediately as
signed White to operate the forklift. While she also per
formed some of the other track laborer tasks, operating the
forklift was White’s primary responsibility.

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In September 1997, White complained to Burlington offi
cials that her immediate supervisor, Bill Joiner, had repeat
edly told her that women should not be working in the Main
tenance of Way department. Joiner, White said, had also
made insulting and inappropriate remarks to her in front of
her male colleagues. After an internal investigation, Bur
lington suspended Joiner for 10 days and ordered him to
attend a sexual-harassment training session.
On September 26, Brown told White about Joiner’s disci
pline. At the same time, he told White that he was remov
ing her from forklift duty and assigning her to perform only
standard track laborer tasks. Brown explained that the re
assignment reflected co-workers’ complaints that, in fairness,
a “ ‘more senior man’ ” should have the “less arduous and
cleaner job” of forklift operator. 364 F. 3d 789, 792 (CA6
2004) (case below).
On October 10, White filed a complaint with the Equal Em
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission).
She claimed that the reassignment of her duties amounted
to unlawful gender-based discrimination and retaliation for
her having earlier complained about Joiner. In early De
cember, White filed a second retaliation charge with the
Commission, claiming that Brown had placed her under
surveillance and was monitoring her daily activities. That
charge was mailed to Brown on December 8.
A few days later, White and her immediate supervisor,
Percy Sharkey, disagreed about which truck should trans
port White from one location to another. The specific facts
of the disagreement are in dispute, but the upshot is that
Sharkey told Brown later that afternoon that White had
been insubordinate. Brown immediately suspended White
without pay. White invoked internal grievance procedures.
Those procedures led Burlington to conclude that White had
not been insubordinate. Burlington reinstated White to her
position and awarded her backpay for the 37 days she was

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suspended. White filed an additional retaliation charge
with the EEOC based on the suspension.
B
After exhausting administrative remedies, White filed this
Title VII action against Burlington in federal court. As rel
evant here, she claimed that Burlington’s actions—(1) chang
ing her job responsibilities, and (2) suspending her for 37
days without pay—amounted to unlawful retaliation in viola
tion of Title VII. § 2000e–3(a). A jury found in White’s
favor on both of these claims. It awarded her $43,500
in compensatory damages, including $3,250 in medical ex
penses. The District Court denied Burlington’s post-trial
motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 50(b).
Initially, a divided Sixth Circuit panel reversed the judg
ment and found in Burlington’s favor on the retaliation
claims. 310 F. 3d 443 (2002). The full Court of Appeals va
cated the panel’s decision, however, and heard the matter en
banc. The court then affirmed the District Court’s judg
ment in White’s favor on both retaliation claims. While all
members of the en banc court voted to uphold the District
Court’s judgment, they differed as to the proper standard to
apply. Compare 364 F. 3d, at 795–800, with id., at 809 (Clay,
J., concurring).
II
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids employer ac
tions that “discriminate against” an employee (or job ap
plicant) because he has “opposed” a practice that Title VII
forbids or has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici
pated in” a Title VII “investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”
§ 2000e–3(a). No one doubts that the term “discriminate
against” refers to distinctions or differences in treatment
that injure protected individuals. See Jackson v. Bir
mingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 174 (2005); Price Water

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house v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 244 (1989) (plurality opin
ion); see also 4 Oxford English Dictionary 758 (2d ed. 1989)
(def. 3b). But different Circuits have come to different con
clusions about whether the challenged action has to be em
ployment or workplace related and about how harmful that
action must be to constitute retaliation.
Some Circuits have insisted upon a close relationship be
tween the retaliatory action and employment. The Sixth
Circuit majority in this case, for example, said that a plaintiff
must show an “adverse employment action,” which it defined
as a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions”
of employment. 364 F. 3d, at 795 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Sixth Circuit has thus joined those Courts of
Appeals that apply the same standard for retaliation that
they apply to a substantive discrimination offense, holding
that the challenged action must “resul[t] in an adverse effect
on the ‘terms, conditions, or benefits’ of employment.” Von
Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F. 3d 858, 866 (CA4 2001); see Rob
inson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F. 3d 1286, 1300 (CA3 1997). The
Fifth and the Eighth Circuits have adopted a more restric
tive approach. They employ an “ultimate employment deci
sio[n]” standard, which limits actionable retaliatory conduct
to acts “ ‘such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promot
ing, and compensating.’ ” Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
104 F. 3d 702, 707 (CA5 1997); see Manning v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 127 F. 3d 686, 692 (CA8 1997).
Other Circuits have not so limited the scope of the provi
sion. The Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits
have said that the plaintiff must show that the “employer’s
challenged action would have been material to a reasonable
employee,” which in contexts like the present one means that
it would likely have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Wash
ington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F. 3d 658, 662 (CA7
2005); see Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1217–1218
(CADC 2006). And the Ninth Circuit, following EEOC

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guidance, has said that the plaintiff must simply establish
“ ‘adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive
and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others
from engaging in protected activity.’ ” Ray v. Henderson,
217 F. 3d 1234, 1242–1243 (2000). The concurring judges
below would have applied this last mentioned standard. 364
F. 3d, at 809 (opinion of Clay, J.).
We granted certiorari to resolve this disagreement. To
do so requires us to decide whether Title VII’s antiretalia
tion provision forbids only those employer actions and result
ing harms that are related to employment or the workplace.
And we must characterize how harmful an act of retaliatory
discrimination must be in order to fall within the provi
sion’s scope.
A
Petitioner and the Solicitor General both argue that the
Sixth Circuit is correct to require a link between the chal
lenged retaliatory action and the terms, conditions, or status
of employment. They note that Title VII’s substantive anti
discrimination provision protects an individual only from
employment-related discrimination. They add that the anti
retaliation provision should be read in pari materia with
the antidiscrimination provision. And they conclude that
the employer actions prohibited by the antiretaliation provi
sion should similarly be limited to conduct that “affects the
employee’s ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
13 (quoting § 2000e–2(a)(1)); see Brief for Petitioner 13
(same).
We cannot agree. The language of the substantive provi
sion differs from that of the antiretaliation provision in im
portant ways. Section 703(a) sets forth Title VII’s core
antidiscrimination provision in the following terms:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer—

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“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individu
al’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
“(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would de
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” § 2000e–2(a) (empha
sis added).
Section 704(a) sets forth Title VII’s antiretaliation provi
sion in the following terms:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testi
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an inves
tigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
§ 2000e–3(a) (emphasis added).
The italicized words in the substantive provision—“hire,”
“discharge,” “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment,” “employment opportunities,” and “status
as an employee”—explicitly limit the scope of that provi
sion to actions that affect employment or alter the condi
tions of the workplace. No such limiting words appear in
the antiretaliation provision. Given these linguistic differ
ences, the question here is not whether identical or similar
words should be read in pari materia to mean the same
thing. See, e. g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S.
349, 355, n. 2 (2005); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U. S. 849, 858
(1994); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 92 (1990). Rather,
the question is whether Congress intended its different

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words to make a legal difference. We normally presume
that, where words differ as they differ here, “ ‘Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or ex
clusion.’ ” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983).
There is strong reason to believe that Congress intended
the differences that its language suggests, for the two provi
sions differ not only in language but in purpose as well. The
antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where indi
viduals are not discriminated against because of their racial,
ethnic, religious, or gender-based status. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800–801 (1973). The
antiretaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objec
tive by preventing an employer from interfering (through
retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance
enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. The substantive
provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who
they are, i. e., their status. The antiretaliation provision
seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do,
i. e., their conduct.
To secure the first objective, Congress did not need to
prohibit anything other than employment-related discrim
ination. The substantive provision’s basic objective of
“equality of employment opportunities” and the elimination
of practices that tend to bring about “stratified job environ
ments,” id., at 800, would be achieved were all employment
related discrimination miraculously eliminated.
But one cannot secure the second objective by focusing
only upon employer actions and harm that concern employ
ment and the workplace. Were all such actions and harms
eliminated, the antiretaliation provision’s objective would
not be achieved. An employer can effectively retaliate
against an employee by taking actions not directly related to
his employment or by causing him harm outside the work
place. See, e. g., Rochon, 438 F. 3d, at 1213 (Federal Bureau
of Investigation retaliation against employee “took the form
of the FBI’s refusal, contrary to policy, to investigate death

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threats a federal prisoner made against [the agent] and his
wife”); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F. 3d 980, 984, 986
(CA10 1996) (finding actionable retaliation where employer
filed false criminal charges against former employee who
complained about discrimination). A provision limited to
employment-related actions would not deter the many forms
that effective retaliation can take. Hence, such a limited
construction would fail to fully achieve the antiretaliation
provision’s “primary purpose,” namely, “[m]aintaining unfet
tered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 346 (1997).
Thus, purpose reinforces what language already indicates,
namely, that the antiretaliation provision, unlike the sub
stantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions
that affect the terms and conditions of employment.
Cf. Wachovia Bank, N. A. v. Schmidt, 546 U. S. 303, 319
(2006) (rejecting statutory construction that would “[t]rea[t]
venue and subject-matter jurisdiction prescriptions as in
pari materia” because doing so would “overloo[k] the dis
crete offices of those concepts”).
Our precedent does not compel a contrary conclusion. In
deed, we have found no case in this Court that offers peti
tioner or the United States significant support. Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), as petitioner
notes, speaks of a Title VII requirement that violations in
volve “tangible employment action” such as “hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.” Id., at 761. But Ellerth does so only to “identify
a class of [hostile work environment] cases” in which an em
ployer should be held vicariously liable (without an affirm
ative defense) for the acts of supervisors. Id., at 760; see
also Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129, 143
(2004) (explaining holdings in Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998), as dividing hostile work environ
ment claims into two categories, one in which the employer

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is strictly liable because a tangible employment action is
taken and one in which the employer can make an affirmative
defense). Ellerth did not discuss the scope of the general
antidiscrimination provision. See 524 U. S., at 761 (using
“concept of a tangible employment action [that] appears in
numerous cases in the Courts of Appeals” only “for resolu
tion of the vicarious liability issue”). And Ellerth did not
mention Title VII’s antiretaliation provision at all. At most,
Ellerth sets forth a standard that petitioner and the Solicitor
General believe the antiretaliation provision ought to con
tain. But it does not compel acceptance of their view.
Nor can we find significant support for their view in the
EEOC’s interpretations of the provision. We concede that
the EEOC stated in its 1991 and 1988 Compliance Manuals
that the antiretaliation provision is limited to “adverse
employment-related action.” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual
§ 614.1(d), p. 614–5 (1991) (hereinafter EEOC 1991 Manual);
EEOC Compliance Manual § 614.1(d), p. 614–5 (1988) (herein
after EEOC 1988 Manual). But in those same manuals the
EEOC lists the “[e]ssential [e]lements” of a retaliation claim
along with language suggesting a broader interpretation.
EEOC 1991 Manual § 614.3(d), pp. 614–8 to 614–9 (complain
ant must show “that (s)he was in some manner subjected to
adverse treatment by the respondent because of the protest
or opposition”); EEOC 1988 Manual § 614.3(d), pp. 614–8 to
614–9 (same).
Moreover, both before and after publication of the 1991
and 1988 manuals, the EEOC similarly expressed a broad
interpretation of the antiretaliation provision. Compare
EEOC Interpretive Manual, Reference Manual to Title VII
Law for Compliance Personnel § 491.2 (1972) (hereinafter
1972 Reference Manual) (§ 704(a) “is intended to provide
‘exceptionally broad protection’ for protestors of discrim
inatory employment practices”), with 2 EEOC Compliance
Manual § 8, p. 8–13 (1998) (hereinafter EEOC 1998 Manual),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html (as

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visited June 20, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case
file) (§ 704(a) “prohibit[s] any adverse treatment that is
based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party or others from engaging in pro
tected activity”). And the EEOC 1998 Manual, which offers
the Commission’s only direct statement on the question of
whether the antiretaliation provision is limited to the
same employment-related activity covered by the antidis
crimination provision, answers that question in the nega
tive—directly contrary to petitioner’s reading of the Act.
Ibid.
Finally, we do not accept petitioner’s and the Solicitor
General’s view that it is “anomalous” to read the statute to
provide broader protection for victims of retaliation than for
those whom Title VII primarily seeks to protect, namely,
victims of race-based, ethnic-based, religion-based, or
gender-based discrimination. Brief for Petitioner 17; Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 14–15. Congress has
provided similar kinds of protection from retaliation in com
parable statutes without any judicial suggestion that those
provisions are limited to the conduct prohibited by the pri
mary substantive provisions. The National Labor Relations
Act, to which this Court has “drawn analogies . . . in other
Title VII contexts,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S.
69, 76, n. 8 (1984), provides an illustrative example. Com
pare 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3) (substantive provision prohibiting
employer “discrimination in regard to . . . any term or condi
tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization”) with § 158(a)(4) (retaliation pro
vision making it unlawful for an employer to “discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter”); see
also Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731,
740 (1983) (construing antiretaliation provision to “prohibi[t]
a wide variety of employer conduct that is intended to re
strain, or that has the likely effect of restraining, employees

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in the exercise of protected activities,” including the retal
iatory filing of a lawsuit against an employee); NLRB v.
Scrivener, 405 U. S. 117, 121–122 (1972) (purpose of the anti
retaliation provision is to ensure that employees are “ ‘com
pletely free from coercion against reporting ’ ” unlawful
practices).
In any event, as we have explained, differences in the pur
pose of the two provisions remove any perceived “anomaly,”
for they justify this difference of interpretation. See supra,
at 63–64. Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the
cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints
and act as witnesses. “Plainly, effective enforcement could
thus only be expected if employees felt free to approach offi
cials with their grievances.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario
Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288, 292 (1960). Interpreting the
antiretaliation provision to provide broad protection from re
taliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which accom
plishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.
For these reasons, we conclude that Title VII’s substantive
provision and its antiretaliation provision are not cotermi
nous. The scope of the antiretaliation provision extends be
yond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory
acts and harm. We therefore reject the standards applied
in the Courts of Appeals that have treated the antiretaliation
provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the
antidiscrimination provision and that have limited actionable
retaliation to so-called “ultimate employment decisions.”
See supra, at 60.
B
The antiretaliation provision protects an individual not
from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an
injury or harm. As we have explained, the Courts of Ap
peals have used differing language to describe the level of
seriousness to which this harm must rise before it becomes
actionable retaliation. We agree with the formulation set
forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits.

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In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse,
“which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’ ” Rochon, 438 F. 3d, at 1219 (quoting Wash
ington, 420 F. 3d, at 662).
We speak of material adversity because we believe it is
important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title
VII, we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code
for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Off
shore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998); see Faragher,
524 U. S., at 788 ( judicial standards for sexual harassment
must “filter out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribula
tions of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive
language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’ ”).
An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior
cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or
minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all
employees experience. See 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman,
Employment Discrimination Law 669 (3d ed. 1996) (noting
that “courts have held that personality conflicts at work that
generate antipathy” and “ ‘snubbing’ by supervisors and
co-workers” are not actionable under § 704(a)). The anti
retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference
with “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms.
Robinson, 519 U. S., at 346. It does so by prohibiting em
ployer actions that are likely “to deter victims of discrimina
tion from complaining to the EEOC,” the courts, and their
employers. Ibid. And normally petty slights, minor an
noyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create
such deterrence. See 2 EEOC 1998 Manual § 8, p. 8–13.
We refer to reactions of a reasonable employee because
we believe that the provision’s standard for judging harm
must be objective. An objective standard is judicially ad
ministrable. It avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrep
ancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plain

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tiff ’s unusual subjective feelings. We have emphasized the
need for objective standards in other Title VII contexts, and
those same concerns animate our decision here. See, e. g.,
Suders, 542 U. S., at 141 (constructive discharge doctrine);
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (hos
tile work environment doctrine).
We phrase the standard in general terms because the sig
nificance of any given act of retaliation will often depend
upon the particular circumstances. Context matters. “The
real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations,
and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”
Oncale, supra, at 81–82. A schedule change in an employ
ee’s work schedule may make little difference to many work
ers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with
school-age children. Cf., e. g., Washington, supra, at 662
(finding flex-time schedule critical to employee with disabled
child). A supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch
is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight. But to re
taliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training
lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s profes
sional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee
from complaining about discrimination. See 2 EEOC 1998
Manual § 8, p. 8–14. Hence, a legal standard that speaks in
general terms rather than specific prohibited acts is prefera
ble, for an “act that would be immaterial in some situations
is material in others.” Washington, supra, at 661.
Finally, we note that contrary to the claim of the concur
rence, this standard does not require a reviewing court or
jury to consider “the nature of the discrimination that led to
the filing of the charge.” Post, at 78 (Alito, J., concurring
in judgment). Rather, the standard is tied to the challenged
retaliatory act, not the underlying conduct that forms the
basis of the Title VII complaint. By focusing on the materi
ality of the challenged action and the perspective of a reason

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70 BURLINGTON N. & S. F. R. CO. v. WHITE
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able person in the plaintiff ’s position, we believe this stand
ard will screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing
those acts that are likely to dissuade employees from com
plaining or assisting in complaints about discrimination.
III
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we believe
that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the
jury’s verdict on White’s retaliation claim. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150–151
(2000). The jury found that two of Burlington’s actions
amounted to retaliation: the reassignment of White from
forklift duty to standard track laborer tasks and the 37-day
suspension without pay.
Burlington does not question the jury’s determination that
the motivation for these acts was retaliatory. But it does
question the statutory significance of the harm these acts
caused. The District Court instructed the jury to deter
mine whether respondent “suffered a materially adverse
change in the terms or conditions of her employment,” App.
63, and the Sixth Circuit upheld the jury’s finding based on
that same stringent interpretation of the antiretaliation pro
vision (the interpretation that limits § 704 to the same
employment-related conduct forbidden by § 703). Our hold
ing today makes clear that the jury was not required to find
that the challenged actions were related to the terms or con
ditions of employment. And insofar as the jury also found
that the actions were “materially adverse,” its findings are
adequately supported.
First, Burlington argues that a reassignment of duties
cannot constitute retaliatory discrimination where, as here,
both the former and present duties fall within the same job
description. Brief for Petitioner 24–25. We do not see why
that is so. Almost every job category involves some respon
sibilities and duties that are less desirable than others.
Common sense suggests that one good way to discourage

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an employee such as White from bringing discrimination
charges would be to insist that she spend more time per
forming the more arduous duties and less time performing
those that are easier or more agreeable. That is presumably
why the EEOC has consistently found “[r]etaliatory work
assignments” to be a classic and “widely recognized” exam
ple of “forbidden retaliation.” 2 EEOC 1991 Manual § 614.7,
pp. 614–31 to 614–32; see also 1972 Reference Manual § 495.2
(noting Commission decision involving an employer’s order
ing an employee “to do an unpleasant work assignment in
retaliation” for filing racial discrimination complaint); Dec.
No. 74–77, CCH EEOC Decisions (1983) ¶ 6417 (1974) (“Em
ployers have been enjoined” under Title VII “from imposing
unpleasant work assignments upon an employee for filing
charges”).
To be sure, reassignment of job duties is not automatically
actionable. Whether a particular reassignment is materi
ally adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particu
lar case, and “should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff ’s position, considering ‘all
the circumstances.’ ” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 81. But here,
the jury had before it considerable evidence that the track
laborer duties were “by all accounts more arduous and dirt
ier”; that the “forklift operator position required more quali
fications, which is an indication of prestige”; and that “the
forklift operator position was objectively considered a better
job and the male employees resented White for occupying
it.” 364 F. 3d, at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on this record, a jury could reasonably conclude that
the reassignment of responsibilities would have been materi
ally adverse to a reasonable employee.
Second, Burlington argues that the 37-day suspension
without pay lacked statutory significance because Burlington
ultimately reinstated White with backpay. Burlington says
that “it defies reason to believe that Congress would have
considered a rescinded investigatory suspension with full

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Opinion of the Court
back pay” to be unlawful, particularly because Title VII,
throughout much of its history, provided no relief in an equi
table action for victims in White’s position. Brief for
Petitioner 36.
We do not find Burlington’s last mentioned reference to
the nature of Title VII’s remedies convincing. After all,
throughout its history, Title VII has provided for injunctions
to “bar like discrimination in the future,” Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418 (1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted), an important form of relief. Pub. L. 88–352,
§ 706(g), 78 Stat. 261, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–5(g).
And we have no reason to believe that a court could not
have issued an injunction where an employer suspended an
employee for retaliatory purposes, even if that employer
later provided backpay. In any event, Congress amended
Title VII in 1991 to permit victims of intentional discrimina
tion to recover compensatory (as White received here) and
punitive damages, concluding that the additional remedies
were necessary to “ ‘help make victims whole.’ ” West v.
Gibson, 527 U. S. 212, 219 (1999) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 102–
40, pt. 1, pp. 64–65 (1991)); see 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (b).
We would undermine the significance of that congressional
judgment were we to conclude that employers could avoid
liability in these circumstances.
Neither do we find convincing any claim of insufficient evi
dence. White did receive backpay. But White and her
family had to live for 37 days without income. They did not
know during that time whether or when White could return
to work. Many reasonable employees would find a month
without a paycheck to be a serious hardship. And White
described to the jury the physical and emotional hardship
that 37 days of having “no income, no money” in fact caused.
Brief for Respondent 4, n. 13 (“ ‘That was the worst Christ
mas I had out of my life. No income, no money, and that
made all of us feel bad. . . . I got very depressed’ ”). Indeed,
she obtained medical treatment for her emotional distress.

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A reasonable employee facing the choice between retaining
her job (and paycheck) and filing a discrimination complaint
might well choose the former. That is to say, an indefinite
suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent, even if
the suspended employee eventually received backpay. Cf.
Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 292 (“[I]t needs no argument to
show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate
to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substand
ard conditions”). Thus, the jury’s conclusion that the 37
day suspension without pay was materially adverse was a
reasonable one.
IV
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, but I disagree with the Court’s
interpretation of the antiretaliation provision of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 257, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a). The majority’s interpre
tation has no basis in the statutory language and will, I fear,
lead to practical problems.
I
Two provisions of Title VII are important here. Section
703(a) prohibits a broad range of discriminatory employment
practices.1 Among other things, § 703(a) makes it unlawful
1 Section 703(a) states in pertinent part:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individu
al’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
“(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status

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for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, reli
gion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)
(emphasis added).
A complementary and closely related provision, § 704(a),
makes it unlawful to “discriminate against” an employee
for retaliatory purposes. Section 704(a) states in pertinent
part:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testi
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an inves
tigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a) (emphasis added).
In this case, we must ascertain the meaning of the term
“discriminate” in § 704(a). Two possible interpretations are
suggested by the language of §§ 703(a) and 704(a).
The first is the interpretation that immediately springs to
mind if § 704(a) is read by itself—i. e., that the term “discrim
inate” in § 704(a) means what the term literally means, to
treat differently. Respondent staunchly defends this inter
pretation, which the majority does not embrace, but this in
terpretation presents problems that are at least sufficient to
raise doubts about its correctness. Respondent’s interpre
tation makes § 703(a) narrower in scope than § 704(a) and
thus implies that the persons whom Title VII is principally
designed to protect—victims of discrimination based on race,
color, sex, national origin, or religion—receive less protec
tion than victims of retaliation. In addition, respondent’s
interpretation “makes a federal case” out of any small differ
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a) (emphasis added).

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ence in the way an employee who has engaged in protected
conduct is treated. On respondent’s view, a retaliation claim
must go to the jury if the employee creates a genuine issue
on such questions as whether the employee was given any
more or less work than others, was subjected to any more or
less supervision, or was treated in a somewhat less friendly
manner because of his protected activity. There is reason
to doubt that Congress meant to burden the federal courts
with claims involving relatively trivial differences in treat
ment. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523 U. S. 75, 81 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S.
775, 786–788 (1998).
The other plausible interpretation, and the one I favor,
reads §§ 703(a) and 704(a) together. Under this reading,
“discriminat[ion]” under § 704(a) means the discriminatory
acts reached by § 703(a)—chiefly, discrimination “with re
spect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.” This is not, admittedly, the most straightfor
ward reading of the bare language of § 704(a), but it is a rea
sonable reading that harmonizes §§ 703(a) and 704(a). It
also provides an objective standard that permits insignificant
claims to be weeded out at the summary judgment stage,
while providing ample protection for employees who are sub
jected to real retaliation.
The Courts of Appeals that have interpreted § 704(a) in
this way state that it requires a materially adverse employ
ment action. See, e. g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F. 3d
858, 865 (CA4 2001); Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212
F. 3d 571, 587 (CA11 2000), cert. denied, 531 U. S. 1076 (2001);
Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F. 3d 1286, 1300 (CA3 1997). In
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 761–762
(1998), we “import[ed]” this test for use in a different con
text—to define the term “tangible employment action,” a
concept we used to limit an employer’s liability for harass
ment carried out by its supervisors. We explained that “[a]
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change

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in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to pro
mote, reassignment with significantly different responsibil
ities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
Id., at 761.
II
The majority does not adopt either of the two interpreta
tions noted above. In Part II–A of its opinion, the majority
criticizes the interpretation that harmonizes §§ 703(a) and
704(a) as not sufficiently faithful to the language of § 704(a).
Although we found the materially adverse employment ac
tion test worthy of “import[ation]” in Ellerth, the majority
now argues that this test is too narrow because it permits
employers to take retaliatory measures outside the work
place. Ante, at 63–64 (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d
1211, 1213 (CADC 2006); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.
3d 980, 984, 986 (CA10 1996)). But the majority’s concern
is misplaced.
First, an employer who wishes to retaliate against an em
ployee for engaging in protected conduct is much more likely
to do so on the job. There are far more opportunities for
retaliation in that setting, and many forms of retaliation off
the job constitute crimes and are therefore especially risky.
Second, the materially adverse employment action test is
not limited to on-the-job retaliation, as Rochon, one of the
cases cited by the majority, illustrates. There, a Federal
Bureau of Investigation agent claimed that the Bureau had
retaliated against him by failing to provide the off-duty secu
rity that would otherwise have been furnished. See 438
F. 3d, at 1213–1214. But, for an FBI agent whose life may
be threatened during off-duty hours, providing security eas
ily qualifies as a term, condition, or privilege of employment.
Certainly, if the FBI had a policy of denying protection to
agents of a particular race, such discrimination would be ac
tionable under § 703(a).
But in Part II–B, rather than adopting the more literal
interpretation based on the language of § 704(a) alone, the

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majority instead puts that language aside and adopts a third
interpretation—one that has no grounding in the statutory
language. According to the majority, § 704(a) does not reach
all retaliatory differences in treatment but only those retal
iatory acts that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimina
tion.” Ante, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
I see no sound basis for this test. The language of
§ 704(a), which employs the unadorned term “discriminate,”
does not support this test. The unstated premise of the ma
jority’s reasoning seems to be that § 704(a)’s only purpose is
to prevent employers from taking those actions that are
likely to stop employees from complaining about discrimina
tion, but this unstated premise is unfounded. While surely
one of the purposes of § 704(a) is to prevent employers from
engaging in retaliatory measures that dissuade employees
from engaging in protected conduct, there is no reason to
suppose that this is § 704(a)’s only purpose. Indeed, the ma
jority itself identifies another purpose of the antiretaliation
provision: “to prevent harm to individuals” who assert their
rights. Ante, at 63. Under the majority’s test, however,
employer conduct that causes harm to an employee is permit
ted so long as the employer conduct is not so severe as to
dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.
III
The practical consequences of the test that the majority
adopts strongly suggest that this test is not what Congress
intended.
First, the majority’s test leads logically to perverse re
sults. Under the majority’s test, § 704(a) reaches retaliation
that well might dissuade an employee from making or sup
porting “a charge of discrimination.” Ante, at 68 (internal
quotation marks omitted). I take it that the phrase “a
charge of discrimination” means the particular charge that

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the employee in question filed,2 and if that is the proper in
terpretation, the nature of the discrimination that led to the
filing of the charge must be taken into account in applying
§ 704(a). Specifically, the majority’s interpretation logically
implies that the degree of protection afforded to a victim of
retaliation is inversely proportional to the severity of the
original act of discrimination that prompted the retaliation.
A reasonable employee who is subjected to the most severe
discrimination will not easily be dissuaded from filing a
charge by the threat of retaliation; the costs of filing the
charge, including possible retaliation, will have to be great
to outweigh the benefits, such as preventing the continuation
of the discrimination in the future and obtaining damages
and other relief for past discrimination. Because the possi
bility of relatively severe retaliation will not easily dissuade
this employee, the employer will be able to engage in rela
tively severe retaliation without incurring liability under
§ 704(a). On the other hand, an employee who is subjected
to a much milder form of discrimination will be much more
easily dissuaded. For this employee, the costs of complain
ing, including possible retaliation, will not have to be great
to outweigh the lesser benefits that might be obtained by
filing a charge. These topsy-turvy results make no sense.
Second, the majority’s conception of a reasonable worker
is unclear. Although the majority first states that its test is
whether a “reasonable worker” might well be dissuaded,
ante, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted), it later sug
2 The alternative interpretation—that “a charge” does not mean the spe
cific charge filed by the employee but an average or generic charge—would
be unworkable. Without gauging the severity of the initial alleged dis
crimination, a jury cannot possibly compare the costs and benefits of filing
a charge and, thus, cannot possibly decide whether the employer’s alleged
retaliatory conduct is severe enough to dissuade the filing of a charge. A
jury will have no way of assessing the severity of the average alleged act
of discrimination that leads to the filing of a charge, and, therefore, if
“a charge” means an average or generic charge, the majority’s test will
leave juries hopelessly at sea.

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gests that at least some individual characteristics of the ac
tual retaliation victim must be taken into account. The ma
jority comments that “the significance of any given act of
retaliation will often depend upon the particular circum
stances,” and provides the following illustration: “A schedule
change in an employee’s work schedule may make little dif
ference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a
young mother with school-age children.” Ante, at 69.
This illustration suggests that the majority’s test is not
whether an act of retaliation well might dissuade the average
reasonable worker, putting aside all individual characteris
tics, but, rather, whether the act well might dissuade a rea
sonable worker who shares at least some individual charac
teristics with the actual victim. The majority’s illustration
introduces three individual characteristics: age, gender, and
family responsibilities. How many more individual charac
teristics a court or jury may or must consider is unclear.
Finally, the majority’s interpretation contains a loose and
unfamiliar causation standard. As noted, the majority’s test
asks whether an employer’s retaliatory act “well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.” Ante, at 68 (internal quota
tion marks omitted; emphasis added). Especially in an area
of the law in which standards of causation are already com
plex, the introduction of this new and unclear standard is
unwelcome.
For these reasons, I would not adopt the majority’s test
but would hold that § 704(a) reaches only those discrimina
tory practices covered by § 703(a).
IV
Applying this interpretation, I would affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The actions taken against respond
ent—her assignment to new and substantially less desirable
duties and her suspension without pay—fall within the defi
nition of an “adverse employment action.”

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With respect to respondent’s reassignment, Ellerth spe
cifically identified a “reassignment with significantly differ
ent responsibilities” as a “tangible employment action.” 524
U. S., at 761. Here, as the Court of Appeals stated, “[i]n
essence, . . . the reassignment was a demotion.” 364 F. 3d
789, 803 (CA6 2004). The “new position was by all accounts
more arduous and ‘dirtier,’ ” ibid., and petitioner’s sole stated
rationale for the reassignment was that respondent’s prior
duties were better suited for someone with greater seniority.
This was virtually an admission that respondent was de
moted when those responsibilities were taken away from her.
I would hold that respondent’s suspension without pay
likewise satisfied the materially adverse employment action
test. Accordingly, although I would hold that a plaintiff as
serting a § 704(a) retaliation claim must show the same type
of materially adverse employment action that is required for
a § 703(a) discrimination claim, I would hold that respondent
met that standard in this case, and I, therefore, concur in
the judgment.