LANCE et al. v. COFFMAN, COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE

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437 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Per Curiam
LANCE et al. v. COFFMAN, COLORADO SECRETARY
OF STATE
on appeal from the united states district court for
the district of colorado
No. 06–641. Decided March 5, 2007
Appellants/Plaintiffs, Colorado citizens, filed this federal suit, arguing that
Article V, § 44, of the State Constitution, as interpreted by the State
Supreme Court, violates their rights under the Elections Clause of the
U. S. Constitution by depriving the state legislature of its responsibility
to draw congressional districts. After this Court vacated the District
Court’s initial judgment that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, the District Court held that citizen-plaintiffs had
standing to bring their Elections Clause challenge, but that the suit was
barred by issue preclusion.
Held:
1. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their Elections Clause claim.
“A plai ntiff raisi ng only a general ly avai lable grievance about
government . . . does not state an Article III case or controversy.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573–574. Here, the only
injury alleged is that the Elections Clause has not been followed—pre
cisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about govern
ment conduct this Court has refused to countenance in the past. See,
e. g., Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355,
and Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, distinguished.
2. The District Court’s judgment is affirmed as to the dismissal of
plaintiffs’ Petition Clause claim.
444 F. Supp. 2d 1149, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Per Curiam.
The Elections Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that the “Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis
added). When Colorado legislators were unable to redraw
congressional districts after the 2000 census to accommodate

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438 LANCE v. COFFMAN
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an additional Representative, a state court did it for them.
See Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P. 3d 642 (Colo. 2002). The legis
lature was able to pass a redistricting plan in 2003, which
Colorado’s Governor signed into law. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 2–1–101.
Colorado’s attorney general, however, filed an original ac
tion in the Colorado Supreme Court to enjoin Colorado’s
secretary of state from implementing this new plan, noting
that Article V, § 44, of the Colorado Constitution limits redis
tricting to once per census. The Colorado General Assem
bly intervened in the action to defend its plan. The Colo
rado Supreme Court granted the injunction, holding that
“judicially-created districts are just as binding and perma
nent as districts created by the General Assembly,” and that
the court-drawn plan must remain in effect until the next
decennial census. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79
P. 3d 1221, 1231 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U. S. 1093 (2004).
The court further held that this result did not offend the
Elections Clause of the United States Constitution. 79 P.
3d, at 1232.
Immediately after Salazar was decided, four Colorado citi
zens—none of whom had participated in Salazar—filed the
instant action in Federal District Court. They argued that
Article V, § 44, of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted
by the Colorado Supreme Court, violates their rights under
the Elections Clause.
The District Court initially determined that it lacked ju
risdiction to hear the suit in light of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, but we vacated and remanded for further proceed
ings. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U. S. 459 (2006) (per curiam).
On remand, the District Court held that the citizen-plaintiffs
had standing to bring their Elections Clause challenge.
Lance v. Dennis, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154–1155 (2006).
The court went on, however, to hold that the suit was barred
by issue preclusion because the plaintiffs “stand in privity
with the Secretary of State and the General Assembly,” who

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were on the losing side in the Salazar litigation. 444
F. Supp. 2d, at 1161. The concurring judge concluded that
appellants lacked standing to sue in the first place. Id., at
1162 (Porfilio, J., concurring in result). Plaintiffs appeal
once again.
Federal courts must determine that they have jurisdiction
before proceeding to the merits. Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 94–95 (1998).* Article
III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” One component of
the case-or-controversy requirement is standing, which re
quires a plaintiff to demonstrate the now-familiar elements
of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561 (1992). “We
have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally
available grievance about government—claiming only harm
to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more di
rectly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”
Id., at 573–574. See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U. S. 332, 344 (2006) (refusing to create an exception to
the general prohibition on taxpayer standing for challenges
to state tax or spending decisions, and observing that tax
payer standing has been rejected “because the alleged injury
is not ‘concrete and particularized,’ but instead a grievance
the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally’ ” (citation omitted)).
Our refusal to serve as a forum for generalized grievances
has a lengthy pedigree. In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S.
126 (1922), for example, a citizen sued the Secretary of State
*Our prior decision in this case did not violate this principle because
Rooker-Feldman concerns a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U. S. 280, 291
(2005), and “there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy,” Ruhrgas AG
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 578 (1999).

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440 LANCE v. COFFMAN
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and the Attorney General to challenge the procedures by
which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. We dis
missed the suit because it was “not a case within the mean
ing of . . . Article III.” Id., at 129. The plaintiff sought to
assert “only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require
that the Government be administered according to law and
that the public moneys be not wasted.” Ibid. “Obviously,”
we held, “this general right does not entitle a private citizen
to institute [a suit] in the federal courts.” Id., at 129–130.
Similarly, in Ex parte Le´vitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937) (per cu
riam), we dismissed a citizen suit claiming that Justice
Black’s appointment to this Court contravened the Constitu
tion’s Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, § 6, cl. 2. We found that
the petitioner had no interest in the suit “other than that of
a citizen and a member of the bar of this Court.” 302 U. S.,
at 634. That was not enough. To have standing, we ob
served, a plaintiff must have more than “a general interest
common to all members of the public.” Ibid. See also
Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mel
lon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (taxpayer standing cannot be
predicated upon an injury the plaintiff “suffers in some in
definite way in common with people generally”). Cf. Tyler
v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405, 406 (1900)
(“[E]ven in a proceeding which he prosecutes for the benefit
of the public . . . [the plaintiff] must generally aver an injury
peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of
his fellow citizens”).
A pair of more recent cases further illustrates the point.
In United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), a fed
eral taxpayer challenged the Government’s failure to disclose
certain CIA expenditures as a violation of the Constitution’s
Accounts Clause, which requires that “a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time.” Art. I, § 9,
cl. 7. Relying on Le´vitt, this Court dismissed the claim as a
“generalized grievance” that is “plainly undifferentiated and

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‘common to all members of the public.’ ” Richardson, 418
U. S., at 176–177. See also id., at 191 (Powell, J., concurring)
(“The power recognized in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137 (1803), is a potent one. Its prudent use seems to me
incompatible with unlimited notions of taxpayer and citizen
standing”).
The same day, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), we addressed standing to bring
a challenge under the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause,
which provides that “no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.” Art. I, § 6, cl. 2. Citizen-taxpayers
brought a lawsuit contending that Members of Congress who
were also members of the military Reserves violated the In
compatibility Clause. This Court dismissed for lack of
standing. It “reaffirm[ed] Le´vitt in holding that standing to
sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind al
leged here which is held in common by all members of the
public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the in
jury all citizens share.” 418 U. S., at 220. Refusing to en
tertain generalized grievances ensures that “there is a real
need to exercise the power of judicial review” in a particular
case, and it helps guarantee that courts fashion remedies “no
broader than required by the precise facts to which the
court’s ruling would be applied.” Id., at 221–222. In short,
it ensures that courts exercise power that is judicial in
nature.
The instant case parallels Fairchild, Le´vitt, and their
progeny. The plaintiffs here are four Colorado voters.
Three days after the Colorado Supreme Court issued its de
cision in Salazar, they filed a complaint alleging that “Article
V, § 44 of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted in Sala
zar, violated [the Elections Clause] of the U. S. Constitution
by depriving the state legislature of its responsibility to
draw congressional districts.” Lance v. Davidson, 379
F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (2005). In light of the discussion

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442 LANCE v. COFFMAN
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above, the problem with this allegation should be obvious:
The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically
the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is
precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance
about the conduct of government that we have refused to
countenance in the past. It is quite different from the sorts
of injuries alleged by plaintiffs in voting rights cases where
we have found standing. See, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S.
186, 207–208 (1962). Because plaintiffs assert no particular
ized stake in the litigation, we hold that they lack standing
to bring their Elections Clause claim.
Our two decisions construing the term “Legislature” in the
Elections Clause do not contradict this holding. Each of
these cases was filed by a relator on behalf of the State
rather than private citizens acting on their own behalf, as is
the case here. See State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 184 Minn.
647, 238 N. W. 792 (1931) (per curiam), rev’d sub nom. Smi
ley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hilde
brant, 241 U. S. 565 (1916). In neither case did we address
whether a private citizen had alleged a “concrete and partic
ularized” injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Article III.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado is therefore vacated in part, and the case
is remanded with instructions to dismiss the Elections
Clause claim for lack of standing. We affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of the Petition Clause claim.
It is so ordered.