SCOTT v. HARRIS

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372 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
SCOTT v. HARRIS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 05–1631. Argued February 26, 2007—Decided April 30, 2007
Deputy Timothy Scott, petitioner here, terminated a high-speed pursuit
of respondent’s car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the vehi
cle, causing it to leave the road and crash. Respondent was rendered
a quadriplegic. He filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleging, inter
alia, the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied Scott’s sum
mary judgment motion, which was based on qualified immunity. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal, concluding, inter
alia, that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1; that the use of such force in this context would
violate respondent’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force
during a seizure; and that a reasonable jury could so find.
Held: Because the car chase respondent initiated posed a substantial and
immediate risk of serious physical injury to others, Scott’s attempt to
terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable,
and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. Pp. 377–386.
(a) Qualified immunity requires resolution of a “threshold question:
Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201. Pp. 377–378.
(b) The record in this case includes a videotape capturing the events
in question. Where, as here, the record blatantly contradicts the plain
tiff ’s version of events so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling
on a summary judgment motion. Pp. 378–381.
(c) Viewing the facts in the light depicted by the videotape, it is clear
that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 381–386.
(1) Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers
rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute “deadly
force.” The Court there simply applied the Fourth Amendment’s “rea
sonableness” test to the use of a particular type of force in a particular
situation. That case has scant applicability to this one, which has vastly
different facts. Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted “deadly
force, ” what matters is whether those actions were reasonable.
Pp. 381–383.

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Syllabus
(2) In determining a seizure’s reasonableness, the Court balances
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental inter
ests allegedly justifying the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462 U. S.
696, 703. In weighing the high likelihood of serious injury or death to
respondent that Scott’s actions posed against the actual and imminent
threat that respondent posed to the lives of others, the Court takes
account of the number of lives at risk and the relative culpability of
the parties involved. Respondent intentionally placed himself and the
public in danger by unlawfully engaging in reckless, high-speed flight;
those who might have been harmed had Scott not forced respondent
off the road were entirely innocent. The Court concludes that it was
reasonable for Scott to take the action he did. It rejects respondent’s
argument that safety could have been ensured if the police simply
ceased their pursuit. The Court rules that a police officer’s attempt to
terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of
innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even
when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.
Pp. 383–386.
433 F. 3d 807, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ.,
joined. Ginsburg, J., post, p. 386, and Breyer, J., post, p. 387, filed con
curring opinions. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 389.
Philip W. Savrin argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Sun S. Choy and Orin S. Kerr.
Deputy Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him
on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant At
torney General Keisler, Jonathan L. Marcus, and Barbara
L. Herwig.
Craig T. Jones argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Andrew C. Clarke.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illi
nois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Gary Feiner
man, Solicitor General, and Michael Scodro, Deputy Solicitor General, by
Craig J. Tillery, Acting Attorney General of Alaska, by Roberto J.
Sa´ nchez-Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys

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374 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a law enforcement official can, con
sistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a flee
ing motorist from continuing his public-endangering flight by
ramming the motorist’s car from behind. Put another way:
Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at
risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s
flight from endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?
I
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respond
ent’s vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a
55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue
flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over.
Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what
General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama,
Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of Cali
fornia, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark
J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indi
ana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Jim
Hood of Mississippi, Mike McGrath of Montana, Kelly A. Ayotte of New
Hampshire, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson
of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsyl
vania, Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry McMaster of South Carolina,
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurt
leff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Robert F. McDonnell of
Virginia, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; and for the National Associa
tion of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda, Charles A. Rothfeld, Andrew J.
Pincus, and Dan Kahan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Hamilton P. Fox III, Steven R. Shapiro,
and Gerald R. Weber; for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers by Jonathan D. Hacker, Nicole A. Saharsky, and Pamela Har
ris; and for the National Police Accountability Project by Karen Blum,
Howard Friedman, and Myong J. Joun.
A brief of amicus curiae was filed for the Georgia Association of Chiefs
of Police, Inc., by Michael A. Caldwell.

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Opinion of the Court
is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85
miles per hour. The deputy radioed his dispatch to report
that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle, and broadcast its li
cense plate number. Petitioner, Deputy Timothy Scott,
heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along
with other officers. In the midst of the chase, respondent
pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was
nearly boxed in by the various police vehicles. Respondent
evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with
Scott’s police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off
once again down a two-lane highway.
Following respondent’s shopping center maneuvering,
which resulted in slight damage to Scott’s police car, Scott
took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and
nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to
attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Precision
Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which causes the
fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.” Brief for Petitioner 4.
Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told
to “ ‘[g]o ahead and take him out.’ ” Harris v. Coweta Cty.,
433 F. 3d 807, 811 (CA11 2005). Instead, Scott applied his
push bumper to the rear of respondent’s vehicle.1 As a
result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left
the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and
crashed. Respondent was badly injured and was rendered
a quadriplegic.
Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others
under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging, inter
alia, a violation of his federal constitutional rights, viz. use
1 Scott says he decided not to employ the PIT maneuver because he was
“concerned that the vehicles were moving too quickly to safely execute
the maneuver.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Respondent agrees that the PIT
maneuver could not have been safely employed. See Brief for Respond
ent 9. It is irrelevant to our analysis whether Scott had permission to
take the precise actions he took.

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376 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a motion
for summary judgment based on an assertion of qualified im
munity. The District Court denied the motion, finding that
“there are material issues of fact on which the issue of quali
fied immunity turns which present sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury.” Harris v. Coweta Cty.,
No. 3:01–CV–148–WBH (ND Ga., Sept. 23, 2003), App. to Pet.
for Cert. 41a–42a. On interlocutory appeal,2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the District Court’s decision to allow respondent’s Fourth
Amendment claim against Scott to proceed to trial.3 Taking
respondent’s view of the facts as given, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly force”
under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 (1985), and that the
use of such force in this context “would violate [respondent’s]
constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a
seizure. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Scott
violated [respondent’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” 433
F. 3d, at 816. The Court of Appeals further concluded that
“the law as it existed [at the time of the incident], was suffi
ciently clear to give reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair
notice’ that ramming a vehicle under these circumstances
was unlawful.” Id., at 817. The Court of Appeals thus con
cluded that Scott was not entitled to qualified immunity.
We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 991 (2006), and now reverse.
2 Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere de
fense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U. S. 511, 526 (1985). Thus, we have held that an order denying qualified
immunity is immediately appealable even though it is interlocutory; other
wise, it would be “effectively unreviewable.” Id., at 527. Further, “we
repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions
at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S.
224, 227 (1991) (per curiam).
3 None of the other claims respondent brought against Scott or any other
party are before this Court.

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II
In resolving questions of qualified immunity, courts are
required to resolve a “threshold question: Taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right? This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz,
533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, the court finds a
violation of a constitutional right, “the next, sequential step
is to ask whether the right was clearly established . . . in
light of the specific context of the case.” Ibid. Although
this ordering contradicts “[o]ur policy of avoiding unneces
sary adjudication of constitutional issues,” United States v.
Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 478 (1995) (citing Ash
wander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346–347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)), we have said that such a departure from prac
tice is “necessary to set forth principles which will become
the basis for a [future] holding that a right is clearly estab
lished,” Saucier, supra, at 201.4 We therefore turn to the
4 Prior to this Court’s announcement of Saucier’s “rigid ‘order of bat
tle,’ ” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201–202 (2004) (Breyer, J., con
curring), we had described this order of inquiry as the “better approach,”
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 841, n. 5 (1998), though
not one that was required in all cases. See id., at 858–859 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); id., at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). There has
been doubt expressed regarding the wisdom of Saucier’s decision to make
the threshold inquiry mandatory, especially in cases where the constitu
tional question is relatively difficult and the qualified immunity question
relatively straightforward. See, e. g., Brosseau, supra, at 201 (Breyer,
J., joined by Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring); Bunting v. Mellen,
541 U. S. 1019 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.,
respecting denial of certiorari); id., at 1025 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehn
quist, C. J., dissenting). See also Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580–584
(CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring). We need not address the wisdom of
Saucier in this case, however, because the constitutional question with
which we are presented is, as discussed in Part III–B, infra, easily de
cided. Deciding that question first is thus the “better approach,” Lewis,
supra, at 841, n. 5, regardless of whether it is required.

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378 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
threshold inquiry: whether Deputy Scott’s actions violated
the Fourth Amendment.
III
A
The first step in assessing the constitutionality of Scott’s
actions is to determine the relevant facts. As this case was
decided on summary judgment, there have not yet been fac
tual findings by a judge or jury, and respondent’s version
of events (unsurprisingly) differs substantially from Scott’s
version. When things are in such a posture, courts are re
quired to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences “in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary
judgment] motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S.
654, 655 (1962) (per curiam); Saucier, supra, at 201. In
qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting (as the
Court of Appeals did here) the plaintiff ’s version of the facts.
There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: existence
in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question.
There are no allegations or indications that this videotape
was doctored or altered in any way, nor any contention that
what it depicts differs from what actually happened. The
videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the story
told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.5
For example, the Court of Appeals adopted respondent’s as
sertions that, during the chase, “there was little, if any, ac
tual threat to pedestrians or other motorists, as the roads
were mostly empty and [respondent] remained in control of
his vehicle.” 433 F. 3d, at 815. Indeed, reading the lower
court’s opinion, one gets the impression that respondent,
5 Justice Stevens suggests that our reaction to the videotape is some
how idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting its con
tents. See post, at 392 (dissenting opinion) (“In sum, the factual state
ments by the Court of Appeals quoted by the Court . . . were entirely
accurate”). We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself. See
Record 36, Exh. A, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/
video/scott_v_harris.html and in Clerk of Court’s case file.

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rather than fleeing from police, was attempting to pass his
driving test:
“[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint,
[respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed
for turns and intersections, and typically used his indica
tors for turns. He did not run any motorists off the
road. Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the shop
ping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian
and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Signifi
cantly, by the time the parties were back on the highway
and Scott rammed [respondent], the motorway had been
cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because
of police blockades of the nearby intersections.” Id., at
815–816 (citations omitted).
The videotape tells quite a different story. There we see
respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in
the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see
it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the
double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions
to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit.6 We see it
run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of
time in the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by
numerous police cars forced to engage in the same hazardous
6 Justice Stevens hypothesizes that these cars “had already pulled to
the side of the road or were driving along the shoulder because they heard
the police sirens or saw the flashing lights,” so that “[a] jury could cer
tainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater risk than
persons who take the same action in response to a speeding ambulance.”
Post, at 391. It is not our experience that ambulances and fire engines
careen down two-lane roads at 85-plus miles per hour, with an unmarked
scout car out in front of them. The risk they pose to the public is vastly
less than what respondent created here. But even if that were not so, it
would in no way lead to the conclusion that it was unreasonable to elimi
nate the threat to life that respondent posed. Society accepts the risk of
speeding ambulances and fire engines in order to save life and property;
it need not (and assuredly does not) accept a similar risk posed by a reck
less motorist fleeing the police.

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380 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
maneuvers just to keep up. Far from being the cautious and
controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the
video more closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of
the most frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent
bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.7
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there
is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party
has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ”
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U. S. 574, 586–587 (1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no gen
uine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247–248 (1986). When opposing parties
tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contra
dicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for pur
poses of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
That was the case here with regard to the factual issue
whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to endan
ger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have
believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied
7 This is not to say that each and every factual statement made by the
Court of Appeals is inaccurate. For example, the videotape validates the
court’s statement that when Scott rammed respondent’s vehicle it was
not threatening any other vehicles or pedestrians. (Undoubtedly Scott
waited for the road to be clear before executing his maneuver.)

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on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the
light depicted by the videotape.
B
Judging the matter on that basis, we think it is quite clear
that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Scott does not contest that his decision to terminate the
car chase by ramming his bumper into respondent’s vehicle
constituted a “seizure.” “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure
[occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596–597 (1989) (em
phasis deleted). See also id., at 597 (“If . . . the police
cruiser had pulled alongside the fleeing car and sideswiped
it, producing the crash, then the termination of the suspect’s
freedom of movement would have been a seizure”). It is
also conceded, by both sides, that a claim of “excessive force
in the course of making [a] . . . ‘seizure’ of [the] person . . . [is]
properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective
reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S.
386, 388 (1989). The question we need to answer is whether
Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable.8
1
Respondent urges us to analyze this case as we analyzed
Garner, 471 U. S. 1. See Brief for Respondent 16–29. We
must first decide, he says, whether the actions Scott took
8 Justice Stevens incorrectly declares this to be “a question of fact
best reserved for a jury,” and complains we are “usurp[ing] the jury’s
factfinding function.” Post, at 395. At the summary judgment stage,
however, once we have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by
the record, see Part III–A, supra, the reasonableness of Scott’s actions—
or, in Justice Stevens’ parlance, “[w]hether [respondent’s] actions have
risen to a level warranting deadly force,” post, at 395—is a pure question
of law.

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constituted “deadly force.” (He defines “deadly force” as
“any use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of
causing death or serious bodily injury,” id., at 19.) If so,
respondent claims that Garner prescribes certain precondi
tions that must be met before Scott’s actions can survive
Fourth Amendment scrutiny: (1) The suspect must have
posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the
officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary
to prevent escape; 9 and (3) where feasible, the officer must
have given the suspect some warning. See Brief for Re
spondent 17–18 (citing Garner, supra, at 9–12). Since these
Garner preconditions for using deadly force were not met in
this case, Scott’s actions were per se unreasonable.
Respondent’s argument falters at its first step; Garner did
not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid pre
conditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute “deadly
force.” Garner was simply an application of the Fourth
Amendment’s “reasonableness” test, Graham, supra, at 388,
to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situa
tion. Garner held that it was unreasonable to kill a “young,
slight, and unarmed” burglary suspect, 471 U. S., at 21, by
shooting him “in the back of the head” while he was running
away on foot, id., at 4, and when the officer “could not reason
9 Respondent, like the Court of Appeals, defines this second precondition
as “ ‘necessary to prevent escape,’ ” Brief for Respondent 17; 433 F. 3d 807,
813 (CA11 2005) (quoting Garner, 471 U. S., at 11). But that quote from
Garner is taken out of context. The necessity described in Garner was,
in fact, the need to prevent “serious physical harm, either to the officer or
to others.” Ibid. By way of example only, Garner hypothesized that
deadly force may be used “if necessary to prevent escape” when the sus
pect is known to have “committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm,” ibid., so that his mere
being at large poses an inherent danger to society. Respondent did not
pose that type of inherent threat to society, since (prior to the car chase)
he had committed only a minor traffic offense and, as far as the police were
aware, had no prior criminal record. But in this case, unlike in Garner,
it was respondent’s flight itself (by means of a speeding automobile) that
posed the threat of “serious physical harm . . . to others.” Ibid.

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ably have believed that [the suspect] . . . posed any threat,”
and “never attempted to justify his actions on any basis
other than the need to prevent an escape,” id., at 21. What
ever Garner said about the factors that might have justified
shooting the suspect in that case, such “preconditions” have
scant applicability to this case, which has vastly different
facts. “Garner had nothing to do with one car striking an
other or even with car chases in general . . . . A police car’s
bumping a fleeing car is, in fact, not much like a policeman’s
shooting a gun so as to hit a person.” Adams v. St. Lucie
County Sheriff ’s Dept., 962 F. 2d 1563, 1577 (CA11 1992)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting), adopted by 998 F. 2d 923 (CA11
1993) (en banc) (per curiam). Nor is the threat posed by the
flight on foot of an unarmed suspect even remotely compara
ble to the extreme danger to human life posed by respondent
in this case. Although respondent’s attempt to craft an
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context is
admirable, in the end we must still slosh our way through
the factbound morass of “reasonableness.” Whether or not
Scott’s actions constituted application of “deadly force,” all
that matters is whether Scott’s actions were reasonable.
2
In determining the reasonableness of the manner in which
a seizure is effected, “[w]e must balance the nature and qual
ity of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental in
terests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v.
Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983). Scott defends his actions by
pointing to the paramount governmental interest in ensuring
public safety, and respondent nowhere suggests this was not
the purpose motivating Scott’s behavior. Thus, in judging
whether Scott’s actions were reasonable, we must consider
the risk of bodily harm that Scott’s actions posed to respond
ent in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying
to eliminate. Although there is no obvious way to quantify

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the risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that
respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives
of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other
civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase.
See Part III–A, supra. It is equally clear that Scott’s ac
tions posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to
respondent—though not the near certainty of death posed
by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head, see
Garner, supra, at 4, or pulling alongside a fleeing motorist’s
car and shooting the motorist, cf. Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F. 3d
1323, 1326–1327 (CA11 2003). So how does a court go about
weighing the perhaps lesser probability of injuring or killing
numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger probability
of injuring or killing a single person? We think it appro
priate in this process to take into account not only the num
ber of lives at risk, but also their relative culpability. It was
respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and
the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless,
high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice be
tween two evils that Scott confronted. Multiple police cars,
with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing
respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored their warning
to stop. By contrast, those who might have been harmed
had Scott not taken the action he did were entirely innocent.
We have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for
Scott to take the action that he did.10
10 The Court of Appeals cites Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593,
595 (1989), for its refusal to “countenance the argument that by continuing
to flee, a suspect absolves a pursuing police officer of any possible liability
for all ensuing actions during the chase,” 433 F. 3d, at 816. The only
question in Brower was whether a police roadblock constituted a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. In deciding that question, the relative
culpability of the parties is, of course, irrelevant; a seizure occurs when
ever the police are “ ‘responsib[le] for the termination of [a person’s] move
ment,’ ” 433 F. 3d, at 816 (quoting Brower, supra, at 595), regardless of
the reason for the termination. Culpability is relevant, however, to the
reasonableness of the seizure—to whether preventing possible harm to

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385 Cite as: 550 U. S. 372 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
But wait, says respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public
equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely
avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pursuit? We
think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped
for the best. Whereas Scott’s action—ramming respondent
off the road—was certain to eliminate the risk that respond
ent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not. First of
all, there would have been no way to convey convincingly to
respondent that the chase was off, and that he was free to
go. Had respondent looked in his rearview mirror and seen
the police cars deactivate their flashing lights and turn
around, he would have had no idea whether they were truly
letting him get away, or simply devising a new strategy
for capture. Perhaps the police knew a shortcut he didn’t
know, and would reappear down the road to intercept him;
or perhaps they were setting up a roadblock in his path.
Cf. Brower, 489 U. S., at 594. Given such uncertainty, re
spondent might have been just as likely to respond by contin
uing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his
brow.11
Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the po
lice to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they
drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in dan
ger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would
create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is
within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour,
crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few
red lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this
the innocent justifies exposing to possible harm the person threatening
them.
11 Contrary to Justice Stevens’ assertions, we do not “assum[e] that
dangers caused by flight from a police pursuit will continue after the pur
suit ends,” post, at 394, nor do we make any “factual assumptions,” post,
at 393, with respect to what would have happened if the police had gone
home. We simply point out the uncertainties regarding what would have
happened, in response to respondent’s factual assumption that the high
speed flight would have ended.

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386 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Ginsburg, J., concurring
invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we
lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to
terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens
the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk
of serious injury or death.
* * *
The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed
a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to
others; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Scott’s
attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the
road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judg
ment. The Court of Appeals’ judgment to the contrary is
reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and would underscore two
points. First, I do not read today’s decision as articulating
a mechanical, per se rule. Cf. post, at 389 (Breyer, J., con
curring). The inquiry described by the Court, ante, at 383–
385 and this page, is situation specific. Among relevant
considerations: Were the lives and well-being of others (mo
torists, pedestrians, police officers) at risk? Was there a
safer way, given the time, place, and circumstances, to stop
the fleeing vehicle? “[A]dmirable” as “[an] attempt to craft
an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context
[may be],” the Court explains, “in the end we must still slosh
our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’ ”
Ante, at 383.
Second, were this case suitable for resolution on qualified
immunity grounds, without reaching the constitutional ques
tion, Justice Breyer’s discussion would be engaging. See
post, at 387–389 (urging the Court to overrule Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U. S. 194 (2001)). In joining the Court’s opinion,

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Breyer, J., concurring
however, Justice Breyer apparently shares the view that,
in the appeal before us, the constitutional question warrants
an answer. The video footage of the car chase, he agrees,
demonstrates that the officer’s conduct did not transgress
Fourth Amendment limitations. See post this page. Con
fronting Saucier, therefore, is properly reserved for another
day and case. See ante, at 377, n. 4.
Justice Breyer, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with one suggestion and two
qualifications. Because watching the video footage of the
car chase made a difference to my own view of the case,
I suggest that the interested reader take advantage of the
link in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 378, n. 5, and watch it.
Having done so, I do not believe a reasonable jury could, in
this instance, find that Officer Timothy Scott (who joined the
chase late in the day and did not know the specific reason
why the respondent was being pursued) acted in violation of
the Constitution.
Second, the video makes clear the highly fact-dependent
nature of this constitutional determination. And that fact
dependency supports the argument that we should overrule
the requirement, announced in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194
(2001), that lower courts must first decide the “constitutional
question” before they turn to the “qualified immunity ques
tion.” See id., at 200 (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether
a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts
alleged”). Instead, lower courts should be free to decide the
two questions in whatever order makes sense in the context
of a particular case. Although I do not object to our de
ciding the constitutional question in this particular case,
I believe that in order to lift the burden from lower courts
we can and should reconsider Saucier’s requirement as well.
Sometimes (e. g., where a defendant is clearly entitled
to qualified immunity) Saucier’s fixed order-of-battle rule
wastes judicial resources in that it may require courts to

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388 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Breyer, J., concurring
answer a difficult constitutional question unnecessarily.
Sometimes (e. g., where the defendant loses the constitu
tional question but wins on qualified immunity) that order
of-battle rule may immunize an incorrect constitutional rul
ing from review. Sometimes, as here, the order-of-battle
rule will spawn constitutional rulings in areas of law so fact
dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clar
ity. And frequently the order-of-battle rule violates that
older, wiser judicial counsel “not to pass on questions of con
stitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101,
105 (1944); see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of ”). In a sharp departure from
this counsel, Saucier requires courts to embrace unnecessary
constitutional questions not to avoid them.
It is not surprising that commentators, judges, and, in this
case, 28 States in an amicus brief have invited us to recon
sider Saucier’s requirement. See Leval, Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1249,
1275 (2006) (calling the requirement “a puzzling misadven
ture in constitutional dictum”); Dirrane v. Brookline Police
Dept., 315 F. 3d 65, 69–70 (CA1 2002) (referring to the re
quirement as “an uncomfortable exercise” when “the answer
whether there was a violation may depend on a kaleidoscope
of facts not yet fully developed”); Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d
565, 580–584 (CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring); Brief for
State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae. I would accept
that invitation.
While this Court should generally be reluctant to overturn
precedents, stare decisis concerns are at their weakest here.
See, e. g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Con
siderations in favor of stare decisis” are at their weakest
in cases “involving procedural and evidentiary rules”). The

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Stevens, J., dissenting
order-of-battle rule is relatively novel, it primarily affects
judges, and there has been little reliance upon it.
Third, I disagree with the Court insofar as it articulates a
per se rule. The majority states: “A police officer’s attempt
to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threat
ens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist
at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 386. This
statement is too absolute. As Justice Ginsburg points
out, ibid., whether a high-speed chase violates the Fourth
Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than
the majority’s rule reflects. With these qualifications, I join
the Court’s opinion.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Today, the Court asks whether an officer may “take ac
tions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or
death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering
the lives of innocent bystanders.” Ante, at 374. Depend
ing on the circumstances, the answer may be an obvious
“yes,” an obvious “no,” or sufficiently doubtful that the ques
tion of the reasonableness of the officer’s actions should be
decided by a jury, after a review of the degree of danger and
the alternatives available to the officer. A high-speed chase
in a desert in Nevada is, after all, quite different from one
that travels through the heart of Las Vegas.
Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion of
a nighttime chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where
no pedestrians or other “bystanders” were present, but
tressed by uninformed speculation about the possible conse
quences of discontinuing the chase, eight of the jurors on this
Court reach a verdict that differs from the views of the
judges on both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on
Georgia roads than we are. The Court’s justification for this
unprecedented departure from our well-settled standard of

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390 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Stevens, J., dissenting
review of factual determinations made by a district court
and affirmed by a court of appeals is based on its mistaken
view that the Court of Appeals’ description of the facts was
“blatantly contradicted by the record” and that respondent’s
version of the events was “so utterly discredited by the
record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.”
Ante, at 380.
Rather than supporting the conclusion that what we see
on the video “resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the
most frightening sort,” ibid.,1 the tape actually confirms,
rather than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the
factual questions at issue. More importantly, it surely does
not provide a principled basis for depriving the respondent
of his right to have a jury evaluate the question whether the
police officers’ decision to use deadly force to bring the chase
to an end was reasonable.
Omitted from the Court’s description of the initial speed
ing violation is the fact that respondent was on a four-lane
portion of Highway 34 when the officer clocked his speed at
73 miles per hour and initiated the chase.2 More signifi
cantly—and contrary to the Court’s assumption that re
spondent’s vehicle “force[d] cars traveling in both directions
1 I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by two
or three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or explo
sions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming by in the
opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most high-speed driving
took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways—when split
second judgments about the risk of passing a slowpoke in the face of on
coming traffic were routine—they might well have reacted to the video
tape more dispassionately.
2 According to the District Court record, when respondent was clocked
at 73 miles per hour, the deputy who recorded his speed was sitting in his
patrol car on Highway 34 between Lora Smith Road and Sullivan Road in
Coweta County, Georgia. At that point, as well as at the point at which
Highway 34 intersects with Highway 154—where the deputy caught up
with respondent and the videotape begins—Highway 34 is a four-lane
road, consisting of two lanes in each direction with a wide grass divider
separating the flow of traffic.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit,” ante, at
379—a fact unmentioned in the text of the opinion explains
why those cars pulled over prior to being passed by respond
ent. The sirens and flashing lights on the police cars follow
ing respondent gave the same warning that a speeding am
bulance or fire engine would have provided.3 The 13 cars
that respondent passed on his side of the road before enter
ing the shopping center, and both of the cars that he passed
on the right after leaving the center, no doubt had already
pulled to the side of the road or were driving along the shoul
der because they heard the police sirens or saw the flashing
lights before respondent or the police cruisers approached.4
A jury could certainly conclude that those motorists were
exposed to no greater risk than persons who take the same
action in response to a speeding ambulance, and that their
reactions were fully consistent with the evidence that re
spondent, though speeding, retained full control of his
vehicle.
The police sirens also minimized any risk that may have
arisen from running “multiple red lights,” ibid. In fact, re
spondent and his pursuers went through only two intersec
tions with stop lights and in both cases all other vehicles
in sight were stationary, presumably because they had been
warned of the approaching speeders. Incidentally, the vid
eos do show that the lights were red when the police cars
passed through them but, because the cameras were farther
away when respondent did so and it is difficult to discern the
color of the signal at that point, it is not entirely clear that
3 While still on the four-lane portion of Highway 34, the deputy who had
clocked respondent’s speed turned on his blue light and siren in an attempt
to get respondent to pull over. It was when the deputy turned on his
blue light that the dash-mounted video camera was activated and began
to record the pursuit.
4 Although perhaps understandable, because their volume on the sound
recording is low (possibly due to sound proofing in the officer’s vehicle),
the Court appears to minimize the significance of the sirens audible
throughout the tape recording of the pursuit.

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392 SCOTT v. HARRIS
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he ran either or both of the red lights. In any event, the
risk of harm to the stationary vehicles was minimized by the
sirens, and there is no reason to believe that respondent
would have disobeyed the signals if he were not being
pursued.
My colleagues on the jury saw respondent “swerve around
more than a dozen other cars,” and “force cars traveling in
both directions to their respective shoulders,” ibid., but they
apparently discounted the possibility that those cars were
already out of the pursuit’s path as a result of hearing the
sirens. Even if that were not so, passing a slower vehicle
on a two-lane road always involves some degree of swerving
and is not especially dangerous if there are no cars coming
from the opposite direction. At no point during the chase
did respondent pull into the opposite lane other than to pass
a car in front of him; he did the latter no more than five
times and, on most of those occasions, used his turn signal.
On none of these occasions was there a car traveling in the
opposite direction. In fact, at one point, when respondent
found himself behind a car in his own lane and there were
cars traveling in the other direction, he slowed and waited
for the cars traveling in the other direction to pass before
overtaking the car in front of him while using his turn signal
to do so. This is hardly the stuff of Hollywood. To the con
trary, the video does not reveal any incidents that could even
be remotely characterized as “close calls.”
In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals
quoted by the Court, ante, at 378–379, were entirely accu
rate. That court did not describe respondent as a “cautious”
driver as my colleagues imply, ante, at 380, but it did cor
rectly conclude that there is no evidence that he ever lost
control of his vehicle. That court also correctly pointed out
that the incident in the shopping center parking lot did not
create any risk to pedestrians or other vehicles because the
chase occurred just before 11 p.m. on a weekday night and
the center was closed. It is apparent from the record (in

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Stevens, J., dissenting
cluding the videotape) that local police had blocked off in
tersections to keep respondent from entering residential
neighborhoods and possibly endangering other motorists.
I would add that the videos also show that no pedestrians,
parked cars, sidewalks, or residences were visible at any
time during the chase. The only “innocent bystanders” who
were placed “at great risk of serious injury,” ibid., were the
drivers who either pulled off the road in response to the si
rens or passed respondent in the opposite direction when he
was driving on his side of the road.
I recognize, of course, that even though respondent’s origi
nal speeding violation on a four-lane highway was rather or
dinary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight was a serious
offense that merited severe punishment. It was not, how
ever, a capital offense, or even an offense that justified the
use of deadly force rather than an abandonment of the chase.
The Court’s concern about the “imminent threat to the lives
of any pedestrians who might have been present,” ante, at
384, while surely valid in an appropriate case, should be dis
counted in a case involving a nighttime chase in an area
where no pedestrians were present.
What would have happened if the police had decided to
abandon the chase? We now know that they could have ap
prehended respondent later because they had his license
plate number. Even if that were not true, and even if he
would have escaped any punishment at all, the use of deadly
force in this case was no more appropriate than the use of a
deadly weapon against a fleeing felon in Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U. S. 1 (1985). In any event, any uncertainty about the
result of abandoning the pursuit has not prevented the Court
from basing its conclusions on its own factual assumptions.5
5 In noting that Scott’s action “was certain to eliminate the risk that
respondent posed to the public” while “ceasing pursuit was not,” the Court
prioritizes total elimination of the risk of harm to the public over the risk
that respondent may be seriously injured or even killed. Ante, at 385
(emphasis in original). The Court is only able to make such a statement

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394 SCOTT v. HARRIS
Stevens, J., dissenting
The Court attempts to avoid the conclusion that deadly force
was unnecessary by speculating that if the officers had let
him go, respondent might have been “just as likely” to con
tinue to drive recklessly as to slow down and wipe his brow.
Ante, at 385. That speculation is unconvincing as a matter
of common sense and improper as a matter of law. Our duty
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non
moving party would foreclose such speculation if the Court
had not used its observation of the video as an excuse for
replacing the rule of law with its ad hoc judgment. There
is no evidentiary basis for an assumption that dangers caused
by flight from a police pursuit will continue after the pursuit
ends. Indeed, rules adopted by countless police depart
ments throughout the country are based on a judgment that
differs from the Court’s. See, e. g., App. to Brief for Georgia
Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., as Amicus Curiae A–52
(“During a pursuit, the need to apprehend the suspect should
always outweigh the level of danger created by the pursuit.
When the immediate danger to the public created by the
pursuit is greater than the immediate or potential danger to
the public should the suspect remain at large, then the pur
suit should be discontinued or terminated. . . . [P]ursuits
should usually be discontinued when the violator’s identity
has been established to the point that later apprehension can
be accomplished without danger to the public”).
Although Garner may not, as the Court suggests, “estab
lish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions”
by assuming, based on its interpretation of events on the videotape, that
the risk of harm posed in this case, and the type of harm involved, rose to
a level warranting deadly force. These are the same types of questions
that, when disputed, are typically resolved by a jury; this is why both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals saw fit to have them be so de
cided. Although the Court claims only to have drawn factual inferences
in respondent’s favor “to the extent supportable by the record,” ante, at
381, n. 8 (emphasis in original), its own view of the record has clearly
precluded it from doing so to the same extent as the two courts through
which this case has already traveled, see ante, at 376, 378–379.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
for the use of deadly force, ante, at 382, it did set a threshold
under which the use of deadly force would be considered con
stitutionally unreasonable:
“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unrea
sonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus,
if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or
there is probable cause to believe that he has committed
a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction
of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if
necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given.” 471 U. S., at 11–12.
Whether a person’s actions have risen to a level warranting
deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a jury.6
Here, the Court has usurped the jury’s factfinding function
and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the four other judges to
review the case unreasonable. It chastises the Court of Ap
peals for failing to “vie[w] the facts in the light depicted by
the videotape” and implies that no reasonable person could
view the videotape and come to the conclusion that deadly
force was unjustified. Ante, at 380–381. However, the
three judges on the Court of Appeals panel apparently did
view the videotapes entered into evidence 7 and described a
very different version of events:
“At the time of the ramming, apart from speeding and
running two red lights, Harris was driving in a non
6 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly noted: “We reject the
defendants’ argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be
considered sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that
he posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm to motorists and
pedestrians. This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury.” Harris
v. Coweta Cty., 433 F. 3d 807, 815 (CA11 2005).
7 In total, there are four police tapes which captured portions of the
pursuit, all recorded from different officers’ vehicles.

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396 SCOTT v. HARRIS
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aggressive fashion (i. e., without trying to ram or run
into the officers). Moreover, . . . Scott’s path on the
open highway was largely clear. The videos introduced
into evidence show little to no vehicular (or pedestrian)
traffic, allegedly because of the late hour and the police
blockade of the nearby intersections. Finally, Scott is
sued absolutely no warning (e. g., over the loudspeaker
or otherwise) prior to using deadly force.” 433 F. 3d
807, 819, n. 14 (CA11 2005).
If two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about
the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding
that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable
juror could disagree with this Court’s characterization of
events. Moreover, under the standard set forth in Garner,
it is certainly possible that “a jury could conclude that Scott
unreasonably used deadly force to seize Harris by ramming
him off the road under the instant circumstances.” 433
F. 3d, at 821.
The Court today sets forth a per se rule that presumes its
own version of the facts: “A police officer’s attempt to termi
nate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the
lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk
of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 386 (emphasis added).
Not only does that rule fly in the face of the flexible and
case-by-case “reasonableness” approach applied in Garner
and Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), but it is also
arguably inapplicable to the case at hand, given that it is
not clear that this chase threatened the life of any “innocent
bystande[r].” 8 In my view, the risks inherent in justifying
unwarranted police conduct on the basis of unfounded as
8 It is unclear whether, in referring to “innocent bystanders,” the Court
is referring to the motorists driving unfazed in the opposite direction or
to the drivers who pulled over to the side of the road, safely out of re
spondent’s and petitioner’s path.

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sumptions are unacceptable, particularly when less drastic
measures—in this case, the use of stop sticks 9 or a simple
warning issued from a loudspeaker—could have avoided such
a tragic result. In my judgment, jurors in Georgia should
be allowed to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision to
ram respondent’s speeding vehicle in a manner that created
an obvious risk of death and has in fact made him a quadri
plegic at the age of 19.
I respectfully dissent.
9 “Stop sticks” are a device which can be placed across the roadway and
used to flatten a vehicle’s tires slowly to safely terminate a pursuit.